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INTRODUCTION 
Although much ink has been spilled regarding the Federal Circuit’s 
failure to achieve the very purpose for which it was created1—to bring 
uniformity to patent law—the decisions in 2004 may have been the most 
frustrating year yet for practitioners, district court judges, and even the 
Federal Circuit judges themselves.2  Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Mathew F. Weil & William C. Rooklidge, Stare Un-Decisis:  The 
Sometimes Rough Treatment of Precedent in Federal Circuit Decision-Making, 80 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 791 (1998) (stating that the Federal Circuit was created in 
order to foster a uniform application of the patent law to allow research based on “well-
established rules”). 
 2. The only group that may be pleased by the Federal Circuit’s consistent 
inconsistency is academia, which, as canvassed by Judge Rader, has generated a remarkable 
body of work critiquing the Federal Circuit’s opinions.  Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1314-25, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1554-66 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, 
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characterized its own precedent as “inconsistent” and “confusing.”3  
Seeming to realize that the resolution of claim construction disputes is 
highly panel dependent, the Federal Circuit announced that it would 
experiment with disclosing the panel composition the Thursday before the 
week of oral argument.4  The court also decided to review en banc the 
panel decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.5 and requested briefing on seven 
different questions concerning claim construction.  However, given that 
many of these questions were not even implicated in Phillips, together with 
the court’s penchant for balkanized opinions in en banc hearings, Phillips 
does not portend well for the much sought after uniformity in claim 
construction jurisprudence. 
I.  PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 
A.  Appellate Jurisdiction 
In Competitive Technologies, Inc. v. Fujitsu Ltd.,6 defendant included 
several counterclaims in its answer to the plaintiff’s action for patent 
infringement, including state-law claims for breach of confidentiality, 
misappropriation of trade secrets, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, as 
well as unfair competition and “abuse of process.”7  Plaintiff contended 
that these counterclaims should have been dismissed because, among other 
things, they violated its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.8  
Crediting plaintiff’s position, the district court determined that plaintiff was 
an “arm of the state” entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment, but held that plaintiff had waived immunity to defendant’s 
counterclaims because such counterclaims were compelled by the 
underlying patent infringement action.9  The district court reasoned that 
defendant’s counterclaims were based on the same underlying factual 
allegations as its affirmative defenses, including unclean hands which 
“encompasses all of the conduct alleged in support of” the counterclaims at 
                                                          
J., dissenting from denial of en banc hearing); see also Paula K. Davis, Questioning the 
Requirement for Written Description:   Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe and Overly Broad 
Patent Cases, 37 IND. L. REV. 467, 500 (2004) (arguing that lenient enforcement of the 
written description requirement slows the pace of scientific research); Harold C. Wegner, 
The Disclosure Requirements of the 1952 Patent Act:   Looking Back and a New Statute for 
the Next Fifty Years, 37 AKRON L. REV. 243, 244 (2004) (criticizing changes to Section 112 
as “an arcane deviation from the rest of the world”). 
 3. Univ. of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1305, 1307, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546, 1548. 
 4. In 2005, the Federal Circuit ended this experiment. 
 5. 376 F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 6. 374 F.3d 1098, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 7. Id. at 1099, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1360-61. 
 8. Id. at 1100, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361. 
 9. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361. 
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issue.10  The court noted, however, that if it later determined that the 
affirmative defenses were not supported by the evidence or were otherwise 
insufficient as a matter of law, it would “‘revisit the question of [plaintiff’s] 
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.’”11  Plaintiff appealed the 
district court’s decision on the waiver issue to the Federal Circuit. 
As a threshold matter, the Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction 
over the appeal because (1) the judgment below lacked finality,12 and 
(2) the district court did not issue the certificate required by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).13  The Federal Circuit was 
not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argument that the judgment was an 
appealable collateral order that fell within an exception to the final 
judgment rule under Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.14  It 
explained that in deciding Cohen, the Supreme Court created an exception 
to the final judgment rule, “permitting immediate appeals from orders that 
‘fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separate 
from, and collateral to rights asserted in the action, too important to be 
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that 
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’”15  
Looking to later cases clarifying Cohen, however, the Federal Circuit held 
that the appealed judgment did not fall within the excepted class of 
orders.16 
Specifically, the Federal Circuit explained that the appealed judgment 
did not “conclusively determine the disputed question” as required by 
Cohen.17  Because the district court stated that “it may be necessary to 
revisit the question of [plaintiff’s] waiver of Eleventh Amendment 
                                                          
 10. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361. 
 11. Id. at 1100-01, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361-62 (quoting Competitive Techs. v. 
Fujitsu Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1140 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). 
 12. Federal law provides that the federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, excepting the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, shall have appellate jurisdiction from 
“all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). 
 13. Competitive Techs., 374 F.3d at 1101, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362; see also 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000) (permitting the appeal of an interlocutory decision if such order 
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference 
of opinion”); FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b) (allowing courts to enter final judgment as to fewer than 
all claims or parties “upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and 
upon express direction for the entry of judgment.”). 
 14. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 15. Competitive Techs., 374 F.3d at 1102, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362. 
 16. Id. at 1103, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363-64 (citing Swint v. Chambers County 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (declining review of summary judgment where district 
court planned to review its ruling)). 
 17. Later cases clarifying Cohen relied upon by the court explained that “[t]o come 
within the ‘small class’ of decisions excepted from the final judgment rule by Cohen, the 
order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal 
form a final judgment.”  Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978), quoted 
in Competitive Techs., 374 F.3d at 1102, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363. 
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immunity” if it were to determine that the affirmative defenses lacked 
sufficient evidentiary support,18 the Federal Circuit determined that the 
appealed judgment resembled those judgments in which appeals had been 
previously prohibited because they were “tentative, informal or 
incomplete,”19 “subject to revision in the District Court,”20 or “subject to 
future reconsideration by the issuing court.”21  Furthermore, the Federal 
Circuit found that an appeal of the issue of waiver at the present stage 
would have been “particularly inappropriate” because the district court had 
not yet decided the propriety of the affirmative defenses, an issue that was 
“intimately bound up with the merits.”22  The Federal Circuit therefore 
concluded that the appealed judgment was distinguishable from Cohen 
which required collateral orders to be “not of such an interlocutory nature 
as to affect, or to be affected by, decision of the merits of th[e] case.”23 
In TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,24 plaintiff appealed a 
judgment that its patents were invalid and defendant cross-appealed the 
dismissal without prejudice of its claims of noninfringement.25  The Federal 
Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over defendant’s cross-
appeal because the district court held that all asserted claims were invalid.  
In so doing, the Federal Circuit first explained that “[a] party that is not 
affected by a judgment lacks standing to appeal.”26  The Federal Circuit 
then reasoned that “it is only necessary and appropriate to file a cross-
appeal when a party seeks to enlarge its own rights under the judgment or 
to lessen the rights of its adversary under the judgment.”27  Considering 
these rules, it held that “[w]here . . . [a] district court has entered a 
judgment of invalidity as to all of the asserted claims, there is no basis for a 
cross-appeal as to . . . claims of noninfringement,”28 even where the 
                                                          
 18. Competitive Techs., 374 F.3d at 1100-01, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1361-62. 
 19. Id. at 1103, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 42). 
 20. Id. at 1104, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. 
at 469). 
 21. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (quoting In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 
745 F.2d 161, 163-64 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
 22. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364. 
 23. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). 
 24. 374 F.3d 1151, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 25. A single judge initially denied TypeRight’s motion to dismiss by order, but the 
Federal Circuit later considered the issue of its jurisdiction over Microsoft’s cross-appeals in 
its final decision, holding that an order by a single judge does not bind the court.  Id. at 1157 
n.5, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505 n.5. 
 26. Id. at 1156, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504.  The court explicitly found that the same 
rule necessarily applies to cross-appeals.  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504. 
 27. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (quoting Bailey v. Dart Container Corp., 292 
F.3d 1360, 1362, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1319, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 28. Id. at 1157, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504. 
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accused infringer has filed a counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of 
noninfringement.29 
Significantly, for litigants looking to appeal validity issues following a 
finding of noninfringement, the Federal Circuit went on to explain that the 
converse was not true:  “a judgment of noninfringement does not 
necessarily moot validity issues on appeal.”30  The Federal Circuit noted 
that “‘a determination of infringement applies only to a specific accused 
product or process,’ whereas ‘invalidity operates as a complete defense to 
infringement for any product, forever.’”31  Distinguishing defendant’s 
situation from circumstances in which an appellee urges invalidity as a new 
ground to support a judgment of noninfringement, necessitating a cross-
appeal,32 the court found that defendant’s rights under the invalidity 
judgment were actually broader than what they would have been under a 
judgment of noninfringement.  Therefore, the court found that defendant 
had not been adversely affected by the district court’s judgment.33 
In a similar case, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott 
Laboratories,34 the Federal Circuit refused to permit defendant to appeal a 
grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) of 
noninfringement.  Defendant “conditional[ly] cross-appealed” that, in the 
event the court reversed the JMOL, defendant was entitled to a new trial 
because the portion of the jury’s verdict which was not disturbed by the 
JMOL could not be reconciled with the infringement verdict that was 
disturbed.35  The Federal Circuit held that the appeal was improper, 
explaining that “[a] party who prevails on noninfringement has no right to 
file a ‘conditional’ cross-appeal to introduce new argument or challenge a 
claim construction, but may simply assert alternative grounds in the record 
for affirming the judgment.”36 
In Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Tech., Inc.,37 the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 29. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (citing Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark, Inc., 
163 F.3d 1326, 1335, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 30. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (quoting Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993)). 
 31. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 (quoting Weatherchem, 163 F.3d at 1335-36, 49 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009). 
 32. Id. at 1157 n.4, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1504 n.4. 
 33. Because there was no jurisdiction, the court dismissed the cross-appeal and stated 
that it would treat Microsoft’s arguments in support of its cross-appeal “as an alternate 
ground for affirming the district court’s judgment” of invalidity.  Id. at 1157, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1504-05.  Considering Microsoft’s noninfringement arguments as an alternative 
ground for sustaining the lower court’s judgment, however, the court declined to reach the 
infringement question because the issue of noninfringement was not considered by the 
district court.  Id. at 1160, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1507. 
 34. 375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 35. Id. at 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659. 
 36. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 
1216, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1423 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 37. 381 F.3d 1178, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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addressed the issue of whether it was vested with appellate jurisdiction 
when “all of the patent claims in [an] amended complaint were dismissed 
prior to [a] non-patent ruling on appeal.”38  Noting that this question turned 
on whether the dismissal of the patent claims was with or without 
prejudice, the court explained that “[d]ismissals without prejudice are de 
facto amendments to the complaint,” and 
[f]or purposes of determining Federal Circuit jurisdiction, we do not 
differentiate between actual and constructive amendments:   both divest 
of us of jurisdiction if they eliminate all issues of patent law . . . . 
Dismissals with prejudice are adjudications on the merits and not 
constructive amendments to the complaint . . . . In all such cases, we 
retain jurisdiction to hear all appeals on all issues.39 
The Federal Circuit then reasoned that: 
Taken together, whenever the complaint included a patent claim and the 
trial court’s rulings altered the legal status of the parties with respect to 
that patent claim, we retain appellate jurisdiction over all pendent claims 
in the complaint.  In other words, if all patent claims raised in the 
amended complaint were dismissed without prejudice, the dismissal 
would divest us of jurisdiction; dismissals with prejudice would not . . . . 
Dismissals divest this court of jurisdiction only if “[t]he parties were left 
in the same legal position with respect to [all] patent claims as if they 
had never been filed.  [T]he dismissal of a claim with prejudice 
operate[s] as an adjudication of that claim on the merits,” and preserves 
our jurisdiction.40 
The Federal Circuit thus concluded that despite the district court’s 
semantic characterization of a dismissal of a patent claim “as ‘without 
prejudice’ subject to a condition subsequent that can no longer occur,”41 
and dismissal of other patent claims as “‘without prejudice’ except in a 
single forum,”42 the court possessed appellate jurisdiction given that the 
effect of the district court’s dismissals did not constitute “‘dismissal 
without prejudice’ because they alter the legal status of the parties vis-à-vis 
all of [plaintiff’s] asserted patent claims.  [The parties] were not ‘left in the 
same legal position with respect to the patent claims as if they had never 
been filed.’”43 
                                                          
 38. Id. at 1189, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
 39. Id. at 1189-90, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232. 
 40. Id. at 1190, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233 (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted). 
 41. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 42. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233. 
 43. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233 (quoting Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., 203 F.3d 782, 
785, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765, 1767 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
2005] PATENT SUMMARY 949 
B. Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction and Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.44 presented an appeal from a declaratory 
judgment action in which the jury returned verdicts of noninfringement and 
invalidity.45  Rather than addressing the merits of the appeal, the Federal 
Circuit held that neither it nor the district court possessed jurisdiction to 
hear the case.46  The trial record demonstrated that prior to commencement 
of the litigation, the defendant granted plaintiff a non-exclusive license to 
its patents in return for an upfront payment and an ongoing royalty.47  On 
December 21, 1999, plaintiff sent defendant a letter indicating that it was 
exercising its license option relating to third-party uses of the licensed 
patents and stating its “intent to maintain the status quo [of the license 
agreement] by continuing to pay royalties throughout the litigation.”48  The 
next day, plaintiff filed its declaratory judgment action, alleging that its 
products did not infringe on any of the licensed patents and that such 
patents were invalid.49 
Despite a full trial in the district court, the Federal Circuit began by 
observing that “[a]ny party or this court sua sponte may raise the question 
of subject matter jurisdiction.”50  Addressing its own jurisdiction in 
declaratory judgment actions the Federal Circuit noted that “the long 
established rule of law is that a declaratory judgment plaintiff must 
establish an actual controversy on the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”51  
Turning to the facts before it, the Federal Circuit determined that its 
decision in C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz52 was analogous.53  Recognizing 
that while the C.R. Bard decision provided that “a patent license need not 
be terminated before a patent licensee may bring a declaratory judgment 
action,”54 the court explained that C.R. Bard also involved “two critical 
circumstances” that vested the court with jurisdiction.55  First, the licensee 
“had ceased payment of royalties under the agreement to licensor and 
patentee.”56  The Federal Circuit further noted that the licensee’s cessation 
                                                          
 44. 359 F.3d 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 45. Id. at 1377, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087. 
 46. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087. 
 47. Id. at 1378, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088. 
 48. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089. 
 49. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088. 
 50. Id. at 1379, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089. 
 51. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089 (quoting Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 
940 F.2d 631, 634, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 52. 716 F.2d 874, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 53. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1380, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 54. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (quoting C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 875, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 198). 
 55. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 56. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (quoting C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 880-81, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 203). 
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of royalty payment constituted “a material breach of the agreement 
that . . . enabled [the licensor] to terminate the agreement.”57  The Federal 
Circuit explained that the material breach granted the licensor “the power 
to file an infringement lawsuit against Bard at any time.”58  Contrasting 
C.R. Bard to the circumstances on appeal, the Federal Circuit explained 
that plaintiff: 
[D]id not cease paying royalties and materially breach its license 
agreement with [defendant]; [defendant] did not file a breach of contract 
action.  In fact, [plaintiff] was a licensee in good standing that continued 
paying royalties throughout the declaratory judgment lawsuit.  In fact, 
[plaintiff] expressly acknowledged its desire to maintain the status quo 
and remain a faithful licensee.59 
The Federal Circuit also placed significant weight on plaintiff’s decision 
to “exercise[] options to extend the duration of the license for its alliances 
with [third parties] contemporaneously with its filing of the declaratory 
judgment lawsuit.  Far from breaching its license agreement, [plaintiff] 
affirmatively confirmed its desire to remain in good standing.”60  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that no controversy existed sufficient 
to confer jurisdiction.61 
Addressing the district court’s reliance on oral notifications and letters 
between plaintiff and defendant regarding possible infringement, the court 
explained that such communications occurred before the parties entered 
into the license agreement,62 and concluded that the license “insulated 
[plaintiff] from an infringement suit instituted by [defendant]” and “unless 
materially breached, obliterated any reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit 
based on prior circumstances cited by the district court.”63 
The Federal Circuit also discussed the district court’s reliance on Lear v. 
Adkins,64 in which the Supreme Court held that a licensee can challenge the 
validity of a patent.65  The Federal Circuit distinguished Lear by reasoning 
that it “does not grant every licensee in every circumstance the right to 
challenge the validity of the licensed patent.”66  Then citing its holding in 
                                                          
 57. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (quoting C.R. Bard, 716 F.2d at 880-81, 219 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 203). 
 58. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 59. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 60. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 61. Id. at 1382, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 62. Id. at 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090. 
 63. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091. 
 64. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
 65. Id. at 656, 671 (rejecting precedent of estopping licensees from attacking the 
validity of licensors’ patents in light of the “strong federal policy favoring free competition 
in ideas which do not merit patent protection.”). 
 66. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091. 
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Studiengesellschaft Kohle M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co.,67 which provided that “a 
licensee . . . cannot invoke the protection of the Lear doctrine until it (i) 
actually ceases payment of royalties, and (ii) provides notice to the licensor 
that the reason for ceasing payment of royalties is because it has deemed 
the relevant claims to be invalid,”68 the court held that, at minimum, a 
licensee must stop paying royalties before bringing suit to challenge the 
licensed patent.69 
In Sierra Applied Sciences, Inc. v. Advanced Energy Industries, Inc.,70 
the Federal Circuit again addressed whether plaintiff had properly 
established a “case or controversy” for seeking a declaratory relief of 
invalidity and noninfringement.71  The Federal Circuit began by articulating 
its two-pronged inquiry for determining whether a case or controversy 
exists in the context of “patent-based declaratory judgment suits,”72 stating 
that: 
There must both be (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee, 
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory 
plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity 
which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with the 
intent to conduct such activity.73 
The Federal Circuit explained that the first prong “looks to the patent 
holder’s conduct,”74 while the second prong “looks to the potential 
infringer’s conduct.”75  The Federal Circuit further noted that the potential 
infringer bears the burden of establishing that “jurisdiction over its 
declaratory judgment action existed at, and has continued since, the time 
the complaint was filed.”76 
Given that plaintiff sought declaratory judgment of noninfringement for 
three separate product categories,77 the Federal Circuit explained that when 
a potential infringer seeks to “ground jurisdiction on activities involving 
distinct, technologically different products, the court must carefully 
calibrate its analysis to each of the products.  To do otherwise would risk 
issuing an advisory opinion on one product—or on a method using that 
                                                          
 67. 112 F.3d 1561, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 68. Id. at 1568, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
 69. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091. 
 70. 363 F.3d 1361, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 71. Id. at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578. 
 72. Id. at 1373, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585. 
 73. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1585-86 (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide 
Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 74. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586. 
 75. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586. 
 76. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586 (quoting Int’l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., 
Inc. v. Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc., 787 F.2d 572, 575, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 278, 281 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986)). 
 77. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586. 
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product—based on an actual controversy involving another product.”78   
Turning to the first prong, the Federal Circuit noted that the question of 
whether a patentee’s conduct “created a reasonable apprehension on the 
part of the declaratory plaintiff ‘is an objective one.’”79  The Federal 
Circuit held that patentee’s letter stating that it “intended to aggressively 
protect its [patent] rights” and that “other patents [that] are pending and are 
expected to issue which will further cover our client’s technology,” was 
sufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension.80  While noting that such 
apprehension waned over a period of time in which the parties did not 
correspond regarding the disputed products and patents, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the reasonable apprehension re-emerged in view of a 
subsequent letter from the patentee stating that if plaintiff “continue[s] to 
make, use, or sell infringing products . . . [it] seems likely to be considered 
intentional patent infringement.”81 
Concerning the second prong’s requirement of “present activity,” the 
Federal Circuit explained that “later events may not create jurisdiction 
where none existed at the time of filing.”82  The Federal Circuit then held 
that although plaintiff’s damages exposure was minimal with respect to the 
first product category, the court possessed jurisdiction because the “Patent 
Act does not set a damages threshold for bringing suit, and thus a patent 
case or controversy can exist even where the conduct at issue would result 
in only de minimis damages.”83  With respect to the second product 
category that plaintiff never made and no longer intended to manufacture, 
the Federal Circuit determined that it lacked jurisdiction because “[o]nce a 
development effort has been wholly abandoned, it can no longer be the 
basis for an ‘intent to engage’ case or controversy.”84 
Looking to the third product category, the court began by clarifying the 
legal standard for determining whether a declaratory plaintiff has taken 
“concrete steps” with intent to infringe.85  The Federal Circuit explained 
that “Article III requires a dispute ‘of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’”86  As to immediacy, the 
Federal Circuit stressed “the importance of the period of time between the 
                                                          
 78. Id. at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586. 
 79. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1586 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 
885, 888, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1627, 1629 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 80. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587. 
 81. Id. at 1374-75, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1587. 
 82. Id. at 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588 (quoting GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v. 
Elk Corp., 90 F.3d 479, 483, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1463, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 83. Id. at 1377, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1588. 
 84. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589. 
 85. Id. at 1378, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589. 
 86. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 
312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)). 
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date on which the complaint was filed and the date on which potentially 
infringing activities will begin.  The greater the length of this interim 
period, the more likely the case lacks the requisite immediacy.”87  As to 
reality, the Federal Circuit explained that: 
The greater the variability of subject of a declaratory judgment suit, 
particularly as to its potentially infringing features, the greater the chance 
that the court’s judgment will be purely advisory, detached from the 
eventual, actual content of that subject—in short detached from eventual 
reality.88 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
third product category because on the date the complaint was filed “it was 
impossible to determine—on that date—whether any eventual design of the 
[product] would infringe [defendant’s] patents.”89 
In Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Medical Products,90 plaintiff appealed an order 
dismissing its declaratory judgment action against defendant.91  Plaintiff 
was defendant’s long-time customer in the “wear-over” sunglass market.  
The parties’ dispute commenced when the defendant’s president informed 
plaintiff that he had seen plaintiff’s intent-to-use trademark application for 
wear-over sunglasses and that although defendant preferred to avoid legal 
disputes with good customers, it had a large patent portfolio covering wear-
over sunglasses that it vigorously enforced against infringers.92  Plaintiff 
responded by stating that it had already obtained a detailed opinion of 
counsel indicating that its products did not infringe defendant’s patents.93  
Later the following month, defendant placed several calls to plaintiff 
stating that defendant had thirteen patents and would soon have forty 
patents covering all of the basic wear-over sunglass frame shapes, and that 
plaintiff was “charging down a path [towards infringement] that [was] 
going to end up into a multi-million dollar lawsuit.”94 
Plaintiff responded by filing the declaratory judgment action.95  Rather 
than counterclaim infringement, however, defendant moved to dismiss the 
action on the basis that plaintiff could not have threatened suit for 
infringement because it had never seen plaintiff’s products, nor had it 
analyzed the products for possible infringement.96  The district court agreed 
with the plaintiff, holding that an actual controversy existed but declining 
                                                          
 87. Id. at 1378-79, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590. 
 88. Id. at 1379, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590. 
 89. Id. at 1380, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591. 
 90. 387 F.3d 1352, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 91. Id. at 1353, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052. 
 92. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052. 
 93. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052. 
 94. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052. 
 95. Id. at 1354, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052. 
 96. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052. 
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to exercise jurisdiction “in its considerable discretion under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act” because defendant had neither filed the compulsory 
counterclaim of infringement nor seen plaintiff’s product.97 
Reversing on appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that although a 
district court has “appropriate discretion” to decline a declaratory judgment 
action, this discretion is to be exercised “in accordance with the purposes of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act and the principles of sound judicial 
administration.”98  In the absence of “well-founded” reasons for declining 
to entertain a declaratory action, the Federal Circuit stated that an accused 
infringer’s declaratory action should be permitted “when there has been a 
direct charge of infringement by the patentee, and an actual controversy 
exists due to ongoing activity that has been accused of infringement.”99  In 
plaintiff’s case, the Federal Circuit found no good reason for dismissal, as 
defendant’s threats created an apprehension of suit, and the apprehension 
was reasonable because defendant was aware that plaintiff had entered into 
the marketplace of wear-over sunglasses.100  The Federal Circuit also 
observed that the fact that defendant had not seen plaintiff’s products was 
irrelevant to whether defendant’s threats instilled a reasonable 
apprehension of suit.101  The Federal Circuit thus explained that it would 
impose no duty on the accused to ascertain whether the patentee had 
conducted a reasonable investigation prior to making its threats.  Finally, 
the Federal Circuit dismissed the district court’s finding that the case was 
not ripe because defendant had other patent applications pending that it felt 
more closely covered the accused products, opining that “the possibility of 
future patents is irrelevant to present rights and liability.”102 
In Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Chiron Corp.,103 the Federal 
Circuit addressed the question of whether its own law or a regional circuit’s 
law applied when determining whether an injunction precluding a party 
from pursuing parallel actions in different district courts is appealable 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).104  While observing that the language of 
                                                          
 97. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 98. Id. at 1355, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053. 
 99. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 100. Id. at 1356, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 101. The court noted that this fact may be relevant to whether the accuser acted 
“responsibly,” however.  Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054. 
 102. Id. at 1357, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.  Dioptics argued that Capo filed its 
declaratory judgment action solely as a pretext for obtaining access to Dioptics’s pending 
patent applications.  The court agreed with Capo that it was Dioptics who injected its 
applications into controversy, but opined that it would be a valid exercise of judicial 
discretion to limit discovery of these pending applications in order to prevent prejudice to 
Dioptics.  Id. at 1357, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
 103. 384 F.3d 1326, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1745 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 104. Id. at 1327-28, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.  Section 1292(a)(1) provides that the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals have jurisdiction from:  “Interlocutory orders of the district courts 
of the United States . . . or of the judges thereof, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing 
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§ 1292(a)(1) “appears to be both unambiguous and compelling,”105 the 
Federal Circuit noted that “there is a circuit split concerning whether 
injunctions enjoining co-pending actions in other courts are appealable 
under [that section].”106  The circuit split was particularly important in the 
pending case because Federal Circuit law provided that such injunctions 
were appealable under § 1292(a)(1) whereas the Third Circuit had held the 
opposite.107 
The Federal Circuit explained that it applies its own law rather than a 
regional circuit’s law governing a procedural issue that does not itself 
involve substantive patent law when the issue:  (1) “pertains to patent law,” 
(2) “bears an essential relationship to matters committed to our exclusive 
control by statute,” or (3) “clearly implicates the jurisprudential 
responsibilities of this court in a field within its exclusive jurisdiction.”108  
The court then analogized the pending case to its earlier decision in 
Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,109 in which a party filed a declaratory 
judgment in the Southern District of Indiana and the patentee filed an 
action the next day in the Northern District of California.110  In Genentech, 
the court explained: 
The question of whether a properly brought declaratory action to 
determine patent rights should yield to a later-filed suit for patent 
infringement raises the issue of national uniformity in patent cases, and 
invokes the special obligation of the Federal Circuit to avoid creating 
opportunities for dispositive differences among the regional circuits.  
Thus, although the Federal Circuit applies the procedural law of the 
regional circuit in matters that are not unique to patent law, . . . and 
although matters of procedure do not always carry substantive weight, 
the regional circuit practice need not control when the question is 
important to national uniformity in patent practice.111 
                                                          
or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a 
direct review may be had in the Supreme Court[.]”   28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2000). 
 105. 384 F.3d at 1328, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. 
 106. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.  Compare FDIC v. Geldermann, Inc., 975 F.2d 
695, 697 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding such injunctions appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1)), Phillips v. Charles Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting 
that § 1292(a)(1) authorizes an interlocutory appeal), and Klein v. Adams & Peck, 436 F.2d 
337, 339 (2d Cir. 1971) (permitting an appeal where an order denies the application for the 
posting of security), with Hershey Foods Corp. v. Hershey Creamery Co., 945 F.2d 1272, 
1278-79 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding same injunctions to affect only venue, not substantive law 
at issue, and thus to be not appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)). 
 107. Lab. Corp., 384 F.3d at 1328, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 (noting that case arose 
from a decision of the Delaware district court, which resides in the Third Circuit). 
 108. Id. at 1330, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (quoting Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan 
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 109. 998 F.2d 931, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 110. Lab. Corp., 384 F.3d at 1330, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (citing Genentech, 998 
F.2d at 935, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242). 
 111. Genentech, 998 F.3d at 937, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244 (citation omitted). 
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Relying on the holding and rationale in Genentech, the Federal Circuit 
held that “injunctions arbitrating between co-pending patent declaratory 
judgment and infringement cases in different district courts are reviewed 
under the law of the Federal Circuit.”112 
In reaching this holding the Federal Circuit addressed its decision in Katz 
v. Lear Siegler, Inc.,113 in which the court stated that it would “[apply] the 
law of the First Circuit”114 to review an order issued by the District of 
Massachusetts enjoining a patentee from prosecuting other pending actions 
in the Western District of New York.115  The Federal Circuit explained that 
the statement in Katz regarding application of First Circuit law “was not 
accompanied by an analysis or discussion of the policy issues relevant to 
the choice of law where there are material differences in Federal Circuit 
and regional circuit precedent.”116  The Federal Circuit thus determined that 
“the reference to First Circuit law in Katz . . . should not be read to 
foreclose consideration of the important policy factors dictating the choice 
of law in cases in which the regional circuit applies a different standard 
than the Federal Circuit.”117 
In Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of America 
Holdings,118 the Federal Circuit held that the district court had no 
jurisdiction to consider defendant’s claims that one of plaintiff’s patent 
claims was invalid where the parties did not dispute that defendant 
continued to pay royalties on a license in effect on tests defendant 
performed that it alleged were covered by that claim.  The Federal Circuit 
likened the situation to the scenario in which a patentee seeks a declaratory 
judgment against a future infringer and determined that there was no real 
case or controversy regarding the defendant test alleged to infringe that 
claim.  The Federal Circuit explained that the license is essentially a 
licensor’s covenant not to sue the licensee.119 
In turn, this court has held that a covenant not to sue deprives a court of 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Accordingly, a licensor who has 
implicitly covenanted not to sue a licensee by virtue of the license 
agreement itself cannot seek a declaratory judgment of infringement.  
Moreover, in light of [defendant’s] continuing royalty payments on the 
panel test, LabCorp cannot itself challenge the validity of a claim for 
                                                          
 112. Lab. Corp., 384 F.3d at 1331, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749. 
 113. 909 F.2d 1459, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 114. Lab. Corp., 384 F.3d at 1329, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (quoting Katz, 909 
F.2d at 1462, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557). 
 115. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (citing Katz, 909 F.2d at 1462-64, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1557-58). 
 116. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748. 
 117. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748. 
 118. 370 F.3d 1354, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 119. Id. at 1369, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
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which it continues to pay royalties.120 
C.  Standing 
In Fieldturf, Inc. v. Southwest Recreational Industries, Inc.,121 the 
Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether an exclusive licensee has 
standing to sue for infringement.  Plaintiff filed suit for infringement of a 
patent related to artificial athletic field surfaces and the district court 
dismissed the case with prejudice for lack of standing.122  The record 
revealed that plaintiff acquired its rights to the asserted patent through a 
variety of transactions, including two license agreements to which its 
predecessor-in-interest was a party.  The first agreement gave the 
predecessor-in-interest the exclusive right to manufacture and market 
commercial embodiments of the patent, but reserved to the licensors the 
right of first refusal to enforce the patent, as well as a “limited right” to 
develop, display commercially, and market to potential costumers.123  In the 
second transaction, the same parties essentially agreed that the predecessor-
in-interest would continue to be the exclusive licensee, and that the second 
agreement would “cancel and replace” the first.124 
Plaintiff argued that it had standing to sue as an exclusive licensee of the 
patent on the licenses to which its predecessor was a party.  The Federal 
Circuit, however, determined that two factors deprived plaintiff of 
standing.  First, the Federal Circuit noted that the second agreement entered 
into by the predecessor-in-interest was “no more than a bare license,” 
despite the fact that it named the predecessor-in-interest as the exclusive 
licensee because it was silent with regard to who had “the right to enforce 
the patent.”125  Second, the Federal Circuit observed that the predecessor-
in-interest failed to acquire “all substantial rights” to the patent required for 
standing because the second agreement was silent with respect to the 
licensor’s retention of a limited right to develop and market the potential 
invention.126  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that plaintiff’s claim for patent 
infringement must be dismissed and remanded for a determination of 
                                                          
 120. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092 (citations omitted). 
 121. 357 F.3d 1266, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1795 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 122. Id. at 1267, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796.  The Federal Circuit reviewed the issue 
of Fieldturf’s standing to sue for infringement on appeal de novo, despite the fact that 
Southwest had already raised the issue in a preliminary motion to dismiss that was 
subsequently denied, citing the rule that “[a] motion to dismiss denied by the order of a 
single judge . . . does not become the law of the case.”  Id. at 1268, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1797; see also supra text accompanying notes 34-36 (discussing similar holding in Novartis 
Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)). 
 123. Fieldturf, 357 F.3d at 1267, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796. 
 124. Id. at 1267-68, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1796. 
 125. Id. at 1269, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797. 
 126. Id. at 1269, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. 
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whether plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed with prejudice.  In particular, 
the Federal Circuit opined that joinder of certain parties, such as the 
predecessor-in-interest’s licensor, might be required to complete plaintiff’s 
standing.  It further noted that plaintiff failed to produce any documentation 
evidencing the transfer of interests in the patent from the patent’s original 
owner to the predecessor-in-interest’s licensor.  Even though plaintiff had 
argued that the licensor was a “successor in form” and was controlled by 
the same partner as the original patent owner, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the argument was unhelpful in identifying the actual successor.127 
D.  Collateral Estoppel 
In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,128 plaintiff 
sued defendant for infringement of two of its patents (the “‘625 patent” and 
the “‘840 patent”), both directed to compositions of cyclosporine, a 
compound used to prevent organ rejection in transplant patients.129  Two 
claims were at issue, one from each patent.  The ‘625 patent required a 
“lipophilic phase component,” the ‘840 patent required a “lipophilic 
component,” and both patents required a “surfactant.”130  The parties 
agreed that “lipophilic component” and “lipophilic phase component,” as 
used in the two patents, bore the same meaning.131 
The jury returned a verdict that defendant did not infringe the ‘625 
patent, but did infringe the ‘840 patent.132  Following the verdict, the 
district court granted defendant’s JMOL with respect to the ‘840 patent, 
finding that defendant’s accused composition did not have a “lipophilic 
component” as required by the asserted claim of that patent, either literally 
or under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Defendant asserted that plaintiff was barred from challenging the court’s 
JMOL of noninfringement of the ‘840 patent because it had failed to 
explicitly challenge the verdict on the ‘625 patent, and therefore any legal 
determinations or factual findings necessary to that verdict were given 
preclusive effect.133  Plaintiff, in turn, argued that it had preserved its right 
to appeal the jury verdict on the ‘625 patent, and that collateral estoppel 
therefore did not bar its challenge to the JMOL on the ‘840 patent.134  
Referencing its discussion on the construction of the term “surfactant,” 
plaintiff first asserted that the term was relevant only to the ‘625 patent.  
                                                          
 127. Id. at 1270, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. 
 128. 375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 129. Id. at 1330, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 130. Id. at 1330-31, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 131. Id. at 1331, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 132. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 133. Id. at 1332, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 134. Id. at 1332-33, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
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Plaintiff then asked the Federal Circuit to remand for further proceedings if 
it reversed the district court’s claim construction but did not reinstate the 
jury infringement verdict on the ‘840 patent.  Finally, defendant admitted 
that plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal might have been broad enough to cover 
the ‘625 patent verdict.  The Federal Circuit found none of these actions 
sufficient to preserve plaintiff’s right to appeal the ‘625 patent jury verdict 
and instead held that plaintiff waived that right because, “from the 
beginning,” it had maintained that it was appealing the entry of the JMOL 
of noninfringement.135 
Regardless of the fact that plaintiff had waived its right to appeal the 
‘625 jury verdict, the Federal Circuit found that plaintiff was not 
collaterally estopped to challenge the ‘840 patent verdict.136  Defendant had 
argued that, because the parties agreed that the terms “lipophilic 
component” and “surfactant” were common to the ‘625 and ‘840 patents, 
plaintiff’s failure to challenge the construction of these terms in the ‘625 
patent estopped it from challenging their construction in the ‘840 patent.  
Applying Third Circuit law, the Federal Circuit disagreed because the jury 
had not been requested to specify on its verdict form, the limitations in the 
claim of the ‘625 patent that it found Abbott’s product did not contain, and 
because no record evidence explained the jury’s rationale for its verdict.137  
Thus, the court explained, it could not conclude that the court’s 
construction of “lipophilic phase component” proved necessary to the 
jury’s noninfringement decision on the ‘625 patent, and Novartis was not 
collaterally estopped from challenging the claim construction and the 
JMOL with respect to the ‘840 patent.138 
Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V.139 involved an appeal from a 
grant of summary judgment “giving collateral estoppel effect to a decision 
in an earlier case between the predecessors of the parties in this case.”140  
                                                          
 135. Id. at 1333, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654-55.  The court contrasted Novartis’ case 
from that of Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 
(Fed. Cir. 2003), in which the court “consented to construe terms that did not form a part of 
the appealed summary judgment because they ‘may be relevant to the remand determination 
of infringement’ and because they were found to be construed erroneously.”  Novartis, 375 
F.3d at 1333, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (quoting Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1366, 65 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866). 
 136. Novartis, 375 F.3d at 1334, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 137. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.  The Federal Circuit applied the law of the 
regional circuit—here, the Third Circuit—to the issue of collateral estoppel.  Id. at 1333, 71 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.  Under the Third Circuit law, the party seeking collateral 
estoppel bears the burden of showing:  “(1) the previous determination was necessary to the 
decision; (2) the identical issue was previously litigated; (3) the issue was actually decided 
in a decision that was final, valid, and on the merits; and (4) the party being precluded from 
relitigating the issue was adequately represented in the previous action.”  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1654 (quoting Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 461, 475 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 138. Id. at 1334, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 139. 363 F.3d 1235, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 140. Id. at 1242, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (citation omitted). 
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Specifically, the district court ruled that the Federal Circuit’s prior decision 
in Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp.,141 in which the 
court held that claims in a related patent were invalid for lack of 
enablement, compelled a holding that the asserted claims in the first 
disputed patent were not enabled and that the asserted claims in a second 
disputed patent were not infringed.142 
With respect to enablement, the Federal Circuit noted that to determine 
whether the claimed “transformation of monocots through the use of 
Agrobacterium” is enabled it is necessary to consult the specification of the 
disputed patents,143 “which differ significantly from the specification of the 
patent at issue in the Plant Genetic Systems case.”144  The Federal Circuit 
thus vacated the grant of summary judgment based collateral estoppel, 
explaining that although the parties in Plant Genetic Sys. fully litigated 
the issue of whether one of ordinary skill in the art in 1986 would be able 
to transform a monocot using Agrobacterium . . . collateral estoppel may 
bear on the enablement issue, but only if the district court concludes that 
the specifications of the [disputed] patents themselves do not teach the 
transformation of monocots.145 
With regard to infringement, the Federal Circuit also reversed the grant 
of summary judgment because the district court improperly “[applied] the 
claim construction in the Plant Genetic Systems case without examining the 
intrinsic evidence specific to the [disputed] patent.”146  The court explained 
that: 
It is not enough for the court simply to rely on the conclusion of the 
court in Plant Genetic Systems that the prosecution history of the patent 
in that case and the corresponding extrinsic evidence support a narrow 
construction . . . because similar terms can have different meanings in 
different patents depending on the specifics of each patent.147 
The Federal Circuit thus held that defendant “should not now be 
precluded from arguing that the same claim term appearing in the claims of 
the [disputed] patent has a different meaning.”148 
                                                          
 141. 315 F.3d 1335, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 142. Monsanto, 363 F.3d at 1242, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262-63. 
 143. Id. at 1243, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. 
 144. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. 
 145. Id. at 1243-44, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 146. Id. at 1245, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265. 
 147. Id. at 1244, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
 148. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264. 
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E.  Trial Procedures 
1.  Jury instructions 
In Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V.,149 plaintiff sued its competitor for 
infringement of two patents related to a method of weaving fabrics and 
operating a weaving machine.  At trial, the jury returned a verdict of 
noninfringement and the district court denied plaintiff’s motion for a new 
trial.  On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erroneously 
instructed the jury that plaintiff carried the burden of establishing that 
defendants “manufactured” its weaving machines using a process that 
included all steps of the asserted claims, where the asserted claims only 
covered a method of operating weaving machines rather than the 
manufacture of such machines.  Plaintiff contended that the error was 
prejudicial given the jury confusion that arose from the instruction coupled 
with plaintiff’s failure to present any evidence showing defendant’s 
manufacture of the accused machine.150  The Federal Circuit rejected 
plaintiff’s argument, holding that to the extent that any error existed, it was 
harmless.  The Federal Circuit explained that the remainder of the jury 
instruction, besides the one statement questioned by plaintiff, properly 
addressed the method of operation of defendant’s machine.151  The Federal 
Circuit further noted that the fact that the parties had put forth evidence 
relating solely to defendant’s operation of the machine supported its 
decision. 
Plaintiff also asserted prejudicial error in the district court’s failure to 
include any instruction with regard to its earlier claim construction of 
disputed terms.152  While the district court construed the claim terms prior 
to the close of evidence, it had not provided its final constructions in the 
jury instructions.  Plaintiff argued that the district court’s omission left the 
jury to construe the claim terms any way it wanted.  The Federal Circuit 
agreed on this point, explaining that because the meaning of claim terms 
are legal issues central to most patent cases, a district court is obligated to 
instruct the jury adequately to ensure that it “fully understands the court’s 
claim construction rulings and what the patentee covered by the claims.”153  
The Federal Circuit further stated that a district court must ensure that the 
jury understands it is not free to diverge from the predetermined 
constructions. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit held that plaintiff failed to establish 
                                                          
 149. 358 F.3d 1356, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 150. Id. at 1364, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966-67. 
 151. Id. at 1365, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967. 
 152. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967-68. 
 153. Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968. 
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that it had been prejudiced by the district court’s error.  Plaintiff attempted 
to show prejudice by pointing to the testimony of its own expert witness, 
who arguably had suggested a construction of a claim term that was 
contrary to the construction finalized by the district court.154  Plaintiff also 
relied on its own presentation of a demonstrative exhibit indicating a 
contradictory construction shown to the jury during the cross-examination 
of defendant’s witness.  The Federal Circuit determined that plaintiff’s 
evidence of prejudice largely originated from its own witnesses’ testimony 
or from its own actions.  Accordingly, based on its determinations that any 
alleged confusion by jury was “invited” by plaintiff and that the other 
testimony at trial adequately reflected the district court’s constructions, the 
court held that the district court’s failure to restrict the jury to the claim 
constructions in its instruction did not prejudice plaintiff.155 
In Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.,156 plaintiff argued that it was entitled 
to a new trial based on erroneous jury instructions issued by the district 
court.157  The Federal Circuit explained that it “reviews jury instructions in 
their entirety and ‘only orders a new trial when errors in the instructions as 
a whole clearly misled the jury.’”158  The Federal Circuit also explained 
that a party seeking a new trial “must show both fatal flaws in the jury 
instruction and a request for alternative instructions which could have 
corrected the flaws.”159  The court then rejected plaintiff’s argument that 
the district court erred by providing an instruction on the burden of proof 
necessary to invalidate a patent but failing to instruct the jury regarding a 
patent’s presumption of validity.160  The Federal Circuit explained that the 
“presumption of validity and heightened burden of proving invalidity ‘are 
static and in reality different expressions of the same thing—a single hurdle 
to be cleared.’”161  The Federal Circuit therefore concluded that the 
instructions were proper because the jury applied the “correct ‘clear and 
convincing evidence’ standard.”162 
Plaintiff also sought a new trial arguing that the district court erroneously 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969. 
 155. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969. 
 156. 363 F.3d 1247, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 157. Id. at 1258, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 158. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. 
Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 415, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1447, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 159. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Delta-X, 984 F.2d at 415, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1451). 
 160. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 161. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & 
Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1360, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 763, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).  The court also 
explained that “the presumption is one of law, not fact, and does not constitute ‘evidence’ to 
be weighed against the challenger’s evidence.”  Id. at 1258-59, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1329 (quoting Avia Group Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562, 7 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1548, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 162. Id. at 1259, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
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instructed the jury regarding the standard for complying with the written 
description requirement.163  The Federal Circuit, however, found no error 
with the instructions, explaining that courts “need not use identical 
language to this court’s opinions in its instructions.”164 
In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,165 plaintiff sought a new trial on the 
issue of obviousness, arguing that “its case was prejudiced because the jury 
was allowed to hear evidence of [plaintiff’s] admitted misstatements to the 
examiner concerning the teachings of [a prior art] reference.”166  At trial, 
plaintiff’s counsel admitted that, in preparation for trial, he had discovered 
that he made a “factual misstatement as to the [prior art reference’s] 
teaching” during prosecution of the asserted patent.167  While the district 
court granted summary judgment that plaintiff did not commit inequitable 
conduct despite the admitted misstatement, the court allowed the jury to 
consider evidence of the misstatement in determining validity, particularly 
in “consider[ing] the proceedings before the examiner and the extent to 
which and the manner in which the prior art was considered by or before 
the examiner.”168 
Citing to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Magnivision, Inc. v. Bonneau 
Co.,169 plaintiff argued that without sufficient evidence to establish the 
factual predicates of inequitable conduct, evidence concerning an 
examiner’s state of mind should not be admitted at trial as unduly 
prejudicial.170  The court accepted plaintiff’s argument, explaining that “the 
presumption of validity is not subject to being diluted by ‘procedural 
lapses’ during prosecution.”171  The Federal Circuit further reasoned that: 
[T]he presence and “strength” of the presumption of validity does not 
warrant inquiry into the examiner’s understanding or competence or 
gullibility . . . . Introspection and speculation into the examiner’s 
understanding of the prior art or the completeness or correctness of the 
examination process is not part of the objective review of 
patentability.172 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court “erred 
in instructing the jury that the presumption of validity varied with the jury’s 
                                                          
 163. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 164. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330. 
 165. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 166. Id. at 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513. 
 167. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514 (quoting Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 252 F. 
Supp. 2d 945, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2002)). 
 168. Id. (quoting Norian, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 960). 
 169. 115 F.3d 956, 960, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1925, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that 
“[p]rocedural lapses during examination, should they occur, do not provide grounds for 
invalidity.”). 
 170. Norian, 363 F.3d at 1329, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
 171. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
 172. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514 (citations omitted). 
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view of whether the examiner believed the applicant’s misstatements or 
otherwise did not ‘properly focus on the prior art.’”173  However, in light of 
plaintiff’s failure to object to this instruction at trial, the court denied the 
motion for a new trial because it was “not persuaded that the error was 
prejudicial or the trial unfair.”174 
2.  Jury composition 
In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Sturman Industries, Inc.,175 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision to empanel a juror whose spouse was 
an employee of the plaintiff.176  During the jury selection stage of trial, 
defendant moved to dismiss for cause any current or former employees of 
plaintiff and their spouses.177  The district court refused to grant 
defendant’s blanket objection, but instructed defendant that it would 
consider individual motions for cause.178  When defendant addressed each 
juror specifically, it “argued beyond the parameters of the initial blanket 
objection,” focusing on potential jurors’ additional connections to 
plaintiff.179  While defendant was making these challenges, however, 
plaintiff repeatedly objected that defendant was merely rearguing its 
previous blanket objection.180 
During this process, the district court focused on whether each potential 
juror or his spouse held a management or union-contract position with 
plaintiff.181  It ultimately dismissed one juror whose husband was in 
management with plaintiff, but refused to dismiss jurors who were 
connected to plaintiff’s union-contract employees.182  Defendant neither 
specifically objected to nor used a peremptory challenge against Juror No. 
3, whose husband was an employee of plaintiff.183  Juror No. 3 ultimately 
sat on the jury.184  After receiving an unfavorable verdict at trial, defendant 
appealed the district court’s decision to empanel Juror No. 3.185 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis of defendant’s appeal by settling 
on a de novo standard of review.  It reasoned that whether Juror No. 3 had 
a financial interest in the case or implicit bias186 presented a question of 
                                                          
 173. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
 174. Id. at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515. 
 175. 387 F.3d 1358, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 176. Id. at 1372-73, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620. 
 177. Id. at 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 178. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 179. Id. at 1369, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 180. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 181. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 182. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 183. Id. at 1364-65, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 184. Id. at 1365, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 185. Id. at 1366, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615. 
 186. Id. at 1368, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616. 
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law.187 
The Federal Circuit next considered whether defendant waived its 
objection to Juror No. 3.188  Holding that it did not, the court reasoned that 
defendant had included Juror No. 3 in its original objection to all current 
and former plaintiff employees and their close family members.189  The 
parties specifically argued about this particular ground for dismissal, and 
the judge ultimately ruled that no juror would be dismissed on this basis 
alone.190  The Federal Circuit therefore held that it was “clear that 
[defendant] voiced its objection to these potential jurors for reasons of 
implied bias, and the court distinctly ruled on the objection.”191 
The Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant was 
required to individually challenge Juror No. 3 in order to preserve an 
objection to her empanelment.192  The Federal Circuit first noted that 
plaintiff’s argument ran contrary to its repeated objections at trial that 
defendant was simply rearguing its blanket objection.193  Further, although 
the district court judge advised defendant to object to specific jurors 
individually, the context of the instruction showed that the judge intended 
that defendant would elicit supplemental reasons for the jurors’ 
dismissal.194  The Federal Circuit opined that “[t]his is best demonstrated 
by the fact that  . . . [defendant] brought up additional facts about the 
individual jurors beyond the reasons given in the original blanket 
objection,” and was further demonstrated by the district court’s focus on 
whether the employees held management versus union-contract positions 
with plaintiff.195 
The Federal Circuit also found that defendant had specifically stated that 
it would not challenge Juror No. 3 despite having “additional” reasons for 
challenging her empanelment.196  The defendant’s statement, the court 
found, again demonstrated that when the district court suggested that 
defendant make individual challenges, the request sought to elicit 
supplemental challenges in addition to defendant’s blanket objection to any 
juror’s employment with or spousal relationship with an employee of 
                                                          
 187. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.  The court contrasted the issue of implied bias 
with that of actual bias, an inquiry the court characterized as factual.  Id. at 1367, 73 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615. 
 188. Id. at 1368, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616. 
 189. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616.  The court found that Sturman had included 
Juror No. 3 in a list of eleven individuals who fell into the category to which its objection 
was directed.  Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616. 
 190. Id. at 1369, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 191. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 192. Id. at 1369-70, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 193. Id. at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 194. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
 195. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617-18. 
 196. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618. 
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plaintiff.197 
The Federal Circuit finally considered whether Juror No. 3 was 
impliedly biased as a matter of law because of her spousal relationship with 
a plaintiff employee.  Applying the law of the Seventh Circuit, it found that 
jurors are excluded for implied bias “in extraordinary circumstances,” but 
that even under this standard jurors had been excluded as a matter of law if 
the juror had “even a tiny financial interest in the case.”198  Thus, the 
Federal Circuit found that because Juror No. 3’s husband worked for 
plaintiff, she had a financial interest that warranted her dismissal as a 
matter of law.  The Federal Circuit deemed it legally irrelevant whether the 
juror’s financial interest arose due to the employee’s position in 
management or as a union-contract employee of plaintiff, and therefore 
disagreed with the district court’s basis for distinguishing between these 
roles.  Because Juror No. 3 should have been excluded as a matter of law, 
yet actually sat on the jury, the Federal Circuit vacated the jury’s verdicts 
in favor of plaintiff and ordered a new trial.199 
3.  Motions for a judgment as a matter of law 
In Gaus v. Conair Corp.,200 plaintiff asserted that defendant waived its 
right to challenge the jury verdict of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents because “simply listing the grounds on which [defendant] 
based its Rule 50(a) motion was insufficient to put [plaintiff] on notice as 
what [defendant] alleged to be deficient in [plaintiff’s] evidence.”201  
Though noting that defendant’s “references to the ‘all elements’ rule and 
‘specification estoppel’ constituted a terse—even cryptic—statement of the 
                                                          
 197. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.  The court distinguished the facts at hand from 
those in Zamora v. Guam, 394 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1968), in which the Ninth Circuit held that 
the defense had waived its right to object to a juror where the defense had made a general 
objection to the seating of jurors, who had been seated in a jury against the same defendant 
in another case, yet failed to question individual jurors as to any bias after the court 
“announced that defense counsel could explore the matter of prejudice with any juror.”  
Caterpillar, 387 F.3d at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618 (citing Zamora, 394 F.2d at 
816).  In Zamora, the Caterpillar court explained, the issue was actual bias, a factual 
question that requires inquiry as to individual jurors.  387 F.3d at 1370-71, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1618.  Implied bias, on the other hand, is a question of law which requires no such 
factual inquiry.  Id. at 1371, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.  In Sturman’s case, the record 
was complete because all relevant facts had been gathered through the voir dire process, 
including the employment and spousal ties of potential jurors to Caterpillar.  Id., 73 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.  Furthermore, Sturman had “expeditiously inform[ed]” the court 
about potential mistakes that might lead to reversal on appeal.  Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1618.  The court found that these facts satisfied the two prongs of the rationale supporting 
the waiver doctrine, encouraging parties to develop a full record of the case and putting the 
court on notice of potential errors.  Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618. 
 198. Caterpillar, 387 F.3d at 1371-72, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618-19 (citing United 
States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 199. Id. at 1373, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620. 
 200. 363 F.3d 1284, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 201. Id. at 1287, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
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grounds” for a Rule 50(a) motion,202 the Federal Circuit noted that the 
district court “was in the best position to judge the sufficiency of the Rule 
50(a) motion in the context of the trial,” and affirmed the district court’s 
holding that no waiver occurred.203 
In Summit Technology, Inc. v. Nidek Co.,204 the Federal Circuit set forth 
its standard for reviewing a motion for a JMOL, stating that “courts 
reviewing a jury verdict on a motion for judgment as a matter of law are 
required to review all of the evidence presented at trial.”205  The Federal 
Circuit further explained that such a review “requires an examination not 
merely of isolated snippets of testimony or abbreviated excerpts from 
documentary evidence divorced from the context in which they appear, but 
of all relevant evidence on which the jury verdict may have been based.”206 
F.   United States Patent and Trademark Office  Procedures 
In re Watts207 presented the issues of (1) waiver of arguments before the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”), and (2) the 
circumstances under which any Board error might preclude the need for 
remand.208  Regarding the first issue, the question before the Federal Circuit 
was whether appellant could challenge the Board’s decision on grounds not 
previously raised before the Board.209  Specifically, appellant sought to 
overturn the Board’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103210 by contending that 
the Board and the examiner mischaracterized a prior art reference.211  The 
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that “[b]ecause the 
appellant failed to argue his current interpretation of the prior art below, we 
do not have the benefit of the Board’s informed judgment on the issue for 
our review.”212  The Federal Circuit then explained that given appellant’s 
failure to proffer a viable excuse for not raising the argument below, it 
declined to “hold that appellant has waived his argument.”213 
The Federal Circuit then addressed the question of whether the Board’s 
rejection of a subset of claims without specific analysis of those claims 
                                                          
 202. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 203. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.  The district court reasoned that the Rule 50(a) 
motion was sufficient given that “liability under the doctrine of equivalents has been the 
central issue in this case since [it] determined . . . that [plaintiff’s] patent was not literally 
infringed.”  Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 204. 363 F.3d 1219, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 205. Id. at 1223, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 206. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 207. 354 F.3d 1362, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 208. Id. at 1366, 1369, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457, 1458. 
 209. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457. 
 210. Id. at 1363, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 211. Id. at 1366-67, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 212. Id. at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 213. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
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constituted reversible error.214  Noting that it had “previously made clear 
that the harmless error rule applies to appeals from the Board just as it does 
in cases originating from district courts,”215 the Federal Circuit explained 
that “to prevail appellant must not only show the existence of error, but 
also show that the error was in fact harmful because it affected the decision 
below.”216  After reviewing the record, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
the Board’s error was harmless because appellant never explained why the 
subset of claims would be patentable if the other claims were properly 
rejected.217 
In the case of In re Sullivan,218 the Federal Circuit resolved several 
procedural issues relating to interferences.  Appellant owned a patent 
involved in an interference that had been provoked by a patent applicant 
who had copied appellant’s patent claims into its own application.219  Some 
of the copied claims had been patented for over one year.  Shortly after the 
first interference was provoked by the applicant, the Board redeclared the 
interference to add another patent owned by appellant and simultaneously 
amended one of the copied claims in the application.220  At this stage, 
Sullivan filed several preliminary motions, but the Board terminated the 
interference in favor of the other party without addressing these motions 
because appellant conceded that he did not have priority.221 
On appeal, the court reviewed the Board’s actions under the arbitrary 
and capricious standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.222  
The appellant first argued that because the Board had no jurisdiction over 
an interference in which some of the claims involved were copied more 
than one year after their issuance,223 the Federal Circuit had no jurisdiction 
to review the Board’s final decision to terminate the interference.224  The 
Federal Circuit quickly dismissed this argument, and explained that even if 
the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction were improper the jurisdictional 
question was properly within the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction.225 
The Federal Circuit also found appellant’s underlying argument 
                                                          
 214. Id. at 1369, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458. 
 215. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458-59. 
 216. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 217. Id. at 1370, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 218. 362 F.3d 1324, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 219. Id. at 1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147. 
 220. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147. 
 221. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147. 
 222. Id. at 1326, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1147; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) 
(“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law.”). 
 223. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 224. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 225. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
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regarding the Board’s jurisdiction to be erroneous.226  The lawfulness of the 
Board’s declaration of the original interference, it stated, was not at issue.  
Instead, the issue was whether the redeclaration of the interference was 
somehow unlawful.227  Appellant attacked the lawfulness of the 
redeclaration on the grounds that he had not been given adequate notice 
and an opportunity to be heard.228  The Federal Circuit rejected this 
interpretation of the facts, concluding that the Board had given notice to 
appellant of the redeclaration and that appellant had entered an opposition 
to the amendment that accompanied the redeclaration.229 
After rejecting the challenges to the Board’s redeclaration of the 
interference, the Federal Circuit addressed appellant’s arguments that the 
Board inappropriately terminated the interference before addressing his 
preliminary motions.  Appellant had argued that the parties’ claims 
corresponding to the interference were unpatentable as obvious in view of 
certain prior art references.230  The Federal Circuit noted that the statute 
governing interferences provides that the Board “shall determine questions 
of priority of inventions and may determine questions of patentability.”231  
The Federal Circuit interpreted this statute to vest the Board with discretion 
to address questions of patentability after it had determined priority.  The 
Federal Circuit then held that the Board’s decision not to exercise this 
discretion after appellant conceded priority was not arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.232 
For its final line of attack against the Board’s decision, appellant took 
issue with a standing order issued by the Board.  The order regulated 
procedural issues such as the form of papers to be filed, the procedure for 
conferences, and the cross-examination of witnesses.  Appellant contended 
that the Board had no authority to enter a standing order governing the 
procedure to be followed during the interference by virtue of 37 C.F.R. § 
1.610, which provides that “times for taking action by a party in the 
interference will be set on a case-by-case basis by the administrative patent 
judge assigned to the interference.”233  The Federal Circuit however, gave 
“controlling weight” to the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s 
(“PTO”) interpretation of § 1.610 to allow such standing orders because the 
Federal Circuit could not find that such interpretation was “plainly 
                                                          
 226. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 227. Id. at 1327, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 228. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 229. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 230. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148. 
 231. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148 (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) 
(2000)). 
 232. Id. at 1327-28, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1148-49. 
 233. Id. at 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.610(c) (2002)). 
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erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”234  The Federal Circuit 
reasoned that the administrative patent judge should not have to “reinvent 
the wheel” in such procedural matters for each interference proceeding, and 
the standing order specifically provided for its own modification by the 
judge when appropriate.235  The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the award of 
priority in favor of the patent applicant. 
G.  Statutory Interpretation 
Kinik Co. v. International Trade Commission236 presented the issue of 
whether the defenses in 35 U.S.C. 271(g)(1)–(2)237 are applicable to 
infringement actions before the International Trade Commission 
(“ITC”).238  The appellant challenged the ITC’s holding that it could not 
invoke such defenses, arguing that pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a),239 the 
ITC is obligated to consider “[a]ll legal and equitable defenses that may be 
presented in all cases.”240 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the legislative 
history concerning § 271(g), which stated that the section was designed to 
provide patentees with the “new right to sue for damages and seek an 
injunction in federal district court when someone, without authorization, 
uses[,] sells[,] . . . or imports into the United States, a product made by [the 
patentee’s] patented process.”241  The Federal Circuit thus explained that 
the purpose of § 271(g) is to “authorize the district courts to adjudicate and 
impose liability for infringement based on the overseas practice of 
processes patented in the United States, upon importation of the products of 
                                                          
 234. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 235. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149. 
 236. 362 F.3d 1359, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 237. Section 271(g) provides: 
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or 
uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the 
United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or 
use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent.  In an action for 
infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on 
account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no 
adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or 
other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product.  A product which is made by a 
patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made 
after— 
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or 
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000). 
 238. Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1362, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 239. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2000) (detailing the adjudicative procedure of the ITC for 
cases involving importation of products that infringe protected U.S. intellectual property). 
 240. Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1362, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (quoting 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1337(c)). 
 241. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 27 (1987)). 
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those processes.”242  Noting that any ambiguity in § 1337, in light of 
§ 271(g), would require deference to the ITC’s interpretation, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the ITC’s holding because “no material changes were 
made in the text of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii) . . . despite the concurrent enactment 
of § 271(g).”243  The Federal Circuit supported its holding by referring to 
Amgen, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission,244 in which 
the court observed that § 271(g) “expressly limited the new defenses to 
infringement ‘for purpose of this title.’”245 
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling246 involved the question of whether by 
passage of the Plant Variety Protection Act,247 Congress intended to 
“preempt and invalidate all prohibitions on seed saving contained in utility-
patent licenses.”248  Answering the question in the negative, the Federal 
Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.249 that plants were subject-matter 
eligible for utility protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101250 and that hybrid seeds 
are also eligible for protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act.251 
H.  Miscellaneous Procedural Issues 
The Federal Circuit in Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.252 
addressed the issue of whether a court may moot a defendant’s 
counterclaims of invalidity and unenforceability in the event it grants 
summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of the defendant.  Despite 
the fact that a defendant who wins on the infringement issue may still have 
an interest in invalidating the patent to prevent the patentee from later 
asserting infringement of the same patent against new products or methods, 
and contrary to its rationale in TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft 
Corp.,253 the Federal Circuit stated that a district court has discretion either 
to hear such counterclaims or to dismiss them without prejudice, subject 
                                                          
 242. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 243. Id. at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 244. 902 F.2d 1532, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 245. 362 F.3d at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303 (citing Amgen, 902 F.2d at 1540 
n.13, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1741 n.13). 
 246. 363 F.3d 1336, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 247. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (2000).  See also 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (providing breeders of 
seed-derived plant varieties patent-like rights protecting the distribution and reproduction of 
their breeds). 
 248. Monsanto, 363 F.3d at 1344, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487. 
 249. 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 250. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”). 
 251. Monsanto, 363 F.3d at 1344, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1487. 
 252. 355 F.3d 1361, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1595 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 253. 374 F.3d 1151, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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only to abuse of discretion review.254  The Federal Circuit reached this 
conclusion despite its recognition that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International255 rejected a strict per se 
policy of mooting claims of invalidity following rulings of 
noninfringement. 
In In re Violation of Rule 28(c),256 the Federal Circuit cautioned that 
serious violations of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, even if 
inadvertent, may result in sanctions.257  At issue was a violation of Rule 
28(c),258 which limits the contents of a cross-appellant’s reply brief to the 
issues raised by the cross-appeal.259  The underlying suit involved a claim 
of patent infringement in which the district court found infringement and 
granted damages in favor of the plaintiff.260  The defendant appealed from 
the infringement judgment and the district court’s calculation of 
damages.261  The plaintiff cross-appealed, seeking to modify the judgment 
on damages.262  Twenty of the twenty-three pages of the cross-appellant’s 
reply brief, however, addressed issues pertinent only to the main appeal and 
not to the cross-appeal.263  Finding no ambiguity in the language of Rule 
28(c), the Federal Circuit explained that the rule prohibits the cross-appeal 
reply brief from addressing the issues raised in the main appeal.264  Because 
the failure to comply with the rule in this case was inadvertent, however, 
the Federal Circuit did not exercise its authority under Rule 46(c) to impose 
sanctions.265  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit warned that “in future cases, 
serious violations of applicable rules, whether or not ‘inadvertent,’ will 
potentially subject counsel to sanctions.”266 
II.  PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY 
A.  35 U.S.C. § 101 
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,267 Judge Gajarsa wrote a 
concurring opinion explaining that he would hold a claim directed solely to 
“crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate” to be invalid under 
                                                          
 254. Liquid Dynamics, 355 F.3d at 1370, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602. 
 255. 508 U.S. 83 (1993). 
 256. 388 F.3d 1383, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 257. Id. at 1385, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
 258. FED. R. APP. P. 28(c). 
 259. Id. 
 260. In re Violation of Rule 28(c), 388 F.3d at 1384, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151. 
 261. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151. 
 262. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151. 
 263. Id. at 1385, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
 264. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
 265. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
 266. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1152. 
 267. 365 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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§ 101.268  The concurrence noted that the “question of patentability under 
Section 101 does not arise often, and a court’s decision to raise it sua 
sponte is even less common.”269  However, citing to the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Slawson v. Grand Street Railroad270 and Richards v. Chase 
Elevator Co.,271 the concurrence explained that “the question of whether 
the invention which is the subject-matter in controversy is patentable or not 
is always open to consideration of the court, whether the point is raised by 
the answer or not.”272  The concurrence also acknowledged that while § 101 
should be “given wide scope,” the statute “nevertheless excludes laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.”273  The concurrence then 
set forth that “the critical distinction guiding all Section 101 inquires into 
the patentability of subject matter is that human-made, or synthetic, 
products or processes are patentable, while products and processes of 
nature are not.”274 
The concurrence explained that the asserted claim covered “a natural 
physical process whereby paroxetine anhydrate . . . could, under normal 
climatic conditions with no human intervention, bond with water molecules 
and convert itself into paroxetine hemihydrate.”275  Observing that the 
disputed claim covering paroxetine hemihydrate “forces the courts to 
consider the patentability of products and/or process launched in a 
laboratory and released into nature,” the concurrence concluded that: 
[A] natural reproduction process, whether sexual, asexual, part of a chain 
reaction, or a process of decay, is ineligible for patent protection under 
Section 101 . . . . An item reproduced by such a natural process, whether 
an inorganic structure or a life form, must ipso facto be ineligible for 
patent protection under Section 101.276 
Addressing the concurrence’s discussion of § 101, the majority opinion 
                                                          
 268. Id. at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748  (Gajarsa, J., concurring).  Section 101 
provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2000). 
 269. SmithKline Beecham, 365 F.3d at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (Gajarsa, J., 
concurring). 
 270. 107 U.S. 649 (1883) (upholding decision that found a patent invalid despite the fact 
that neither party put the validity in dispute). 
 271. 158 U.S. 299 (1895) (dismissing a patent for lack of novelty). 
 272. SmithKline Beecham, 365 F.3d at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748 (Gajarsa, J., 
concurring) (quoting Slawson, 107 U.S. at 652).  The court also canvassed various decisions 
from circuit courts in which issues relating to patentable subject matter under § 101 were 
raised sua sponte.  Id. at 1321-23, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748-50 (Gajarsa, J., 
concurring). 
 273. Id. at 1329, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 274. Id. at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 275. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1755 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 276. Id. at 1331-32, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1756 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted). 
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explained that “the claimed invention is without question a ‘composition of 
matter’ or an article of ‘manufacture’ within the terms of § 101.  
Accordingly, the claimed invention represents subject matter eligible for 
patent protection.”277 
B.  35 U.S.C. § 102 
1.  Printed publication 
In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,278 the Federal Circuit addressed 
whether an “Abstract” presented at a dental research conference constituted 
prior art that was “described in a printed publication” more than one year 
before publication pursuant to § 102(b).279  Affirming the district court’s 
holding that the abstract did not qualify as a printed publication for 
purposes of anticipation, the Federal Circuit explained that “the lack of 
substantial evidence of actual availability of the Abstract adequately 
supports the court’s conclusion that dissemination of the Abstract was not 
established.”280  In particular, the Federal Circuit credited testimony from a 
co-author of the Abstract that he did not recall whether he attended the 
conference and did not recall whether the Abstract was actually distributed 
to conference participants.281 
In re Klopfenstein282 presented the issue of whether a slide presentation 
that was pasted onto poster boards and “displayed continuously for two and 
a half days”283 at an industry conference and displayed again for less than a 
day at another industry conference constituted a “printed publication” for 
purposes of § 102(b).284  The appellant argued that the presentation was not 
a “printed publication” because it had not been “disseminated by the 
distribution of reproduction or copies and/or indexed in a library or 
database.”285  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, explaining that its 
precedent does not limit a “printed publication” only to material that is 
indexed or distributed.286  Rather, the Federal Circuit opined that: 
[T]hroughout our case law, public accessibility has been the criterion by 
                                                          
 277. Id. at 1316, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). 
 278. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 279. Id. at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) 
(prohibiting issuance of patent if an invention was published more than a year before patent 
application). 
 280. Norian, 363 F.3d at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.  The court’s reference to 
“the lack of substantial evidence” is at odds with its statement that “[w]hether a document is 
a prior publication is a question of law.”  Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515. 
 281. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515. 
 282. 380 F.3d 1345, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 283. Id. at 1347, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
 284. Id. at 1348, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
 285. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
 286. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
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which a prior art reference will be judged for purposes of § 102(b).  
Oftentimes courts have found it helpful to rely on distribution and 
indexing as proxies for public accessibility.  But when they have done 
so, it has not been to the exclusion of all other measures of public 
accessibility. In other words, distribution and indexing are not the only 
factors to be considered in a § 102(b) “printed publication inquiry.”287 
 Providing an example, the Federal Circuit reasoned that 
a public billboard targeted to those of ordinary skill in the art that 
describes all of the limitations of an invention and that is on display for 
the public for months may be neither “distributed” nor “indexed”—but it 
most surely is “sufficiently accessible to the public interested in the art” 
and therefore . . . a “printed publication.”288 
The Federal Circuit also explained that determining whether a reference 
constitutes a “printed publication” requires “a case-by-case inquiry into the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the reference’s disclosure to members 
of the public.”289 
Having concluded that the presentation at issue was available to the 
public only during certain periods of time at industry conferences, the 
Federal Circuit identified several factors for determining whether a 
temporarily displayed reference is sufficiently accessible to the public to 
qualify as a “printed publication”: 
The factors relevant to the facts of this case are:   the length of time the 
display was exhibited, the expertise of the target audience, the existence 
(or lack thereof) of reasonable expectations that the material displayed 
would not be copied, and the simplicity or ease with which the material 
displayed could have been copied.290 
The Federal Circuit instructed that “[o]nly after considering and 
balancing these factors can we determine whether or not the [presentation] 
was sufficiently accessible to be a ‘printed publication.’”291 
In analyzing these factors, the Federal Circuit first explained that 
“duration of the display is important in determining the opportunity of the 
public in capturing, processing, and retaining the information conveyed by 
the reference,” and that the more “transient the display, the less likely it is 
to be considered a ‘printed publication.’”292  The Federal Circuit noted that 
the presentation was displayed for a total of approximately three days.293  
The Federal Circuit also determined that the intended target audience of the 
                                                          
 287. Id. at 1350, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 288. Id. at 1348, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119. 
 289. Id. at 1350, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 290. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 291. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 292. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120. 
 293. Id. at 1351, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121. 
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presentation was those of ordinary skill in the art.294  The Federal Circuit 
further reasoned that no expectation existed that the presentation would not 
be copied given the absence of any measures taken to protect the displayed 
information.295  Finally, the Federal Circuit concluded that the presentation 
was displayed in a simple manner and “copying of the information it 
contained would have been a relatively simple undertaking.”296  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the cumulative weight of these 
factors established that the presentation “was sufficiently publicly 
accessible to count as a ‘printed publication.’”297 
2.  Anticipation 
a. Inherency 
In Toro Co. v. Deere & Co.,298 the asserted patents were directed to a 
machine for lifting and fracturing soil to decrease subsurface soil density, 
thereby increasing turf growth.  In support of its motion for summary 
judgment of invalidity, defendant argued that one of the asserted claims 
was anticipated by a reference that expressly disclosed two of the three 
claim limitations, and inherently disclosed the third.  The district court 
rejected defendant’s argument concerning inherency, stating that “no 
reasonable factfinder could find that one of skill in the art would discern 
from the [prior art] patent the unique combination of all of the necessary 
parameters to produce the aeration method claimed in the [asserted] 
patent . . . . The [prior art] patent does not thus anticipate the [asserted] 
patent.”299 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit identified numerous errors in the district 
court’s analysis.  First, the Federal Circuit explained that the district court 
erroneously failed to construe the claim limitation at issue, and that such 
failure rendered it impossible to decide whether the prior art inherently 
disclosed the limitation.  The Federal Circuit further noted that the district 
court had suggested contradictory constructions by stating in one part of its 
opinion that the terms and phrases should be given their ordinary meaning, 
and, in another part of its opinion, incorporating specific operational 
features described in the specification of the asserted patent, including 
those described in the preferred embodiments but not recited in the asserted 
                                                          
 294. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121. 
 295. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121. 
 296. Id. at 1352, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121. 
 297. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121. 
 298. 355 F.3d 1313, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1584 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 299. Id. at 1319, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589 (quoting Toro Co. v. John Deere & Co., 
143 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1130 (D. Minn. 2001)). 
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claim.300 
The Federal Circuit also found error in the district court’s failure to 
address “a critical question” for inherent anticipation:   whether, as a matter 
of fact, practicing the prior art invention necessarily featured or resulted in 
the allegedly inherent limitation of the asserted patent.301  Stating that proof 
of inherent anticipation required that the “missing descriptive matter is 
necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would 
be so recognized by one of ordinary skill in the art,” the court opined that 
the district court erroneously suggested that the inventor or other artisans 
must have recognized that practicing the invention would result in the 
allegedly inherent characteristic.302  The Federal Circuit pointed to its 
decision in Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,303 which held 
that a characteristic that is a necessary feature or result of a prior art 
embodiment, sufficiently described and enabled, suffices for an inherent 
disclosure even if such feature or result was unknown at the time of the 
prior invention. 
Along similar lines, the Federal Circuit found flaws in the district court’s 
statement that “no reasonable factfinder could find that one of skill in the 
art would discern from the [prior art reference] the unique combination of 
all of the necessary parameters to produce the aeration method claimed in 
the ‘168 patent.’”304  The Federal Circuit explained that this statement was 
made without a “proper construction” of the relevant limitation and “a 
corresponding factual analysis of [the prior art reference’s] 
embodiments.”305  Further, the Federal Circuit noted that a proper 
construction of the disputed term could demonstrate that the claim was not 
restricted to the precise numerical ranges included in the specification, 
thereby rendering irrelevant the absence of numerical ranges in the prior art 
reference. 
In Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,306 defendant appealed the district 
court’s finding that two of plaintiff’s patents directed to the antibiotic 
known by the trade name of Ceftin® were not anticipated or made obvious 
by a third patent owned by Glaxo.307  Defendant had presented expert 
testimony that performance of the experiments recited in the examples of 
                                                          
 300. The Federal Circuit, however, stopped short of construing the claims because the 
appellate record did not contain sufficient evidence to guide it, and instead remanded the 
issue back to the district court.  Id. at 1321, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1591. 
 301. Id. at 1320, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589-90. 
 302. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590 (quoting Toro, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1129-30). 
 303. 339 F.3d 1373, 1377-78, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 304. Toro, 355 F.3d at 1319, 1321, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1589-90 (quoting Toro, 143 
F. Supp. 2d at 1130). 
 305. Id. at 1321, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1590. 
 306. 376 F.3d 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 307. Id. at 1343, 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803, 1807. 
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the allegedly anticipating reference resulted in the features claimed by the 
asserted patents, necessitating a finding that those features were inherent in 
the reference.308  The district court discredited this testimony because the 
expert had admitted to deviating from the examples in performing his 
experiments.309  Furthermore, the expert admitted that he had read the 
patents asserted by plaintiff prior to performing the experiments.310  The 
district court opined that these facts rendered the expert’s experiments 
“highly suspect” and that therefore the experiments did not constitute clear 
and convincing evidence of the patents’ invalidity.  The Federal Circuit 
found no error in the district court’s conclusions.311 
b.   Anticipation by a printed publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
In the case of In re Ngai,312 an inventor appealed the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interference’s decision that its patent claims were anticipated 
or rendered obvious by the prior art.  The patent at issue was generally 
directed to methods for “amplifying” and “normalizing” ribonucleic acids 
(“RNA”) in order to prepare sufficient quantities of RNA for 
experimentation.  Although most claims covered methods, the only claim at 
issue on appeal was drawn to a “kit” for normalizing and amplifying RNA 
populations comprising several components including “instructions 
describing the method of claim 1.”313  The Board held that kits existed in 
the prior art, which contained all of the claimed components including 
instructions, and thus the claim was anticipated.  Relying on the court’s In 
re Gulack314 decision for the proposition that “[d]ifferences between an 
invention and the prior art cited against it cannot be ignored merely 
because those differences reside in the content of the printed matter,”315 
appellant contended that its claims could be distinguished from the prior art 
because no prior art kit had instructions bearing the same content. 
The Federal Circuit determined that the circumstances on appeal were 
not analogous to Gulack.  The invention in Gulack was a circular band 
bearing printed numbers that could be used for math education and 
recreation.  Although bands with numbers printed on them were widely 
                                                          
 308. Id. at 1345, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 309. Id. at 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 310. Id. at 1345, 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804, 1807. 
 311. Id. at 1345, 1348-49, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804, 1807.  It further found that 
secondary factors of non-obviousness including commercial success, long felt but 
unresolved need, and unexpected results favored the non-obvious determination reached by 
the court below, especially considering the admission of Apotex’s expert that the patent 
Apotex relied upon did not suggest the benefits of the additional features of the inventions 
covered by the asserted patents.  Id. at 1349, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 312. 367 F.3d 1336, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1862 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 313. Id. at 1337, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863. 
 314. 703 F.2d 1381, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 315. Id. at 1385, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 403. 
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known in the prior art, the numbers in Gulack’s invention had a functional 
relationship to the band:   the band supported the digits, and the digits 
exploited the endless nature of the band.  In contrast, Ngai’s printed matter 
in no way “depend[ed] on the kit, and the kit [did] not depend on the 
printed matter.”316  The Federal Circuit thus held that even Gulack pointed 
out that printed matter would not distinguish the invention from prior art 
where the printed matter is not functionally related to the substrate.  The 
Federal Circuit also observed that accepting appellant’s position would 
require the PTO to grant patents on a product to anyone who would attach a 
new instruction sheet to it. 
Kioto Manufacturing Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC317 involved an appeal 
from a district court’s grant of a JMOL holding claims directed to methods 
for injection molding of plastic products invalid as anticipated.318  On 
appeal, the patentee argued that the district court erred because the plaintiff 
“merely submitted th[e] [prior art] reference into evidence and made no 
specific mention of it at trial.”319  The Federal Circuit began its analysis by 
stating that a party advancing an anticipation shoulders “an especially 
heavy burden.”320  In reviewing the trial record, the Federal Circuit 
observed that although plaintiff entered the prior art reference into 
evidence, it “otherwise failed to provide any testimony or other evidence 
that would demonstrate to the jury how that reference met the limitations of 
the claims . . . or how the reference enabled one of ordinary skill in the art 
to practice the claimed invention.”321  The Federal Circuit also observed 
that plaintiff’s invalidity expert never specifically mentioned the prior art 
reference during his testimony and “offered a conclusion of invalidity 
relating to a quintet of prior art patents which included [the prior art 
reference].”322 
In reversing the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, the 
Federal Circuit explained: 
Typically, testimony concerning anticipation must be testimony from 
one skilled in the art and must identify each claim element, state the 
witnesses’ interpretation of the claim element, and explain in detail how 
each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference.  The testimony 
is insufficient if it is merely conclusory.323 
                                                          
 316. In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864. 
 317. 381 F.3d 1142, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 318. Id. at 1144-45, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1191-92. 
 319. Id. at 1151, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196. 
 320. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197 (quoting N.V. Akzo v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 
810 F.2d 1148, 1150-51, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704, 1707 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 321. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197. 
 322. Id. at 1151-52, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197. 
 323. Id. at 1152, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197 (quoting Schumer v. Lab. Computer 
Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1315-16, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832, 1841 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
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The Federal Circuit thus concluded that the “general and conclusory 
testimony” provided by plaintiff’s invalidity expert “does not suffice as 
substantial evidence of invalidity . . . . This is so even when the [prior art] 
reference has been submitted into evidence before the jury.”324 
In re Elsner325 presented an appeal from the PTO’s finding that claims 
directed to geranium and rose plants were anticipated under § 102(b).326  In 
particular, the PTO determined the appellants’ published Plant Breeder’s 
Rights patent applications disclosed the claimed inventions while the 
foreign sales of the claimed plants placed the possession of the inventions 
in those skilled in the art.327  The Federal Circuit explained that the precise 
issue on appeal was “whether evidence of foreign sale of a claimed 
reproducible plant variety may enable an otherwise non-enabled printed 
publication disclosing that plant, thereby creating a § 102(b) bar.”328  The 
Federal Circuit began by noting that while “foreign sales of an invention in 
combination with a publication will not constitute a bar because such a 
result would circumvent the established rules that neither non-enabling 
publications nor foreign sales can bar one’s right to a patent,”329 the case 
before it was distinct because “it deals with plant patents, which may be 
granted to ‘[w]hoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any 
distinct and new variety of plant.’”330  The Federal Circuit thus reasoned 
that “only when possession derived in this manner enables a person of skill 
in the art to practice asexual reproduction of the plant in a manner 
consistent with the statute can a non-enabling publication and a foreign sale 
act as a § 102(b) bar.”331 
The Federal Circuit rejected appellant’s argument that its holding would 
create a printed publication bar when a non-enabling publication could be 
coupled with a foreign sale, explaining that: 
When a publication identifies the plant that is involved or discovered and 
a foreign sale occurs that puts one of ordinary skill in the art in 
possession of the plant itself, which, based on the level of ordinary skill 
in the art, permits asexual reproduction without undue experimentation, 
that combination of facts and events so directly conveys the essential 
knowledge of the invention that the sale combines with the publication to 
erect a statutory bar.332 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the PTO’s use of the published patent 
                                                          
 324. Id. at 1152, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197. 
 325. 381 F.3d 1125, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 326. Id. at 1126, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039. 
 327. Id. at 1126-27, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039-40. 
 328. Id. at 1128, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041. 
 329. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041. 
 330. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000)). 
 331. Id. at 1128-29, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041. 
 332. Id. at 1129, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1041. 
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applications together with the sales of the claimed plants “to show that the 
public was in possession of the claimed plants and thus that the [patent] 
applications were enabled anticipatory references”333 because its precedent 
“supports the use of secondary references to show that a primary § 102(b) 
reference was in fact enabled.”334 
In Nystrom v. Trex Co.,335 the Federal Circuit applied its precedent in 
Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group International, Inc.336 and In re 
Wright337 to determine whether a patent figure anticipated a claim 
limitation directed to a radius of curvature to width ratio of a surface of a 
board used for constructing outdoor decks.  The patentee argued that the 
district court incorrectly based its anticipation decision on data generated 
by an employee of defendant, who made a software model of the boards 
depicted in the perspective drawings of the allegedly anticipatory patent 
figure, and then performed computation to determine that the figure 
displayed the recited ratio.  The district court concluded that the precedents 
of Hockerson-Halberstadt and Wright were not applicable as it found that 
“the correct inquiry [was] whether a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would use measurements from the [cited] reference to ascertain the degree 
of curvature.”338 
The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court erroneously 
applied precedents that indicated the court’s “disfavor in reading precise 
proportions into patent drawings which do not expressly provide such 
proportions.”339  Because the district court improperly relied on defendant’s 
data, which assumed the patent figure was drawn to scale, in its holding 
that certain claims of plaintiff’s patent were anticipated, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity.340 
c.   On-sale bar and public use 
In Elan Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,341 the Federal Circuit 
reversed a finding that plaintiff’s patent covering a sustained release 
formulation of the anti-inflammatory composition, naproxen sodium, was 
                                                          
 333. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042. 
 334. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1042. 
 335. 374 F.3d 1105, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 336. 222 F.3d 951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming the district 
court’s judgment of noninfringement in a patent infringement case concerning an article of 
outer footwear). 
 337. 569 F.2d 1124, 193 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 332 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that appellant’s 
invention concerning a whiskey barrel croze would have been obvious, at the time it was 
made, to a person of ordinary skill). 
 338. 374 F.3d at 1116, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250. 
 339. Id. at 1117, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250. 
 340. Id. at 1117-18, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1251. 
 341. 366 F.3d 1336, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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invalid under the on-sale bar.342  Defendant asserted that the patent was 
barred by plaintiff’s offer to supply the composition to several 
pharmaceutical companies in the United States in excess of one year before 
the patent’s application filing date.343  The district court agreed, finding that 
a letter drafted by a plaintiff’s executive to a potential licensee, dated 
approximately four years before plaintiff filed its patent application, 
constituted an offer for sale for purposes of the statutory bar.344  The letter 
“confirmed” plaintiff’s plans to be in a position to file an Investigational 
New Drug (“IND”) by the following year, and to file a New Drug 
Application (“NDA”) after two years of collecting necessary data and 
developing a sustained-release naproxen sodium compound.  The letter also 
expressed plaintiff’s interest in seeking a partner in such licensing and 
development and specified the licensing and clinical fees that would be 
associated with partnership.345  The letter further “confirmed” that plaintiff 
would be responsible for supplying bulk tablets to the potential customer 
under a price structure that would allow the potential licensee an “initial 
gross margin based on current naproxen prices of not less than 70% after 
taking into account [its] processing charge . . . , A.I. cost, packaging and 
royalty.”346 
Reversing the judgment on appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that its 
previous decisions, such as In re Kollar,347 made clear that “an offer to 
license a patent claiming an invention after future research and 
development had occurred, without more, is not an offer to sell the 
invention.”348  The Federal Circuit further explained that “a sale of rights in 
a patent, as distinct from a sale of the invention itself, is not within the 
scope of the statute, and thus does not implicate the on-sale bar.”349  Thus, 
contrary to the district court’s opinion, the Federal Circuit found that 
plaintiff’s letter to the potential licensee was merely an offer to enter into a 
license under a patent for future sale of the invention “when and if it has 
been developed.”350  The Federal Circuit explained that the letter lacked 
provisions for quantities, time of delivery, place of delivery, and detailed 
product specifications.  The Federal Circuit also noted that the price terms 
provided for in the letter were labeled “licensing fees,” and therefore 
merely represented the amount that plaintiff requested to form and continue 
                                                          
 342. Id. at 1337, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723. 
 343. Id. at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1724. 
 344. Id. at 1337-39, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723-25. 
 345. Id. at 1337-38, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723-24. 
 346. Id. at 1338, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723. 
 347. 286 F.3d 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 348. Elan, 366 F.3d at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725-26. 
 349. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725 (quoting Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, 
Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1049, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 350. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726. 
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a partnership with the potential licensee.  The fees were not, the Federal 
Circuit explained, price terms for the sale of tablets.  The court also found 
important the absence of any terms linking prices to quantities of tablets.  
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that plaintiff’s “confirmation” that it would 
supply bulk tablets according to a specified price structure was not a “price 
term” because the actual prices would not be determinable until the 
sustained release formulation was approved as safe and effective, and the 
charges for processing, packaging, and etcetera would not be determinable 
until later.351 
Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.352 addressed the 
validity of six design patents owned by plaintiff, a furniture sales company 
that provided customers and industry representatives a preview of its new 
furniture designs one month before a biannual, industry-wide “Market” 
event.353  Plaintiff’s preview event was called “Pre-Market.”  Plaintiff’s 
standard procedures at Pre-Market required attendants to be named on a 
special list of invitees and to present identification twice at the exhibition 
before being escorted by a sales representative around the showroom.  No 
pictures were allowed, and no one could take anything from the showroom 
when they left the exhibition.  In September 1999, plaintiff hosted a 
preview event at which it showcased a line of furniture that it later adopted 
as its “Coronado Collection.”354  The designs of this particular furniture 
collection were the subject of the six asserted patents. 
The district court held that four of the asserted patents were invalid 
under § 102(b) as a result of plaintiff’s exhibition of its designs at the 
September 1999 Pre-Market.355  On appeal, plaintiff argued that (1) the Pre-
Market event was not “public” for purposes of § 102(b), and that 
(2) defendant failed to adduce sufficient evidence that the designs exhibited 
at the September 1999 Pre-Market were actually covered by the asserted 
patents.  The court first focused on whether defendant had sufficiently 
proven that the exhibited designs fell within the scope of the patents at 
issue.  The evidence proffered by defendant showed that four stock keeping 
units (“SKUs”), used by plaintiff to track its designs, had been included in 
a “Pre-Market Wish List,” a document listing the SKUs of the furniture that 
would be exhibited at Pre-Market events.  Defendant argued that these 
SKUs corresponded to furniture designs covered by the asserted patents.  
Defendant also presented a document from plaintiff summarizing 
comments gathered from the invitees to the September 1999 Pre-Market 
                                                          
 351. Id. at 1342, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1726-27. 
 352. 386 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 353. Id. at 1373-74, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903-04. 
 354. Id. at 1373-75, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903-04. 
 355. Id. at 1375, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
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event that named three such SKUs.  The district court concluded from this 
evidence that it was highly likely that “the furniture designs for the four 
SKUs corresponding to the patents were shown at the 1999 Pre-Market.”356 
The Federal Circuit found the district court’s analysis of this question to 
be lacking.  Although the district court had found that the furniture pieces 
corresponding to the “SKUs” were “similar to” the furniture design shown 
in each patent, the court did not apply the “ordinary observer test” or the 
“points of novelty test” to determine whether the designs actually displayed 
were “substantially similar in appearance in the eyes of an ordinary 
observer . . . or appropriated the points of novelty of the patented 
designs.”357 
Next, the Federal Circuit considered whether the Pre-Market exhibition 
was “public” within the meaning of § 102(b).  The district court had held 
that the Pre-Market exhibition was public because it found that plaintiff had 
produced insufficient evidence that the Pre-Market invitees were under any 
duty or ethical obligation of confidentiality when they viewed the items 
displayed.  The Federal Circuit found that this conclusion was 
“misdirected.”358  Contrary to the implications of the district court’s 
opinion, it held that the presence or absence of confidentiality agreements 
was not dispositive of whether use is public under § 102(b), and that the 
appropriate inquiry mandates review of the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the allegedly barred use.359  Specifically, it found the district 
court had failed to analyze how plaintiff’s Pre-Market exhibition 
comported with the policies underlying the public use bar.  This failure was 
enough for the Federal Circuit to find the court’s analysis incomplete and 
to justify vacating the court’s holding. 
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,360 the court explained 
that the public use defense under § 102(b)361 incorporates the same “ready 
for patenting” analysis as the on-sale bar.362  The court explained that while 
the commercial sale prong of the on-sale bar does not apply, public use 
“includes any use of the claimed invention by a person other than the 
inventor who is under no limitation, restriction, or obligation of secrecy to 
the inventor.”363  The Federal Circuit thus made clear that the public use 
                                                          
 356. Id. at 1376, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905 (quoting Bernhardt L.L.C. v. Collezione 
Eurpoa USA, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 485, 495 (M.D.N.C. 2003)). 
 357. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907. 
 358. Id. at 1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 359. Id. at 1379, 1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907, 1909. 
 360. 365 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 361. Section 102(b) provides in relevant part that a claim is invalid if “the invention 
was . . . in public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to the date of the 
application for the patent in the United States.”  35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 362. SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1316-17, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 363. Id. at 1317, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (quoting Netscape Communications 
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defense “erects a bar where, before the critical date, the invention was 
ready for patenting and was used by a person other than the inventor who is 
under no confidentiality obligation.”364 
Turning to the undisputed facts in the record, the Federal Circuit held the 
claim invalid observing that “the record shows that [the claimed 
compound] PHC hemihydrate was in public use before the critical date.”365  
In particular, the Federal Circuit noted that the plaintiff “placed PHC 
hemihydrate in public clinical trials in the United States . . . . Moreover, 
[plaintiff] administered PHC hemihydrate to patients without any apparent 
confidentiality restrictions on the patients or the administering 
physicians.”366 
The Federal Circuit also addressed plaintiff’s argument that the clinical 
trials constituted experimental use exempt from the reach of the public use 
bar, explaining that:   “Testing or experimentation performed with respect 
to non-claimed features of the device does not show that the invention was 
the subject of experimentation.  In other words, an experimental use only 
negates a statutory bar when the inventor was testing claimed features of 
the invention.”367  Then, noting its adoption of plaintiff’s own construction 
of PHC hemihydrate as not limited by any considerations of “efficacy, 
commercial use, or pharmaceutical viability,”368 the Federal Circuit held 
that “clinical trials designed to establish the efficacy and safety of the 
compound as an antidepressant for FDA approval are not experimental uses 
of that claimed invention.”369  The Federal Circuit further elaborated that 
“[i]n other words, the claim covers the compound regardless of its use as an 
antidepressant.  The antidepressant properties of the compound are simply 
not claimed features.”370  The Federal Circuit also explained that potential 
confusion may exist between experimental use and the “separate 
requirement of patent law to test an invention for utility, i.e., to show that it 
works for its intended propose.”371  While noting a “potential overlap for 
utility and experimental testing,”372 the Federal Circuit held that “utility 
testing (reduction to practice) and experimental use testing are not 
synonymous,”373 and “after the invention is reduced to practice, further 
testing will not qualify as experimental use for purposes of negating a bar 
                                                          
Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1321, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1580, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 364. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 365. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 366. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 367. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 368. Id. at 1318, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 369. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 370. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 371. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 372. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 373. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
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under § 102(b).”374 
The Federal Circuit also stated that it was aware of its decisions in EZ 
Dock, Inc. v. Schafer Systems, Inc.,375 Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & 
Court Construction,376 and Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, 
Inc.,377 in which the experimental use was found despite “testing that did 
not focus on an expressly claimed feature.”378  The court, however, 
explained that “[e]ach of those cases permitted testing to negate the bar 
when the experimentation improves or verifies a feature inherent in the 
express claims of the invention.”379 
With respect to Manville, the Federal Circuit noted that the decision 
explicitly provided that the inventor’s testing was necessary because 
“durability in an outdoor environment is inherent to the purpose of the 
invention,” a covered light pole used for highway repairs.380  Discussing 
Seal-Flex, the Federal Circuit explained that the case involved claims 
directed to “an all-weather track” and “experimentation again focused on 
features inherent to the claimed invention.”381  With regard to EZ Dock, the 
Federal Circuit explained that although that case involved claims covering 
a “floating dock” without an express limitation on performance in “choppy 
water,” the claim language “carried the implication that the invention must 
perform in rough water.  Thus, again the experimentation verified or 
improved a feature inherent to the claimed invention.”382  Having 
                                                          
 374. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.  The court also explained that experimental 
testing and utility testing stemmed from “different origins and purposes, the narrower 
experimental use negation does not extend beyond perfecting claimed features.”  Id. at 1319, 
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 375. 276 F.3d 1347, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (remanding a patent 
infringement case regarding a polyethylene floating dock to determine factual issues as to 
whether sale of the dock before the critical date was experimental). 
 376. 98 F.3d 1318, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reversing the district 
court’s summary judgment of a patent infringement case concerning all-weather athletic 
track because factual questions existed on the issue of patentability of invention under on-
sale bar). 
 377. 917 F.2d 544, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that the use of 
iris guide arms for self-centering luminaire assembly for lighting poles on one pole at one 
site was experimental for purposes of on-sale and public use bars). 
 378. SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1318, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 379. Id. at 1319, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 380. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747 (quoting Manville, 917 F.2d at 551, 16 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1592). 
 381. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.  The court noted that Seal-Flex was decided 
under the “totality of the circumstances” standard rendered inapplicable by a subsequent 
Supreme Court opinion.  Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (rejecting totality of 
circumstances test as “undermin[ing] the interest in certainty” and adopting a two-prong test 
for the on-sale bar).  The court further explained that the Seal-Flex decision did not 
affirmatively hold that experimental use was applicable, but rather vacated the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment on invalidity and remanded the case.  SmithKline, 365 
F.3d at 1319, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. 
 382. SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1319, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.  The court again 
explained that in EZ Dock there was no definitive holding that the experimental use 
exception was applicable, but instead a vacate of summary judgment of invalidity and a 
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canvassed its decisions in these cases, the Federal Circuit concluded that its 
jurisprudence “has remained faithful to the strict requirements of the 
experimental use negation by limiting it to testing to perfect claimed 
features, or, in a few instances, testing to perfect features inherent to the 
claimed invention.”383  The Federal Circuit then instructed that:   “[A] 
patentee should understand that testing the properties, uses, and 
commercial significance of a compound claimed solely in structural terms 
may start the clock under § 102(b) for filing a claim that is not limited by 
any property, commercially significant amount, or other use of the 
compound.”384 
Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc.385 involved the 
question of whether a pre-patenting sale of a device that was capable of 
performing the patented process rendered the disputed patent claims invalid 
under the on-sale bar of § 102(b).386  In affirming the jury’s verdict that the 
claims were not invalid, the Federal Circuit explained that substantial 
evidence established that the sold device was not designed to perform the 
patented process and was not used to perform the patented process until 
after the asserted claims had issued.387 
C.  35 U.S.C. § 103—Obviousness 
In Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,388 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s holding that a patent directed to a screw anchor system that was 
used to support and stabilize slouching buildings was invalid as obvious in 
light of the prior art.  The asserted claims recited an elongated shaft with a 
screw tip and a transversely extending load-bearing metal bracket.  Of the 
two prior art patents relied upon by the district court, one disclosed the 
screw anchor component and the other disclosed the metal bracket 
                                                          
remand to the district court.  Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747. 
 383. Id. at 1319-20, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.  While concurring with the 
majority’s holding that the asserted claim was invalid, Judge Gajarsa wrote a concurring 
opinion explaining that he would affirm the district court’s decision that plaintiff is entitled 
to summary judgment that the claim is not invalid under public use because “the control 
[plaintiff] actually exercised over the trials was sufficient to demonstrate that the trials were 
in the nature of experimentation rather than mere commercial use.”  Id. at 1324, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750-51 (quoting SmithKline Beechum v. Apotex Corp., 286 F. Supp. 
2d 925, 934 (N.D. Ill. 2001).  The concurrence also noted that the majority opinion failed to 
explain why out of the cases discussed, only the plaintiff in the case at bar “had reduced its 
claimed invention to practice sufficiently to preclude the experimental use doctrine.”  Id. at 
1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751. 
 384. Id. at 1320, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747-48. 
 385. 383 F.3d 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 386. Id. at 1308-09, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688-89.  Section 102(b) provides, in 
pertinent part, that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention 
was . . . on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for 
patent in the United States.”  35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). 
 387. Poly-America, 383 F.3d at 1309, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688-89. 
 388. 357 F.3d 1270, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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component.  Both references disclosed systems for supporting building 
foundations.   
The Federal Circuit had previously remanded the case because the 
district court had not made specific findings on the motivation to combine 
the prior art references, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and whether 
and to what extent secondary considerations were probative in its 
obviousness analysis.389  Upon remand, the district court again came to its 
original conclusion:   the asserted claims were obvious in light of the cited 
references, stating that motivation to combine the references was found in 
the problem of underpinning foundations to which the asserted patent and 
the prior art references were addressed.390  The district court also explained 
that the patentee’s evidence of commercial success and doubt of expert 
witnesses were weak. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed and rejected the patentee’s 
argument that the district court exercised hindsight in its obviousness 
analysis, explaining that motivation to combine prior art references can be 
found in the nature of the problem to be solved, particularly with “simpler 
mechanical technologies.”  The Federal Circuit noted that it was therefore 
proper for the district court to find a motivation to combine “because the 
two references address precisely the same problem,” underpinning 
structural foundations.391  The Federal Circuit also rejected the patentee’s 
contention that the district court employed hindsight in identifying the 
required motivation to combine.  The Federal Circuit pointed to the district 
court’s careful consideration and ultimate dismissal of a witness’s 
testimony that actually supported a finding of a motivation to combine, and 
declared that this careful consideration “show[ed] further that it performed 
a detailed and reasoned analysis of the evidence, rather than a conclusion-
oriented discussion that typically accompanies a hindsight analysis.”392 
In National Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway,393 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s patents were 
not invalid as obvious over two prior art references.  The primary issues 
were:  (1) whether either reference disclosed the “drop-deck” or 
“intermediate depressed floor section” limitation of the asserted claims, in 
which the floor of the rail car between the end truck assemblies was lower 
than the portion of the floor over the end truck assemblies, and (2) whether 
there existed a motivation to combine the references.394  The Federal 
Circuit found that one reference disclosed a rail car with a floor while the 
                                                          
 389. Id. at 1274, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. 
 390. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. 
 391. Id. at 1276, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690. 
 392. Id. at 1277, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691. 
 393. 357 F.3d 1319, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 394. Id. at 1322-25, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643-45. 
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other reference disclosed a railcar in which the bottom’s center portion was 
lower than the portion over the ends.  The fact that the second reference’s 
bottom was not load-bearing, as the district court construed the term 
“floor” to require, was not problematic the Federal Circuit reasoned, 
because it found a load-bearing floor could be found in the first reference. 
Plaintiff argued that even if these two references disclosed all of the 
limitations of its asserted claims, defendant did not demonstrate a sufficient 
motivation to combine them in order to raise a substantial question of 
invalidity for obviousness.  The Federal Circuit, however, rejected that 
argument, explaining that defendant produced two pieces of documentary 
evidence supporting its position that one of ordinary skill in the art would 
have been motivated to combine the references.395 
The Federal Circuit thoroughly criticized the district court’s reasoning 
underlying its conclusion that plaintiff’s patent was obvious.  First, 
addressing the district court’s conclusion that neither reference had been 
disclosed to a sufficient number of people in order to qualify as “prior art,” 
the court emphasized that “[p]ublic distribution is irrelevant” as it has “long 
been the law that the motivation to combine need not be found in prior art 
references, but equally can be found in the knowledge generally available 
to one of ordinary skill in the art.”396  The Federal Circuit explained that the 
question was not whether others learned of the drawing evidencing the 
motivation to combine, as it would be if the issue was whether the drawing 
constituted prior art; rather the inquiry was whether the drawing 
demonstrated that persons of ordinary skill in the art would have 
considered it obvious to combine the elements found in the prior art 
references.397 
Second, the Federal Circuit found clear error in the district court’s 
dismissal of one of the references as prior art on the basis that it was 
created by a person without knowledge of engineering or rail car design.  
The court explained that the fact that the creator of a work allegedly 
showing the motivation to combine had less skill than one of ordinary skill 
in the art is actually probative of what one of ordinary skill in the art would 
have found obvious.398 
Third, the Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s conclusion that 
because the references addressed goals different from those served by the 
asserted patent, they “taught away” from the claimed invention.  The 
Federal Circuit reasoned that “[a] finding that two inventions were 
designed to resolve different problems . . . is insufficient to demonstrate 
                                                          
 395. Id. at 1337-38, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 396. Id. at 1337, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655 (internal quotations omitted). 
 397. Id. at 1338, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655. 
 398. Id. at 1338, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655-56. 
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that one invention teaches away from another.”399  
Finally, addressing secondary considerations, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that the district court’s finding that a long-felt but unsatisfied 
need for the invention existed was “flatly contradictory” with its additional 
finding that customers were satisfied with railcars that already existed on 
the market.  The Federal Circuit further noted that the other secondary 
considerations considered by the district court were insufficient by 
themselves to uphold its conclusion with regard to obviousness.400 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the grant of a preliminary 
injunction. 
In Knoll Pharmaceutical Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,401 the 
Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment that plaintiff’s drug 
patent was invalid as obvious.  The patent was directed to a composition of 
ibuprofen and hydrocodone and methods of administering such 
composition to treat pain.  The district court found the prior art suggesting 
combination of hydrocodone and ibuprofen to be invalidating.402  On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that the district court erred by failing 
to look to the specification’s acknowledgment that the analgesic effect 
resulting from the combination was greater than that provided by using 
either ibuprofen or hydrocodone alone.  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit 
found the district court improperly excluded the patentee’s evidence of 
studies conducted after the patent was granted that demonstrated the 
synergistic interaction of hydrocodone and ibuprofen.  The Federal Circuit 
held that such “[e]vidence developed after the patent grant is not excluded 
from consideration” because it provides an “understanding of the full range 
of an invention is not always achieved at the time of filing the patent 
application.”403 
The Federal Circuit also found error in the district court’s treatment of 
certain evidence of the failure of others to develop similar combination 
drugs, including evidence that others had abandoned their FDA registration 
applications for related compounds.  The district court did not ignore this 
evidence altogether, but dismissed it on the basis that several similar 
combinations had made it to market.  The Federal Circuit deemed these 
materials to be objective evidence of others’ failure to make the invention, 
and held that the district court improperly weighed conflicting evidence 
instead of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the opponent 
of summary judgment.404  As the Federal Circuit saw it, “[a]t a minimum 
                                                          
 399. Id. at 1339, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 400. Id. at 1340, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 401. 367 F.3d 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1957 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 402. Id. at 1384, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1959. 
 403. Id. at 1385, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960. 
 404. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960. 
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the conflicting evidence reinforced the patentee’s argument that the activity 
observed for the patented combination [was] not routinely present for all 
[related] combinations.”405 
In TypeRight Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,406 plaintiff sued 
defendant for infringement of its various patents directed to certain V-
shaped ergonomic keyboards.407  The district court granted a motion for 
summary judgment of invalidity, finding that all of the asserted claims 
were obvious in light of prior art.408  Defendant relied primarily on one 
reference created by a German company called Marquardt (“the 
document”) which included several pictures of V-shaped keyboards similar 
to the claimed invention.  The document, however, was undated, and 
therefore the main issue was whether it in fact constituted prior art.  The 
district court heard several of defendant’s witnesses testify to the effect that 
the document had been published at a trade show in Germany in 1986, 
prior to the critical date, and therefore determined that it was prior art. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that genuine issues existed as to the 
credibility of defendant’s witnesses and therefore summary judgment had 
been improperly granted.  First, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
defendant’s testimony that the document was publicly available in 1986 
was tentative—one witness had said he thought the document had been 
handed out at the 1986 trade show, and the other testified only that he 
remembered seeing documents “similar” to the document at the trade 
show.409  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit observed that these same 
witnesses testified that the document had been found in a file dated 1990 
and that the document had served as the basis for patent applications filed 
in 1991, and would have barred those patent applications had it been 
published in 1986.  Finally, the Federal Circuit noted that although the 
witnesses had testified that it was possible to verify the exact date of the 
document, no evidence suggested that such a step had been taken.410 
Under these circumstances, the Federal Circuit determined that summary 
judgment of invalidity was improperly granted.411  The Federal Circuit 
explained that although a naked statement that witnesses should not be 
believed would not prohibit summary judgment, “where the opposing party 
offers specific facts that call into question the credibility of the movants 
                                                          
 405. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1960. 
 406. 374 F.3d 1151, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 407. Id. at 1154, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502. 
 408. Id. at 1155, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503. 
 409. Id. at 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505. 
 410. Id. at 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505. 
 411. The court did not discuss the fact that had the document been published as late as 
1990, it still could have been considered prior art. 
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[sic] witnesses” summary judgment is not appropriate.412  
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,413 the Federal 
Circuit held that a prior art reference’s recognition of a problem to be 
solved did not render obvious subsequent claims for solving that 
problem.414  Cardiac Pacemakers involved an appeal from a district court’s 
grant of a JMOL, holding claims directed to cardiac defibrillators that are 
permanently installed under a patient’s skin invalid for obviousness.415  In 
granting the JMOL, the district court reasoned that all the elements of the 
disputed claims were well known in the prior art and found a “compelling 
motivation” to combine the various elements in light of a prior art reference 
that identified the same problem and solved the disputed claims.416  
Reversing the grant of the JMOL, the Federal Circuit explained that the 
district court “applied an incorrect standard to the ultimate question” of 
obviousness:417 
Recognition of the problem of treating complex heart arrhythmias does 
not render obvious the eventual solution.  Recognition of a need does not 
render obvious the achievement that meets that need.  There is an 
important distinction between the general motivation to cure an uncured 
disease . . . and the motivation to create a particular cure.418 
Though opining that “[t]here can of course arise situations wherein 
identification of the problem is itself the invention,” the Federal Circuit 
explained that “in the case at bar the problem was well-recognized . . . 
[and] the solution of this problem, according to trial proceedings, had not 
previously been achieved.”419  The Federal Circuit therefore determined 
that “[r]ecognition of an unsolved problem does not render the solution 
obvious.”420 
In re Fulton421 involved an appeal from the Board’s obviousness 
rejection of claims directed to an improved shoe sole.422  The Federal 
Circuit first noted that “[w]hen a rejection depends on combination of prior 
art references, there must be some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
combine the references.”423  The Federal Circuit  also explained that the 
source of the motivation to combine may be “the nature of the problem, the 
                                                          
 412. TypeRight Keyboard, 374 F.3d at 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1505-06. 
 413. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 414. Id. at 1377, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 415. Id. at 1374, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. 
 416. Id. at 1376-77, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 417. Id. at 1377, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 418. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 419. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 420. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337. 
 421. 391 F.3d 1195, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 422. Id. at 1196-97, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142-43. 
 423. Id. at 1200, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 
1355, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
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teachings of the pertinent references, or the ordinary knowledge of those 
skilled in the art.”424 
Appellant argued that the Board’s finding of a motivation to combine 
lacked substantial evidence because it failed to show that the characteristics 
in the prior art reference “are preferred over other alternatives disclosed in 
the prior art.”425 The court rejected this argument and explained: 
[O]ur case law does not require that a particular combination must be the 
preferred, or the most desirable, combination described in the prior art in 
order to provide motivation for the current invention. “The question is 
whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the 
desirability, and thus the obviousness, of making the combination,” not 
whether there is something in the prior art as a whole to suggest that the 
combination is the most desirable combination available.426 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that “a finding that the prior art as 
a whole suggests the desirability of a particular combination need not be 
supported by a finding that the prior art suggests that the combination 
claimed by the patent applicant is the preferred, or most desirable, 
combination.”427 
Relying on its precedent that a reference “teach[es] away when a person 
of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from 
following the path set out in the reference,”428 appellant also argued that the 
Board erred in finding that none of the prior art references taught away 
from the combination of prior art references relied upon for the rejection.429  
The Federal Circuit also rejected this argument, reasoning that “[t]he prior 
art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a 
teaching away from any of [the] alternatives because such disclosure does 
not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed in the 
[appellant’s] application.”430 
Appellant further argued that the Board erred by failing to establish that 
the prior art contained a teaching identifying the importance of a feature 
covered by the claimed invention.431  The Federal Circuit also declined to 
accept this argument, noting that it “relies on the mistaken premise that the 
prior art must teach that a particular combination is preferred, or ‘optimal,’ 
                                                          
 424. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Rouffet, 149 
F.3d at 1355, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456). 
 425. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145. 
 426. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (quoting In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1311, 24 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1040, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 427. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145. 
 428. Id. at 1201, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145 (quoting In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553, 
31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 429. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145-46. 
 430. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. 
 431. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. 
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for the combination to be obvious.”432  Citing In re Gurley,433 the court 
stated that “as long as some motivation or suggestion to combine the 
references is provided by the prior art taken as a whole, the law does not 
require that the reference be combined for the reasons contemplated by the 
inventor.”434 
In re Bigio435 presented the question of whether prior art references 
relating to toothbrushes constituted analogous art for purposes of 
determining whether claims directed to a hair brush would have been 
obvious.436  The Federal Circuit observed that: 
[t]wo separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art:  (1) whether 
the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem 
addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s 
endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the 
particular problem with which the inventor is involved.437 
Challenging the Board’s application of the field of endeavor test, 
appellant argued that such an approach is “unworkable because the lack of 
clear guidelines leaves the application of this test to an examiner’s 
subjective judgment.”438  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, 
explaining that “the field of endeavor test is neither wholly subjective nor 
unworkable.  The test for analogous art requires the PTO to determine the 
appropriate field of endeavor by reference to explanations of the 
invention’s subject matter in the patent application, including the 
embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.”439  The 
Federal Circuit further observed that: 
Although the majority of the case law precedent for analogous arts 
hinges on the second test, this court detects no ambiguity in the “field of 
endeavor” test. While the scope of any field of endeavor will vary with 
the factual description of each invention, that variability does not equate 
with ambiguity and absence of a neutral standard.440 
Turning to the record, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s 
determination that the toothbrush references were analogous art to claims 
directed to a hair brush “because the structural similarities between 
toothbrushes and small brushes for hair would have led one of ordinary 
skill in the art working in the specific field of hairbrushes to consider all 
                                                          
 432. Id. at 1201-02, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146. 
 433. 27 F.3d 551, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130. 
 434. Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1202, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1146 (citations omitted) (quoting 
In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1312, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1040, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 435. 381 F.3d 1320, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 436. Id. at 1325, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211. 
 437. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
 438. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
 439. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
 440. Id. at 1326, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
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similar brushes including toothbrushes.”441  The Federal Circuit also 
affirmed the Board’s finding that one skilled in the art would have 
considered toothbrushes and hairbrushes “to be within the same 
endeavor.”442  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s 
rejection of the claims “[b]ecause there is no dispute that the combination 
of the three toothbrush references renders [appellant’s] invention 
obvious.”443 
In dissent, Judge Newman explained that the “toothbrush art is not 
analogous to the hair brush art.  [Appellant’s] patent application is directed 
to a hair brush, and his claims are limited to a hair brush” and “[a] brush for 
hair has no more relation to a brush for teeth than does hair resemble 
teeth.”444  Judge Newman further reasoned that: 
The mode and mechanics of brushing teeth cannot reasonably be viewed 
as analogous to the mode and mechanics of brushing hair.  To state the 
obvious:   teeth require a brush that penetrates around the edges of 
relatively large and hard substrates, a brush that administers a soapy 
abrasive, a brush that works in the up-and-down and circular motion 
needed to scrub teeth; a brush for hair must serve entirely different 
shapes and textures and purposes.445 
Iron Grip Barbell Co. v. USA Sports, Inc.446 involved an appeal from a 
grant of summary judgment holding invalid as obvious a claim directed to a 
weight plate “formed with solely a triad of spaced apart elongated handle 
openings.”447  In comparing the claims to the prior art, the Federal Circuit 
emphasized its precedent warning against use of hindsight to evaluate the 
prior art and explained that the “district court’s use of an ‘overall picture’ 
and ‘common sense’ test of obviousness falls squarely into the hindsight 
trap.”448  Then noting that the requirement for a motivation to combine 
prior art “prevents the use of ‘the inventor’s disclosure as a blueprint for 
piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability—the essence of 
hindsight,’”449 the Federal Circuit reasoned that the appeal presented 
circumstances in which the disputed claim limitation fell within a range 
disclosed in the prior art references.450  The Federal Circuit observed that: 
Where the “prior art . . . discloses a range encompassing a somewhat 
                                                          
 441. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
 442. Id. at 1327, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213. 
 443. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213. 
 444. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 445. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1213 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 446. 392 F.3d 1317, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 447. Id. at 1319, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,436,015 
(issued Aug. 20, 2002)). 
 448. Id. at 1320, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 449. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 450. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
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narrower claimed range,” the narrower range may be 
obvious . . . . “[W]hen the difference between the claimed invention and 
the prior art is the range or value of a particular variable,” then a patent 
should not issue if “the difference in range or value is minor.”451 
The Federal Circuit thus reasoned that “simply because an invention falls 
within a range disclosed by the prior art does not necessarily make it per se 
obvious.  Both the genus and species may be patentable.”452  The Federal 
Circuit further explained that “where there is a range disclosed in the prior 
art, and the claimed invention falls within that range, there is a presumption 
of obviousness,”453 but observed that the presumption could be rebutted if:  
(1) the prior art teaches away from the claimed invention, or (2) the 
claimed invention results in unexpected results not disclosed in the prior 
art.454 
Reviewing the record evidence, the Federal Circuit reasoned that: 
The prior art suggested that a large number of elongated grips in exercise 
weights was beneficial, thus plainly suggesting that one skilled in the art 
look to the range appearing in the prior art.  The prior art disclosed 
weight plates with one, two, or four elongated handles.  [Plaintiff] is 
claiming a weight plate with three elongated handles, within the range of 
the prior art.455 
The Federal Circuit then noted that, other than a conclusory statement, 
plaintiff offered no evidence that the prior art taught away from the 
invention.456  The Federal Circuit further observed that plaintiff failed to 
adduce any evidence showing the three-grip barbell produced unexpected 
results, particularly because “[t]here is no indication of any new and 
unexpected results from the use of a three-grip plate in the . . . patent or the 
prosecution history.”457  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the 
claim was invalid as obvious “absent substantial evidence of pertinent 
secondary factors supporting patentability.”458 
Finally, addressing the record evidence on secondary considerations, the 
Federal Circuit determined that plaintiff failed to establish commercial 
success of the claimed invention.459  In particular, the Federal Circuit 
observed that “[t]he only evidence of marketplace success that [plaintiff] 
proffers is that six retail competitors offered three-grip plates, and three of 
                                                          
 451. Id. at 1321, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227-28 (quoting Haynes Int’l v. Jessop Steel 
Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1577 n.3, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652, 1655 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 452. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 453. Id. at 1322, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 454. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 455. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 456. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 457. Id. at 1323, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228. 
 458. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
 459. Id. at 1324, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. 
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those competitors have entered into license agreements with respect to 
the . . . patent.”460  The Federal Circuit explained that such evidence was 
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact because plaintiff “did 
not explain the terms of the licenses nor the circumstances under which 
they were granted . . . . Our cases specifically require affirmative evidence 
of nexus where the evidence of commercial success presented is a license, 
because it is often ‘cheaper to take licenses than to defend infringement 
suits.’”461 
Then addressing plaintiff’s evidence of copying, the Federal Circuit 
explained that “[n]ot every competing product that arguably falls within the 
scope of a patent is evidence of copying. Otherwise every infringement suit 
would automatically confirm the nonobviousness of the patent.”462  The 
Federal Circuit thus concluded that evidence that competitors abandoned 
one-arm plates in favor of three-arm plates was insufficient to establish 
copying.463 
D.  35 U.S.C. § 112 
1.  Written description 
Although in 2004 the Federal Circuit as a whole continued to debate at a 
conceptual level what role, if any, the written description requirement 
should play in patent jurisprudence, the court’s individual decisions 
reaffirmed that the written description requirement provides a viable 
challenge to the validity or the patentability of claims. 
University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.464 involved an appeal from 
a grant of summary judgment holding claims covering methods of 
selectively inhibiting COX-2 enzymes invalid for failure to comply with 
the written description requirement of § 112, ¶ 1.465  On appeal, plaintiff 
first argued that the district court erred in holding the claims invalid 
because “no written description requirement exists independent of 
enablement.”466  The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, providing an 
                                                          
 460. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 461. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (quoting EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 
755 F.2d 898, 908, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 20, 26  (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 462. Id. at 1325, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 463. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230. 
 464. 358 F.3d 916, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 465. Id. at 917-19, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888-89.  Section 112 states that the patent 
shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process 
of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 466. Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 920, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890. 
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extensive analysis establishing that written description and enablement are 
two separate and independent requirements that must both be satisfied by 
the patentee.467  The Federal Circuit began by noting that § 112, ¶ 1, 
provides three separate criteria for patentability “referred to as the ‘written 
description requirement,’ the ‘enablement requirement,’ and the best mode 
requirement.’”468  The Federal Circuit explained that: 
Although there is often significant overlap between the three 
requirements, they are nonetheless independent of each other . . . . Thus, 
an invention may be described without an enabling disclosure of how to 
make and use it.  A description of a chemical compound without a 
description of how to make and use it, unless within the skill of one of 
ordinary skill in the art, is an example.  Moreover, an invention may be 
enabled even though it has not been described . . . . Such can occur when 
enablement of a closely related invention A that is both described and 
enabled would similarly enable an invention B if B were described.  A 
specification can likewise describe an invention without enabling the 
practice of the full breadth of its claims.  Finally, still further disclosure 
might be necessary to satisfy the best mode requirement if otherwise 
only an inferior mode would be disclosed.469 
The Federal Circuit also reasoned that the written description 
requirement “serves a teaching function, as a ‘quid pro quo’ in which the 
public is given ‘meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from 
practicing the invention for a limited period of time.’”470  Then providing a 
historical analysis of the case law addressing § 112, ¶ 1, the Federal Circuit 
made clear that its “precedent clearly recognizes a separate written 
description requirement.”471 
Plaintiff next argued that the Federal Circuit s decisions in Regents of 
University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co.,472 Fiers v. Reval,473 and Enzo 
                                                          
 467. Id. at 921-23, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890-92. 
 468. Id. at 921, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890. 
 469. Id. at 921-22, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891 (citations omitted). 
 470. Id. at 922, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891 (quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-
Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that the public notice function of the written description requirement 
“became redundant with the advent of claims in 1870,” the court stated that “[s]tatutory 
language does not become redundant unless repealed by Congress in which case it no longer 
exists.”  Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891. 
 471. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891.  The court examined the following cases:   Enzo, 
323 F.3d at 956, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609; Regents of Univ. of California v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fiers v. Reval, 984 
F.2d 1164, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 178 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 620 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
118 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 553, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 647 (C.C.P.A. 
1963); In re Sus, 306 F.2d 494, 134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 301 (C.C.P.A. 1962); and In re Moore, 
155 F.2d 379, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524 (C.C.P.A. 1946).  Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 
922, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891. 
 472. 119 F.3d 1559, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398. 
 473. 984 F.2d 1164, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601. 
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Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.474 were not applicable on the grounds that 
those cases “all related to genetic material whereas this case does not.”475  
The Federal Circuit found plaintiff’s distinction to be “irrelevant” because 
the written description statute “applies to all types of inventions” and there 
was “no reason for the rule to be any different when non-genetic materials 
are at issue.”476  The Federal Circuit also rejected the plaintiff’s contention 
that “those cases were limited to composition of matter claims, whereas the 
[asserted] patent is directed to a method.”477  The Federal Circuit opined 
that: 
Regardless whether a compound is claimed per se or a method is claimed 
that entails the use of the compound, the inventor cannot lay claim to that 
subject matter unless he can provide a description of the compound 
sufficient to distinguish infringing compounds from non-infringing 
compounds, or infringing methods from non-infringing methods.478 
The Federal Circuit clarified its reasoning by explaining that it was not 
suggesting that “the written description requirement can be satisfied only 
by providing a description of an actual reduction to practice.”479  Rather, 
the Federal Circuit instructed that “[c]onstructive reduction to practice is an 
established method of disclosure, but the application must nonetheless 
‘describe the claimed subject matter in terms that establish that [the 
applicant] was in possession of the . . . claimed invention.”480 
The plaintiff also challenged the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, contending that a “‘patent-in-suit cannot be per se invalid’ 
because written description is a question of fact.”481  The Federal Circuit 
found this argument unavailing, reasoning that “although compliance with 
the written description requirement is a question of fact . . . [plaintiff’s] 
argument that a patent may not be held invalid on its face is contrary to our 
case law . . . . After all, it is in the patent specification where the written 
description must be met.”482  In a related argument, plaintiff argued that 
“because [defendant] adduced no evidence, other than the patent in suit, to 
support its written description defense, [plaintiff] was entitled to summary 
judgment on that issue.”483  The Federal Circuit likewise rejected this 
argument explaining “[a]lthough section 282 of the Patent Act places the 
                                                          
 474. 323 F.3d 956, 970, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 1609, 1617. 
 475. Univ. of Rochester, 358 F.3d at 925, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893. 
 476. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893. 
 477. Id. at 926, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894. 
 478. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (emphasis omitted). 
 479. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894. 
 480. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (quoting Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1353, 
47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 481. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (emphasis omitted). 
 482. Id. at 927, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895 (citations omitted). 
 483. Id. at 930, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897. 
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burden of proof on the party seeking to invalidate a patent, it does not 
foreclose the possibility of that party demonstrating that the patent in suit 
proves its own invalidity.”484 
Following issuance of the panel opinion in University of Rochester v. 
G.D. Searle & Co.,485 the plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing to the panel 
and then a petition for rehearing en banc.486  The petition for rehearing en 
banc was denied by one vote, with five judges writing separate opinions to 
express their views on the state of law of the written description 
requirement.487  Judge Newman dissented from the denial of rehearing en 
banc, citing the need for the court to resolve “the burgeoning conflict in the 
pronouncements of this court concerning the written description and the 
enablement requirements of the Patent Act.  This question has been 
promoted from simple semantics into a fundamental conflict concerning 
patent scope and the support needed to claim biological products.”488  
Interestingly, while dissenting from the denial of the en banc hearing, 
Judge Newman explained that she “fully share[s] Judge Lourie’s 
understanding of the law.  The continuing attack on well-established and 
heretofore unchallenged decisions . . . is not only unwarranted, but is 
disruptive of the stability with which this court is charged.”489  Rather, 
Judge Newman observed that: 
[T]he issue of whether patent law contains a separate written description 
requirement has percolated through various panels of this court, on a 
variety of facts.  The differences of opinion among the judges of the 
Federal Circuit are, in microcosm, the “percolation” that scholars feared 
would be lost by a national court at the circuit level.  Percolation is the 
great justifier of conflict among the regional circuits.490 
Judge Newman then addressed the concerns advanced by the 
biotechnology industry concerning the written description requirement: 
The new biology has indeed raised new and important questions, with 
implications for policy as well as law.  However, the answer is not the 
simplistic one espoused by some commentators; it is simply incorrect to 
say that there is not now and never has been a “written description” 
requirement in the patent law.  It has always been necessary to disclose 
                                                          
 484. Id., U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.  Addressing the plaintiff’s argument that the district 
court’s decision “vitiates universities’ ability to bring pioneering innovations to the public” 
as intended by the Bayh-Dole Act, the court found the argument to be “unsound” because 
“no connection exists between the Bayh-Dole Act and the legal standards that courts employ 
to assess patentability.”  Id. at 929, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1896. 
 485. 375 F.3d 1303, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 486. Id. at 1304, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545. 
 487. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545. 
 488. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 489. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (citations omitted) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 490. Id. at 1305, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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and describe what is patented.  It has never been the law that one can 
claim what is not made known and set forth in the patent.491 
Judge Newman further explained that “[i]f the nature of the subject 
matter is not amenable to precise description, some alternative mode of 
disclosure is required, such as deposit in a pubic depository . . . . However, 
the public purpose of patents is seriously disserved by eliminating the 
description requirement entirely.”492 
Judge Lourie, the author of the original Rochester opinion, concurred in 
the court’s decision not to rehear the case en banc,493 explaining that: 
Contrary to the assertions of the appellant, certain amici, and some of the 
dissenters, there is and always has been a separate written description 
requirement in the patent law.  The requirement to describe one’s 
invention is basic to the patent law, and every patent draftsman knows 
that he or she must describe a client’s invention independently of the 
need to enable one skilled in the relevant art to make and use the 
invention.  The specification then must also describe how to make and 
use the invention (i.e., enable it), but that is a different task.494 
Judge Lourie further reasoned that the written description requirement 
cannot be swept away by claiming that it relates only to priority issues or 
that the prohibition on introduction of new matter takes care of the need 
for a written description. The statute does not contain a limitation that it 
pertains only to priority issues.  Moreover, the prohibition on 
introduction of new matter . . . is not a substitute for the written 
description requirement.495 
Addressing arguments that the court’s recent application of the written 
description requirement was not consonant with the historical use of § 112, 
¶ 1, Judge Lourie opined that: 
The fact, if it is a fact, that written description has only been relied upon 
in recent years as a ground of invalidity does not remove that 
requirement from the statute.  Legal holdings arise when they do because 
litigants raise them and courts have to decide them.  Contrary to what has 
been asserted, the interpretation of the statute as containing a separate 
written description requirement did not originate with [Eli] Lilly . . . . It 
has always been there.496 
Judge Rader, joined by Judges Gajarsa and Linn, dissented from the 
court’s decision not to hear the case en banc, noting that “[b]y a narrow 
margin . . . this court avoids the opportunity to clarify and correct its 
confusing jurisprudence on the new written description invalidity 
                                                          
 491. Id. at 1304, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 492. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 493. Id. at 1305, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 494. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 495. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 496. Id. at 1306, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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doctrine.”497  Judge Rader’s motivation for an en banc hearing was his 
disagreement with the court’s decision in Eli Lilly and its progeny: 
[T]his court for the first time applied the written description language of 
35 U.S.C. § 112 . . . as a general disclosure requirement in place of 
enablement, rather than in its traditional role as a doctrine to prevent 
applicants from adding new inventions to an older disclosure . . . . In 
simple terms, contrary to logic and the statute itself, Eli Lilly requires 
one part of the specification (the written description) to provide 
“adequate support” for another part of the specification (the claims).  
Neither Eli Lilly nor this case has explained either the legal basis for this 
new validity requirement or the standard for “adequate support.”  
Because this new judge-made doctrine has created enormous confusion 
which this court declines to resolve, I respectfully dissent.498 
Judge Rader noted that the Eli Lilly opinion engendered the court’s 
opinion in Enzo, which “[f]ollowing issuance, withdrawal, and 
reissuance . . . [caused the] court [to] engage in lengthy debate over the 
new disclosure validity doctrine” and “[t]hat debate continued in [the] 
court’s subsequent cases.”499  Judge Rader observed that “a brief survey of 
the literature on this topic, an astounding amount in a few short years, 
shows thirty-one articles criticizing the Eli Lilly doctrine, seven articles 
defending the doctrine, and sixteen neutrally commenting on the state of 
this evolving case law.”500 
Addressing the hypothetical provided in the Rochester opinion for 
explaining the necessity of a written description requirement separate from 
an enablement requirement, Judge Rader opined: 
The hypothetical actually facilitates a policy analysis that explains the 
reasons that the new 1997 requirement is both superfluous and 
dangerous.  In the first place, the hypothetical rarely, if ever, happens.  
No actual case presents the hypothetical.  In both Eli Lilly and Rochester, 
for instance, the invention A (rat insulin in Eli Lilly; an assay for Cox 1 
and 2 in Rochester) was enabled and described, but the invention B 
(human insulin in Eli Lilly; a Cox 2 inhibitor in Rochester) was not 
enabled. 
In understandable terms, the hypothetical says that an inventor invents 
the radio, but his invention solves a problem that enables those of 
ordinary skill in the art to know how to make and use both a radio and a 
TV. His patent disclosure only describes a radio but he claims broadly an 
“electrical receiver.”  Thus, his claims seem to encompass the TV which 
his specification does not describe but would enable if it were described.  
                                                          
 497. Id. at 1307, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 498. Id. at 1307-08, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548-49 (citations omitted) (Rader, J., 
dissenting). 
 499. Id. at 1308, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 500. Id. at 1309, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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In that context, the reason the hypothetical does not occur becomes 
obvious.  If everyone of ordinary skill in the art knows from the 
disclosure how to make and use the TV, the exceptionally talented 
inventor will also.  To avoid any risk of losing the TV invention, the 
inventor will fully disclose it and claim it, probably in a separate 
application.  For this very practical reason, no case has ever presented 
the hypothetical.  Inventors know when they have made an invention and 
realize that they must properly disclose it or risk losing it entirely.501 
Joined by Judge Rader and Judge Gajarsa, Judge Linn also dissented 
from the court’s denial of en banc consideration, explaining that the 
Rochester panel opinion “perpetuates the confusion our precedent in [Eli] 
Lilly and Enzo has engendered in establishing ‘written description’ as a 
separate requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, on which a patent 
may be held invalid.”502  Judge Linn reasoned that: 
The question presented by 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, is not, “Does 
the written description disclose what the invention is?”  The question is, 
“Does the written description describe the invention recited in the 
claims—themselves part of the specification—in terms that are sufficient 
to enable one of skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention 
and practice the best mode contemplated by the inventor?”  That is the 
mandate of the statute and is all our precedent demanded prior to [Eli 
Lilly]. 
Reading into paragraph 1 of section 112 an independent written 
description requirement, divorced from enablement, sets up an inevitable 
clash between the claims and the written description as the focus of the 
scope of coverage.  This is ill-advised.  Surely there is no principle more 
firmly established in patent law than the primacy of the claims in 
establishing the bounds of the right to exclude.503 
Accordingly, Judge Linn concluded that “[c]onstruing section 112 to 
contain a separate written description requirement beyond enablement and 
best mode creates confusion as to where the public and the courts should 
look to determine the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude.”504 
Finally, Judge Dyk wrote separately explaining that while he concurred 
in the court’s decision not to hear the case en banc “[f]or the reasons set 
forth in the panel opinion and in Judge Lourie’s opinion concurring in the 
denial of en banc review,” his vote to deny en banc review “should not be 
taken as an endorsement of our existing written description jurisprudence.  
In my view we have yet to articulate satisfactory standards that can be 
                                                          
 501. Id. at 1312, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 502. Id. at 1325, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 503. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566-67 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 504. Id. at 1326, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
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applied to all technologies.”505 
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.506 involved an appeal from a denial of 
plaintiff’s motion for a JMOL that claims directed to monoclonal 
antibodies were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102 because those claims could 
not claim priority back to earlier applications.507  The Federal Circuit began 
its analysis by noting that § 120 provides that an 
“[A]pplication for [a] patent for an invention disclosed in the manner 
provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in an 
application previously filed in the United States . . . shall have the same 
effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior 
application.”508 
The Federal Circuit then explained that a claim “may only claim priority 
to an earlier application if the earlier application fulfills the requirements of 
§ 112, first paragraph.”509  
Turning to the trial record, the Federal Circuit noted that “genetically 
engineered antibodies, specifically chimeric antibodies, first appeared as a 
successful technology in the literature of this art field in May 1984, four 
months after the filing date of the first application” to which plaintiff 
claimed priority.510  The Federal Circuit thus observed that the “jury may 
have found that the [first application] does not provide any support for the 
new matter . . . [b]ecause chimeric antibody technology did not even exist 
at the time of the 1984 filing.”511  The Federal Circuit  thus concluded that 
“the record conclusively supports that the [plaintiff’s] scientists did not 
possess and disclose this technology in the February 1984 filing.”512 
In Koito Manufacturing Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,513 plaintiff 
advanced two separate theories in arguing that the disputed claims failed to 
satisfy the written description requirement.514  First, plaintiff argued that 
the patentee amended the patent specification through a certificate of 
                                                          
 505. Id. at 1327, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 506. 363 F.3d 1247, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 507. See Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1249-50, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322-23.  The parties 
stipulated before trial that the claims would be invalid under § 102 based on intervening 
prior art if the claims were entitled to a priority filing date of earlier applications.  Id. at 
1252, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. 
 508. See id. at 1253, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 120). 
 509. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325.  The first paragraph of § 112 provides that: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it 
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 510. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1254, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 511. Id. at 1255, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 512. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 513. 381 F.3d 1142, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 514. See id. at 1153-54, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198-99. 
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correction in a manner that was not supported by the original disclosure.515  
The Federal Circuit noted that “a change to correct an error is not 
considered new matter if ‘one skilled in the art would appreciate not only 
the existence of an error in the specification but what the error is.’”516  The 
Federal Circuit then rejected the written description challenge, concluding 
that “[b]ecause the amended material is inherently contained in the original 
application, it cannot constitute new matter.”517 
Second, plaintiff argued that claims requiring a “significantly thicker and 
wider” flow channel were not supported because such structure was not 
depicted by certain figures in the patent specification.518  The Federal 
Circuit rejected this argument and upheld the jury’s verdict that the claims 
were adequately supported by the specification, explaining that “the written 
description requirement can be satisfied by ‘words, structures, figures, 
diagrams, formulas, etc.’”519  The Federal Circuit then concluded that 
figure 1 of the patent “clearly shows that [the] flow channel . . . is 
‘significantly thicker and wider.’”520 
In re Wallach521 involved an appeal from the Board’s rejection of 
pending claims for failure to satisfy the written description requirement.522  
The appellants had two pending applications before the PTO—one 
application contained claims directed to proteins capable of inhibiting the 
cytotoxic effect of tumor neurosis factor, and a second application with 
claims directed to deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) molecules capable of 
encoding such proteins.523  The claims at issue on appeal were the latter.524  
Challenging the Board’s finding, the appellants argued that the 
specification itself “establishes that the present inventors were in fact in 
possession of the entire claimed genus of DNA sequences at the time the 
application was filed.”525  In response, the PTO argued that the 
specification “includes neither any actual DNA sequence within the scope 
of the claims nor the complete amino acid sequence of the [claimed] 
protein, but only the sequence of . . . [certain] amino acids that make up the 
protein.”526 
                                                          
 515. Id. at 1153, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1198. 
 516. Id. at 1154, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199 (quoting In re Oda, 443 F.2d 1200, 1206, 
170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 268, 272 (C.C.P.A. 1971)). 
 517. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199. 
 518. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199. 
 519. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199 (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 
F.3d 1565, 1572, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 520. Id. at 1155, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199. 
 521. 378 F.3d 1330, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 522. Id. at 1331, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940-41. 
 523. Id. at 1331-32, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940-41. 
 524. Id. at 1332, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 525. Id. at 1333, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 526. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
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While noting that it saw “no reason to require a patent applicant to list 
every possible permutation of the nucleic acid sequences that can encode a 
particular protein for which the amino acid sequence is disclosed,”527 the 
Federal Circuit explained that the appellants “did not claim the nucleic acid 
molecules that encode the simple protein sequence that they disclosed.  
Rather, they claimed the nucleic acids encoding a protein for which they 
provided only a partial sequence.”528  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
appellant’s argument that because it demonstrated possession of the 
claimed protein, it was also “necessarily in possession of its inherent amino 
acid sequence, as well as all of the DNA sequences encoding that amino 
acid sequence.”529  The Federal Circuit reasoned that 
[w]hether Appellants were in possession of the protein says nothing 
about whether they were in possession of the protein’s amino acid 
sequence.  Although Appellants correctly point out that a protein’s 
amino acid sequence is an inherent property of the protein, the fact that 
the Appellants may have isolated and thus physically possessed [the 
claimed protein] does not amount to knowledge of that protein’s 
sequence or possession of any of its other descriptive properties.530 
The Federal Circuit further explained that while it has “recognized that 
the written description requirement can in some cases be satisfied by 
functional description . . . such functional description can be sufficient only 
if there is also a structure-function relationship known to those of ordinary 
skill in the art.”531  The Federal Circuit thus concluded that without a 
sequence “or with only a partial sequence, those structures cannot be 
determined and the written description requirement is consequently not 
met.”532 
In a series of cases in 2004, the court addressed the issue of whether 
disclosure of a species could support claims broadly directed to a genus.  In 
re Curtis533 was an appeal of the Board’s re-examination decision holding 
that the patentee could not overcome a prior art rejection by claiming the 
benefit of an earlier application.534  The rejected claims were directed to 
dental floss covering a genus of friction-enhancing coating, while the 
earlier application disclosed only micro-crystalline wax (“MCW”) 
                                                          
 527. Id. at 1334, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 528. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 529. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
 530. Id. at 1334-35, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
 531. Id. at 1335, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943 (citations omitted). 
 532. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
 533. 354 F.3d 1347, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274  (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 534. Id. at 1348, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275 (explaining that patentee’s earlier 
application “failed to adequately describe the subject mater encompassed by the rejected 
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.”). 
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coating.535  Because the parties agreed that the patentee could overcome the 
anticipation and obviousness rejections only by obtaining the benefit of the 
earlier application’s filing date, the sole issue was whether substantial 
evidence supported the Board’s finding that the earlier application did not 
provide “a written description of [appellant’s] later-claimed genus of 
friction enhancing coatings.”536 
Concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings, the 
Federal Circuit explained that the earlier application was replete with 
passages describing MCW as the only suitable coating.537  The Federal 
Circuit observed that the single test example in the earlier application 
involved MCW coating and the application did not name “a suitable 
friction enhancing coating for . . . dental floss other than MCW.”538  The 
Federal Circuit further underscored its conclusion by noting that during 
prosecution of the earlier application, the patentee submitted declarations 
“demonstrating that MCW coating was in fact the only friction enhancing 
coating conveyed by [appellant] at the time the [earlier] application was 
filed and that dental flosses . . . would not be expected to be commercially 
acceptable when coated with other materials.”539 
As a collateral attack on the Board’s decision, the patentee argued that 
under the reasoning of In re Smythe,540 the earlier application provided 
adequate support for the later genus claims because it “convey[ed] how and 
why individual species of the genus are operable in the invention.”541  In 
Smythe, the Federal Circuit’s predecessor allowed later genus claims 
because an earlier application “clearly convey[ed] to one skilled in the art 
that in this invention the characteristics of a fluid are what make 
segmentizing medium work . . . .”542  The Court of Customs and Patents 
Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”), however, qualified its holding by explaining that 
“where there is unpredictability in performance of certain species or 
subcombinations other than those specifically enumerated, one skilled in 
the art may be found not to have been placed in possession of a genus or 
combination claimed at a later date in the prosecution of a patent 
application.”543 
The Federal Circuit rejected appellant’s analogy to Smythe, explaining 
                                                          
 535. Id. at 1349, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1275-76. 
 536. Id. at 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278. 
 537. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278. 
 538. Id. at 1352-53, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278-79. 
 539. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278-79. 
 540. 480 F.2d 1376, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 279 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 541. Curtis, 354 F.3d at 1354, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279-80. 
 542. Id. at 1355, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (quoting In re Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1382, 
178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 284). 
 543. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (quoting In re Smythe, 480 F.2d at 1382, 178 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 284-85). 
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that the substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding of 
unpredictability in the art of dental floss.544  The Federal Circuit explained 
that 
[u]nlike the circumstances In re Smythe presented, the instant facts 
present a case in which there is ‘unpredictability in performance of 
certain species or subcombinations other than those specifically 
enumerated . . . . As such, mere recitation of properties common to all 
species of friction enhancing coatings in the [earlier] [a]pplication did 
not put persons of ordinary skill in the art in possession of the full range 
of later-claimed friction enhancing coatings.545 
The Federal Circuit further noted that, though in certain cases a 
disclosure of a species may support later claims of a genus, 
. . . we have never held that in all such cases, including those in which 
persons of ordinary skill in the art could not predict the operability of 
undisclosed species, the decision in In re Smythe compels a finding that 
the claim to the genus is adequately described under § 112, ¶ 1.546 
Noelle v. Lederman547 was an appeal from an interference proceeding 
involving inter alia an issue of whether a junior party’s earlier application 
could provide support for later claims directed to monoclonal antibodies.548  
At the PTO, the Board predicated its analysis by analogizing the antibody 
claims to DNA claims, and denied the junior party the benefit of an earlier 
filing date because the earlier application “failed to describe any structural 
features of the human or genus antibodies or antigens.”549 
Accepting the Board’s analogy to precedent analyzing the written 
description requirement in the context of DNA claims, the Federal Circuit 
began by noting that “[a]n earlier application that describes later-claimed 
genetic material only by a statement of function or result may be 
insufficient to meet the written description requirement.”550  Rather, the 
Federal Circuit explained that “a description of DNA ‘requires a precise 
definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical 
properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed chemical 
invention.”551 
The Federal Circuit then affirmed the Board’s finding, explaining that 
the earlier application did not provide sufficient support for claims “to the 
human CD40CR antibody” in the earlier application because the junior 
party “failed to disclose the structural elements of human CD40CR 
                                                          
 544. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280. 
 545. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280 (citations omitted). 
 546. Id. at 1356, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1281. 
 547. 355 F.3d 1343, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 548. Id. at 1346, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511. 
 549. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511. 
 550. Id. at 1348, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513. 
 551. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513. 
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antibody or antigen in his earlier . . . application.”552  The Federal Circuit 
also noted that the junior party “only described [a] mouse antigen when he 
claimed mouse, human, and genus forms of CD40CR antibodies by citing 
to the ATCC number of the hybridoma secreting the mouse DC40CR 
antibody.”553  The court further stated that the junior party could not claim 
a genus form of the CD40CR antibody by simply describing mouse 
CD40CR antigen, explaining that “a patentee of a biotechnological 
invention cannot necessarily claim a genus after only describing a limited 
number of species because there may be unpredictability in the results 
obtained from species other than those specifically enumerated.”554 
Bilstad v. Wakalopulos,555 involved an appeal from the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interference’s judgment that appellant’s patent application 
lacked a sufficient written description under § 112.  Appellant provoked an 
interference by copying claims of appellee’s patent into the patent 
application.  The technology to which the application and patent were 
directed was an apparatus for sterilizing three-dimensional objects using 
ionizing radiation without hurting the objects.556  The relevant portions of 
the interference count read as follows:   “A sterilization apparatus 
comprising, an electron beam tube . . . and a moveable member 
manipulating objects in a plurality of directions within the reactive volume 
wherein the manipulated objects are sterilized.”557 
Having construed “plurality” to connote an “indefinite numerical range,” 
ranging from two to infinity, the Board concluded that appellant’s 
application disclosing manipulation in only a small number of directions 
did not support the interference count.558  On appeal, appellant argued that 
the Board erred in requiring that the application describe every 
embodiment within the range of two to infinity attributed to the term 
“plurality” by the Board.  The Federal Circuit approached this question by 
reviewing the “spectrum of cases” discussing whether disclosure of a 
species supports a claim covering a genus, including In re Smythe,559 In re 
Rasmussen,560 Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc.,561 Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,562 In re Curtis,563 and Tronzo 
                                                          
 552. Id. at 1349, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
 553. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
 554. Id. at 1350, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
 555. 386 F.3d 1116, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 556. Id. at 1118, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786-87. 
 557. Id. at 1119, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787. 
 558. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787. 
 559. 480 F.2d 1376, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 279 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 560. 650 F.2d 1212, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 561. 772 F.2d 1570, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 177 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that a parent 
written description supported several open-ended ranges). 
 562. 93 F.3d 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 563. 354 F.3d 1347, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 
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v. Biomet, Inc.564  It noted that although the “general rule” was that 
“disclosure of a species provides sufficient written description support for a 
later filed claim directed to the genus,”565 exceptions to this rule exist 
where the art is unpredictable such that persons skilled in the art would not 
readily discern the other members of the genus that would perform 
similarly to the disclosed members,566 and like in Tronzo, where the 
specification specifically distinguished the disclosed invention from other 
members of the genus.567 
The Federal Circuit disapproved of the Board’s analysis of this question.  
Though the Board found that appellant’s disclosure of manipulation of an 
object in only a small number of directions was insufficient to support the 
claim to manipulation of objects in a range from two to infinity, the Federal 
Circuit held that the Board failed to analyze “what one skilled in the art 
would have understood from the Bilstad disclosure or the degree of 
predictability of technical variations in this field of art.”568 The Federal 
Circuit thus remanded for reconsideration under the “proper test” for 
support of the interference count. 
2.  Enablement 
In Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc.,569 the Federal Circuit explained that 
in order to support a claim of priority, the earlier application must satisfy 
both the enablement requirement and written description requirement of § 
112.570  The Federal Circuit then canvassed the applicable enablement law, 
explaining that to satisfy the enablement requirement requires that “one 
skilled in the art, after reading their disclosures, could practice the 
invention . . . without undue experimentation.”571  The Federal Circuit 
explained that simply because some experimentation is necessary “does not 
preclude enablement; what is required is that the amount of 
experimentation ‘must not be unduly extensive.’”572  The Federal Circuit 
                                                          
534-539 and accompanying text (reviewing implications of species disclosure in In re 
Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 564. 156 F.3d 1154, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that there was 
insufficient evidence for a verdict that a parent disclosing only a trapezoidal shape 
supported claims to a hip prosthesis of a generic shape). 
 565. Bilstad v. Wakalopulos, 386 F.3d 1116, 1125, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785, 1791 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 566. See supra notes 540-546 and accompanying text (discussing In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 
1347, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2004), where the Federal Circuit stated that 
prior disclosure of species is unlikely to support a later claim of genus where one skilled in 
the art is unlikely to be able to predict operation of other species). 
 567. See supra note 564. 
 568. Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1126, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792. 
 569. 363 F.3d 1247, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 570. Id. at 1253, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325. 
 571. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325. 
 572. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (quoting PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. 
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further noted that while the full scope of the claim must be enabled, 
[t]hat is not to say that the specification itself must necessarily describe 
how to make and use every possible variant of the claimed invention, for 
the artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can 
often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even 
extrapolate beyond disclosed embodiments, depending upon the 
predictability of the art.573 
The Federal Circuit also observed that enablement is determined as of 
the filing date of the application, and explained that nascent technology 
“must be enabled with a ‘specific and useful teaching’ . . . because a person 
of ordinary skill in the art has little or no knowledge independent from the 
patentee’s instruction.”574 
Turning to the trial record, the Federal Circuit explained that “the jury 
was entitled to determine as a matter of fact that chimeric antibodies were 
not future technology, but were nascent technology requiring a ‘specific 
and useful teaching.’”575  The Federal Circuit noted that “[e]vidence 
presented to the jury showed that creation of genetically engineered 
antibodies, such as chimeric antibodies, required significant 
experimentation in 1985 and 1986 because those antibodies were 
unpredictable at that early stage of development.”576  In particular, the 
Federal Circuit noted that the record evidence demonstrated that only a few 
laboratories contained the necessary equipment to make chimeric 
antibodies, that the plaintiff’s applications did not disclose how to make or 
use chimeric antibodies, and that the applications did not provide any 
working examples of chimeric antibodies within the scope of the disputed 
claims.577  The Federal Circuit further observed that while plaintiff’s 
applications “certainly enable[d] murine antibodies, they [did] not enable 
chimeric antibodies.”578  As a result, the applications failed to enable all 
                                                          
Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618, 1623 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).  The court 
also identified the Wands factors that are used to gauge whether undue experimentation 
would be required to practice the claimed invention: 
These factual considerations include “(1) the quantity of experimentation 
necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or 
absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the 
prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or 
unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.” 
Id. at 1255-56, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 573. Id. at 1253, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325 (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 
F.3d 1234, 1244, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1280, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 574. Id. at 1254, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (quoting Genentech, Inc. v. Novo 
Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1368, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 575. Id. at 1255, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (quoting Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1368, 
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006). 
 576. Id. at 1256, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 577. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 578. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
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antibodies within the scope of the asserted claims, which covered both 
murine and chimeric antibodies.579 
The Federal Circuit also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the 
applications “need not specifically enable chimeric antibodies, because 
technicians of ordinary skill in this art could make and use them by that 
time without undue experimentation.”580  The Federal Circuit explained 
that the record contained substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding 
of non-enablement, including expert testimony that the ability to 
manufacture chimeric antibodies was not routine technology when 
plaintiff’s applications were filed;581 evidence that very few laboratories 
had the capacity and expertise necessary to make genetically engineered 
antibodies;582 and an article published in 1989 that described techniques of 
chimeric antibodies as “obviously those of a very young and very 
ambitious field.”583 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Bryson explained that “enablement must 
be judged in light of the state of the art at the time of the application.”584  In 
so doing, the concurrence cautioned against interpreting the Federal 
Circuit’s predecessor’s opinion In re Hogan585 as holding that “claims that 
are enabled by original application may be construed broadly enough to 
encompass technology that is not developed until later and was not enabled 
by the original application.”586  The concurrence thus opined that the proper 
approach “is to address cases of new technology by construing claims, 
where possible, as they would have been understood by one of skill in the 
art at the time of the invention, and not construing them to reach the as-yet-
undeveloped technology that the applicant did not enable.”587 
In Koito Manufacturing Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC,588 plaintiff argued 
that the patent specification failed to enable claims directed to injection-
molded plastics because the patentee did not disclose a “proprietary 
formula for achieving the claimed predetermined flow direction.”589  
Rejecting this argument, the Federal Circuit explained that 
                                                          
 579. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 580. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 581. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 582. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 583. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (quoting Sherie L. Morrison, Genetically 
Engineered (Chimeric) Antibodies, HOSP. PRACTICE, Oct. 15, 1989, at 75).  The court also 
explained that the Plaintiff’s failure to produce a commercial embodiment “also bears on 
whether chimeric or humanized antibodies with the scope of the claims of the [asserted] 
patent were routine technology.  Accordingly, that evidence is relevant to enablement.”  Id. 
at 1260-61, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
 584. Id. at 1262, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 585. 559 F.2d 595, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 527 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
 586. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1262, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 587. Id. at 1263, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 588. 381 F.3d 1142, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 589. Id. at 1155, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199. 
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[w]hile this evidence may go to best mode, it does not demonstrate that 
any certain formula for achieving flow direction was required for one of 
ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed invention or that undue 
experimentation would be required for one of ordinary skill in the art to 
predetermine flow direction through trial and error.590 
The Federal Circuit also rejected plaintiff’s argument that the 
enablement requirement was not met because the patentee omitted a 
disclosure of certain injection parameters and gate size.  Observing that 
“[t]his Court has repeatedly explained that a patent applicant does not need 
to include in the specification that which is already known to and available 
to one of ordinary skill in the art,”591 the Federal Circuit concluded that 
plaintiff did not provide clear and convincing evidence that knowledge of 
injection parameters and gate size were necessary to practice the claims 
without undue experimentation.592 
3.  Best mode 
The Federal Circuit’s disposition of best mode issues593 in 2004 was 
consistent with its earlier proclamation that “[i]n the history of this court 
and our predecessor courts, we have held claims invalid for failure to 
satisfy the best mode requirement on only seven occasions.”594  The 
Federal Circuit’s opinions, however, appeared to graft a subjective “intent 
to conceal” requirement as part of the second prong of the best mode 
inquiry—whether the patent application disclosed the inventor’s best mode 
of practicing the claimed invention—that has long been classified as an 
objective test.595 
                                                          
 590. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199. 
 591. Id. at 1156, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200. 
 592. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200. 
 593. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) provides: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it 
is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention. 
 594. Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306, 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 595. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1869, 1874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2001); N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 
1281, 1286, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the “[first] 
inquiry is wholly subjective . . . [t]he second inquiry . . . is objective and depends upon the 
scope of the claimed invention and the level of skill in the relevant art”); Nobelpharma AB 
v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1064, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1101 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 876 (1998) (“[W]hether the best mode was disclosed in 
sufficient detail to allow a skilled artisan to practice it without undue experimentation . . . is 
an objective determination.”); Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1548, 41 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 908 (1997) (stating that  
determining whether a patent satisfies the best mode requirement involves two 
factual inquiries.  First, a fact-finder must determine whether at the time an 
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High Concrete Structures, Inc. v. New Enterprises Stone & Lime, Inc.596 
involved an appeal from a grant of summary judgment holding the disputed 
claims invalid under the best mode requirement.597  The disputed claims 
were directed to use of pre-formed concrete frames that orientated heavy 
cargo at an angle such that the cargo would not extend too far beyond a 
transporting truck’s flat bed.598  The district court held that the inventors 
violated the best mode requirement because the specification failed to 
disclose “that a crane was the preferred mode of carrying out the method of 
loading and tilting the [concrete] frame.”599 
In reversing the grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit first 
explained that “[i]nvalidation for failure to satisfy the best mode requires 
(1) the inventor knew of a better mode than was disclosed, and (2) the 
inventor concealed the better mode.”600  With respect to the second prong, 
the Federal Circuit further elaborated that a best mode violation “requires 
that the inventor knew of and intentionally concealed a better mode than 
was disclosed.”601  Then, apparently accepting that use of a crane was the 
inventors’ preferred mode of carrying out the invention, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the best mode requirement was not violated because that 
the record was devoid of evidence regarding the inventors’ intent to 
conceal use of cranes: 
[Defendant] conceded that use of a crane to assist with heavy loads is 
well known to person in the field of loading cargo.  There was neither 
evidence nor inference of concealment of this information by the 
inventors.  Deliberate concealment is not charged.  The best mode 
requirement of § 112 is not violated by unintentional omission of 
information that would be readily known to persons in the field of the 
invention.602 
The Federal Circuit also distinguished its decisions in Northern Telecom, 
Inc. v. Datapoint Corp.603 and Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd.,604 explaining that in 
                                                          
applicant filed an application for a patent, he or she had a best mode of practicing 
the invention; this is a subjective determination.  Second, if the inventor had a best 
mode of practicing the invention, the fact-finder must determine whether the best 
mode was disclosed in sufficient detail to allow one skilled in the art to practice it, 
which is an objective determination. 
). 
 596. 377 F.3d 1379, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1948 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 597. Id. at 1380, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948-49. 
 598. Id. at 1380-82, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948-50. 
 599. Id. at 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950. 
 600. Id. at 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950. 
 601. Id. at 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950. 
 602. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950-51. 
 603. 908 F.2d 931, 940, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming 
the district court’s determination that the inventors deliberately concealed the usage of tape 
and cassettes of their own design in a patent for an invention to capture data on standard 
audio magnetic tape cassettes). 
 604. 860 F.2d 415, 419-20, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1692, 1696-97 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding 
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“the case before us it was undisputed that anyone with experience of heavy 
loads would know to use a crane to move the load.”605  The Federal Circuit 
thus held that “[k]nown ways of performing a known operation cannot be 
deemed intentionally concealed absent evidence of intent to deliberately 
withhold that information.”606 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.607 also involved a 
best mode challenge to the validity of claims directed at cardiac 
defibrillators that are permanently installed under a patient’s skin.608  The 
case came to the court on appeal from a grant of a JMOL that the claims 
were invalid after a jury verdict finding no best mode violation.609  The 
Federal Circuit framed the question as whether the best mode requirement 
creates a disclosure “obligation with respect to subject matter that is not 
part of the invention, but that is used in conjunction therewith—here the 
battery for use with the  battery-powered [cardiac defibrillators].”610  In 
particular, the issue was whether the inventors were required to disclose a 
battery specifically designed by a third-party for use with the claimed 
cardiac defibrillators.611 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by stating that “invalidity for 
omission of a better mode than was revealed requires knowledge of 
concealment of that better mode.”612  The Federal Circuit then explained 
that “[t]he obligation to disclose the best mode relates to the invention that 
is described and claimed.  Subject matter that is not part of the invention 
that is claimed need not be included in the specification, and thus is not 
subject to the best mode requirement.”613  Upon review of the record, the 
Federal Circuit determined that substantial evidence supported the jury’s 
verdict that the best mode had not been violated, including testimony that 
the “invention was not about batteries, that there was not intent to conceal 
                                                          
that the best mode requirement was violated because it was not disclosed that a technique of 
applying silicone to rubber surfaces was known to be essential for the successful operation 
of the claimed stem seals for valves). 
 605. High Concrete Structures, 377 F.3d at 1384, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 606. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 607. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 608. Id. at 1374, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. 
 609. Id. at 1374-75, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. 
 610. Id. at 1378-79, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338. 
 611. See id. at 1379, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338-39 (stating that the inventors asked 
the third party to develop a battery to use with the cardiac devices, but then decided not to 
include this battery in the patent specification since there were many different battery 
choices that could be made and the inventors actually chose a different battery for their 
commercial device). 
 612. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338 (citing Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced 
Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1575, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re 
Gay, 309 F.3d 769, 772, 135 U.S.P.Q. 311, 315 (C.C.P.A. 1962)). 
 613. Id. at 1379, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339 (citing Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer 
Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1532, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1300, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
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the [third-party] or any battery, and that it was not concealed,”614 and 
evidence that “persons knowledgeable in the field of the invention would 
know the sources of batteries for pacemakers and related devices.”615  
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit reversed the grant of a JMOL because 
“[t]here was no evidence of concealment, and the jury had evidence that the 
[third-party] battery was published in a publication for battery 
specialists.”616 
4.  Indefiniteness 
The volume of cases in which the indefiniteness defense was considered 
and rejected by the court in 2004 underscores two recently emerging 
themes in patent litigation:  (1) defendants will frequently avail themselves 
of the indefiniteness argument under § 112, ¶ 2 and (2) the Federal Circuit 
will reject such a defense almost as frequently as it is raised. 
Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Insurances Co.617 involved the 
issue of whether the claim term “surrender value protected investment 
credits” was indefinite618 under § 112, ¶ 2 of the Patent Act.619  Seeking to 
invalidate the claims, defendant argued that the term was indefinite because 
(1) the patent did not expressly define the term, (2) the meaning of the term 
could not be determined from the patent, and (3) the term did not have an 
understood meaning by those skilled in the field of the invention.620  In 
response, plaintiff argued that “surrender value protected investment 
credits” meant the same thing as “stable value protected investment 
credits,” which is a term that appeared throughout the patent and had a 
well-established meaning in the field.621 
The Federal Circuit began by canvassing its indefiniteness jurisprudence, 
noting that the indefiniteness analysis is akin to “the court’s performance of 
its duty as the construer of patent claims [and] therefore, like claim 
construction, is a question of law.”622  The Federal Circuit explained that 
indefiniteness is determined by “whether those skilled in the art would 
understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the 
specification.”623  The Federal Circuit stated that “a claim is not indefinite 
                                                          
 614. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338-39. 
 615. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339. 
 616. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339. 
 617. 359 F.3d 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 618. Id. at 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 619. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004) (providing that claims must “particularly point[] out and 
distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”). 
 620. Bancorp Servs., 359 F.3d at 1371-72, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 621. Id. at 1372, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 622. Id. at 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (quoting Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage 
Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1378, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 623. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (citing Personalized Media Communications, Inc. 
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 705, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880, 1888 (Fed. Cir. 
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merely because it poses a difficult issue of claim construction; if the claim 
is subject to construction . . . it is not invalid for indefiniteness.”624  Rather, 
the Federal Circuit explained that “if the meaning of the claim is 
discernible, ‘even though the task may be formidable and the conclusion 
may be one over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the 
claim sufficiently clear to avoid invalidity on indefiniteness grounds.’”625  
The Federal Circuit further explained that “[b]y finding claims indefinite 
only if reasonable efforts at claim construction prove futile, we accord 
respect to the statutory presumption of patent validity . . . . Thus ‘close 
questions of indefiniteness in litigation involving issued patents are 
properly resolved in favor of the patentee.’”626 
While noting that the entire term “surrender value protected investment 
credits” is not defined in the patent, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
claims were not indefinite because “the components of the term have well-
recognized meanings, which allow the reader to infer the meaning of the 
entire phrase with reasonable confidence.”627  The Federal Circuit first 
noted that “the term ‘surrender value’ has a clear meaning to one of 
ordinary skill in the relevant art.”628  The Federal Circuit then stated that 
the patent specification and extrinsic evidence demonstrate that the term 
“protected investment” likewise has a clear meaning.629  The Federal 
Circuit also explained the specification provides a clear meaning for 
“credits.”630  Thus, viewing the various parts of the claim term together, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that the meaning of the term “surrender value 
protected investment credits” could be reasonably determined,631 and 
explained that “[t]he failure to define [a claim] term is, of course, not fatal, 
for if the meaning of the term is fairly inferable from the patent, an express 
definition is not necessary.”632 
In reaching its conclusion, the Federal Circuit credited plaintiff’s 
argument that the correspondence between “surrender value protected 
                                                          
1998); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1081, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 624. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338-39, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 625. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United 
States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 626. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999 (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g, 265 F.3d at 
1380, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1276). 
 627. Id. at 1372, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 628. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999. 
 629. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
 630. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
 631. See id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000 (concluding that “‘surrender value protected 
investment’ means the difference between the actual value of a protected investment and the 
targeted return value of that investment at the time the protected life insurance policy is 
surrendered.”). 
 632. Id. at 1373, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
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investment credits” used in the claims and the reference to “SVP writer” in 
specification “provides substantial support . . . that, as used in the patent, 
the terms ‘stable value protected investment,’ ‘surrender value protected 
investment,’ and ‘SVP’ are equivalent.”633  The Federal Circuit also 
explained that “evidence of defendants’ knowledge of the use of the term 
prior to patenting is relevant to show that the term was in use and had a 
discernible meaning to at least some persons practicing in the field.”634 
In SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,635 the district court 
construed a claim covering the chemical compound “[c]rystalline 
paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate”636 (“CPH hemihydrate”) as limited 
to commercially significant quantities of CPH hemihydrate, reasoning that 
if the claim covered trace amounts of the compound then “potential 
infringers would not be able to determine (and avoid) infringement if they 
[could not] detect the claimed compound.”637  In reversing the district 
court’s holding, the Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he test for 
indefiniteness does not depend on a potential infringer’s ability to ascertain 
the nature of its own accused product to determine infringement, but 
instead on whether the claim delineates to a skilled artisan the bounds of 
the invention.”638  The Federal Circuit further explained that the fact that 
defendant could not “accurately ascertain the nature of its own product”639 
in light of the claim language was irrelevant because “[t]he scope of this 
claim is clear; infringement of [defendant’s] product is not.  Even if a claim 
is broad enough to embrace undetectable trace amounts of the claimed 
invention, ‘breadth is not indefiniteness.’”640  Reasoning that the disputed 
“claim covers a definite chemical structure [and] [t]o a chemist in this field, 
this claim is plain on its face,” the court held that there was no violation of 
the definiteness requirement.641 
                                                          
 633. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000. 
 634. Id. at 1376, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2002. 
 635. 365 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated by 403 F.3d 
1328, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 636. Id. at 1308, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738. 
 637. Id. at 1314, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743 (citing Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal 
Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1469-70, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 638. Id. at 1315, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.  The court’s approach is correct in light 
of well-established law that infringement involves a two-step process:  (1) construing the 
claim language, which like indefiniteness is a question of law, and (2) applying the 
construed claims to the accused device, which is a question of fact.  Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461, 1464 (1996).  The district court’s 
approach would have collapsed this two prong test for infringement into a strained 
indefiniteness inquiry, such that if a defendant was uncertain about infringement, the claim 
necessarily would be invalid as indefinite. 
 639. SmithKline Beecham, 365 F.3d at 1315, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
 640. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743 (quoting In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 788, 166 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 140 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
 641. SmithKline Beecham, 365 F.3d at 1314, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743. 
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In Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,642 defendant appealed the decision 
of the district court that Glaxo’s patents were valid and infringed.  The 
asserted claims at issue claimed “[c]efuroxime axetil . . . having a purity of 
at least 95% aside from residual solvents” and “[a] process for preparing a 
highly pure . . . form of cefuroxime axetil which comprises preparing a 
highly pure solution of cefuroxime axetil and spray drying said 
solution . . . .”643  Defendant asserted that the district court’s construction of 
“purity” and “pure” in the asserted claims rendered the claims indefinite.644  
The district court had construed “pure” in the process claim “to mean the 
absence of impurities, where excipients are not considered to be 
impurities.”645  It construed “purity of at least 95%” in the product claim to 
mean that the cefuroxime axetil must have “no more than 5% degrading, 
unwanted impurities,” where, again, impurities do not include excipients.646  
According to defendant, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not 
realize that the product claim covered cefuroxime axetil that had more than 
five percent of other ingredients, or that the process claim covered a 
process by which exicipients are mixed with cefuroxime axetil.647 
The Federal Circuit found these arguments to be “disingenuous.”648  It 
affirmed the district court’s construction of “purity” based on the fact that 
the specification of the patent containing the product claim “specifically 
states that the pharmaceutical compositions covered by the invention may 
contain between 0.1 to 99% of the active ingredient.”649  “CA formulations 
with more than 5% other ingredients were thus pointed out to the public in 
the patent.”650  The Federal Circuit similarly affirmed the construction of 
“pure” because the patent containing the process claim disclosed that 
pharmaceutical compositions of cefuroxime axetil could be produced by 
spray drying “a suspension of pure amorphous [CA] with the excipients 
appropriate for said tablets, capsules or granules [and] Glaxo therefore 
informed the public that combining CA with excipients prior to spray 
drying was contemplated under the . . . patent.”651  The Federal Circuit 
found that the patents’ detailed disclosures “clearly conveyed to [a person] 
of ordinary skill in the art that the patentee ‘invented what is claimed’ and 
also gave notice to the public of the limits of the invention.”652 
                                                          
 642. 376 F.3d 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 643. Id. at 1343, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. 
 644. Id. at 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806. 
 645. Id. at 1345, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 646. Id. at 1344-45, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 647. Id. at 1348, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806-07. 
 648. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 649. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 650. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 651. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 652. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807 (quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 
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E.  Design Patent 
In Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc.,653 the Federal 
Circuit addressed, for the first time, the issue of what evidence must be 
presented to prove infringement of a design patent under the point of 
novelty test.654  Plaintiff sued defendant for infringement of six of its 
design patents related to furniture designs.655  The district court held that 
Plaintiff had not met its burden of establishing that defendant’s designs 
appropriated the points of novelty of plaintiff’s patented designs.656  On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that it was sufficient for showing the 
points of novelty for plaintiff to introduce its presentation of the patents-in-
suit and their prosecution histories, all of the references cited during 
prosecution, and its filing of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law specifying its contentions as to the points of novelty.657  The Federal 
Circuit ruled that, at minimum, a patentee must introduce “the design 
patent at issue, its prosecution history, and the relevant prior art references 
cited in the prosecution history,” and must proffer, “in some form, its 
contentions as to points of novelty.”658  It opined that the contentions as to 
points of novelty “may be made in any appropriate way, such as in 
proposed findings of fact.”659  If the points of novelty can be discerned 
from these submissions, the Federal Circuit ruled that additional evidence 
such as expert testimony was not necessary.660  The Federal Circuit held 
that plaintiff had met the minimal evidentiary burden, and that the court 
was wrong to have declined to determine the points of novelty from 
plaintiff’s submissions and to have concluded, without analysis of the 
submitted evidence, that Bernhardt did not sufficiently show how 
defendant’s designs appropriated such points of novelty.661 
F.  Interference and Priority of Invention 
In Stevens v. Tamai,662 Stevens appealed from the Board’s decision 
granting priority in an interference proceeding to Tamai.663  Tamai was the 
senior party to the interference, whose application was filed February 15, 
1994, and was accorded the benefit of the filing date of the application, 
                                                          
1555, 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
 653. 386 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 654. Id. at 1384, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 655. Id. at 1373-74, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903. 
 656. Id. at 1384, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 657. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 658. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 659. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 660. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
 661. Id. at 1385, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 662. 366 F.3d 1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 663. Id. at 1327, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767. 
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March 29, 1993, to which it was a continuation-in-part (“U.S. patent 
application”).  Stevens’s patent was filed February 7, 1994.  During the 
interference, both Stevens and Tamai filed motions under 37 C.F.R. § 
1.633(f) “to be accorded the benefit of the filing date of earlier filed 
application[s].”664  Stevens based his motion on several European 
applications showing a constructive reduction to practice as early as 
February 1993.665  Tamai’s motion was based on a Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (“PCT”)666 application and an earlier Japanese patent application, 
both of which were written in Japanese.667  The Board granted Stevens’s 
motion, but partly denied Tamai’s motion with respect to the PCT 
application on the basis that Tamai did not supply a translation of the PCT 
application to English in accordance with Rule 637.668  The Board still 
granted Tamai priority, however, on the basis of its Japanese application.669 
Stevens contended on appeal to the Federal Circuit that the Board erred 
in granting Tamai’s motion for the benefit of the Japanese application.  
According to Stevens, 35 U.S.C. § 119670 prohibited Tamai from directly 
claiming the benefit of that application because Tamai failed to obtain the 
benefit of the intervening PCT application and because the Japanese 
application was filed more than one year prior to March 29, 1993.671  It 
followed, Stevens argued, that Tamai had failed to prove a constructive 
reduction to practice of the subject matter corresponding to the interference 
count prior to March 29, 1993, and therefore Stevens should have been 
awarded priority. 
The Federal Circuit agreed with Stevens, holding that “because Tamai 
failed to prove his entitlement to the benefit of the [intervening] PCT 
application, it was error for the Board to afford Tamai the benefit of the 
[earlier] Japanese application.”672  It reasoned that because the Japanese 
application was filed more than one year prior to the filing date of the U.S. 
parent application, § 119 precluded reliance on that application for priority. 
The Federal Circuit rejected Tamai’s arguments that a preliminary 
                                                          
 664. Id. at 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.633(f) (2003)). 
 665. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767. 
 666. Patent Cooperation Treaty, With Regulations, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645. 
 667. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767. 
 668. Id. at 1328-29, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.637(f)(2) 
(2004) (requiring that, for a preliminary motion for benefit of the filing date of an earlier 
application under § 1.633(f), “[i]f the earlier filed application is not in English, the 
requirements of § 1.647 must also be met”). 
 669. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1329, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1768. 
 670. See 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) (2000) (granting a patent for invention that was filed “in a 
foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the 
United States” the same rights as if it was filed in the U.S. on that date “if the application in 
[the U.S.] is filed within twelve months from the earliest date on which such foreign 
application was filed”). 
 671. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1330, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769. 
 672. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1769. 
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motion for benefit under Rule 633 was unnecessary in the first instance 
because Tamai filed its PCT application with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office for the purpose of entering the national stage 
examination, and according to procedures governing PCT applications, 
included therein a translation of the Japanese application.673  The Federal 
Circuit found that the statutes governing PCT applications and the PTO 
procedural requirements governing interferences “have little to do with one 
another.”674  Tamai relied on 35 U.S.C. § 363, which requires an applicant 
who seeks the benefit of an international application for his national stage 
application to submit a copy of the international application and an English 
translation of that application.675  The Federal Circuit noted that Tamai 
overlooked 35 U.S.C. § 372(b)(3), which permits the PTO to “require a 
verification of the translation of the international application . . . if the 
application . . . was filed in a language other than English.”676  Thus, the 
Federal Circuit found that the PTO was “not required to accept an 
applicant’s transmittal letter requesting entry into the national stage as 
conclusive proof that a foreign language application contains a particular 
disclosure.”677 
The Federal Circuit went on to note that the Rules 633, 637, and 647 
governing interference procedures were reasonable to the extent that they 
placed the burden on the applicant in the best position to know the content 
of the disclosure and who hopes to benefit from the content of that 
disclosure to prove its content and to assume the translation costs 
associated with such proof.678  In view of the reasonableness of those rules 
and the substantial deference to which they are accorded, the Federal 
Circuit rejected Tamai’s assertion that § 363 “overwhelms the PTO’s 
interference rules and requires the Board to accord Tamai the benefit of the 
PCT ‘947 application merely because he completed the requirements for 
entering the national stage of examination in the United States.”679 
The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s rejection of Tamai’s 
argument that the U.S. patent application was the translation of the PCT 
application was supported by substantial evidence where Tamai’s motion 
for benefit failed to allege as much, and because Tamai submitted no 
                                                          
 673. Id. at 1332, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770-71. 
 674. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 675. See 35 U.S.C. § 363 (2000) (mandating that “[a]n international application 
designating the United States shall have the effect . . . of a national application for patent 
regularly filed”). 
 676. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1333, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771 (quoting 35 U.S.C. 
§ 372(b)(3) (2000)). 
 677. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 678. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771-72. 
 679. Id. at 1334, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
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affidavit alleging as much.680  Nor did the court agree with Tamai that his 
submission of a translation with the international application to enter 
national stage examination under § 371(c)(2) was sufficient to comply with 
Rules 637(f) and 647, as § 371(c)(2) does not require an affidavit attesting 
to the accuracy of the translation.681  In the court’s opinion, “compliance 
with [particular] filing requirements is not sufficient to prove constructive 
reduction to practice in an interference proceeding.”682 
Finding Tamai’s remaining arguments “either irrelevant or 
unpersuasive,” the court concluded that “the Board did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to award Tamai the benefit of [his] PCT 
application.”683  However, because Tamai was not entitled to the benefit of 
the PCT application, it found that the board also erred in awarding Tamai 
the benefit of the Japanese application.684 
G.  Patent Term 
In Arnold Partnership v. Dudas,685 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision that the PTO did not err in its interpretation of 35 
U.S.C. § 156 and denial of a patentee’s application to extend a patent’s 
term.686  Section 156 provides for the extension of a patent’s term under 
certain conditions where the patent claims a drug product that has been 
subjected to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or 
use, such as that required by the FDA.687  The term extension compensates 
a patent applicant for time lost as a result of the regulatory review period, 
time which the patent applicant arguably could be profiting from its 
invention.  The statute conditions term extension on the fact that the 
“product” was not previously approved for commercial marketing.688 
The patent claims at issue in Arnold addressed compositions of 
hydrocodone and ibuprofen and the method of treating pain with such 
compositions.689  Hydrocodone and ibuprofen had each been previously 
approved for commercial marketing, in conjunction with other ingredients 
                                                          
 680. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 681. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 371(c)(2) (2000) 
(requiring only that a translation is filed and not requiring that an affidavit attesting to the 
accuracy of a translation is not necessary), with 37 C.F.R. § 1.647 (2004) (requiring, in 
addition to the translation itself, that an affidavit attesting to the accuracy of such translation 
also be filed). 
 682. Stevens, 366 F.3d at 1334, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 683. Id. at 1335, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 684. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 685. 362 F.3d 1338, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 686. Id. at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 687. See 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2004) (extending the patent term when “the product has 
been subject to a regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use”). 
 688. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(5)(A) (2004). 
 689. Arnold P’ship, 362 F.3d at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
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or alone.690  On this basis, the PTO denied the application for patent term 
extension.691  The district court affirmed.692 
Appellant argued that the statute permits extension of the patent term for 
a combination drug product when the combination itself previously had not 
been marketed, and that the drug product should be examined as a whole 
under the statute, and not on a component-by-component basis.693  The 
Federal Circuit interpreted § 156 without deference to the district court, but 
determined that the district court was correct in construing § 156 to require 
examination of a drug product on a component-by-component basis.694   
The Federal Circuit particularly emphasized the statute’s definition of 
“product,” which means “drug product,” which is further defined to mean 
“the active ingredient of a new drug . . . product . . . including any salt or 
ester of the active ingredient, as a single entity or in combination with 
another active ingredient.”695  It found the final phrase, “as a single entity 
or in combination with another active ingredient,” to be determinative.696  
Under the court’s construction, the statute would allow extension of the 
term of a patent claiming a drug product with two active ingredients, A and 
B, where either A or B had never been commercially marketed.697  But 
where either A or B had been commercially marketed, no extension would 
be allowed.698 
The Federal Circuit refused to give in to Appellant’s argument that its 
construction would conflict with § 156(c), which provides that a patent’s 
term “shall be extended by the time equal to the regulatory review period 
for the approved product which period occurs after the date the patent is 
issued,”699 suggesting that the combination as a whole should be reviewed 
for prior marketing, since each combination drug product receives only one 
regulatory review period.700  The Federal Circuit found that this argument 
was based on a “vague implication” that could not overcome the 
unambiguous language of the rest of the statute.701  It also refused to 
change its decision despite its own admission that it does not perfectly 
overlay with the FDA’s practices and regulations, specifically the 
regulations requiring an NDA for combination drugs, and agreed with the 
                                                          
 690. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 691. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312. 
 692. Id. at 1340, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 693. Id. at 1339, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313. 
 694. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 695. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (2000)). 
 696. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 697. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 698. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 699. Id. at 1342, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314 (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 
156(c) (2000)). 
 700. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
 701. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
2005] PATENT SUMMARY 1025 
district court’s reasoning for dismissal of the applicant’s policy argument 
that its interpretation would create a financial disincentive to 
pharmaceutical companies’ development of new therapeutic combination 
drugs.702  The Federal Circuit explained that it “must follow the directions 
of the law, not its own conceptions of the best way to make the law achieve 
certain policy objectives.”703 
Lastly, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the existence 
of synergism exhibited by a drug combination would call for a different 
result.704  The hydrocodone/ibuprofen drug combination was said to exhibit 
synergistic effects in that it had a greater analgesic effect yet less harmful 
side effects than that which could be achieved by its separate components 
alone.705  Finding that “the statutory language [did] not distinguish at all 
between synergistic and nonsynergistic combinations,” the court declined 
to do so as well.706 
In Pfizer Inc. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd.,707 the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s infringement claims.708  
Plaintiff secured a patent on certain dihydropyridine compounds and their 
acid addition salts.  One such dihydropyridine compound was called 
amlodipine.  Plaintiff later obtained FDA approval of a drug for anti-
hypertension and anti-ischemic therapeutic uses in which the active 
ingredient was an amlodipine besylate salt, and successfully applied for the 
extension of its patent term under § 156 to compensate for the days 
consumed by the federal regulatory approval process.709  The patent was 
originally scheduled to expire in early 2003, but as a result of the extension 
granted to plaintiff, the expiration date was changed to mid-2006.  For its 
patent term extension application, plaintiff identified amlodipine besylate 
as the product for which it obtained regulatory approval,710 but as part of 
the registration of its drug during the FDA approval process, it submitted 
clinical data obtained from uses of both amlodipine besylate and 
amlodipine maleate, the latter being just another salt of amlodipine. 
Plaintiff accused defendant of patent infringement in response to 
plaintiff’s filing of a New Drug Application proposing to market 
amlodipine maleate.  As part of its NDA, defendant had relied on the 
clinical data submitted by plaintiff for its amlodipine besylate product.  
                                                          
 702. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314-15. 
 703. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315. 
 704. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315. 
 705. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315. 
 706. Id. at 1343, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315. 
 707. 359 F.3d 1361, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2016 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 708. Id. at 1363, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2016. 
 709. Id. at 1364, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2017. 
 710. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2017. 
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Defendant conceded that amlodipine maleate came within the scope of 
plaintiff’s patent claims, but argued that the term extension obtained by 
plaintiff applied only to protection of amlodipine besylate because that was 
the compound plaintiff identified in its application for patent term 
extension.711  Following this reasoning, plaintiff’s patent term would have 
essentially expired for all compounds other than amlodipine besylate. 
The Federal Circuit held that the term extension did in fact cover 
amlodipine maleate.  It reasoned that the statutory definition of “drug 
product” in § 156(f) included “any salt or ester of the active ingredient”712 
and was thus met by both amlodipine besylate and amlodipine maleate, 
amlodipine being the “active ingredient” in both compositions.  
Defendant’s attempt to market the same drug product for which plaintiff 
had obtained approval, simply by changing the salt, would exploit the very 
loophole that the statute’s definition of “drug product” foresaw and 
guarded against.  Furthermore, defendant’s reliance on the “rights derived” 
provision of § 156(b), which specifically limits the extension of a patent 
term to “any use approved for the product,” was misguided because that 
section did not limit the term extension to any specific form of the 
“product,” and thus must be construed to cover the “product” as that word 
is defined in § 156(f), “including any salt or ester of the active 
ingredient.”713  Thus, the court held that the extended term of plaintiff’s 
patent included any salt or ester of amlodipine, and reversed the district 
court’s judgment of noninfringement. 
H.  Inventorship 
In Caterpillar Inc. v. Sturman Industries,714 plaintiff sued defendant for  
alleged violation of Illinois’s trade secret statute, breach of a joint 
development agreement, and unlawful conversion of plaintiff’s property.715  
Plaintiff also sought correction of inventorship of two patents issued to 
defendant, the “‘329 patent” and the “‘987 patent.”716  Defendant 
counterclaimed, seeking correction of inventorship of a third patent issued 
to plaintiff, the “‘901 patent,” and for fraudulent inducement.717  The 
dispute arose out of a joint development agreement entered into by parties 
through which the parties intended to work together “to develop actuators 
and driver circuits for Caterpillar’s exclusive use in fuel systems for diesel 
                                                          
 711. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2017. 
 712. Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2019 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (2000)). 
 713. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2019. 
 714. 387 F.3d 1358, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 715. Id. at 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 716. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 717. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
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engines.”718  Under the agreement, defendant agreed to assign plaintiff 
certain intellectual property “made or conceived by [defendant’s] 
personnel, either alone or with others (a) pursuant to the joint development 
program or (b) resulting from [plaintiff’s] Proprietary Information.”719  
Plaintiff agreed to pay defendant royalties for its use of any such 
intellectual property assigned, extending beyond the termination of the 
agreement.720 
The actuators and driver circuits jointly developed by defendant and 
plaintiff were mainly of a certain type used for “mechanically actuated, 
electronically controlled unit injectors” (“meuis”).721  Defendant assigned 
his rights to these inventions to plaintiff, and plaintiff subsequently filed 
applications for patents on them which were granted as the ‘131 and ‘219 
patents.  One weekend in September 1992, the parties  met at a hotel to 
discuss fuel injector designs and on the second day “brainstormed alternate 
system designs.”722  The following morning, defendant sketched an idea for 
an “integrated spool valve employing residual magnetic latching.”723  This 
valve comprised a spool-shaped piece that moves back and forth within a 
cylindrical housing.724  When a current is applied to one side of the 
cylinder, the spool is magnetically attracted to that side of the cylinder and 
slides to that side.725  The current is alternatively applied to each side of the 
housing, making the spool move back and forth from side to side.726  In 
doing so, the spool opens and closes various channels carrying fluids, and 
thereby changes the flow of fluids in each repetition.727 
When defendant showed his sketch to plaintiff’s employees, plaintiff 
recognized the potential value of the valve, but rejected the use of the valve 
design for use in meuis because it would not be suitable for high pressure 
fuel systems.728  Later, however, plaintiff investigated the valve’s use in 
another type of fuel injector, the hydraulically actuated, electronically 
controlled unit injector (“heui”).  Plaintiff did not disclose its investigation 
to defendant.729 
In 1993, when the joint development agreement expired, plaintiff 
attempted to persuade defendant to release plaintiff from its ongoing 
                                                          
 718. Id. at 1361, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611. 
 719. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611. 
 720. Id. at 1362, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611. 
 721. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611. 
 722. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 723. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 724. Id. at 1363, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 725. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 726. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 727. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 728. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 729. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
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royalty obligation for use of intellectual property in exchange for a one-
time payment of $275,000.730  Defendant attempted to get clarification 
from plaintiff as to the exact intellectual property rights that would be 
released.731  Plaintiff listed the ‘131 and ‘219 patents but did not mention 
the integrated spool valve invention.  Defendant agreed to the release.732 
Shortly thereafter, defendant published an article describing the 
integrated spool valve technology and filed two patent applications based 
on it.733  Subsequently, counsel for plaintiff approached defendant to 
request that he sign a patent application to be filed in the name of plaintiff 
covering the integrated spool valve.734  The application named defendant a 
co-inventor, and his signature was therefore necessary to complete the 
application.735  Defendant refused, stating that he had invented the valve 
outside the scope of the joint development agreement.736  Plaintiff then 
proceeded to file two applications based on the technology.737  The first 
named defendant as an inventor, and as defendant refused to sign it, it was 
ultimately abandoned.738  The second did not name defendant as an 
inventor and issued as the ‘901 patent.739 
The district court denied plaintiff’s co-inventorship claim to Sturman’s 
‘329 and ‘987 patents.  The court held that plaintiff’s engineer’s alleged 
contribution to the invention, the selection of the type of steel to be used in 
the valve, was “merely the exercise of ordinary skill in the art and therefore 
not a significant addition to the conception” of the inventions.740  As part of 
the development of meuis under the joint development agreement, plaintiff 
engineers had searched for and found a type of steel that had specific 
magnetic and physical characteristics that would meet the demands of meui 
systems, such as “a sixty pound latching force.”741  Although defendant’s 
drawing indicated the use of the particular steel identified by the plaintiff 
engineers, the court found that the demands of the integrated spool valve 
did not require the use of such steel.742  Furthermore, available publications 
including a patent issued to defendant prior to the existence of the joint 
development agreement taught that “substantially any magnetic material” 
                                                          
 730. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 731. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 732. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612. 
 733. Id. at 1363-64, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 734. Id. at 1364, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 735. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 736. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 737. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 738. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 739. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 740. Id. at 1376, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Sturman 
Indus., Inc., No. 99-1201, slip op. 44 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2003)). 
 741. Caterpillar, 387 F.3d at 1362, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611. 
 742. Id. at 1376, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
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would suffice for use in the integrated spool valve.743  Therefore, plaintiff’s 
contribution to the integrated spool valve was not considered a significant 
addition to the invention.744 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that 
defendant was the sole inventor of the ‘329 and ‘987 patents.  Considering 
the district court’s findings of fact, it agreed that the use of the particular 
steels identified by plaintiff engineers was an “insignificant contribution” 
which did not support a claim to co-inventorship.  Furthermore, because the 
‘329 patent claims did not require either type of steel suggested by the 
plaintiff engineers, it was legally correct that the engineers were not 
inventors because its precedent required “that one contribute something to 
the claimed invention.”745  The Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument 
that defendant’s amendments of the ‘329 and ‘987 patents claims to require 
“material with enough residual magnetism” compelled correction of 
inventorship.746  These limitations, it reasoned, were not specific to the 
steels identified by plaintiff engineers.  Furthermore, when used in the 
integrated spool valve, defendant’s prior patent taught all that was 
necessary for someone of ordinary skill in the art to select appropriate 
materials.747 
As for the ‘901 patent, all the claims of this patent covered a three-way, 
dual-solenoid, integrated spool valve used to control the flow of working 
fluid in a heui.  The district court held that, although plaintiff had worked 
on a three-way integrated spool valve for use in a heui separately from 
defendant, defendant demonstrated his own prior conception of a three-way 
version of the valve in a marketing presentation delivered to plaintiff.  As 
for plaintiff’s other alleged improvements to the integrated spool valve, the 
court found that each of these were either an exercise of ordinary skill or 
disclosed in defendant’s sketch.  The Federal Circuit found that the district 
court had clearly erred in its conclusion.  Although defendant’s 
presentation had disclosed a three-way valve, it did not refer to an 
integrated spool valve.  Additionally, it found that because a three-way 
valve was “more complex” than the two-way valve disclosed in 
defendant’s sketch, plaintiff’s contribution was “not insignificant in quality 
                                                          
 743. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (reciting the district court’s detailed factual 
findings, including its observation that public texts also described the magnetic properties of 
potentially useful materials, that led to its conclusion that Caterpillar’s contribution was 
insignificant). 
 744. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622. 
 745. Id. at 1378, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623 (emphasis added) (quoting Fina Oil & 
Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1935, 1941 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
 746. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623-24. 
 747. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624. 
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when measured against the dimension of the full invention.”748  
Accordingly, because defendant had failed to present clear and convincing 
evidence of his prior conception of a three-way integrated spool valve, it 
reversed the district court’s conclusion that defendant was the sole inventor 
of the ‘901 patent.749 
In Eli Lilly and Co. v. Aradigm Corp.,750 plaintiff sued defendant under 
35 U.S.C. § 256751 seeking to have two of its scientists listed as inventors 
of U.S. Patent No. 5,888,477, owned by defendant.752  Following a jury 
verdict, the district court ordered the PTO to add one of plaintiff’s scientists 
as an inventor.  Defendant appealed this decision.753 
Defendant argued that the jury had been provided with erroneous 
instructions at trial.  First, it contended that the jury should have been 
provided with a construction of one of the claims for which joint 
inventorship was asserted.  The Federal Circuit agreed that “the legal scope 
of a claim must be known before the contributions of an alleged co-
inventor can be compared to that claim to determine whether the correct 
inventors were named,”754 but found that defendant had waived this 
argument because it had never requested construction of the claims and 
thereby implicitly conceded that the meanings of the terms therein were 
clear.755  Defendant then argued that the jury verdict form and one of the 
jury instructions had included “prejudicially paraphrased” descriptions of 
the claim.756  At trial defendant had objected to the paraphrasing, but had 
not indicated to the district court why such paraphrasing was prejudicial.  
The Federal Circuit again held that defendant had waived this argument 
because it failed to indicate what was lacking in the paraphrased 
                                                          
 748. Id. at 1380, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1609 (quoting Fina Oil, 123 F.3d at 1473, 43 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935, 1941). 
 749. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
 750. 376 F.3d 1352, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1787 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 751. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (2000) (entitling the Director to issue a certificate correcting an 
error in naming an inventor, provided that the error was not made with any deceptive 
intention and on application of all the parties and assignees with proof of the facts). 
 752. Lilly also sued Aradigm for state law claims of unjust enrichment and breach of 
contract.  Aradigm, 376 F.3d at 1368-70, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799-1800. 
 753. This was a cross-appeal.  Lilly appealed the district court’s denial of injunctive 
relief as a remedy for Aradigm’s breech of contract and unjust enfringment claims, for 
which the jury only awarded Lilly two dollars in nominal damages.  Id. at 1368-69, 71 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799. 
 754. Id. at 1360, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792. 
 755. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792. 
 756. The jury was instructed that “[t]he ‘inventions’ at issue in this case include:  . . . that 
aerosolized lispro produces a relative bioavailability greater than twice that seen after the 
inhalation of a similar amount of [regular] human insulin.”  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1792-93.  The verdict form also described the invention of claim 6 as “inhaling an 
aerosolized formulation of insulin lispro into the lungs, which produces a relative 
bioavailability greater than twice that seen after the inhalation of a similar amount of 
[regular] insulin.”  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793. 
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description or specify what made it prejudicial: 
Generically alleging that the wording of a jury instruction is confusing, 
without suggesting the logical error the jury might make, does not give 
the district court the information that it requires to see the alleged error 
of its ways and to have a meaningful first opportunity to consider 
changing its course.757 
Despite concluding that defendant had waived its right to raise its 
paraphrasing arguments regarding the jury instructions on appeal because 
its objections were not sufficiently specific, the Federal Court applied 
Seventh Circuit law758 and addressed those arguments on their merits.  In 
doing so, the Federal Circuit found that the description of the claimed 
invention in the verdict form differed from the language of the claim itself 
only in that the description did not recite as a “distinct first step [the] 
aerosolizing of lispro” as did the claim.759  The description in the verdict 
form, however, “necessarily encompassed the step of aerosolizing” in that 
it required that the invention include “inhaling an aerosolized formulation” 
of lispro.760  Turning to the asserted error in the instructions, Aradigm 
contended that the description given in the instructions had only recited one 
limitation that was present in the claim at issue. The Federal Circuit found 
that Seventh Circuit law requires review of the jury instructions as a whole, 
and that “in light of the verdict form, any alleged error in instruction 20 did 
not prevent the jury from reasonably discerning the correct message.”761  
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit reasoned, the law of inventorship does not 
require that an inventor have contributed to the conception of each 
limitation of any one patent claim.762 
Defendant next argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
jury verdict that plaintiff’s scientist was a joint inventor of the ‘477 patent.  
Plaintiff claimed that its scientist was a joint inventor of the ‘477 patent 
because he had conveyed to the defendant’s scientists that “aerosolized 
                                                          
 757. Id. at 1361, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792. 
 758. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792 (noting that Rule 51 requires objections to state 
“distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection”); see also Wilk v. Am. 
Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207, 218 (7th Cir. 1983) (dictating the need to look to “the 
instructions as a whole, in a common sense manner, avoiding fastidiousness, inquiring 
whether the correct message was conveyed to the jury reasonably well”); Avern Trust v. 
Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1241 (7th Cir. 1969) (“Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure precludes the assignment of error when no specific objection to an instruction is 
made.”). 
 759. Aradigm, 376 F.3d at 1361, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792. 
 760. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792. 
 761. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793. 
 762. Id. at 1361-62, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793.  Aradigm also contested the 
paraphrasing of the invention in the instructions and the verdict form on the basis that it 
allowed the jury to find that Lilly’s scientist was a co-inventor when he had contributed “a 
mere realization about the chemical properties of lispro” already a part of the public domain.  
Id. at 1362, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794. 
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lispro might be used to produce ‘a relative bioavailability greater than twice 
that seen after the inhalation of a similar amount of human insulin’” during 
joint development meetings between Lilly and Aradigm in 1995 and 
1996.763  The Federal Circuit held that the jury’s verdict was not 
sustainable because the jury had not been presented with substantial 
evidence that this information had ever been communicated by the 
plaintiff’s scientist.  The evidence showed that plaintiff’s scientist had 
discussed insulin at meetings with defendant, and had suggested to 
defendant that it try lispro in its aerosol delivery devices.  No evidence 
existed, however, that directly showed that the plaintiff’s scientist had 
conveyed to defendant that aerosolized lispro should be used “to produce a 
relative bioavailability greater than twice that seen after inhalation of 
human insulin.”764  The Federal Circuit held that, where the standard for 
correcting inventorship was a clear and convincing standard, the jury’s 
verdict could not stand on circumstantial evidence alone.765 
In its appeal, plaintiff also alleged that the jury instructions were 
erroneous in that they required plaintiff to prove that its scientist had 
contributed to the conception of the claimed invention by clear and 
convincing evidence.  Plaintiff argued that joint inventorship disputes 
under § 256 should be analyzed under the preponderance of the evidence 
standard where the person allegedly omitted from an issued patent had a 
co-pending patent application claiming the same subject matter as the 
issued patent.  Plaintiff based its argument on 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 and 
Environ Products, Inc. v. Furon Co.766  Section 1.601 provides that a party 
who does not have the earliest effective filing date in an interference 
proceeding need only to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it was the first to invent in order to succeed in the interference if the 
two patents or applications at issue were co-pending before the PTO.767  In 
this case, the general presumption of patent validity does not apply.  In 
Environ Products, the Federal Circuit had held that in a three-way priority 
contest, between two issued patents and a patent application, all of which 
had been pending before the PTO at the same time, the parties to the 
priority contest only needed to prove their claim to original inventorship by 
a preponderance of the evidence.768 
The Federal Circuit explained that its holding in Environ Products was 
not binding in this case because the issue there was priority of invention, 
not correction of inventorship. Furthermore, it did not see a reason to 
                                                          
 763. Id. at 1363-64, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793. 
 764. Id. at 1364, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794. 
 765. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1795. 
 766. 215 F.3d 1261, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 767. 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (2005). 
 768. Environ Products, 215 F.3d at 1265, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1041. 
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extend the holding of Environ Products to correction of inventorship cases. 
The existence of co-pending applications does throw into question the 
presumption of validity for the first-filed patent insofar as the 
presumption involves an issue of timing or priority, namely that the 
patentee was first to invent.  The existence of co-pending applications, 
however, does not undermine to the same degree the presumption that 
each of the groups of inventors listed on the patent applications acted 
independently.769 
The Federal Circuit found that the clear and convincing burden of proof 
as applied to joint inventorship disputes was justified because individuals 
are prone to “reconstructing” the extent of their contribution to the 
conception of inventions.770  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit opined that, 
unlike a junior party to an interference proceeding, a person alleging non-
joinder would benefit from a lower standard of proof without assuming any 
related risk.  A junior party to an interference, on the other hand, risks its 
own patent claims if it does not successfully demonstrate priority.771 
Furthermore, plaintiff’s argument assumed that its scientist’s patent 
application claimed the same subject matter as the claims of the ‘477 
patent.  In a priority dispute interference, however, the preponderance of 
the evidence standard does not come into play until it has been adjudicated 
or conceded by the parties that the competing patents or applications do in 
fact cover the same subject matter.772  The Federal Circuit found this to be 
an additional reason why it could not treat plaintiff’s inventorship claim as 
the functional equivalent of the priority determination in an interference 
proceeding.773  For these reasons the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that 
it deserved a new trial because the jury instruction should have provided 
that plaintiff could prove joint inventorship by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Linear Technology Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.774 presented an appeal 
from a district court’s grant of summary that an alleged inventor’s claim of 
joint inventorship was not adequately corroborated.775  The Federal Circuit 
began by noting that a party seeking to correct inventorship must establish 
that it contributed to the conception of the claimed invention “with more 
than their own testimony concerning the relevant facts.”776  The court 
explained that an alleged inventor must corroborate its inventorship claim 
                                                          
 769. Aradigm, 376 F.3d at 1366, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797. 
 770. Id. at 1367, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797. 
 771. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1797-98. 
 772. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. 
 773. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1798. 
 774. 379 F.3d 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 775. Id. at 1327, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 776. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
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with reliable evidence such as:  (1) ”records made contemporaneously with 
the inventive process”; (2) “[c]ircumstantial evidence of an independent 
nature”; and (3) “oral testimony from someone other than the alleged 
inventor.”777  After reviewing the alleged inventor’s evidence, the court 
held that the district court “correctly concluded that no reasonable juror 
could find that [the] inventorship claim was corroborated.”778 
I.  Double Patenting 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Pharmachemie B.V.,779 the issue was 
whether the exclusive licensee could invoke § 121780 as a defense to the 
argument that the claims of the disputed later patent were invalid for 
double patenting in light of a related earlier patent.781  The district court 
granted summary judgment to the exclusive licensee, holding that the “the 
divisional application that led to the [later] patent was filed as a result of, 
and consistent with, the restriction requirement issued in 1973.”782  On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit explained that its precedent mandates that § 121 
is available as a defense to double patenting only if the application for the 
later patent “was filed as a result of a restriction requirement and is 
consonant with the restriction requirement.”783  After canvassing the 
prosecution histories of the earlier and later patents, the Federal Circuit 
determined that: 
There was, to say the least, some confusion at various points as to how 
the various claims should be sorted out for purposes of restriction.  But 
even though at some points restriction requirements were imposed that 
were similar to, or even identical to, earlier restriction requirements, each 
requirement was nevertheless separately imposed with respect to each 
separate application.  The record this does not support the inference that 
any of the various restriction requirements automatically carried forward, 
                                                          
 777. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076. 
 778. Id. at 1329, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077. 
 779. 361 F.3d 1343, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 780. Section 121 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application, 
the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of the 
inventions . . . . A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a 
requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or on an application 
filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the 
Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or 
against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the 
divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other 
application. 
35 U.S.C. § 121 (2000). 
 781. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 361 F.3d at 1344-45, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1097. 
 782. Id. at 1348, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
 783. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
2005] PATENT SUMMARY 1035 
in part or in whole, from one application to the next.784 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated the grant of summary judgment 
and remanded to the district court, explaining that given “the complexity of 
the factual record . . . [w]hether further analysis of the sequence of 
applications, restriction requirements, and responses by applicants may 
reveal other grounds for concluding that the protection of Section 121 
should be extended . . . is a matter for the district court to address in the 
first instance.”785 
In dissent, Judge Newman wrote that regardless of whether the patent 
applicants complied with the restriction requirements by various applicants, 
“the issuance of these actions was entirely discretionary with the 
Commissioner.”786  The dissent reasoned that because no dispute existed 
“that the applicant made the required election for each restriction 
requirement, and the divisional and continuing applications at issue were 
accepted by the examiner as properly filed . . . [Section 121] protected the 
patentee from citation of the earlier patent against the later one.”787  The 
dissent further noted that if the majority’s opinion 
require[s] that the minutiae of the various discretionary restriction 
requirements and the acceptance by the examiners of the applicant’s 
compliances with those requirements are subject to appellate review, the 
standard of review is that of the Administrative Procedure Act, not the de 
novo untangling of internal procedures for which my colleagues remand 
to the district court.788 
III.  INFRINGEMENT 
A.  Claim Construction 
The Federal Circuit’s claim construction landscape during the early part 
of 2004 was marred by a string of 2-1 decisions.  The underlying tension 
between different claim construction methodologies espoused by different 
camps of judges came to a head when the Federal Circuit decided to hear 
en banc the panel’s decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.789  This section 
initially discusses the panel decision in Phillips and the subsequent order to 
                                                          
 784. Id. at 1349, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101. 
 785. Id. at 1350, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.  The court’s remand for further 
proceedings is curious given the prior decisions holding that, similar to claim construction, 
double patenting is a question of law subject to de novo review.  Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr 
Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 972, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1869, 1881 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he 
double patenting issue in this case is solely a matter of law.”). 
 786. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 361 F.3d at 1350, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (Newman, 
J., dissenting). 
 787. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 788. Id. at 1350-51, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 789. 376 F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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hear the case en banc.  The secton next offers the authors’ modest proposal 
for a claim construction methodology.  Given that the Federal Circuit’s 
claim construction jurisprudence does not lend itself to easy classification, 
the remaining parts of this section groups cases according to the following 
criteria:  (1) cases adopting a broad construction; (2) cases adopting a 
narrow construction; (3) cases in which the inventors used a “coined term”; 
(4) means-plus-function limitation cases; and (5) preamble limitations.  
Finally, this section discusses miscellaneous issues involving claim 
construction and discuss the various tools that the court employed in 2004 
to arrive at its constructions. 
1.  Phillips v. AWH Corporation:  The panel decision and the en banc 
order 
Phillips involved the proper construction of the term “baffles” in claims 
directed to modular wall panels suitable for impact resistance.790  At the 
district court, even though both parties stipulated that “baffles” should be 
construed as a “means for obstructing, impeding, or checking the flow of 
something,” the district court determined that “the term was ambiguous 
because ‘it does not identify the substance or force the flow of which it is 
intended to check, impede, or obstruct.’”791  The district court then 
reasoned that “the claim language ‘does not adequately describe the 
function of the structure,” and therefore concluded that “the claim contains 
means-plus-function language subject to construction under 35 U.S.C. § 
112, ¶ 6.”792  Looking to the specification, the district court held that “every 
textual reference in the Specification and its diagrams show baffle 
deployment at an angle other than 90 to the wall faces.”793 
On appeal, though holding that the district court erred in treating the 
term “baffle” as a means-plus-function limitation,794 the Federal Circuit 
explained that its “analysis does not end there . . . we must still read the 
claims in view of the specification and determine whether the patentee has 
otherwise limited the scope of the claims.”795  The Federal Circuit started 
its analysis by noting that “[t]he ordinary meaning of a term must be 
considered in view of the intrinsic evidence [such as] the claims, the 
                                                          
 790. 363 F.3d 1207, 1209-10, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1419 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 791. Id. at 1210, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97-
MK-212, slip op. at 23 (D. Colo. Nov. 22, 2002)). 
 792. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418.  “An element in a claim for a combination may 
be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of 
structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the 
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents 
thereof.”  35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) 
 793. Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1210, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1418. 
 794. Id. at 1212, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. 
 795. Id. at 1212-13, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. 
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specification, and the prosecution history,”796 and observing that a “claim 
term will not carry its ordinary meaning if the intrinsic evidence shows that 
the patentee distinguished the term from the prior art on the basis of a 
particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a 
particular embodiment as important to the invention.”797 
In examining the intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit observed that the 
“specification is rife with references to impact resistance, especially against 
projectiles such as bullets and bombs,”798 and referred to the specification’s 
“Disclosure of the Invention” section that stated that baffles are “disposed 
at such angles that bullets which might penetrate the outer steel panels are 
deflected.”799  The Federal Circuit then explained that: 
[T]he specification addresses and distinguishes the prior art, asserting 
that “[i]n secured facilities, and protective barriers, it is feasible that 
projectiles may be encountered, such as bullets from high powered guns 
or bomb fragments.”  It continues by stating that “[t]here have not been 
effective ways of dealing with these powerful impact weapons with 
inexpensive housing in the prior art.”800 
Focusing on the figures and diagrams in the asserted patent, the Federal 
Circuit again emphasized that the patent’s objective was to prevent objects 
from penetrating through walls because the specification taught that “if 
bullets ‘were to penetrate the outer steel shell wall, the baffles are disposed 
at angles which tend to deflect the bullets.’”801  The Federal Circuit thus 
held: 
From the specification’s explicit descriptions of the invention, we 
conclude that the patentee regarded his invention as panels providing 
impact or projectile resistance and that the baffles must be oriented at 
angles other than 90. Baffles directed at 90 cannot deflect projectiles as 
described in the [asserted] patent, and in any event, are disclosed in the 
prior art.802 
Addressing the dissent’s argument that its construction was limiting 
claims to the preferred embodiment, the majority explained that 
“[i]nspection of the patent shows that baffles angled at other than 90º is the 
only embodiment disclosed in the patent; its is the invention.  It is 
impossible to derive anything else from the specification.”803 
                                                          
 796. Id. at 1213, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. 
 797. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswich Corp., 
288 F.3d 1359, 1366-67, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1662-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 798. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420. 
 799. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421. 
 800. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798 (issued July 
7, 1987)) (citations omitted). 
 801. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 4,677,798). 
 802. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421. 
 803. Id. at 1214, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421. 
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In dissent, Judge Dyk wrote that the majority’s opinion “effectively 
limits the claims to the preferred embodiment, contrary to our recent 
decision in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc. . . . and numerous other 
decisions of this court. In doing so, the majority decision attempts to work 
a major and unfortunate change in our recent claim construction 
jurisprudence.”804  The dissent explained that the majority’s decision 
imposed an “additional structural limitation upon the patentee’s preferred 
embodiments that limits baffles to structures ‘oriented at angles other than 
90º.’  This is contrary to the plain meaning, and there is no suggestion that 
the patentee, acting as his own lexicographer, gave a special meaning to the 
term baffles.”805 
Addressing the three grounds proffered by the majority opinion, the 
dissent found that “[n]one is convincing.”806  With regard to the majority’s 
position that baffles angled at other than 90º was only embodiment 
disclosed, the dissent noted that the court’s jurisprudence has “expressly 
rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, 
the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to the 
embodiment.”807  With regard to the majority’s reasoning that the object of 
the invention required baffles orientated at angles other than 90º, the 
dissent reasoned that the specification “merely identifies impact resistance 
as one of several objectives of the invention.”808  Again relying on Liebel-
Flarshiem the dissent noted that the “fact that a patent asserts that an 
invention achieves several objectives does not require that each of the 
claims be construed as limited to structes that are capable of achieving all 
of the objectives.”809  Finally, with regard to the majority’s position that 
any broader construction of the term “baffles” would read on the prior art, 
the dissent explained that “[t]he ‘axiom’ that claims should be construed to 
preserve validity is not an invitation to narrowly construe ambiguous claim 
language contrary to its plain meaning.”810 
Four months after the panel opinion, the Federal Circuit “determined to 
                                                          
 804. Id. at 1216, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423 (Dyk, J., dissenting); see also Leibel 
Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(reversing the district court’s order granting summary judgment of noninfringement and 
rejecting the contention that a patent must be construed as being limited to one embodiment 
if the patent only describes a single embodiment). 
 805. Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1217, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1423  (Dyk, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Phillips, 363 F.3d at 1213, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421 (Lourie, J., writing for 
the majority)). 
 806. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 807. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (quoting Leibel-Flarsheim, 
358 F.3d at 906, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807). 
 808. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 809. Id. at 1217-18, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1424 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (quoting Liebel-
Flarsheim, 358 F.3d at 908, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809). 
 810. Id. at 1218, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1425 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
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hear th[e] case en banc in order to resolve issues concerning the 
construction of patent claims raised by the now-vacated panel majority and 
dissenting opinions.”811  In so doing, the court set forth seven questions for 
which it invited submission of additional briefs from the parties as well as 
amicus curae: 
Is the public notice function of patent claims  better served by 
referencing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries and 
similar sources to interpret a claim term or by looking primarily to the 
patentee’s use of the term in the specification?  If both sources are to be 
consulted, in what order? 
If dictionaries should serve as the primary source for claim 
interpretation, should the specification limit the full scope of claim 
language (as defined by the dictionaries) only when the patentee has 
acted as his own lexicographer or when the specification reflects a clear 
disclaimer of claim scope?  If so, what language in the specification will 
satisfy those conditions?  What use should be made of general as 
opposed to technical dictionaries?  How does the concept of ordinary 
meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the same 
term?  If the dictionary provides multiple potentially applicable 
definitions for a term, is it appropriate to look to the specification to 
determine what definition or definitions should apply? 
If the primary source for claim construction should be the specification, 
what use should be made of dictionaries?  Should the range of the 
ordinary meaning of claim language be limited to the scope of the 
invention disclosed in the specification, for example, when only a single 
embodiment is disclosed and no other indications of breadth are 
disclosed? 
Instead of viewing the claim construction methodologies in the majority 
and dissent of the now-vacated panel decision as alternative, conflicting 
approaches, should the two approaches be treated as complementary 
methodologies such that there is a dual restriction on claim scope, and a 
patentee must satisfy both limiting methodologies in order to establish 
the claim coverage it seeks? 
When, if ever, should claim language be narrowly construed for the sole 
purpose of avoiding invalidity under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 
112? 
What role should prosecution history and expert testimony by one of 
ordinary skill in the art play in determining the meaning of the disputed 
claim terms? 
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc. . . . and our en banc decision in Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
                                                          
 811. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765, 1766 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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Technologies, Inc. . . . is it appropriate for this court to accord any 
deference to any aspect of trial court claim construction rulings?  If so, 
on what aspects, in what circumstances, and to what extent?812 
Judge Rader concurred with decision to hear the case en banc and 
suggested that the court receive further commentary on an additional 
question: 
Is claim construction amenable to resolution by resort to strictly 
algorithmic rules, e.g., specification first, dictionaries first, etc.?  Or is 
claim construction better achieved by using the order or tools relevant in 
each case to discern the meaning of terms according to the understanding 
of one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention, thus 
entrusting trial courts to interpret claims as a contract or statute?813 
Chief Judge Mayer, however, dissented from the court’s decision to hear 
the case en banc,814 and in an opinion echoing his earlier dissents in 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.815 and Cybor Corp. v. FAS 
Technologies, Inc.,816 the Chief Judge explained: 
Until the court is willing to reconsider its holdings in [Markman] . . . and 
[Cybor Corp.] . . . that claim construction is a pure question of law 
subject to de novo review in this court, any attempt to refine the process 
is futile.  Nearly a decade of confusion has resulted from the fiction that 
claim construction is a matter of law, when it is obvious that it depends 
on underlying factual determinations which, like all factual questions if 
disputed, are the province of the trial court, reviewable on appeal for 
clear error.  To pretend otherwise inspires cynicism.817 
While the Federal Circuit’s decision to address these seven questions en 
banc is ambitious in scope and appears a good idea in the abstract, Phillips 
may ultimately present a situation in which the initial en banc order over-
promises and the ultimate resolution, if any, under-delivers in terms of 
resolving the Federal Circuit’s fundamental conflicts regarding the 
mechanics of claim construction.  This is especially true because, as 
explained above, many of the questions on which the court desired briefing 
were never even raised by the parties in Phillips, much less disputed.818  
Indeed, at the district court, the parties stipulated to the construction of the 
                                                          
 812. Id. at 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766. 
 813. Id. at 1384, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (Rader, J., concurring). 
 814. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting). 
 815. 52 F.3d 967, 989, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) 
(Mayer, J., concurring), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 816. 138 F.3d 1448, 1463, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Mayer, J., 
concurring). 
 817. Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1384, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767. 
 818. For example, the role of prosecution history, expert testimony, dictionaries, and 
deference to district courts in claim construction either played no role in the panel and 
district court’s opinion or received only passing reference. 
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term “baffles” that ultimately gave rise to the en banc hearing.819 
2.   A modest proposal for a claim construction methodology 
Chief Judge Mayer dissented from the order granting an en banc 
rehearing in Phillips, arguing that “[n]early a decade of confusion has 
resulted from the fiction that claim construction is a pure question of law” 
and that a “shuffling” of the Court’s precedent based on that “fiction” 
would not resolve that confusion.820  We agree with Chief Judge Mayer’s 
view of the Federal Circuit’s precedent and propose a solution. 
It is a staple proposition that claim construction begins with the words of 
the claims and that claim terms are, in the first instance, to be given their 
ordinary meanings as they are understood by persons of skill in the art at 
the time of invention.821  The next step, after ascertaining the ordinary 
meaning, is to review the intrinsic evidence to determine whether the 
disputed claim terms should receive meanings that differ from the ordinary 
meanings of the words.  We believe that the problem lies in treating the 
first step as a pure question of law. 
The Court has struggled to create a purely legal claim construction 
analysis because the determination of the “ordinary” meaning of a claim 
term is not a question of law.  For example, determining what the term 
“mosfet” meant to an electrical engineer in 1995 simply is not something 
that may be determined as a question of law.  Rather, it is a question of fact 
that requires evidence necessary to identify the characteristics of a person 
of ordinary skill and to determine how such a person understood the term 
“mosfet” at the relevant time.  Various Federal Circuit decisions have 
vacillated between using specification822 and dictionaries from the relevant 
time823 because the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence is tethered to the idea of 
claim construction as a pure question of law.  But it is not really the role of 
the specification to define terms as they would ordinarily be understood by 
a person of skill.  Instead the specification functions to teach the new 
                                                          
 819. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1210, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417, 1419 
(discussing Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 97-MK-212, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27298, at *32). 
 820. Phillips, 376 F.3d at 1384,  71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1767 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting). 
 821. Nathaniel Durrance, How The Doctrine Of Equivalents May Save Claim 
Construction, 33 AIPLA Q. J. 73, 94 (2005) (explaining that the plain meaning of a claim 
must be determined first and without reference to the offending device).  
 822. See, e.g., Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 74 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“In most cases, the best source for discerning this 
proper context is the patent specification, wherein the patent applicant describes the 
invention.”). 
 823. See, e.g., Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309, 51 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is entirely appropriate, perhaps even 
preferable, for a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim 
construction it is tending to from the patent file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, 
plainly apposite, and widely held understandings in the pertinent technical field.”). 
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invention and to define terms, when necessary, that would not be 
understood by the person of ordinary skill (at least not understood in the 
way intended by the inventor).  Dictionaries are a more apt tool for 
determining the ordinary meaning of a term at a relevant time, but they are 
only one such resource and they often provide inconsistent or conflicting 
meanings, thereby requiring the court to choose amongst them without 
making a finding of fact. 
A better methodology would be to acknowledge that step one of the 
claim construction process—ascertaining the ordinary meaning—is a 
question of fact and allow trial courts to review all relevant evidence, such 
as dictionaries, expert testimony, and treatises, and make a factual finding 
as to the ordinary meaning of a disputed term.  That finding would be given 
deference by the court and would serve as a default.  The next step in the 
process, the review of the patent, would remain a question of law reviewed 
de novo by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.  The trial court would 
review the intrinsic evidence to determine if the patentee used a disputed 
term in a way that is inconsistent with the previously ascertained ordinary 
meaning.  This is a question of law because it only requires the court to 
analyze legal documents (the patent and the prosecution history) to 
determine the legal significance of the words chosen by the patentee as 
well as legal significance of the public record in the patent office.  For 
example, the trial court would review the claims to determine if the 
doctrine of claim differentiation indicates that a particular construction is 
appropriate.  Likewise, the court would review the specification to see if 
the patentee defined the term (explicitly or implicitly) or if the described 
purpose of the invention indicates that a particular construction is 
appropriate or if the patentee indicated that a described element was 
particularly important to the patented invention.  The court would review 
the prosecution history to see if the patentee or the PTO indicated that a 
particular term should be given a construction different than the ordinary 
meaning.  This type of analysis of legally operative documents is what 
courts are trained to do.  Courts, however, have no training which would 
allow them to ascertain the ordinary meanings of words, other than through 
the review of evidence and the assessment of credibility. 
We propose, therefore, that the Federal Circuit adopt a process whereby 
the district court would ascertain the ordinary meanings of disputed terms 
as a question of fact and review the patent and the prosecution history as a 
question of law to ascertain if those documents indicate that a term should 
receive a particular meaning.  Where the ordinary meaning and the 
meaning derived from the intrinsic evidence are different, the meaning 
derived from the intrinsic evidence would be adopted as long as the court 
finds that such an intrinsic meaning exists.  If the district court does not 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
2005] PATENT SUMMARY 1043 
conclude that the intrinsic evidence indicates a particular definition for the 
term, then the ordinary meaning applies. 
3.  “Broad construction” cases 
In Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.,824 the Federal Circuit held 
that a claim reciting the language, “heating the resulting batter coated 
dough to a temperature in the range of about 400 degrees F to 850 degrees 
F . . . means what it says” and required the dough itself, not the oven, to be 
heated to the stated temperature.825  The disputed claims were directed to 
the process of producing a “light, flaky dough product.”  Plaintiff appealed 
after the lower court granted summary judgment of noninfringement 
against it.  The Federal Circuit affirmed despite the fact that the district 
court’s claim construction produced a nonsensical result—the dough would 
be burned to a crisp if it was heated to 400-850°F.826  The Federal Circuit 
reasoned that nothing in the specification or the prosecution history 
suggested that the patentees meant “to” to mean “at,” and a court is not 
required to redraft claims that, under their only reasonable interpretation 
make no sense, especially where the patentee himself drafted the claims.827 
In fact, according to the Federal Circuit, the prosecution history appeared 
to indicate that plaintiff intended to use “to” instead of “at,” implying that 
the dough itself should obtain the specified temperature range rather than 
the oven in which it would be heated.  The temperature range language was 
added to the claims in response to the examiner’s rejection of them for 
failing to satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112.828  The original 
application contained another claim as well as a description in the 
specification that employed the word “to” to relate the concept of heating 
dough to the stated temperature range, while in an example, the word “at” 
took the place of “to.”  Thus, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the patentees 
had a choice between using “to” or “at” and consciously chose “to” when it 
amended the claim.829 
Plaintiff argued that the district court was wrong because it did not 
construe the claim terms as one of ordinary skill in the art would do.  
Plaintiff’s position rested on a declaration of its baking expert, in which the 
expert stated that he would not interpret the claims to require the dough 
itself to be heated to 450 - 850°F because the resulting product would be 
“unusable.”  The Federal Circuit was not persuaded, explaining that the 
declaration lacked any explanation of how “to” would be interpreted to 
                                                          
 824. 358 F. 3d 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 825. Id. at 1372, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 826. Id. at 1373, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. 
 827. Id. at 1374, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
 828. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
 829. Id. at 1375, 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1860. 
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mean “at” in the art and thus restated the argument to rewrite the claim 
simply because the paternal prices would not perform the intended 
function, which it had already rejected.830 
In Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Astrazeneca UK Ltd.,831 plaintiff 
appealed a district court’s construction of several terms in four of its 
patents directed to methods for screening substances for protein “inhibitors 
and activators.”  A representative claim included one of the disputed terms, 
“inhibitor or activator of a protein,” in its preamble as follows:  “A method 
of determining whether a substance is an inhibitor or activator of a protein 
whose production by a cell evokes a responsive change in a phenotypic 
characteristic other than the level of said protein in said cell per se.”832  The 
claimed method used two cell lines, one which produced more of the 
protein of interest and that exhibited a greater phenotypic response to such 
protein than the other.  The district court construed the term “inhibitor or 
activator of a protein” to mean “a substance that has a greater effect on the 
phenotype of cells that express the protein of interest at a higher level than 
on the phenotype of cells that express the protein of interest at a lower level 
or not at all.”833  Under this construction, plaintiff stipulated that all four of 
its patents were invalid and noninfringed.  On appeal, however, plaintiff 
argued that the term “inhibitors or activators” of proteins should have been 
limited to substances that directly bind to the target protein; the district 
court’s construction would cover substances that operated to achieve the 
recited result by both direct and indirect means. 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s broader construction for 
several reasons, including its finding that the specification expressly 
defined “inhibitor or activator of a protein” as a substance that yields a 
positive response to the claimed method, encompassing substances that do 
not directly bind to the protein of interest.834  Plaintiff attempted to argue 
that a narrower construction was required under Athletic Alternatives, Inc. 
v. Prince Manufacturing, Inc.,835 which, plaintiff asserted stood for the 
proposition that the notice function of patent law requires that the narrower 
meaning prevails in the event of a tie between a broader and narrower 
meaning.  Plaintiff also relied on Rhine v. Casio, Inc.,836 which stated that 
                                                          
 830. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1860. 
 831. 366 F.3d 1348, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 832. Id. at 1350, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 833. Id. at 1351, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643 (internal quotations omitted). 
 834. Id. at 1352, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644. 
 835. 73 F.3d 1573, 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Where 
there is an equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a claim, and there is 
an enabling disclosure that indicates that the applicant is at least entitled to a claim having 
the narrower meaning, we consider the notice function of the claim to be best served by 
adopting the narrower meaning.”). 
 836. 183 F.3d 1342, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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“[c]laims should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity.”837 
The Federal Circuit found neither of plaintiff’s attempts to invoke 
canons of construction to support its limited meaning to be persuasive.  
First, it found that plaintiff misinterpreted Athletic Alternatives, 
characterizing that case as “unusual” and not on point because in that case 
the patent applicant had made two “contradictory and irreconcilable 
affirmative representations of the contested limitation,”838 and for that 
reason the court held that the narrower definition should trump the broader 
one.  As for plaintiff’s reliance on Rhine, the Federal Circuit said that 
neither it nor the district court reviewed validity, and therefore plaintiff’s 
“stipulation of invalidity alone is insufficient to invoke this canon.”839  The 
Federal Circuit also determined that it was only required to turn to a 
construction that preserves validity if, after applying “all the available tools 
of claim construction . . . the claim is still ambiguous.”840 
In Fuji Photo Film Co. V. International Trade Commission,841 Fuji 
sought enforcement, modification, and clarification of the International 
Trade Commission’s (“ITC”) previously issued cease-and-desist and 
general exclusion orders directed to imported disposable 35-millimeter film 
cameras that allegedly infringed Fuji’s utility and design patents.  The ITC 
adopted the orders of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to whom the 
case was assigned and Fuji appealed them.  Specifically, Fuji appealed the 
constructions of claims in four of its patents:   the ‘168 patent, the ‘087 
patent, the ‘495 patent, and the ‘649 patent. 
Fuji first asserted error in the ITC’s construction of Claim 1 of Fuji’s 
‘168 patent, which contained a limitation directed to the front cover section 
of a camera.  The limitation read: 
[A] front cover section which . . . closes said open front of said main 
case section to cover the majority of said taking lens and said shutter 
means and said film transporting means, said front cover section being 
formed with at least one opening for partly receiving therein a member 
of one of said means . . . .842 
Fuji argued that several named parties’ cameras infringed Claim 1 
because they all had front covers with openings which received the film 
transporting means, the shutter means, or the taking lens.843  The ITC 
disagreed based on its constructions of “opening” and “said means.” 
                                                          
 837. Id. at 1345, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379 (internal quotations omitted). 
 838. Housey Pharms., 366 F.3d at 1356, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 839. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. 
 840. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 
358 F.3d 898, 911, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 841. 386 F.3d 1095, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 842. Id. at 1098, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771.  
 843. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
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The ITC construed “opening” to mean “hole, breach, or aperture.”  Fuji 
argued that the term should include “[a]n open space serving as a passage 
or gap,” or “an unobstructed or unoccupied space or place.”844  The Federal 
Circuit agreed with the ITC’s construction, holding that the term “opening” 
was used throughout the specification to refer to perforations in the surface 
covering the body of a disposable camera.845  Fuji argued that “opening” 
must be interpreted to include an open space because the specification 
stated that the lens hole in the front cover was defined by a “circular boss,” 
that the circular boss consists of a hollow bulge in the front cover section, 
and that the hollow bulge is “for receiving therein the taking lens.”846  The 
Federal Circuit dismissed this argument because the sentence on which Fuji 
relied “significantly” did not refer to the circular boss as an “opening.”  
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded the sentence did not support Fuji’s 
argument at all. 
The ITC construed “said means” to include the “shutter means” and the 
“film transporting means,” but not the “taking lens.”847  The ITC based its 
decision on the fact that “taking lens” was not denominated as a “means” in 
the claim.  Fuji disputed this construction, pointing out that other parts of 
the patent referred to the taking lens as a “means” and discloses cameras in 
which the taking lens is received by a hole in the camera’s front cover.  The 
Federal Circuit found the plain language of the claim to be dispositive.  
Because the word “means” was used in reference to two of the three 
components set forth in the “front cover section” limitation but not the 
third, and because the same distinction existed in the preamble to the 
claims, which referred to a “taking lens, shutter means, and film 
transporting means,” the ITC’s construction was strongly supported.848  
The Federal Circuit distinguished Fuji’s construction, “which requires that 
the word ‘means’ be read into a portion of the claim where it is 
conspicuously absent.”849  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit found that the 
specification did not require a construction different from that which it 
ascertained from the plain meaning of the claims.  Rather, in every 
embodiment described by the patent, the lens was never the sole element 
that was partly received by an opening in the camera cover.  Therefore, the 
claim as construed was not at odds with the specification and did not 
produce a nonsensical result.850  
The Federal Circuit also rejected Fuji’s argument that the omission of the 
                                                          
 844. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 845. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 846. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771. 
 847. Id. at 1099, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 848. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 849. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 850. Id. at 1100, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
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word “means” after “taking lens” was an inadvertent error.  During 
prosecution, the examiner had made clear that he understood “said means” 
to refer to two, not three, means when he stated that “said means” 
“referr[ed] back to the previous two means.”851  The applicant never 
disputed this understanding.  Therefore, although it explained that “caution 
must be used in attaching weight to an applicant’s silence in response to an 
examiner’s statement about claim scope,”852 the Federal Circuit 
characterized the applicant’s failure to correct the examiner’s 
understanding as well as its failure to correct the claim by amendment or 
other measure as supporting its decision that the omission of “means” was 
not inadvertent.853 
Fuji argued that because claims depending on Claim 1 referred to “said 
taking lens means,” and because the phrase “taking lens means” was used 
twice in the specification, “taking lens” in Claim 1 should be construed as 
“taking lens means.”  The Federal Circuit again disagreed with Fuji, 
reasoning that although “taking lens means” was used twice in the 
specification, “taking lens” without the word “means” was used thirteen 
times.  The Federal Circuit thus concluded that there was “no basis for 
assuming that the use of the term ‘taking lens’ without the term ‘means’ 
was simply a one-time departure from a contrary usage employed 
throughout the patent.”854  The fact that the “Summary of Invention” 
section employed the term “taking lens means” and stated that the front 
cover of the camera has “at least one opening for partially receiving therein 
a member of at least one of the means” made no difference, as the 
“Background of the Invention” section referred to the “present invention” 
as having “a taking lens, a photographic transporting means, [and] an 
exposure means.”855  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
inconsistency between Claim 1’s use of “taking lens” and the dependent 
claims’ use of “taking lens means” could have just as easily been resolved 
by deleting “means” in the dependent claims as inserting “means” into 
Claim 1.856 
                                                          
 851. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73. 
 852. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 853. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.  Noting that Fuji’s argument, if successful, 
would broaden the scope of the claims, the court recited the general rule that “as between 
the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and 
the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection 
for particular subject matter.”  Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 854. Id. at 1101, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 855. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 856. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.  The court also rejected Fuji’s argument that the 
court’s constructions conflicted with the claim construction adopted in the original 
investigation of the case.  The construction adopted originally was the product of a 
stipulation made by one of the respondents in the prior case.  Because the present case 
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The Federal Circuit turned next to Fuji’s arguments with respect to the 
construction of the ‘649 patent.  Claim 1 of the ‘649 patent recited a 
method for assembling a disposable camera consisting of three essential 
steps:   winding a film taken from a light tight container in a darkroom, 
loading the film into the camera, and affixing the back cover of the 
camera.857  Although the words “in a darkroom” appeared only in the first 
of the three steps, the ITC argued that “in a darkroom” should be read into 
the other two steps as well.  It found support for this construction in the 
specification, in which all embodiments describe the three steps being 
performed in a darkroom.  The Federal Circuit determined that the 
inclusion of “in a darkroom” in the first step and its omission from other 
two steps provided strong textual support for Fuji’s argument that the 
second steps are not required to be performed in a darkroom.  The Federal 
Circuit held that the ITC’s statement that “there is no suggestion in the ‘649 
patent that the steps 2 and 3 could be performed outside a darkroom . . . 
ha[d] it backwards.”858  Rather, “the proper question was whether the 
specification indicated that the second and third steps cannot be performed 
outside a darkroom, and thus must be interpreted more narrowly than its 
language appears to require.”859  For all statements in the specification 
which the ITC said supported its construction, the context indicated that the 
statement was describing a preferred embodiment, not the invention as a 
whole. 
The Federal Circuit also disposed of the theory that the second and third 
steps must occur in a darkroom because it would be difficult to successfully 
perform them outside of a darkroom—Fuji’s expert testified that the steps 
could be performed outside of a darkroom so long as the film was protected 
from light during the processes of loading the camera and securing the back 
cover.860  Furthermore, although the specification referred to the need to 
avoid exposing the film to light during these steps, the Federal Circuit 
found nothing in the specification that said the only method of light 
avoidance is performance of the steps in a darkroom. 
In Bilstad v. Wakalopulos,861 Bilstad appealed from a Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interference judgment in favor of Wakalopulos that found 
Bilstad’s patent application lacked a sufficient written description under § 
112.862  Bilstad provoked an interference by copying claims of 
                                                          
affected different respondents, none of which were parties to the prior stipulation, the 
original constructions were not binding.  Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773-74. 
 857. Id. at 1104, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774-75. 
 858. Id. at 1105, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 859. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 860. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1777. 
 861. 386 F.3d 1116, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 862. Id. at 1118, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786 (affirming the Board’s decision but 
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Wakalopulos’s patent into its patent application.  The technology to which 
the application and patent were directed was an apparatus for sterilizing 
three-dimensional objects using ionizing radiation without hurting the 
objects.  The relevant portions of the interference count read as follows:   
“A sterilization apparatus comprising . . . an electron beam tube . . . and a 
moveable member manipulating objects in a plurality of directions within 
the reactive volume wherein the manipulated objects are sterilized.”863  
During the interference proceedings, Wakalopulos filed a motion seeking 
judgment that Bilstad’s claim, designated to the interference count was not 
patentable because it lacked an adequate written description under § 112 
for the claim limitation “a moveable member manipulating objects in a 
plurality of directions within the reactive volume.”864  After conducting a 
hearing on Wakalopulos’s motion, the Board granted judgment in favor of 
Wakalopulos.  The Board focused on the term “plurality,” which it 
construed to connote an indefinite numerical range from two to infinity.  In 
contrast to the wide range denoted by “plurality” in the count, the written 
description of Bilstad’s application described manipulation in only a “small 
number of directions.”865 
Bilstad argued on appeal that the Board incorrectly construed plurality.  
Specifically, it contended that the Board contradicted Federal Circuit 
precedent by combining dictionary definitions to achieve a range of two to 
infinity.866  The Federal Circuit saw no error in the Board’s construction of 
plurality.  Confronted with opposing arguments from the parties as to the 
meaning of the term, the court found that the Board looked to a dictionary 
to ascertain the ordinary meaning of plurality, then looked to the written 
description for context in ascertaining the appropriate meaning of 
“plurality” found in the dictionary.  It then properly determined that the 
dictionary definitions, Bilstad’s proffered definition, and Wakalopulos’s 
proffered definition were all consistent with the written description and 
construed the term to encompass all of the definitions.  The Federal Circuit 
approved of these steps taken by the Board to derive the correct 
construction of “plurality,” citing precedent stating that “if more than one 
dictionary definition is consistent with the use of the words in the intrinsic 
record, the claim terms may be construed to encompass all consistent 
                                                          
remanding the case to the Board in order to apply the correct standard). 
 863. Id. at 1119, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787. 
 864. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“The 
specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of 
carrying out his invention.”). 
 865. Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1122, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789-90. 
 866. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790. 
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meanings.”867  The fact that the Board’s definition did “little more than 
incorporate the several distinct [dictionary] definitions into a single one 
covering the entire scope of ‘plurality’” was not problematic because “the 
Board did not change the scope of the term or alter the ordinary meanings 
in any significant way.”868 
In Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,869 defendant asserted error in the 
district court’s construction of “pure” and “having a purity of at least 95%” 
in plaintiff’s claims directed to a pharmaceutical product and a process of 
manufacturing such product.  The district court’s construction of both terms 
excluded from consideration of purity “excipients.”  Thus, plaintiff’s 
process claim requiring “a highly pure solution of cefuroxime axetil” was 
construed to cover processes that used a solution that contains excipients in 
addition to cefuroxime axetil, and its product claim requiring “cefuroxime 
axetil . . . having a purity of at least 95%” was construed to cover 
formulations of cefuroxime axetil with more than five percent other 
ingredients.870 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s constructions of both 
terms.  It proffered three reasons for its decision.  First, the Federal Circuit 
held that the ordinary meaning of “impurity” included “unwanted reaction 
products formed during synthesis,”871 and the specification described the 
types of molecules that are considered impurities consistently with this 
ordinary meaning.  Because “excipients” are “inactive ingredients that are 
routinely and purposefully added to the active ingredient to enhance the 
performance of the active ingredient,”872 excipients were excluded from the 
ordinary meaning of impurity. 
Second, the Federal Circuit reasoned that if excipients were considered 
impurities, then one of the patent claims would have to be construed to 
exclude a preferred embodiment, in violation of the principle that claims 
“should rarely, if ever” be construed as such.873  Finally, the Federal Circuit 
found that a construction that would exclude compositions that contained 
more than five percent of ingredients other than cefuroxime axetil would 
conflict with the specification of the product patent, which lists 
pharmaceutical examples which all contained less than ninety-five percent 
                                                          
 867. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790 (quoting Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive 
Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1300, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).  
The court also found that the definition of “plurality” attributed to it by the Board was 
consistent with the disclosure of Wakalopulos’s patent.  Id. at 1122-23, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1790. 
 868. Bilstad, 386 F.3d at 1123, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790. 
 869. 376 F.3d 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 870. Id. at 1344-45, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 871. Id. at 1347, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806. 
 872. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806. 
 873. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806. 
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cefuroxime axetil.874 
In Mars v. H.J. Heinz Co.,875 plaintiff brought suit for infringement of its 
patent directed to a “dual-textured pet or animal food product comprising 
[among other things] a soft inner component of a dual texture pet or animal 
food product containing a mixture of lipid and solid ingredients.”876  The 
first issue on appeal was whether “ingredients” should be construed to 
mean only starting materials.  The Federal Circuit held that the term was 
not so limited.  First, the Federal Circuit found that dictionary definitions 
indicated that the ordinary meaning of “ingredient” could refer to either 
starting materials or to the components of a mixture after they have been 
combined.877  The Federal Circuit further looked to the claims themselves 
that were drawn to “a mixture . . . of ingredients.”  The context of the term 
“ingredients” in the claim “strongly suggests that ‘ingredients’ refers to the 
components after they have been combined to form that ‘mixture.’”878  The 
Federal Circuit referred to its previous decisions in PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte 
Chemical Co.879 and Exxon Chemical Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp.,880 in 
which it “equated a composition with a mixture and construed the term 
‘composition’ to refer to the claimed ingredients after they were joined 
together.”881  Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed defendant’s argument 
that the examples appear to use the term “ingredients” to refer to starting 
materials by saying that this was “not a sufficient reason . . . to deviate 
from the ordinary meaning of the claim language,” and furthermore, the 
statements cited by defendant did not use the term mixture of 
ingredients.882 
The second issue on appeal was whether the correct construction of 
“containing a mixture of lipid and solid ingredients” was limited to include 
mixtures containing only solid and lipid ingredients and exclude mixtures 
containing ingredients in addition to solid and lipid ingredients.883  The 
Federal Circuit again held that the term was not as narrow as defendant 
contended, and cited a general purpose dictionary and the Manual Patent 
Examing Procedure to show that “containing” is open-ended and does not 
exclude additional, unnamed ingredients.  Furthermore, the parties agreed 
                                                          
 874. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806. 
 875. 377 F.3d 1369, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1837 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 876. Id. at 1372, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839. 
 877. Id. at 1374, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740. 
 878. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740. 
 879. 304 F.3d 1235, 1244, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 880. 64 F.3d 1553, 1558, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The 
chemical composition exists at the moment the ingredients are mixed together.”). 
 881. Mars v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1374, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1837, 1841 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 882. Id. at 1375, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841. 
 883. Id. at 1374, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841. 
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that “mixture” means “a portion of matter consisting of two or more 
components in varying proportions that retain their own properties,” and 
that nothing within this ordinary meaning of “mixture” barred additional, 
unnamed ingredients.884 
The Federal Circuit determined that the district court’s reasons for 
limiting the term to exclude mixtures containing ingredients in addition to 
solid and lipid ingredients were lacking.  The Federal Circuit reasoned that 
the district court erred in concluding that the patentee had used the terms 
“containing” or “mixture” inconsistently with the ordinary, open-ended 
meanings of these terms.  The district court had relied on portions of the 
specification which provided that the soft inner component should “not 
exceed 100 wt%’ of lipids and solids and that ‘the most preferred 
embodiment comprises about 60 wt% solids and 40 wt% lipids.’”885  The 
specification’s full description of “preferable” embodiments, however, 
allowed for the possibility that the sum weight percent of solids and lipids 
was less than 100%, where it stated that “[i]t is preferable for the inner 
portion or component to comprise about 40-90 wt solids and about 10-60 
wt lipids,”886 and even stated that the “sum of the wt of solids and lipids, in 
all cases, [does] not exceed 100wt.”887 
Furthermore, it rejected defendant’s argument that the patentee had 
limited the scope of its claims during prosecution of a related application 
when it replaced claims requiring an inner component “containing at least 
an ingredient comprising a lipid, wherein said [inner] component has a total 
moisture content less than about 25 wt%,” with claims requiring an inner 
component “containing a mixture of lipid an solid ingredients forming a 
cream-like matrix . . . and a total moisture content less than about 
15wt%.”888  Although the amendment narrowed the total moisture content 
limitation, the Federal Circuit found that “the extent to which additional 
subject matter, if any, has been surrendered is ambiguous.”889 
The Federal Circuit also rejected defendant’s claim that the scope of 
“containing” should be limited to include only the specified ingredients 
because the patentee used “containing at least” to describe the components 
of the outer shell of the claimed dual-textured animal food.  The Federal 
Circuit dismissed this argument, reasoning that the phrase “at least” to not 
be required to make the outer shell limitation open-ended, and instead, it 
                                                          
 884. Id. at 1376, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842. 
 885. Id. at 1372, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1839. 
 886. Id. at 1376, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,312,746 
(issued Nov. 6, 2001)). 
 887. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 6,312,746 (issued Nov. 
6, 2001)). 
 888. Id. at 1377, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1842. 
 889. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
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was added to clarify that “not all, but ‘at least’ one, of the listed ingredients 
must be present in the outer shell.”890  In contrast, “at least” was not used in 
conjunction with the inner component because the inner component was 
intended to contain both solids and lipids. 
For its final argument, defendant contended that the patentee had 
disclaimed the addition of water in any amount to the starting materials 
used to make the inner component by its statements in the specification that 
“it is desirable to provide a palatable edible product without the use of 
water,” and that “the soft inner portion that is coextruded in the center of 
the extruded rope does not contain any added water . . . .”891  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that these statements cited by defendant did not “amount 
to the ‘clear disclaimer of particular subject matter’ required by [its] 
precedent to narrow the ordinary meaning of the claim language.”892  
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit observed other statements in the 
specification and claims that made clear that water is present in the inner 
component, including “water activity” and “total moisture content” 
limitations for the inner component and statements that the inner 
component has certain “moisture components.”893 
Holding that the district court had erred in its construction of Mars’s 
claims, the Federal Circuit concluded that genuine issues of fact remained 
as to whether the accused products infringed the patents as properly 
construed and remanded for further consideration.894 
In Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. (d/b/a Conagra 
Refrigerated Foods),895 the patentee appealed a district court’s grant 
summary judgment of invalidity and unenforceability of its patent covering 
a “Method of Browning Precooked Whole Muscle Meat Products.”896  The 
district court found the asserted patent claims invalid under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 102(b) based on the invention’s prior sale and public use.897  On appeal, 
the patentee argued that the district court failed to construe the disputed 
                                                          
 890. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1843. 
 891. Id. at 1378, 1378 n.6, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844, 1844 n.6. 
 892. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 
Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 909, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 893. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843. 
 894. Id. at 1379, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1844. 
 895. 375 F.3d 1341, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 896. Id. at 1344, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.  Unitherm and Jennie-O Foods, Inc. 
together sued Conagra for a variety of claims, including for a declaratory judgment that its 
patent was invalid and for tortious interference with Unitherm’s prospective economic 
relationships, and Unitherm separately sued Conagra for violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act 
(Walker Process claim).  Only the court’s judgment with respect to the declaratory judgment 
of patent invalidity is related to patent law and therefore is the only part of the court’s 
opinion discussed here.  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 897. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (entitling a person to patent an invention, unless it was “patented 
or described in a printed publication . . . or in public use . . . more than one year prior to the 
date of the application for patent.”). 
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claim terms and incorrectly construed the term “golden brown” according 
to its plain and ordinary meaning, instead of limiting its scope to the color 
described in the patent’s five examples. 
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the patentee on both counts.898  First, 
the Federal Circuit held that because the patentee failed to identify any 
“disputed claim terms” in its summary judgment brief or in its brief on 
appeal other than the term “golden brown,” the district court was free to 
have construed only that term in granting summary judgment.899  The 
patentee’s generalized contention that the district court should have 
conducted a Markman hearing did not suffice to show that a genuine issue 
of material fact precluded summary judgment.900  Second, the Federal 
Circuit found that the district court had properly concluded that the term 
“golden brown” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning where it 
had found that (1) the patentee had not acted as its own lexicographer and 
explicitly defined the term and (2) dictionary definitions of “golden brown” 
did not conflict with any definition found in, or ascertained by, a reading of 
the intrinsic evidence.901  The Federal Circuit labeled patentee’s attempt to 
limit the meaning of “golden brown” to the color descriptions provided in 
the patent examples a “violation of our precedent counseling against 
importing limitations into the claims.”902  The Federal Circuit reasoned that 
the examples represented “neither clear nor explicit disavowal of the 
common meaning,” and “[i]n fact, [were] . . . precisely what they purport to 
be:   examples of Hunter-Lab Color Meter measurements falling within the 
commonly understood range of ‘golden brown.’”903 
Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.904 involved claims directed to a 
remote-controlled portable search light.905  While certain unasserted claims 
expressly recited that the search light rotate through 360 degrees, the 
disputed claim called for a “horizontal drive means for rotating . . . [a] lamp 
                                                          
 898. Unitherm, 375 F.3d at 1344, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707. 
 899. Id. at 1346-47, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 900. Id. at 1349, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 901. Id. at 1351-52, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996), 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 
1578 n. 6, for the proposition that “judges may rely on dictionary definitions when 
construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any 
definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents”). 
 902. Id. at 1351, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 903. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713 (emphasis added) (citing Texas Digital Sys. v. 
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-04, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
for the proposition that the presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is only rebutted 
where the patentee “clearly set forth an explicit definition of the term different from its 
ordinary meaning,” or used “words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, 
representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.”). 
 904. 355 F.3d 1327, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 905. Id. at 1329, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
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unit in a horizontal direction.”906  The issue before the Federal Circuit was 
whether this language required a search light to be capable of rotating 
through 360 degrees.907  Conceding that the disputed claim did not recite a 
360 degree rotation, defendant argued that such a construction was 
mandated by the specification and prosecution because “the scope of the 
claims cannot exceed what is supported by the written description of the 
patent.”908  Seeking support in the specification, defendant relied on a 
passage stating that a “searchlight apparatus in accordance with the present 
invention includes a lamp unit mounted in a housing which has a . . . 
horizontal drive mechanism for rotating the lamp unit in a horizontal 
direction through at least 360 degrees.”909 
The Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s analysis of the specification, 
explaining that although the inventors described their invention as having 
the ability to rotate through 360 degrees, “this particular advantage is but 
one feature of the invented search light.  The written description describes 
other significant features as well.”910  The Federal Circuit then reasoned 
that the “patentees were not required to include within each of their claims 
all of these advantages or features described as significant or important in 
the written description.”911  The Federal Circuit further explained that the 
specification’s description of lone embodiment as capable of rotating 
through 360 degrees was not determinative because an “applicant is not 
necessarily required . . . to describe more embodiments than its preferred 
one, and we have outright rejected the notion that disclosure of a single 
embodiment necessarily limits the claims.”912 
Regarding the prosecution history, defendant argued that the inventors 
acted as lexicographers requiring that the term “rotating” as used in all the 
claims be capable of rotating through 360 degrees.913  To support its 
contention, defendant cited to the arguments in which the patentee 
overcame the prior art by arguing that “the claims in issue have been 
amended to recite rotation through at least 360 degrees and avoid an 
incidental disclosure of rotation which could be imputed to Lipman.”914  
The Federal Circuit again found defendant’s argument unconvincing, 
explaining that “we find no clear or express statement by the patentees 
giving ‘rotating’ a special meaning” because the patentee’s statements were 
                                                          
 906. Id. at 1330, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 907. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 908. Id. at 1331, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 909. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 910. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 911. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 912. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484 (citing to Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 
299 F.3d 1313, 1327, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 913. Teleflex, 355 F.3d at 1332, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 914. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
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subject “to multiple reasonable interpretations.”915  In particular, the 
Federal Circuit explained that the patentee’s statements could be 
understood “to distinguish only those claims that explicitly recited a 360 
degrees limitation,” and thus concluded that that statements “do not rise to 
level of a clear disavowal of scope with respect to” the disputed claim.916 
The majority opinion also rejected defendant’s argument that the claims 
must require a 360 degree rotation because the claims were written in 
means plus function format pursuant to § 112, ¶ 6.917  Focusing on the 
functional language, the majority reasoned that “the function of the 
‘horizontal drive means’ is ‘rotating said lamp unit in a horizontal 
direction’” and nothing in such language requires a 360 degree rotation.918  
Then looking to the structure corresponding to the recited function, the 
majority noted that although the assembly structure “may be capable of 
rotating through 360 degrees, we see nothing in the written description that 
compels limiting the function to only this degree of rotation, or to rotation 
through any particular angle at all.”919 
In dissent, Judge Archer construed the claim language as requiring 
rotation through 360 degrees because the claims were written in means plus 
function format, and the only “structure in the specification which 
describes the horizontal rotating means expressly states that it is ‘free to 
rotate through greater than 360 degrees in either direction.’”920  The dissent 
thus reasoned that “only devices capable of rotating through 360 degrees 
and their equivalents are covered by this claim limitation; a device 
incapable of rotating through 360 degrees is not.”921  In addition to the 
specification, the dissent noted that the patentee distinguished his claims 
from the prior art by arguing that the prior art reference “would not be 
rotatable so as to be able to sweep through 360 degrees or greater as 
achieved by applicants’ invention.”922  In light of these arguments, the 
dissent concluded that the applicants “defined ‘rotate’ . . . to require that 
the horizontal drive means for rotating be capable of rotation through 360 
degrees.”923 
International Rectifier Corp. v. Ixys Corp.924 involved claims directed to 
metal-oxide-silicon field effect transistors (“MOSFET”) devices having a 
                                                          
 915. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 916. Id. at 1333, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 917. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000); Teleflex, 355 F.3d at 1333, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1486. 
 918. Teleflex, 355 F.3d at 1333-34, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 919. Id. at 1334, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 920. Id. at 1341, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 921. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 922. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492 (emphasis added). 
 923. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
 924. 361 F.3d 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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limitation reciting “at least [a] first base region being a cellular polygonal 
region . . . and [a] first source region having the shape of an annular ring 
disposed within [the] cellular polygonal first base region.”925  On appeal, 
the claim terms in dispute were “polygonal” and “annular.”926 
With respect to “polygonal,” the issue on appeal was whether the district 
court properly construed the term to mean that the “corners of the 
polygonal regions may take the form of spherical junctions (i.e., round) 
after processing and are not necessarily formed by straight lines 
intersecting at a point to form a well defined angle.”927  In particular, 
defendant argued that the district court improperly departed from the 
ordinary and customary meaning of polygonal, which would require that 
the polygon corners have straight lines joining together in well-defined 
angles.928 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis “with an examination of the 
possible dictionary definitions of the word ‘polygon.’”929  Having reviewed 
different versions of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,930 the 
Federal Circuit reasoned that “[b]y necessity, the boundary of a closed 
plane figure will also include multiple included angles formed at the 
intersection of the straight lines.”931  The Federal Circuit next looked to the 
specification to determine “whether the patentee acted as his own 
lexicographer, or otherwise disavowed or disclaimed the full scope of the 
ordinary and customary meaning of [polygonal].”932  In so doing, the 
Federal Circuit reasoned that the “depictions and descriptions of the patents 
are consistent with the ordinary definition of the word ‘polygon.’”933  The 
Federal Circuit therefore held that the construction allowing the polygonal 
corners to be round rather than formed by straight edges was erroneous.934 
In reaching its construction, the Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s 
argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the 
processing techniques for MOSFET transistors would “necessarily blur[] 
the outline of the regions.”935  The court explained that “[w]hile [the 
plaintiff] is correct that the meaning of claim terms must be considered 
from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art, that does not mean 
                                                          
 925. Id. at 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
 926. A third claim term on appeal was “adjoining.”  Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212. 
 927. Id. at 1370, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214. 
 928. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214. 
 929. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214. 
 930. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214. 
 931. Id. at 1371, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1214. 
 932. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. 
 933. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215.  The court also noted that “neither party argues 
that anything in the prosecution history affects the scope of the any of the disputed claim 
terms.”  Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. 
 934. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. 
 935. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. 
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that the inventor’s choice of words may be ignored.”936  The Federal Circuit 
thus concluded that nothing in the intrinsic evidence “suggest[s] that the 
recognition of these diffusion effects by those skilled in the art warrants the 
re-definition of the term polygon to mean anything other than ‘a closed 
plane figure bounded by straight lines.’”937 
With respect to the term “annular,” the issue was whether the district 
court’s construction of the term as encompassing shapes not ordinarily 
considered to be annular, such as hexagonal and ovals shapes, was overly 
broad.938  Though observing that the dictionaries indicated that the term’s 
ordinary meaning is “of or relating to an area formed by two concentric 
circular regions,”939 the Federal Circuit determined that the patentee acted 
as a lexicographer and expressly defined “annular” to include more than 
just circular shapes.940  Specifically, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the 
inventor “deviated from th[e] ordinary and customary meaning, and used 
the word ‘annular’ to describe structures that are . . . polygonal.  In 
particular, [the specifications] illustrate[] base and source regions of 
concentric squares and . . . of concentric hexagons.941  The text 
accompanying these figures refers to these shapes as ‘rings.’”942  Given 
such statements in the specification, the Federal Circuit held that “the 
patentee acted as his own lexicographer, and the patentee’s definition 
trumps the ordinary and customary meaning that otherwise would have 
attached.”943 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.944 involved a claim covering 
the chemical compound “crystalline paroxetine hydrocholride 
hemihydrate” (“PHC hemihydrate”) having antidepressant properties.945  
Relying on the patent specification’s discussion of “the superior handling 
properties of the hemihydrate form that improve the manufacture of PHC,” 
the district court construed the claim as limited to “commercially 
significant amounts of PHC hemihydrate.”946 
Reversing this construction on appeal, the Federal Circuit began its 
analysis by noting that claim construction requires courts “to place the 
claim language in its proper technological and temporal context.”947  
                                                          
 936. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. 
 937. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215. 
 938. Id. at 1372, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1215-16. 
 939. Id. at 1373, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216. 
 940. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216. 
 941. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216. 
 942. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216. 
 943. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1216. 
 944. 365 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 945. Id. at 1308, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739. 
 946. Id. at 1313, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. 
 947. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
2005] PATENT SUMMARY 1059 
Turning to the claim itself, the court explained that the “language is not 
ambiguous, but rather describes a very specific compound.  The record 
repeatedly shows that artisans in this area of technology at the time of 
invention would have understood that the claim embraces PHC 
hemihydrate without further limitation.”948  With regard to the remaining 
intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit explained that the specification does 
not “redefine the compound in terms of its commercial properties, but 
emphasize[s] that the new compound exhibits favorable characteristics.”949  
The Federal Circuit thus concluded that “[a] description of characteristics 
does not redefine a compound with an established and unambiguous 
structural definition.”950  The Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion 
upon review of the prosecution history, noting that “nothing in the 
prosecution history . . . defines the invention in terms of commercially 
significant quantities.”951 
The Federal Circuit also addressed the district court’s public policy 
consideration that absent a “commercially significant quantity” limitation, 
the claim would cover trace amounts of the claimed compound thereby 
producing “absurd results” that would “not serve any policy of patent law” 
by precluding “attempts to make prior art PHC anhydrate compound.”952  
The Federal Circuit explained that claim construction “is not a policy-
driven inquiry,” and claim scope cannot “be broadened or narrowed based 
on abstract policy considerations regarding the effect of a particular claim 
meaning.”953 
In Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc.,954 the issue was whether the 
phrase “upon detection of a suitable stable endpoint” in claims directed to 
measuring glucose concentration in a blood sample was limited to use of 
“predetermined timing methods,”  as required by the district court’s 
construction.955  In reversing the construction below the Federal Circuit 
began by noting that the “claim language itself governs the meaning of the 
claim.”956  Focusing on the context of the claim language, the court 
reasoned that the disputed phrase “does not explicitly require a 
predetermined time for the reaction, but instead measures the endpoint by 
                                                          
 948. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. 
 949. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. 
 950. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. 
 951. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. 
 952. Id. at 1313-14, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742. 
 953. Id. at 1314, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1742.  This reasoning appears to provide a 
clear answer to one of the en banc questions to be addressed in Phillips.  Namely, whether 
claim language should “be narrowly construed for the sole purpose of avoiding invalidity 
under, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 and 112.”  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383, 
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765, 1766 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 954. 381 F.3d 1352, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 955. Id. at 1354-55, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278. 
 956. Id. at 1355, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278. 
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the stability of reflectance . . . [and] emphasizes that the method does not 
require any determination of a starting point for application of the blood 
sample to the matrix.”957  Thus, based on the claim language, the Federal 
Circuit determined that the claim “limits the endpoint by reference to 
suitable stability in the reflectance readings, not by reference to a 
predetermined time.”958 
Turning to the remaining intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the specification supported its construction because, “[i]n 
discussing the invention as a whole,” the specification provides examples 
illustrating “that a ‘suitably stable endpoint’ varies between unspecified 
points in time.”959  The Federal Circuit also observed that although the 
predetermined timing method was the only embodiment disclosed in the 
patent, “the specification limits its discussion of predetermined timing 
methods to preferred embodiments.”960  Explaining that “the applicant’s 
choice to describe only a single embodiment does not mean that the patent 
clearly and unambiguously disavowed other embodiments,” the Federal 
Circuit determined that the district court erroneously “plac[ed] too much 
emphasis on the specification’s discussion of the preferred embodiments, 
rather than the meaning of the claims themselves.”961 
The Federal Circuit also noted that the prosecution history established 
that the claims were not limited to a predetermined timing method because 
claim language in related patent applications evolved from “‘predetermined 
time period’ to ‘predetermined incubation period’ to ‘suitably stable 
endpoint’” thus showing that the patentee “purposefully sought in the 
[asserted] patent claim scope broader than the predetermined timing 
method.”962  In addition, the Federal Circuit used prior art cited during 
prosecution of the disputed claims as a tool to underscore that persons of 
ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim language to be broader 
than use of predetermined timing methods. 
In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,963 an issue on appeal 
was whether the claim phrase “a plurality of lamp supports . . . for 
engaging and supporting . . . fluorescent lamps”964 was properly construed 
by the district court as limited only to structures providing support from 
below.965  The Federal Circuit reversed this construction, explaining that 
                                                          
 957. Id. at 1356, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279. 
 958. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279. 
 959. Id. at 1356-57, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279. 
 960. Id. at 1357, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279. 
 961. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1279. 
 962. Id. at 1358, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1280.   
 963. 382 F.3d 1354, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 964. Id. at 1363, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
 965. Id. at 1364, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346. 
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although the intrinsic evidence clearly shows that the lamp supports may 
provide support from below, nothing in the intrinsic evidence restricts the 
claims solely to such an embodiment.966  In particular, the Federal Circuit 
explained that the disputed claim language “is not by its terms limited to 
supports that engage and support the lamps from below, and there is no 
language in the written description that limits the term ‘supporting and 
engaging’ to support and engagement from below.”967  The Federal Circuit 
further explained that although the asserted patent contained several figures 
“show[ing] lamp supports that provide support from below the lamps, the 
scope of the claims is not limited to particular embodiments depicted in the 
figures or described in the written description.”968  The court further 
elaborated that 
[t]he ordinary meaning of the terms “supporting and engaging” includes 
more than support or engagement from below, and the fact that the 
patentee has not included figures depicting support and engagement from 
other orientations is not sufficient to limit the claim language to the 
particular orientation depicted in the figures.969 
The Federal Circuit also noted that several figures in the asserted patent 
depicted a device that “appears to clip around the lamps and thus provides 
support and engagement for the lamps that would be effective in other lamp 
orientations.”970  In so doing, the Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s 
argument that such a clip was unclaimed and thus dedicated to the public, 
explaining that this “argument misses the relevance of the clip”971 because 
plaintiff “does not point to the clip as a claimed feature, but instead refers 
to the clip to show that its use of the terms ‘supporting and engaging’ was 
not meant to be limited to support and engagement from below.”972 
In In re Bigio,973 the question was whether the Board properly construed 
the term “hair brush” as including “not only brushes that may be used for 
human hair on [a] scalp, but also brushes that may be used for hairs on 
other parts of animal bodies (e.g., human facial hair . . . or pet hair).”974  
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that the “PTO gives a 
disputed claim term its broadest reasonable interpretation during patent 
prosecution . . . . The ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ rule recognizes 
that ‘before a patent is granted the claims are readily amended as part of the 
                                                          
 966. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346-47. 
 967. Id. at 1365, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353. 
 968. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353. 
 969. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353. 
 970. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353. 
 971. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353. 
 972. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353. 
 973. 381 F.3d 1320, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 974. Id. at 1323-24, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1210. 
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examination process.’”975  In affirming the PTO’s construction, the Federal 
Circuit examined the claim language and determined that “the word ‘hair’ 
preceding ‘brush’ throughout the body of the claim does not alone limit the 
claim to brushes for scalp hair.  At best, the word ‘hair’ carries the meaning 
that the claimed invention involves brushing some kind of hair.”976  
Regarding the specification, the Federal Circuit held that the PTO correctly 
declined to import limitations from the specification that would limit the 
claims only to scalp hair because “[a]bsent claim language carrying a 
narrow meaning, the PTO should only limit the claim based on the 
specification or prosecution history when those sources expressly disclaim 
the broader definition.”977  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that 
because “the term ‘hair brush’ alone does not specify the kind of hair to be 
groomed by the claimed invention . . . the term may reasonably encompass 
not only scalp hair brushes but also facial hair brushes.”978 
In In re American Academy of Science Tech Center,979 the owner of a 
patent directed to a computer network sought review of the Board’s 
decision upholding an examiner’s rejection of all claims as anticipated by 
several references.980  The patented network distributed the processing of 
user applications among several computers, in contrast to a system in 
which one mainframe computer processed user applications and was 
connected to several “dumb terminals” with which users would interface.981 
The claims under consideration required a “plurality of independent, not 
necessarily uniform, general purpose user computers” that are “connected 
to a data center computer.”982  The claims also recited the “user application 
program” to “indirectly issu[e] data base calls.”983  One of the four 
references relied upon by the examiner and the Board described a system in 
which several mainframe computers interfaced with a single database.984  
Another disclosed the networking of several personal computers to a 
database computer that is connected to a database.985  The examiner found 
that the mainframe computer in the first reference and the personal 
computers of the second reference anticipated the “general purpose user 
computers” element of the claims.986 
                                                          
 975. Id. at 1324, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Quigg, 822 
F.2d 1581, 1583, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 976. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211. 
 977. Id. at 1325, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211. 
 978. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211. 
 979. 367 F.3d 1359, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 980. Id. at 1361, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828. 
 981. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828. 
 982. Id. at 1362, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829. 
 983. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829. 
 984. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829. 
 985. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829. 
 986. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829. 
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On appeal, American Academy argued that “user computer” should be 
limited to refer only to single-user computers, pointing to the Background 
of the Invention section of the specification that points to deficiencies with 
multi-user computers such as mainframes.987  The Federal Circuit disagreed 
with American Academy’s characterization.  Although the Background 
highlighted the problems inherent in performing all the processing 
necessary to run multiple user applications at a central computer, the 
Federal Circuit also noted that the specification did not “disclaim” the 
networking of mainframes to a central computer that performs the function 
of database access.988  The Federal Circuit opined that the Background 
section appeared to allow such a configuration and that “[i]n such a case, 
several less expensive mainframe computers could be used to manage the 
processing of an increasing number of user applications while the overhead 
associated with communication among processors would be limited to 
communications related to the storage and retrieval of data.”989 
American Academy countered that by describing the invention as 
including a “plurality of user stations each dedicated to servicing a user 
(which could be a person, another device, or machine),” the definition of 
“user computer” could not include “multi-user computers.”990  The Federal 
Circuit nevertheless agreed with the PTO that “machine” could include a 
mainframe computer, that statements in the specification that distinguished 
“user computer” from a data center computer in terms of function, and that 
indicated that a “variety of configurations” could be used to enable the user 
computer to serve its function suggested that a construction of “user 
computer” that would include multi-user computers would not be 
unreasonably broad.991 
The Federal Circuit also refused to find any fault with the Board’s 
decision to discredit declarations submitted by American Academy which 
ostensibly supported its construction of “user computer.”992  The Federal 
Circuit explained that the Board was entitled to conclude that the lack of 
factual corroboration warranted discounting the opinions expressed 
therein.993 
                                                          
 987. Id. at 1365, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832. 
 988. Id. at 1366, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832. 
 989. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832. 
 990. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832. 
 991. Id. at 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832. 
 992. Id. at 1368, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833. 
 993. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833-34.  The Federal Circuit also rejected American 
Academy’s argument that the prosecution history supported its construction.  During 
prosecution of the application that matured into the patent, the applicant described a 
reference cited by the PTO as including remote transaction terminals and a host computer 
which processed the transactions.  Neither the applicant nor the examiner referred to the 
host computer as a “user computer,” and American Academy argued that this was evidence 
that the user computer was limited to serving one user.  The Federal Circuit, however, said 
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Finally, the Federal Circuit refused to find that the Board’s construction 
of “user computer” was fatally inconsistent with the construction adopted 
by the district court during American Academy’s litigation against an 
accused infringer.994  The district court had construed “user computer” to 
mean “a computer that serves one user at a time.”995  The Federal Circuit 
opined that the Board is “required to use a different standard for construing 
claims than that used by district courts,” in that it must “give claims their 
broadest reasonable interpretation during examination.”996 
American Academy also contended that the Board’s construction of the 
term “indirectly issuing” to mean “requiring only that a request from the 
host computer go through some other component before it is sent to the 
database”997 was erroneous.  American Academy urged that the term should 
be limited in its meaning to “a user computer application program issuing a 
call for data as though from resident storage, coupled with an intermediate 
step redirecting the call to the remote data center computer.”998  American 
Academy pointed to the specification’s description of the preferred 
embodiment in which a “data base simulator program” enabled an 
application program running at a user station to request storage or retrieval 
of data from a data center as though it were requesting data from a data 
base that resided on the user station.999 
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, stating that its precedent 
“caution[s] against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred 
embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only 
embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”1000  
The Federal Circuit found no such clear disclaimer in the specification 
here.1001  Rather, it again found that the specification described the 
invention in broad terms and lucidly identified the data base simulator as “a 
preferred embodiment, and just one of the ‘variety of conventional protocol 
procedures.’”1002  Thus, the Federal Circuit did not find that “indirectly 
                                                          
that the applicant distinguished the cited reference on the basis that the application programs 
were run on the host computer instead of the remote terminals, likening the disclosed system 
to that of the “dumb terminal” configuration that the invention was intended to replace.  
Thus, the court found, this was the reason why it would not have made sense for the 
applicant to refer to the host computer as a “user computer.”  Id. at 1368-69, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1833-34. 
 994. Id. at 1369, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834. 
 995. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834. 
 996. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834. 
 997. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834. 
 998. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834. 
 999. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834 (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,714,989 (issued Dec. 
22, 1987)). 
 1000. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834 (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 
F.3d 898, 906, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 1001. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834. 
 1002. Id. at 1370, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1834. 
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issuing” was limited to the use of a data base simulator.1003 
In Nystrom v. Trex Co.,1004 plaintiff appealed the district court’s 
construction of disputed claim terms in its patent directed to wooden planks 
used in the construction of outdoor decks.1005  The disputed claim terms 
construed by the Federal Circuit included “board,” “manufactured to,” and 
“convex top surface.”1006 
The Federal Circuit construed “board” as used in the claims to require 
“an elongated, flat piece of wood or other rigid material.”1007  The Federal 
Circuit rejected defendant’s proposed construction, adopted by the district 
court, which would further limit “board” to mean “a piece of elongated 
construction material made from wood cut from a log.”1008  Defendant 
manufactures decking planks “made from composites of wood fibers and 
recycled plastic.”1009  Defendant argued that both dictionary definitions of 
“board” and the prosecution history supported its limited construction.1010 
Beginning its claim construction analysis with the words of the claim, 
the Federal Circuit found that although some dictionaries included 
definitions of “board” that limited the term to planks of wood cut from a 
log, others did not.1011  Thus, the Federal Circuit found that “these 
definitions show[ed] that the ordinary meaning of the word ‘board’ 
encompasses both a piece of cut wood or sawn timber and a similarly-
shaped item made of a rigid material.”1012  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit 
held that plaintiff had not disclaimed boards made from materials other 
than logs, as he described his invention as “a decking board which is 
shaped to shed water from its upper surface, and which also yields a 
superior product when cut from a log.”1013  The Federal Circuit concluded 
the phrase “when cut from a log” to implicitly recognize that the 
invention’s boards may be cut from a material other than a log.  Finally, the 
Federal Circuit found support for its broader construction in the claims 
themselves where some claims were expressly limited to “wood decking 
board[s]” having “curved growth rings.”1014 
The Federal Circuit also found no support for defendant’s proposed 
                                                          
 1003. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835. 
 1004. 374 F.3d 1105, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1005. Id. at 1107, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 1006. Id. at 1108-09, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243-44. 
 1007. Id. at 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247. 
 1008. Id. at 1110, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.   
 1009. Id. at 1109, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244. 
 1010. Id. at 1111, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245. 
 1011. Id. at 1111-12, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246. 
 1012. Id. at 1112, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246. 
 1013. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246 (emphasis in original). 
 1014. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246-47 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,474,831 (issued Dec. 
12, 1995)). 
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construction in the prosecution history.1015  Defendant pointed to a 
statement made by plaintiff in overcoming an obviousness rejection that a 
cited reference “[was] clearly not concerned with materials made from 
wood.”1016  Rather than a disclaimer, the Federal Circuit interpreted that 
statement to be simply “an argument against the examiner’s obviousness 
rejection.”1017  Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that the argument 
was made to show why there was no motivation to combine the cited 
reference with another cited reference and therefore the argument was 
“insufficient to restrict the scope of [plaintiff’s] claims.”1018 
The Federal Circuit next turned to the definition of “manufactured to 
have.”1019  The district court restricted this term to “a manufacturing 
process utilizing woodworking techniques” based on the statements in the 
specification that “‘the advantages of the invention’ were achieved through 
‘cutting or milling and the like.’”1020  In light of its construction of “board,” 
the Federal Circuit found no reason to limit “manufactured to have” to 
woodworking techniques.1021  Furthermore, it noted that even the district 
court acknowledged that the “cutting or milling” language was used to 
describe a preferred embodiment.  The Federal Circuit therefore held that 
“manufactured to have” in the context of the claims at issue meant that “the 
convex top surface is shaped by manufacturing.”1022 
Finally, the Federal Circuit analyzed the meaning of “convex top 
surface.”1023  The district court again limited this term on the basis of 
statements made during prosecution, holding that the term meant “an upper 
surface with an outward curve that has a ratio of its radius of curvature to 
width of the board between 4:1 to 6:1.”1024  The statements relied upon by 
the district court were made in a supplemental amendment to one particular 
claim, of the patent Claim 16.  Plaintiff indicated in conjunction with that 
amendment that it had tried several different radii of curvature and 
discovered that a ratio of radius of curvature to width of the board of about 
5:1 “produced the desired result, i.e. it shed water and did not produce an 
uneven sensation to someone standing on it.”1025  Plaintiff noted that the 
basic objectives of the invention could be met by boards with curvature to 
width ratios within a “narrow” range of 4:1 to about 6:1, but that “anything 
                                                          
 1015. Id. at 1112-13, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247. 
 1016. Id. at 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247. 
 1017. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247. 
 1018. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247. 
 1019. Id. at 1113-14, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247-48. 
 1020. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247-48. 
 1021. Id. at 1114, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 1022. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 1023. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 1024. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248. 
 1025. Id. at 1115, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248-49. 
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much outside this range does not provide satisfactory performance and/or is 
not acceptable to the consumer.”1026 
The Federal Circuit held that the dictionary definition of “convex” is 
“having a surface or boundary that curves or bulges outward, as the exterior 
of a sphere,” and that this definition was consistent with the 
specification.1027  Plaintiff’s statements during prosecution relied upon by 
the district court, it found, were only directed to Claim 16 and were not 
intended to limit “convex” in every instance that term was used within the 
entire patent.1028  It also reasoned that the district court had ignored the fact 
that Claim 16 already contained the limitation that required “said top 
surface having a radius of curvature that is approximately five times as 
great as the width of the board” prior to the amendment involving the 
statements at issue.1029 
4.  “Narrow construction” cases 
In Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Systems, Inc.,1030 Multi-Tech sued 
Net2Phone for infringing three of its patents directed to systems and 
methods for simultaneously transmitting voice and/or computer data to a 
remote site over a telephone line, (the ‘649, ‘647, and ‘532 patents).1031  Six 
months later, Microsoft brought an action in the same court against Multi-
Tech to invalidate the same patents Multi-Tech was asserting against 
Net2Phone, and Multi-Tech countersued Microsoft for infringement.  The 
court issued a single Markman order construing the claim terms in dispute 
in the two cases and entered final judgment of non-infringement against 
Multi-Tech in both cases where Multi-Tech conceded that neither 
Microsoft nor Net2Phone’s accused systems met the limitations of the 
asserted claims as the court had construed them.  Multi-Tech then appealed 
the district court’s claim construction and Microsoft’s invalidity claims 
were stayed pending the Federal Circuit’s resolution of claim construction 
and infringement issues. 
For its argument, Multi-Tech first addressed the district court’s 
construction of claim limitations referring to the “sending,” “transmitting,” 
and “receiving” of data packets, which limited those activities to the 
transmission of data packets over a direct point-to-point telephone line 
connection, and as such did not cover transmission over a packet-switched 
                                                          
 1026. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
 1027. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 402 (4th ed. 2000)). 
 1028. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
 1029. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249. 
 1030. 357 F.3d 1340, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1031. Id. at 1342, 1344, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1816, 1819. 
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network such as the Internet.1032  The Federal Circuit agreed with the 
district court’s construction.  Although only one of the claims at issue 
explicitly stated that the transmission of data packets must occur “over a 
telephone line,” the specification, identical for all patents at issue, 
“repeatedly and consistently describe[d] the local and remote systems of 
the claimed inventions as communicating directly over a telephone 
line.”1033  All of the specification’s preferred embodiments described 
hardware components that “‘communicat[ed] over a standard telephone 
line,’” and it disclosed that the system “‘allows the user to connect to 
remote locations equipped with similar system or with modems, facsimile 
machines, or standard telephones over a single analog telephone line.’”1034  
The Federal Circuit particularly emphasized that statements describing 
transmission over a telephone line were found in the Summary of Invention 
section of the specification and were not limited to preferred 
embodiments.1035 
Multi-Tech attempted to argue that its descriptions of the claimed 
inventions were limited to just the “ends” of the communication system, 
but the Federal Circuit rejected this argument because the description 
referred to the transfer of data packets “over” and “through” telephone lines 
about two dozen times.  Thus, the Federal Circuit could not avoid the 
“inescapable conclusion” that communications contemplated by Multi-
Tech’s patents occurred directly over telephone lines. 
As further support for its construction, the Federal Circuit pointed to the 
prosecution history of one of the three patents, in which Multi-Tech had 
summarized its invention as part of its response to an examiner’s office 
action rejecting its claims as obvious over prior art.  Multi-Tech’s summary 
described its invention as a system which operates “over a standard 
telephone line,” one that “establishes a point-to-point connection between 
the telephone equipment on each end of the line,” and in which “packets 
[are transmitted] across a POTS [(“plain old telephone service”)].”1036  
Multi-Tech argued, however, that these statements were made during 
prosecution of only one of the patents at issue, and not during prosecution 
of the other two.1037  Therefore, Multi-Tech contended that the statements 
were inapplicable to the construction of the claims belonging to its two 
remaining patents at issue, one of which was issued before the statements 
                                                          
 1032. Id. at 1346, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820. 
 1033. Id. at 1348, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1034. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,452,289 (issued Sept. 
19, 1995)). 
 1035. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 1036. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822. 
 1037. Id. at 1350, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
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were even made.1038  The Federal Circuit disagreed,1039  Holding that the 
statements made during prosecution of the ‘649 patent were also 
“pertinent” to the construction of the claims in both the ‘627 and ‘532 
patents because all three patents shared the same specification, and 
therefore represented Multi-Tech’s own understanding of the inventions 
disclosed in all three patents.1040  Even though the examiner of the 
applications giving rise to the ‘627 and ‘532 patents did not rely on the 
statements made during prosecution of the ‘649 patent, the Federal Circuit 
had on numerous occasions held that the patentee’s own statements were 
relevant to claim interpretation regardless of whether or not the examiner 
relied upon them in issuing the patent.1041  According to the Federal Circuit, 
“[w]e take the patentee at its word and will not construe the scope of the 
‘649 patent’s claims more broadly than the patentee itself clearly 
envisioned.”1042 
Even though its resolution of the medium of transmission issue disposed 
of the need for the Federal Circuit to proceed to construe other claim 
limitations, it went on to construe the terms “multiplexing,” “headers,” 
“speaker phone” and “digitizing” in the interest of judicial efficiency.1043  
The district court had concluded that Multi-Tech acted as its own 
lexicographer and construed the term “multiplexing” in accordance with 
Multi-tech’s definition to be “the combining of voice data (“V-data”) and 
conventional data (“C-data”) for transmission through the same channel by 
dynamically changing the time allocations for transmission of each type of 
data, such that V-data has higher priority over C-data and C-data is 
substituted for silence packets which are detected and discarded.”1044  
Multi-Tech argued that the district court’s construction improperly 
imported limitations from the specification into the claims.1045  Although it 
agreed that it had “acted as its own lexicographer” in this instance, Multi-
Tech disagreed with the district court’s construction to the extent that it 
limited “multiplexing” to require the prioritization of V-data over C-data 
and the substitution of C-data for silence packets.1046  The Federal Circuit 
only partly agreed with Multi-Tech, holding that the district court 
improperly construed “multiplexing” to require detection and discarding of 
silence packets and the transmission of computer data packets during 
                                                          
 1038. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 1039. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 1040. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 1041. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 1042. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 1043. Id. at 1351, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824. 
 1044. Id. at 1345, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,452,289 
(issued Sept. 19, 1995)). 
 1045. Id. at 1351, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824. 
 1046. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824. 
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periods of silence because those features were described only in association 
with preferred embodiments of the invention.  They were nowhere 
described as “necessary for the multiplexing function.”1047  Furthermore, 
these features were separately claimed in independent claims not at issue, 
and thus the doctrine of claim differentiation weighed against their 
limitation of independent claims reciting only “multiplexing.”  Because the 
specification provided that V-data was prioritized over C-data “to ensure 
the integrity of the real-time voice transmission,” and because the Federal 
Circuit considered maintaining such integrity to be “central to the 
functioning of the claimed inventions,” the term “multiplexing” must be 
defined to require such prioritization.1048 
The Federal Circuit next addressed the term “headers.”  Several claims at 
issue recited limitations in which “headers” were placed on or otherwise 
associated with various data packets transmitted in the systems.  Multi-
Tech argued that “headers” should be given its ordinary meaning and be 
defined as “information structures that precede units of data, such as 
packets.”1049 The district court, however, required that “headers” attached 
to voice data packets identify whether the packets contained speech or 
silence, and Microsoft further argued on appeal that computer data packet 
headers must identify packet type and packet length.  The Federal Circuit 
took yet a fourth view.  Starting with the presumption that “headers” 
carried its own ordinary meaning of “information structure[s] that precede[] 
and identif[y] the information that follows,” the court next looked to the 
claim language and found that it separately referred to “headers” associated 
with voice data packets and those headers associated with computer data 
packets.1050  Furthermore, the specification explained that the voice data 
packets used different headers than computer data packets so that sites 
receiving the data could distinguish between the two types of data packets, 
and that such distinction was necessary to enable prioritization.  Thus, it 
held that “headers” required information identifying whether the packets 
that followed them contained voice or computer data.  But further 
limitation of the term advanced by the district court and Microsoft was 
inappropriate, as the asserted limitations were found only in conjunction 
with the preferred embodiments disclosed by the patents and were merely 
illustrative of how the headers could be configured.  Thus, “headers” did 
not need to identify the type and length of the computer data packets or 
whether the voice packets contained speech or silence. 
The Federal Circuit next addressed the terms “hands-free speaker 
                                                          
 1047. Id. at 1351-52, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824. 
 1048. Id. at 1351, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824. 
 1049. Id. at 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1824-25. 
 1050. Id. at 1352-53, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825. 
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phone,” “full-duplex speaker phone,” and “full-duplex hands-free speaker 
phone.”  The district court had limited the “hands-free” speaker phones to 
those speaker phones with the traditional telephone hardware, including a 
handset and headset.  Multi-Tech argued that the hands-free phones were 
not limited to any structure beyond a speaker and a microphone and the 
Federal Circuit agreed.  Neither the claims nor the specification described 
any particular physical housing for the hands-free phones, and the 
specification repeatedly described the hands-free interface as simply a 
microphone and a speaker.  Furthermore, claims dependent on those that 
merely recited “hands free speaker phone” required headset hardware.  
Finally, the court concluded that to require more structure than just a 
speaker and a microphone would “impermissibly exclude a preferred 
embodiment from the claim limitation.”1051 
The Federal Circuit did, however, follow the district court’s lead in 
requiring “speaker phone” limitations to require the use of “echo 
cancellation.”  The specification “clearly mandate[d] the use of acoustical 
and line echo cancellation” where it provided that the “‘use of the speaker 
and microphone necessitates the use of an acoustical echo cancellation 
algorithm to prevent feedback from destroying the voice signals,’” and that 
“‘a line echo cancellation algorithm is needed no matter which telephone 
interface . . . is used.’”1052 
Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s construction of 
the term “digitizing” where it found that the parties did not dispute its 
construction:   Multi-Tech argued that the district court improperly 
construed it as necessarily being performed by “the codec circuit” that was 
disclosed in the preferred embodiments of the specification, while 
Microsoft responded that the court did not interpret the term to require such 
performance by the codec circuit.1053 
In Searfoss v. Pioneer Consolidated Corp.,1054 plaintiff appealed the 
decision of the district court to grant summary judgment of non-
infringement.1055  Plaintiff sued for infringement of its patent related to 
moveable cover systems for trucks.  Plaintiff sued exclusively under the 
doctrine of equivalents and did not allege literal infringement. 
The district court found that defendant’s truck covers did not infringe 
because they did not meet at least two elements of the asserted claim.  The 
first, “actuation means for connecting said tension bail to said extension 
assembly and applying a downward force through said tension bail center 
                                                          
 1051. Id. at 1353-54, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825-26. 
 1052. Id. at 1354, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826. 
 1053. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826. 
 1054. 374 F.3d 1142, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1517 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1055. Id. at 1144, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518. 
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section to said cover,”1056 had been construed by the court in its Markman 
order to be a means-plus-function term with two claimed functions:  (1) to 
connect the tension bail and extension assembly, and (2) to apply a 
downward force through the tension bail to the cover.1057 The district court 
further construed the “connecting” function to require in the context of the 
asserted claim a “direct pivotal connection” between the extension 
assembly and the tension bail such that “connecting” was synonymous with 
“attaching.”1058  Thus, it held, this claim term excluded means in which the 
tension bail and extension assembly were indirectly connected, and 
especially excluded means in which they were tangentially connected 
through the cover, “because one function of the actuation means is to apply 
downward force to the cover and a construction of actuation means to 
include cover would be ‘nonsensical.’”1059 
The district court also held that a “direct pivotal connection” was 
required to perform the second function of the actuation means, to apply a 
downward force through the tension bail cover.  It rejected plaintiff’s 
argument that the downward force was merely gravity1060 because the 
actuation means was “described in relation to its function of applying 
downward force” and therefore “there must be some relation between the 
actuation means and the downward force.”1061  Furthermore, the court 
looked to the claim language that stated that the downward force is 
substantially reduced while the cover is winding back on its reel, and the 
court found that “the direct pivotal connections between the tension bail 
and the extension assembly  are what makes this possible.”1062 
The court held that no reasonable jury could find that the asserted claims 
were infringed under the doctrine of equivalents1063 because the defendant’s 
system did not contain an equivalent of an “actuation means.”  Plaintiff 
appealed both the construction of the asserted claim and the court’s 
decision to grant summary judgment based on that construction.1064 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by first stating that the “actuation 
means” term was not a means-plus-function term as construed by the 
district court at all, but rather, because the claim specifically recited the 
structure that performed the claimed function the presumption resulting 
                                                          
 1056. Id. at 1145, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519. 
 1057. Id. at 1146, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519. 
 1058. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519-20. 
 1059. Id. at 1147, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520 (quoting Searfoss v. Pioneer Consol. 
Corp., No. 99-CV-76394-DT, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27471, at 6-7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 
2002)). 
 1060. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520. 
 1061. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520. 
 1062. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520. 
 1063. Id. at 1148, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-21. 
 1064. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521. 
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from the use of the word “means” had been overcome.1065  The Federal 
Circuit held, however, that this error was harmless because, as both parties 
agreed, the scope of the claim would have been identical had it been 
construed under a means-plus-function term or under the doctrine of 
equivalents.1066 
Next the Federal Circuit turned to the district court’s construction of 
“connecting.”  Plaintiff argued that neither defendant nor the district court 
had pointed to anything in the specification to overcome the heavy 
presumption that “connecting” should be construed in accordance with its 
ordinary meaning derived from several non-technical dictionaries to 
encompass both direct and indirect connections.  Citing the general law that 
“what the claim terms would mean to laymen is irrelevant,” the Federal 
Circuit concluded that what the district court had done was proper.1067  The 
Federal Circuit determined that the district court had “acknowledged the 
competing general dictionary definitions of ‘connect’” but had also 
consulted the written description “as it must.”1068  There, the Federal 
Circuit agreed with the district court, it was evident that “as used in claim 
3, the term ‘connecting’ refers to a ‘direct pivotal connection between the 
tension bail and the extension assembly’ because the patent referred to the 
term ‘connecting’ as synonymous with ‘attaching.’”1069 
The Federal Circuit found support for this decision in the fact that all 
relevant figures of the patent showed a direct connection between the legs 
of the tension bail and those of the extension assembly, and that the 
specification made reference to such direct connections throughout.1070  
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that any 
construction which would permit a connection “through the cover” would 
be problematic because the cover would then be part of the actuation 
means, and therefore would apply a downward force to itself according to 
the rest of the claim language. 
In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,1071 plaintiff 
sued defendant for infringement of two patents directed to compositions of 
cyclosporine, a compound used to prevent organ rejection in transplant 
patients.1072  One of the claimed compositions at issue comprised three 
                                                          
 1065. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521. The description of the structure which overcame 
this presumption is as follows:   “said actuation means including first and second pivot 
connections respectively between said first and second tension bail legs and a midpoint t on 
said respective first and second extension bail legs.”  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521. 
 1066. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1521. 
 1067. Id. at 1149-50, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 1068. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 1069. Id. at 1150, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 1070. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 1071. 375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1072. Id. at 1330, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
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components in addition to the active cyclosporine ingredient:  (1) “a 
hydrophilic component,” (2) a “lipophilic component,” and (3) “a 
hydrophilic surfactant.”1073  The district court granted defendant’s post-
verdict motion for a JMOL that it did not infringe this particular patent 
claim, and plaintiff appealed.  Specifically, plaintiff argued that the district 
court had too narrowly construed the term “lipophilic component” to 
exclude lipophilic components which acted as “surfactants.”1074 
The district court had held that the patent disavowed lipophilic 
components that acted as surfactants in stating that “[s]uitable components 
for use as lipophilic phase include any pharmaceutically acceptable solvent 
which is non-miscible with the selected hydrophilic phase . . . . Such 
solvents will appropriately be devoid or substantially devoid of surfactant 
function.”1075  The court found further support for its decision from the fact 
that the claim listed three excipients:   a hydrophilic component, a 
lipophilic component, and a surfactant, and as such, suggested that each 
component was separate and distinct.1076  Finally, support was found in the 
prosecution history of the patent, which the jury found that defendant did 
not infringe, where the patentee had acknowledged a distinction between 
surfactants and lipophilic components.1077  In granting its JMOL, the 
district court also had held that, as a matter of law, a jury could not find 
that defendant’s product infringed under the doctrine of equivalents 
because of the “specific exclusion principle.”1078 
Plaintiff pointed out on appeal that parts of the specification taught that a 
surfactant may form “part of” the lipophilic phase, and that these teachings 
contradicted the district court’s findings that a surfactant can form no part 
of the lipophilic component.  The Federal Circuit agreed with plaintiff on 
this point, but found that the specification’s teaching that a surfactant or a 
mixture of surfactants can form “part of” the lipophilic phase necessarily 
implies that the other part of the lipophilic phase must not be a 
surfactant.1079  Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion that the specification’s disclosure 
indicated that a surfactant “could function alone” as the solvent of the 
lipophilic phase was found to “directly contradict[] the express teaching of 
the specification, and [could] not be used to give [the Court] appropriate 
                                                          
 1073. Id. at 1330-31, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652-53. 
 1074. Id. at 1335, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 1075. Id. at 1331, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (quoting  U.S. Patent No. 5,342,625 
(issued Aug. 30, 1994)). 
 1076. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1077. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1078. Id. at 1337, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
 1079. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.  For example, the patent provided that if a 
surfactant forms a part of the lipophilic phase, it does so as a “co-solvent.”  Id., 71 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658. 
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guidance to reach the correct claim construction.”1080  Thus, in view of the 
intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit held that “lipophilic component” 
must be construed to require a non-surfactant component. 
Plaintiff also argued that “lipophilic phase” had been unnecessarily 
limited to require “that the lipophilic component must be immiscible with 
the hydrophilic phase in the absence of surfactants.”1081  The specification 
provided only that “suitable components for use as lipophilic phase” may 
include solvents that were nonmiscible with the hydrophilic phase.1082  The 
Federal Circuit agreed with Novartis that this teaching did not require that 
the entire lipophilic phase be nonmiscible, rather that only one of its 
components should be immiscible.1083 
In On-Line Technologies, Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GMBH,1084  
plaintiff appealed the district court’s claim construction and resultant grant 
of summary judgment of non-infringement of its patent claims directed to 
an improvement of a gas cell.1085  The gas cells contemplated by the patent 
were used in infrared spectrometers to house gas samples for testing their 
composition.1086  In the infrared spectrometer, an infrared light beam is 
passed through the gas in the gas cell and a detector on the other side 
measures the absorption of the light by the gas.1087  Plaintiff’s invention 
improved the accuracy of the absorption reading by achieving a longer light 
path of the beam in the gas cell while simultaneously reducing the effects 
of astigmatism and light beam diffusion that had until then prohibited 
effective lengthening of the beam.1088  Plaintiff sued defendant for selling 
devices that allegedly infringed its patent.1089 
At the district court level, defendant was granted summary judgment of 
non-infringement because its devices had objective mirrors with toroidal 
surfaces, not “substantially spherical” surfaces “having a cylindrical 
component added thereto” as required by the asserted claim.1090  The 
district court held that toroidal surfaces were excluded from the scope of 
the claims because the patent’s specification described the contour of the 
spherical objective mirrors as “approaching toroidal,” and interpreted this 
statement to mean that the contemplated mirrors were not actually 
                                                          
 1080. Id. at 1335-36, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 1081. Id. at 1336-37, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1082. Id. at 1331, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (quoting  U.S. Patent No. 5,342,625 
(issued Aug. 30, 1994)). 
 1083. Id. at 1337, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1084. 386 F.3d 1133, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1085. Id. at 1135-36, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117-18. 
 1086. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117-18. 
 1087. Id. at 1135, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117. 
 1088. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1117-18. 
 1089. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118. 
 1090. Id. at 1136-37, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118-19. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
1076 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:941 
toroidal.1091  In addition, extrinsic evidence was characterized as 
establishing that “spherical objective mirrors with cylindrical corrections 
are not the same as toroidal objective mirrors.”1092  The court further found 
that because the specification disclosed toroidal surfaces but did not claim 
them, the dedication-disclosure rule mandated that plaintiff could not use 
the doctrine of equivalents to cover defendant’s toroidal mirrors.1093 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the term “substantially 
spherical . . . having a cylindrical component added thereto” has no 
“precise and generally understood meaning in the art as applied to 
reflective surfaces.”  The Federal Circuit therefore searched the 
specification for guidance as to the term’s meaning.  There, it found that 
the descriptions of the preferred embodiments referred to the curved 
surfaces as toroidal surfaces and used the same language that was used in 
the asserted claim.  This explicit equation between a toroidal surface and a 
substantially spherical surface having a cylindrical component added 
thereto “made clear” that for purposes of the patent, a toroidal surface was 
included within the scope of the claim.  The Federal Circuit went on to 
state that even if the specification had not been so explicit in its equation, 
the reference in the description of the preferred embodiment to toroidal 
surfaces would give rise to a “very strong inference” that the claim 
included such surfaces within its scope.  This was due to the court’s 
precedent that claims should rarely if ever be construed to exclude the 
preferred embodiments. 
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of 
“approaching toroidal.”  Considered in conjunction with the preferred 
embodiments’ explicit reference to toroidal surfaces, the Federal Circuit 
considered it clear that “approaching toroidal” did not intend to exclude 
surfaces that were actually toroidal.  To substantiate this point, the Federal 
Circuit pointed to evidence that it was considered impossible to make any 
surface perfectly toroidal, and to the fact that the specification and claims 
described characteristics and functions of surfaces which were consistent 
with those of a toroidal surface.1094  Thus, Federal Circuit held that the 
district court construed the disputed claim too narrowly and vacated the 
                                                          
 1091. Id. at 1137, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119. 
 1092. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119. 
 1093. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119. 
 1094. Id. at 1138-39, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120-21. The Federal Circuit in any event 
disagreed with Perkin-Elmer’s characterization of the extrinsic evidence and found that it 
instead supported the construction advanced by On-Line. Specifically, it found that Perkin-
Elmer’s evidence demonstrating a technical, mathematical distinction between a toroid and 
a spherocylinder was refuted by On-Line’s expert’s testimony that a person of ordinary skill 
in the art would understand the disputed claim language to describe the toroidal surfaces 
used by On-Line and Perkin-Elmer’s products as opposed to having the meaning attributed 
to the term by mathematicians.  Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120-21. 
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grant of summary judgment.1095 
In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp.,1096 plaintiff sued for 
direct infringement and inducement of infringement of its patent directed to 
a surgical mesh implant used to repair hernias.1097  The asserted claim 
required “a hollow plug” wherein “the surface of said hollow plug [is] 
conformable,” and “said hollow plug [is] extremely pliable.”1098  In its 
claim construction order, the district court construed the asserted claim to 
require “pre-formed pleats.”  The Federal Circuit affirmed this 
construction.  In an opinion written by Judge Michel, the Federal Circuit 
explained that the pleating limitation was required because the patent’s 
specification, particularly the Abstract and Summary of the Invention 
sections, consistently described the plug as having pleats.1099  Although 
Bard argued that Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.1100 required 
the court to look to dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary and 
customary meaning of the claim terms, the court rejected any interpretation 
of Texas Digital that would have it disregard the intrinsic record.1101  It 
acknowledged that two lines of claim construction cases exist.  One, 
outlined in Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications 
Group, Inc.1102 and Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,1103 “indicates that 
the intrinsic record is the primary source for determining claim 
meaning.”1104  A second, outlined in Texas Digital, “suggests that the 
intrinsic record, except for the claims, should be consulted only after the 
ordinary and customary meaning of claim terms to persons skilled in the 
pertinent art is determined,” and which “emphasizes technical and general-
usage dictionaries in determining the ordinary meaning.”1105  But even the 
latter line of cases, the Federal Circuit said, 
does not require, or even allow, the Court to disregard the intrinsic 
record.  Instead, these cases merely suggest a methodology that 
emphasizes the use of dictionaries and claim that if courts adopt this 
methodology, claim terms “will be more accurately determined” and 
improperly narrow constructions “will be more easily avoided.”1106 
The Federal Circuit deliberately refrained from settling the law on the 
                                                          
 1095. Id. at 1140, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121-22. 
 1096. 388 F.3d 858, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1097. Id. at 861, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013. 
 1098. Id. at 860, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013. 
 1099. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013. 
 1100. 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1101. C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014. 
 1102. 262 F.3d 1258, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1103. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 1104. C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 861, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014. 
 1105. Id. at 862, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1014. 
 1106. Id. at 862-63, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (quoting Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. 
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1205, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1820 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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issue of the “relationship between ordinary and customary meaning, 
dictionary definitions and the intrinsic record,” explaining that it would 
affirm the district court’s construction under the standard set forth by either 
the Texas Digital or the Bell Atlantic line of cases.1107  Beginning by 
consulting the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim terms as 
requested by plaintiff, the Federal Circuit determined that plaintiff’s 
proffered general-use dictionary definitions of “conformable” and “pliable” 
were unhelpful.  The Federal Circuit found definitions of “conformable” 
and “pliable” to be inapposite because the controlling issue was how “plug” 
should be construed.  The Federal Circuit also questioned the need to 
consult the dictionary to derive the ordinary meanings of “conformable” or 
“pliable” because these terms were commonplace.  Finally, the Federal 
Circuit said, referring to Texas Digital, “even under the cases [plaintiff] 
cite[d], the ordinary and customary meaning of a term does not govern if 
the intrinsic record contains clear lexicography or disavowal of claim 
scope.”1108 
The Federal Circuit next explained how the patent’s specification 
required that the claim be limited to pleated plugs.  The Summary of 
Invention and Abstract both described the invention as being an implant or 
plug having a pleated surface.  It indicated that although “a statement’s 
location is not determinative” statements that describe the invention as a 
whole, rather than statements that describe only preferred embodiments, are 
more likely to support a limiting definition of a claim term and are more 
likely found in certain locations such as the Summary of Invention section 
of a patent.1109 
Plaintiff attempted to argue that statements indicating that the plugs of 
the invention were pleated were merely “passing references,” by citing 
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,1110 but the court found that in the 
present case the patentee “explicitly defines the inventive plug as ‘having’ 
or ‘including a pleated surface.’”1111  By “defines,” the Federal Circuit 
stated that it did not mean that the inventors acted as “lexicographers and 
redefined words differently from their ordinary meaning in the art.”1112  
Instead, the Federal Circuit said it used the term “merely to denote that the 
specification makes clear at various points that the claimed invention is 
                                                          
 1107. See id. at 863, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015 (predicting that a resolution to the 
debate over whether dictionaries may be considered intrinsic evidence would soon be 
forthcoming).  The court was referring to its decision to rehear Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 
F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc).  Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1015. 
 1108. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1015. 
 1109. Id. at 864, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016. 
 1110. 358 F.3d 898, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1111. C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 864-65, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 1112. Id. at 864 n.3, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020 n.3. 
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narrower than the claim language might imply based on a reading of the 
specification as a whole.”1113 
Plaintiff also contended that the statements referring to pleating did not 
define the terms “conformable” or “pliable” as requiring pleating, but again 
the court found that the focus on these terms was beside the point as the 
patent described the plug or implant to have pleats.1114  Plaintiff also argued 
that because the patent’s descriptions of preferred embodiments did not 
describe the implant as pleated, the claim cannot be limited to pleated plugs 
because that construction would counter the general rule that claims should 
not be construed to exclude preferred embodiments.  The Federal Circuit 
held that the description of the preferred embodiment relied upon by 
plaintiff unsurprisingly omitted reference to pleating because the 
description focused on the “filler body” of the implant, which was only one 
aspect of the claimed invention.1115  Additionally, because the patent 
“globally defined the plug as having a pleated surface, the term ‘pleated’ 
need not be repeated each time a term describing some other aspect of the 
plug is used.”1116  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the failure of the 
applicant to insert “pleated” before “implant” in the description of the 
preferred embodiment did not mean that a non-pleated plug was 
disclosed.1117 
Even though the Federal Circuit found that the specification sufficiently 
demonstrated that the claimed plug must be pleated, it went on to 
demonstrate that the prosecution history confirmed its analysis.  The 
Federal Circuit determined that during prosecution, the applicants had 
overcome at least two rejections by referring to the pleated feature of its 
invention.  First, the applicants overcame a prior art reference by stating 
that the implant disclosed in reference “does not contain pleats.”  Second, 
the applicants overcame an indefiniteness rejection by stating that the 
“compressibility” of its plug derives from the configuration of the mesh 
fabric of which it was comprised, not the mesh fabric itself.  Third, in an 
interview summary, the applicants restated their position that the prior art 
reference was not invalidating because it did not contain pleats and that it 
was “the texturing of the implant which permits the claimed plug to 
conform to irregularities in the shape of the defect without kinking or 
buckling.”1118  (The court construed the applicants’ emphasis on the 
configuration and texturing of the mesh fabric to implicate pleating.)1119  
                                                          
 1113. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1020 n.3. 
 1114. Id. at 864-65, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016-17. 
 1115. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016-17. 
 1116. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016-17. 
 1117. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016-17. 
 1118. Id. at 867, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 1119. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
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Similar arguments were made during reexamination of the patent.  Some of 
the applicants’ arguments that its claims required pleating during 
prosecution and reexamination were not clearly made with reference to the 
asserted claim at issue, and the Federal Circuit acknowledged that it would 
be “improper” to rely on these arguments as the sole basis for limiting the 
asserted claim to require pleating.  During reexamination, however, the 
Federal Circuit  reasoned that the examiner had rejected the asserted claim 
and one other claim over a prior art reference on the basis that these claims 
did not require pleating, and the patentee responded by saying “[a]s 
explained in the specification . . . the surface of the inventive plug is 
pleated.”1120  The Federal Circuit found this to be an unequivocal statement 
constituting a clear disclaimer of claim scope.1121 
In W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating, L.L.C.,1122 the Federal Circuit 
held that the ordinary and customary meanings of claim terms must stand if 
the written description and prosecution history are ambiguous as to whether 
the patentee used the terms in an inconsistent manner.1123  Plaintiff sued for 
infringement of its patent on a metal “Hydraulically Efficient Ribbed Pipe” 
for use in storm drain and sewer applications.  Claim one of the patent 
recited pipe of “single piece construction . . . consisting essentially 
of . . . ribs defining a corresponding plurality of open channels” formed in 
the material that becomes the pipe wall.1124  The district court held that 
defendant’s pipe did not infringe because it found the “open channel” 
requirement was not met by the accused channels, which were closed with 
metal inserts.  Nor could the district court understand how a “single piece 
construction” might include multiple pieces.  It thus rejected plaintiff’s 
position that the prosecution history required a departure from the ordinary 
and customary meaning of the claim terms.1125  The district court further 
rejected plaintiff’s theory as to the partially open transition term 
“consisting essentially of.”  Although it agreed that this term permits 
additional elements that do not materially affect the basic and novel 
properties of an invention, the Federal Circuit held that its presence in the 
asserted claim did not extend the claim’s scope to include defendant’s 
metal inserts, which materially affected cost, hydraulic efficiency, and 
corrosion—all of which Hall stated were the novel and basic properties of 
the invention.1126 
The Federal Circuit readily concluded that the district court correctly 
                                                          
 1120. Id. at 861, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1013. 
 1121. Id. at 868, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019. 
 1122. 370 F.3d 1343, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1123. Id. at 1353, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 1124. Id. at 1346, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 1125. Id. at 1349, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 1126. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
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construed the claims.  It began by stating the general rule that where the 
inventor does not act as his own lexicographer within the four corners of 
the intrinsic evidence, the appellate court must rely on the plain and 
ordinary meaning of these terms.1127  The Federal Circuit then reasoned 
that, according to general use dictionaries, the term “open” means “[n]ot 
shut in or confined, not surrounded by barriers,” and that “single piece” 
was clear in meaning without resorting to a dictionary.1128  Further, the 
Federal Circuit noted nothing in the specification or the prosecution history 
clearly suggests that plaintiff intended to use these terms in a manner other 
than according to their ordinary meanings.1129 
The Federal Circuit then rejected defendant’s plea to read “open 
channels” as meaning those that are free from reinforcing inserts, and 
“single piece construction” to mean that only a single element contributing 
to the structural integrity of the pipe.1130  The Federal Circuit pointed out 
that, while plaintiff focused on the reinforcing elements of the prior art 
Nyssen pipe during prosecution, the record does not dispositively show that 
the company intended to use the disputed terms in any manner inconsistent 
with their ordinary meanings.  Further, the Federal Circuit added that, 
while some statements from the prosecution history might be read to 
support plaintiff’s theory as to the “single piece construction” language, 
because this dialogue is not necessarily inconsistent with the term’s 
ordinary meaning, the district court was correct in using the ordinary 
meaning.1131 
In Kinik Co. v. International Trade Commission,1132 the issue was 
whether claims directed to a perform made from a “mixture containing a 
liquid binder, powdered matrix material, and abrasive particles”1133 were 
limited to mixtures containing a larger volume of liquid binder 
concentration than powdered matrix material.1134  Recognizing case law 
stating that, “while claims are to be interpreted in light of the 
specification . . . it does not follow that limitation from the specification 
may be read into the claims,”1135 the Federal Circuit explained that such 
                                                          
 1127. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 
F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 1128. Id. at 1350, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 1129. W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating, L.L.C., 370 F.3d 1343, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1135 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1130. Id. at 1351, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 1131. Id. at 1351, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 1132. 362 F.3d 1359, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1133. Id. at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 1134. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302. 
 1135. Id. at 1364, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (citing Sjolund v. Musland, 847 F.2d 
1573, 1581, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2020, 2027 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and Texas Instruments, Inc. v. 
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1563, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 833, 835 (Fed. Cir. 
1986)). 
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“precedent does not hold that claims are not limited by what is described 
and enabled.  Patent claims are directed to the invention set forth in the 
specification.”1136 
Reviewing the specification of the disputed patent, the court noted that 
the claimed invention was “described with specificity . . . and this 
specificity was illustrated in the examples.”1137  In particular, the Federal 
Circuit observed that the specification “states that the prior art performs 
having low binder volume are hard, stiff, and brittle. . . . The inventor’s 
discussion of the disadvantages of the low binder prior art sheds light on 
the scope of the invention.”1138  The Federal Circuit further explained that 
“[e]ven the broadest descriptive test in the [] specification describes only 
mixtures where binder volume exceeds matrix powder volume.”1139  
Additionally, the Federal Circuit determined that the prosecution history 
confirmed its reading of the specification because “[d]uring prosecution the 
same specificity—the excess volume of liquid binder over matrix powder 
in the perform mixture—was emphasized as a material distinction from the 
prior art.”1140  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the claimed 
mixture required a greater volume of liquid binder than powdered matrix 
because “[c]laims cannot be construed as encompassing prior art that was 
distinguished in the specification and disclaimed during prosecution.”1141 
Finally, addressing an ALJ’s reasoning that the term “mixture” should be 
construed consistent with dictionary definitions, the Federal Circuit 
explained that the “issue, however, is not one dictionary definition of a 
common word, but meaning of ‘mixture’ as used in the patent 
documents . . . . The words of patent claims have the meaning and scope 
with which they are used in the specification and prosecution history.”1142 
Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.1143 involved the proper 
construction of the term “solubilizer.”1144  Although the parties agreed that 
the ordinary meaning of “solubilizer” encompassed surfacants, co-solvents, 
and complexation agents, defendant argued that the term’s use in the 
intrinsic evidence required that it be construed as limited only to 
surfacants.1145  While the district court rejected defendant’s effort to curtail 
the term’s ordinary meaning, the court reversed.  However, in so doing, the 
                                                          
 1136. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 1137. Id. at 1365, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 1138. W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating, L.L.C., 370 F.3d 1343, 1365, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1135, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1139. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 1140. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 1141. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 1142. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (citation omitted). 
 1143. 384 F.3d 1333, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1726 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1144. Id. at 1135-36, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727-29. 
 1145. Id. at 1336, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728. 
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court directly acknowledged that “[t]he district court’s lengthy and careful 
opinions relied extensively on our recent case law, which is unfortunately 
complex and inconsistent.”1146 
The Federal Circuit began by addressing the competing theories of claim 
construction that have emerged in its jurisprudence.  The Federal Circuit 
first noted that: 
A long line of cases indicates that evidence intrinsic to the patent—
particularly the patent’s specification, including the inventors’ 
statutorily-required written description of the invention—is the primary 
source for determining claim meaning.  We have embraced that position 
frequently . . . . Indeed, that proposition has been accepted in patent law 
for many years . . . . [T]he goal of claim construction is to determine 
what an ordinary artisan would deem the invention claimed by the 
patent, taking the claims together with the rest of the specification.  
Under this approach to claim construction, evidence extrinsic to the 
patent is useful insofar as it ‘can shed useful light on the relevant art—
and thus better allow a court to place itself in the shoes of a person of 
ordinary skill in the art’ reading the claims alongside the rest of the 
specification.1147 
The Federal Circuit also observed that at the same time: 
Language in some of our recent cases suggests that the intrinsic record, 
except for the claims, should be consulted only after the ordinary and 
customary meaning of the claim terms to persons skilled in the art is 
determined.  The language in these cases emphasizes the use of technical 
and general-usage dictionaries in determining the ordinary meaning.  
Under this approach, where the ordinary meaning of a claim is evidence, 
the inventor’s written description of the invention, for example, is 
relevant only insofar as it provides clear lexicography or disavowal of 
the ordinary meaning.1148 
The Federal Circuit then explained that the “question becomes whether 
the intrinsic evidence takes priority in our construction of the claim term 
‘solubilizer,’ or if instead the ordinary meaning of the term, as determined 
from sources such as treatises and dictionaries, controls our construction in 
the absence of intrinsic evidence of clear lexicography or disavowal.”1149  
The Federal Circuit, however, determined that it need not “decide which 
approach is proper as a matter of law” because, even under plaintiff’s 
proposed approach, the intrinsic evidence “clearly binds [plaintiff] to a 
narrower definition of ‘solubilizer’ than the extrinsic evidence would 
                                                          
 1146. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728. 
 1147. Id. at 1336-37, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728-29 (citations omitted). 
 1148. Id. at 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729 (citing Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. 
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations 
omitted)). 
 1149. Id. at 1337-38, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729. 
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support.”1150 
After reviewing the specification, the Federal Circuit reasoned that both 
the Background of the Invention and the Description of the Invention 
establish that the inventors used “solubilizer” as limited only to 
surfacants.1151  In particular, the Federal Circuit explained that the 
specification statement that “[t]he solubilizers suitable according to the 
invention are defined below,” and then stated that “[t]he solubilizers 
suitable for the preparations according to the invention are semi-solid or 
liquid non-ionic surface active agents [i.e., surfacants] . . . .”1152 Rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that such statements referred to the preferred 
embodiment, the court explained that “[w]e might agree if the specification 
stated, for example, ‘a solubilizer’ . . . but in fact the specification 
definitively states ‘the solubilizers suitable for the preparations according 
to the invention.’”1153  The Federal Circuit further elaborated that while 
plaintiff “seems to suggest that lexicography requires a statement in the 
form ‘I define ___ to mean ___,’ . . . such rigid formalism is not 
required.”1154 
The Federal Circuit also held that the specification disavowed coverage 
of nonsurfactant solubilizers, explaining that the “inventors’ lexicography 
alone works an implicit disavowal . . . the rest of the specification goes 
further.”1155  Again rejecting the argument that such statements of 
disavowal simply addressed features of the preferred embodiment, the 
Federal Circuit explained that: 
[Plaintiff] seems to suggest that clear disavowal requires an “expression 
of manifest exclusion or restriction” in the form of “my invention does 
not include ___.”  But again, such rigid formalism is not required:  
Where the general summary or description of the invention describes a 
feature of the invention . . . and criticizes other products . . . that lack that 
feature, this operates as a clear disavowal of these other products (and 
processes using these products).1156 
The Federal Circuit also stated that “while it is of course improper to 
limit the claims to the particular preferred embodiments described in the 
specification, the patentee’s choice of preferred embodiments can shed 
                                                          
 1150. Id. at 1338, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729-30. 
 1151. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729-30. 
 1152. Id. at 1339, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730. 
 1153. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730. 
 1154. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730. 
 1155. Id. at 1340, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731. 
 1156. See id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731 (citing its decision in SciMed Life Sys., Inc. 
v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) in support of this proposition and explaining that even its seemingly 
countervailing decision in Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 63 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002) cited SciMed with approval). 
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light on the intended scope of the claims.”1157  The Federal Circuit then 
determined that the “fact that all of the solubilizers listed in the 
specification and used in the working examples were surfactants adds 
further support to the conclusion that the term ‘solubilizer’ . . . should be 
limited, according to the definition employed in the specification, to 
surfactants.”1158 
In Gaus v. Conair Corp.,1159 the disputed language was “an electrical 
operating unit and a pair of spaced-apart electrically exposed conductive 
probe networks” in claims directed to circuit devices for use in appliances 
such as hair dryers.1160  The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether 
the “electrical operating unit” was properly construed as being separate 
from the “conductive probe networks.”1161  Starting with the claims 
themselves, the Federal Circuit reasoned that “the clear implication of the 
claim language is that the pair of probe networks is a distinct component, 
separate from the electrical operating unit.”1162 
Having surveyed the specification, the Federal Circuit determined that 
“[n]othing in the descriptions of these two components suggests that their 
structures or functions overlap.  To the contrary, the specification plainly 
describes the two components as separate.”1163  In particular, the Federal 
Circuit found it significant that “the specification describes one of the 
principal advantages of the claimed invention in a way that excludes the 
electrical operating unit from serving as part of the pair of probe 
networks.”1164  The specification distinguished prior art devices that 
triggered a protective circuit only when there was direct contact between 
water and the power supply, and taught that the claimed invention “protects 
the user from . . . a shock . . . by arranging for the protective circuit to be 
separate from the voltage-carrying components of the appliance.”1165 
Rejecting plaintiff’s argument that such discussion in the specification 
was directed to a preferred embodiment, the Federal Circuit noted that the 
specification states that  “‘according to the invention’ the protective circuit’ 
accomplishes this disconnection before the user can be connected to 
voltage-carrying exposed parts via the fluid which has entered the 
                                                          
 1157. Id. at 1341, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731. 
 1158. See id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1731 (explaining that, in addition to the 
specification, prosecution history may be looked at in making a claim construction 
determination). 
 1159. 363 F.3d 1284, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1160. Id. at 1288, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 1161. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 1162. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 1163. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 1164. Id. at 1289, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383. 
 1165. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383. 
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housing.”1166  The Federal Circuit thus held that “[t]he 
specification . . . demonstrates that the invention itself requires that the user 
can be completely protected from shock, in contrast to prior art devices that 
exposed the user to a brief, non-lethal shock.”1167 
In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Eon Labs Manufacturing, Inc.,1168 
the issue was whether the claim term “hydrosol” was “limited to medicinal 
products prepared outside of the body or whether it also include[d] 
products formed . . . after a particular medicinal product has been 
ingested.”1169  Because the parties did not “suggest[] that hydrosol has a 
specialized meaning inconsistent with the ordinary dictionary 
definition,”1170 the court began its analysis by examining general purpose 
dictionary definitions.1171  After reviewing various dictionaries, the Federal 
Circuit observed that it was presented with two competing definitions:   one 
definition “include[s] a dispersion of solid particles in aqueous colloidal 
solution formed in a patient’s stomach” and another definition is “limited to 
medicinal preparation consisting of dispersion of solid particles in an 
aqueous colloidal solution formed outside the body.”1172 
Faced with these competing dictionary definitions, the Federal Circuit 
explained that well-settled precedent provides that a court “need not 
arbitrarily pick and choose from the various accepted definitions of a word 
to decide which meaning was intended as the word is used in a given claim.  
[Rather t]he subject matter, the context, etc., will more often than not lead 
to the correct conclusion.”1173  The Federal Circuit then turned to the 
specification and observed that the claimed “hydrosol” is described strictly 
“in terms of a pharmaceutical composition and makes no mention of the 
term in any other context.”1174  In particular, the Federal Circuit noted the 
specification “repeatedly describes the invention as a ‘pharmaceutical 
composition,’”1175 and distinguishes the claimed “hydrosol” from the prior 
art “on the ground that ‘it was never [previously] proposed to use 
pharmacologically active agent particles in an aqueous hydrosol form for 
intravenous injection purposes.’”1176  The Federal Circuit thus concluded 
                                                          
 1166. Id. at 1290, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 1167. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
 1168. 363 F.3d 1306, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1169. Id. at 1308, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 1170. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 1171. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 1172. Id. at 1310, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 1173. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (quoting Liebscher v. Boothroyd, 258 F.2d 948, 
951, 119 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133, 135 (C.C.P.A. 1958)). 
 1174. Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1310, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1438, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1175. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 1176. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,389,382 (issued Feb. 
14, 1995)). 
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that “[b]ecause an injectable hydrosol must necessarily be prepared outside 
the body, these statements further support adoption of more limited 
definition of ‘hydrosol’ as a medicinal preparation prepared outside the 
body.”1177 
The Federal Circuit further determined that the prosecution history also 
required that the claimed “hydrosol” be limited to preparation outside the 
body because the patentee’s arguments to overcome the prior art “clearly 
suggest[] that the hydrosol is a ‘pharmaceutical composition’ that can be 
injected into a patient.”1178  While noting that none of the statements in the 
intrinsic evidence “is an explicit disclaimer of subject matter sufficient to 
vary the scope of the claim from its ordinary meaning, these statements are 
helpful in guiding us to choose between competing dictionary definitions of 
a claim term.”1179 
In reaching its construction, the Federal Circuit distinguished its prior 
decision in Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.,1180 in 
which the court held that claimed subject matter was not limited to a pre-
ingested form, because “the plain meaning of the claim language was clear 
and there was no express or implied pre-ingestion limitation.”1181  The 
Federal Circuit also distinguished its decision in Schering Corp. v. Geneval 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1182 involving circumstances in which the parties 
agreed that the claimed metabolite was formed in a patients body following 
ingestion.1183 
In dissent, Judge Clevenger criticized the majority’s reliance on 
“multiple dictionaries to find an ambiguity in the meaning of ‘hydrosol’ as 
claimed.”1184  In particular, the dissent explained that it was “at a loss to 
understand why this dictionary search creates an ambiguity” and that the 
“majority’s decision depends entirely on a suspect secondary meaning for 
‘medicine’ found in only a single dictionary,” especially when the disputed 
term was hydrosol.1185  Accordingly, the dissent reasoned that it would 
have followed “our settled law to allow the term its full breadth, unless the 
patentee had made an explicit disclaimer or clear disavowal of scope to 
alter the ordinary broad meaning of the term.”1186 
In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,1187 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
                                                          
 1177. Id. at 1310-11, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42. 
 1178. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42. 
 1179. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42. 
 1180. 19 F.3d 1418, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 1181. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 363 F.3d at 1311, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
 1182. 339 F.3d 1373, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1183. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 363 F.3d at 1311, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442. 
 1184. Id. at 1313, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). 
 1185. Id. at 1315, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1446 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). 
 1186. Id. at 1314, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). 
 1187. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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construction of the term “phosphoric acid source” to mean an “acidic 
chemical that acts as a source of phosphate.”1188  While noting that the 
“most natural reading of the [claim language] . . . would be a source of 
phosphoric acid,”1189 the court explained that: 
The meaning of a technical term in a patent claim is determined in 
accordance with its usage in the specification, elaborated if appropriate 
by the prosecution history and with due consideration to usage in the 
field of invention . . . . A technical term is not properly removed from its 
context in order to seek its meaning . . . . Whether a term appearing in a 
patent claim is subject to limitations beyond its abstract general meaning 
is determined in the context of the invention described in the 
specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art.1190 
The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s construction 
because it “accord[ed] with the chemical descriptions in the specification,” 
and “[n]o contradictory information appears in the patent prosecution.”1191 
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.1192 involved the issue of whether 
the term “skin permeable form” should be construed to cover fentanyl that 
can pass through skin including fentanyl citrate solutions.1193  Noting that 
the claim term “is not plain on its face to one of ordinary skill in the art,” 
the Federal Circuit proceeded to review the remaining intrinsic evidence to 
determine the term’s meaning.1194  Referring to the specification’s 
statement that the inventors “have discovered that fentanyl citrate . . . has 
such a low skin permeability that it is not at all suitable for transdermal 
delivery even with the use of permeation enhances.  Instead . . . the drug 
should be incorporated in the transdermal therapeutic system in the form of 
the base,”1195 the Federal Circuit reasoned that fentanyl citrate “is not a skin 
permeable form of fentanyl in the context of the invention of the [asserted] 
patent.”1196  The Federal Circuit then determined that the prosecution 
history confirmed that the claim term did not include fentanyl citrate based 
on the inventors’ argument distinguishing the prior art as “suggest[ing] the 
production of a diffusion matrix containing fentanyl citrate, which we 
specifically stated in the [asserted] patent was unsuitable for transdermal 
delivery.”1197  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that “[b]oth the 
prosecution history and the specification disclaimed fentanyl citrate 
                                                          
 1188. Id. at 1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511. 
 1189. Id. at 1325-26, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511-12. 
 1190. Id. at 1326, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512. 
 1191. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512. 
 1192. 391 F.3d 1365, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1193. Id. at 1370-71, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 1194. Id. at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64. 
 1195. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64. 
 1196. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64. 
 1197. Id. at 1371, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
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because it was unsuitable for transdermal administration and therefore not a 
‘skin permeable form’ of fentanyl.”1198 
5.  “Coined terms” cases 
In 2004, the Federal Circuit rendered several opinions extending the 
court’s holding in J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atlantic Past & Glue Co.1199 that if a 
“dispostive claim limitation is a term unknown to those of ordinary skill in 
the art at the time the application was filed[, i]t thus fell on the applicants, 
as a duty, to provide a precise definition for . . . the limitation.”1200 
In Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc.,1201 the Federal Circuit noted that though 
a heavy presumption exists that terms carry their ordinary meaning as 
would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, such a presumption 
is inapplicable when “a claim term has no ordinary and customary 
meaning, [and] a court must resort to the remaining intrinsic evidence—the 
written description and the prosecution history—to obtain the meaning of 
that term.”1202  The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that the 
“parties agree that the term ‘marker substance’ has no accepted meaning to 
one of ordinary skill in the art, and we find no reason to disagree with their 
conclusion.  Accordingly we construe [the term] only as broadly as 
provided for by the patent itself.”1203  In affirming the district court’s 
construction of “intra-cellular marker substance” to mean an “antigen 
existing within a body cell,”1204 the Federal Circuit reasoned that the patent 
disclosed twenty-six different antigens, all of which were described as 
“suitable . . . marker substances.”1205  The Federal Circuit thus determined 
that, at minimum, the “patent clearly regards ‘antigens’ as falling within the 
scope of ‘marker substances.’”1206 
The Federal Circuit then explained that the prosecution history supports 
the district court’s construction by “further reveal[ing] the inventor’s 
understanding of the term ‘marker substance’ as synonymous with 
‘antigen.’”1207  In particular, the Federal Circuit pointed to the applicant’s 
argument that “[t]he method and compositions claimed in the present 
application relate to antibodies to intracellular tumor-associated 
antigens.”1208  The Federal Circuit thus concluded that “[b]ecause neither 
                                                          
 1198. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 1199. 106 F.3d 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 1200. Id. at 1570, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 1201. 373 F.3d 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1202. Id. at 1164, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1203. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 1204. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1205. Id. at 1165, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 1206. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 1207. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 1208. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
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the patent specification nor the prosecution history supports the breadth of 
the construction that [plaintiff] desires, we affirm the district court’s claim 
construction . . . .”1209 
In Irdeto Access, Inc. v. Echostar Satelite Corp.,1210 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the proper construction of the term “group key.”1211  Challenging 
the district court’s construction of the term to mean “a key associated with 
a subset of the total subscriber base,”1212 plaintiff contended that such a 
construction was contrary to the “heavy presumption that [the claims] mean 
what they say,” and thus “proffer[ed] definitions from a general-usage 
dictionary to show that nothing in the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the claim 
terms requires limiting ‘group’ to fewer than all subscribers.”1213  
Nonetheless, based on the applicants statements during prosecution that 
“the claims have certain ‘key’ modifiers which have no accepted meaning 
in the art . . . [and] that the modifiers for key [such as group] . . . are very 
adequately described in the specification,”1214 the Federal Circuit rejected 
the argument.1215  The Federal Circuit instead agreed with defendant’s 
position that “there can be no such ‘heavy presumption’ where a disputed 
term lacks an accepted meaning in the art.”1216  Citing to its decision in J.T. 
Eaton, the Federal Circuit explained that “absent such an accepted 
meaning, we construe a claim term only as broadly as provided for by the 
patent itself. The duty thus falls on the patent applicant to provide a precise 
definition for the disputed term.”1217  The Federal Circuit further explained 
that:   “[W]here evidence such as expert testimony or technical dictionaries 
demonstrates that artisans would attach a special meaning to a claim term 
or would attach no meaning at all to the claim term independent of the 
specification[,] ‘general usage dictionaries are rendered irrelevant with 
respect to that term.’”1218  The Federal Circuit thus reasoned that “[h]aving 
conceded that the ‘key’ modifiers have no accepted meaning in the art, the 
                                                          
 1209. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.  In affirming, the court also clarified that 
“molecular sub-units, such as those present in the HCG antigen, qualify as antigens under 
this construction.”  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.  Based on this clarification, the court 
reversed the grant of summary judgement of no infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.  Id. at 1169, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263. 
 1210. 383 F.3d 1295, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  The authors’ law firm 
represented plaintiff in the case. 
 1211. Id. at 1300, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 1212. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 1213. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682 (quoting Lieble-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 
358 F.3d 898, 913, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1813 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 1214. Id. at 1298, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681. 
 1215. Id. at 1300, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 1216. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 1217. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682  (citing J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue 
Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1570, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646-47 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 1218. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682  (quoting Vanderlande Indus. Nederaland B.V. v. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696, 1704 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)). 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
2005] PATENT SUMMARY 1091 
applicant expressly directed the public to the specification to discern that 
meaning and thus measure the scope of the claimed invention.”1219 
Seeking to mitigate the impact of the prosecution history, plaintiff 
argued that the applicant’s statement that certain terms were adequately 
described in the specification “does not transform every aspect of the 
preferred embodiment into a claim limitation,” and identified portions of 
the specification that used language such as “may” and “for example” when 
describing the term “group key.”1220  The Federal Circuit, however, rejected 
this argument as well, explaining that “the specification consistently 
equates group with a subset of all subscribers.”1221  Relying on its decision 
in Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, 
Inc.,1222 holding that “the specification may define claim terms ‘by 
implication’ such that the meaning may be ‘found in or ascertained by 
reading of the patent documents,’”1223 the Federal Circuit concluded that: 
[W]hile the specification does not contain any statements of explicit 
disavowal or words of manifest exclusion, it repeatedly, consistently, and 
exclusively uses “group” to denote fewer than all subscribers, 
manifesting the patentee’s clear intent to so limit the term.  The 
specification also contains no affirmative indication that group can 
consist of all subscribers within the system.  A reasonable competitor 
reading the patent could only understand “group” to refer to a subset of 
all subscribers.1224 
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s 
argument that “only statements of ‘clear disclaimer’ in language indicating 
‘manifest exclusion or restriction’ can overcome the ‘heavy presumption’ 
in favor of ordinary meaning.”1225  In so doing, the Federal Circuit 
distinguished cases such as Leibel-Flarshiem Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,1226 
Brookhill-Wilk I, L.L.C. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.,1227 and Teleflex Inc. v. 
Ficosa North America Corp.1228 on the basis that such cases did not 
involve[] a situation where the applicant admitted that certain claim 
terms lacked any agreed upon meaning in the art . . . and unequivocally 
directed the patent examiner, as well as the public, to the specification as 
                                                          
 1219. Id. at 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1220. Id. at 1300, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1221. See id. at 1301, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683 (explaining that “[n]owhere does the 
specification contemplate a single group made up of the entire subscriber base.”). 
 1222. 262 F.3d 1258, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1223. Id. at 1268, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870-71 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 n.6, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1578 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)). 
 1224. Irdeto Access, Inc., 383 F.3d at 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1225. Id. at 1301, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1226. 358 F.3d. 898, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1227. 334 F.3d 1294, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1228. 299 F.3d 1313, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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the complete source of meaning for the disputed terms . . . . Patentee’s 
clear intent to rely on the four corners of his patent to define fully the 
terms at issue thus takes this case out of the “heavy presumption” regime 
of our cases.1229 
6.  Means-plus-function claims 
a. Determining whether a claim limitation invokes the means-plus 
function format of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 
One of the Federal Circuit’s most consistent areas of jurisprudence is its 
practice of strictly enforcing the rule that a claim term without the word 
“means” carries a heavy presumption that it is not a means-plus-function 
limitation under § 112, ¶ 6.1230  As the Federal Circuit explained in 2004, 
“it is not surprising that we have seldom held that a limitation not using the 
term ‘means’ must be considered to be in means-plus-function form.  In 
fact, we have identified only one published opinion since [1996] in which 
we have done so.”1231 
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,1232 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s construction of the phrase “determining 
a condition of the heart from among a plurality of conditions of the 
heart.”1233  Agreeing with plaintiff’s contentions that the claim preamble’s 
recitation of “the method comprising the steps of”1234 does not invoke a 
means-plus-function analysis, the Federal Circuit held that 
Method claims necessarily recite steps of the method, and the preamble 
words that “the method comprises the steps of” do not automatically 
convert each ensuing step into the form of § 112[,] ¶ 6.  Nor does the 
preamble usage “steps of” create a presumption that each ensuing step is 
in step-plus-function form; to the contrary, the absence of the signal 
“step for” creates the contrary presumption.1235 
In Linear Technology Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,1236 the Federal 
Circuit addressed the issue of whether the terms “circuit” and “circuitry” 
failed to connote sufficient structure such that the terms should be 
construed as means-plus-function limitations.1237  Reversing the 
construction of these terms pursuant to § 112, ¶ 6, the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 1229. Irdeto Access, Inc., 383 F.3d at 1302-03, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1230. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000) (stating that, in the specification of a patent 
application, the means of performing a function can be an element of the specification). 
 1231. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1362, 72 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1232. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1233. Id. at 1375, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. 
 1234. Id. at 1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340. 
 1235. Id. at 1382, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341. 
 1236. 379 F.3d 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1237. Id. at 1319, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
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explained that the district court legally erred by failing to impose on the 
party advocating a means-plus-function construction the burden 
“demonstrating that the claim fails to ‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ 
or recites a ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing 
that function.’”1238  The Federal Circuit noted that to “determine whether a 
claim term recites sufficient structure, we examine whether it has an 
understood meaning in the art,”1239 and concluded that the “[t]echnical 
dictionaries, which are evidence of the understandings of persons of skill in 
the technical arts, plainly indicate that the term ‘circuit’ connotes 
structure.”1240  The Federal Circuit also reasoned that viewing the claim 
language in context confirmed that the term “circuit” connoted sufficient 
structure because claims recited the “respective objectives or operations” 
for each circuit.1241  In addition, the Federal Circuit observed that an expert 
declaration from plaintiff’s expert demonstrated “[t]hat persons of ordinary 
skill in the art would understand the structural arrangements of circuit 
components from the term ‘circuit’ coupled with the qualifying language of 
[the] claim[s].”1242  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that 
because the term “circuit” is used in each of the disputed limitations of 
[the] claims . . . with a recitation of the respective circuit’s operation in 
sufficient detail to suggest structure to persons of ordinary skill in the art, 
the “circuit” and “circuitry” limitations of such claims are not means-
plus-function limitations.1243 
The decision in Linear Technology appears to comport with the decision 
in Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc.,1244 in which the Federal Circuit held 
that the term “circuit” preceded by “an appropriate identifier such as 
‘interface,’ ‘programming’ and ‘logic,’ certainly identifies some structural 
meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art” so as to preclude invocation of § 
112, ¶ 6 absent the word “means.”1245  The Federal Circuit’s holding that 
the term “circuit” for performing a certain function provides sufficient 
structure is difficult to reconcile with its reasoning in Personalized Media 
Communications, L.L.C. v. International Trade Commission,1246 which 
posited that § 112, ¶ 6 would be applicable for “generic structural term[s] 
                                                          
 1238. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (quoting Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 
880, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1838 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 1239. Id. at 1320, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1665 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 1240. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1241. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1242. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 1243. Id. at 1320-21, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 1244. 325 F.3d 1364, 1371-72, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1245. Id. at 1373, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.  However, the court expressly noted that 
“we do not find it necessary to hold that the term ‘circuit’ by itself always connotes 
sufficient structure.”  Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451. 
 1246. 161 F.3d 696, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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such as ‘means,’ ‘element,’ or ‘device.’”1247 
In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,1248 an issue on 
appeal was whether the claim term “connector assembly” was a means-
plus-function limitation under § 112, ¶ 6.1249  The Federal Circuit began its 
analysis by observing that its “precedent provides that ‘[a] claim limitation 
that actually uses the word ‘means’ invokes a rebuttable presumption that § 
112, ¶ 6 applies.  By contrast, a claim term that does not use ‘means’ will 
trigger the rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.’”1250  The 
Federal Circuit then explained that “[t]he presumption that a limitation 
lacking the term ‘means’ is not subject to section 112, ¶ 6 can be overcome 
if it is demonstrated that ‘the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite 
structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for 
performing that function,’”1251 and noted that its “cases make clear . . . that 
the presumption flowing from the absence of the term ‘means’ is a strong 
one that is not readily overcome.”1252  The Federal Circuit further reasoned 
that “[t]he task of determining whether [a] limitation in question should be 
regarded as a means-plus-function limitation, like all claim construction 
issues, is a question of law for the court, even though it is a question on 
which evidence from experts may be relevant.”1253  The Federal Circuit 
thus explained that “even when expert evidence has been offered with 
respect to the issue of claim construction, we must determine whether that 
evidence comports with the intrinsic evidence in the case.”1254 
Turning to the claim language and record before it, the Federal Circuit 
observed that defendant introduced an expert declaration urging that the 
means-plus-function format should be invoked because “the term 
‘connector’ encompasses ‘at least a single infinity of possible devices’ and 
that the term ‘would not provide [those] of ordinary skill in the lighting 
fixture art with sufficient structural information . . . as to what device or 
component would read on the claim element.”1255  The Federal Circuit, 
however, explained that the expert declaration failed to 
address the central issue in determining whether section 112[,] ¶ 6 
applies.  Implicit in [defendant’s expert] declaration is the premise that in 
order to be regarded as structural for purposes of section 112[,] ¶ 6, a 
                                                          
 1247. Id. at 704, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1887. 
 1248. 382 F.3d 1354, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1249. Id. at 1358, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1250. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 
288 F.3d 1359, 1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 1251. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc., 288 F.3d at 1369, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664 (internal quotations omitted)). 
 1252. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1253. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348. 
 1254. Id. at 1359, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. 
 1255. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. 
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claim limitation must identify a specific structure and not use a generic 
term that includes a wide variety of structures.1256 
The Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s approach as “unduly 
restrictive,”1257 explaining that precedent does not “require[] the claim term 
to denote a specific structure;”1258 rather, it is sufficient “if the claim term is 
used in common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to 
designate structure, even if the term identifies a broad class of structures by 
their function.”1259 
The Federal Circuit thus explained that the proper inquiry was whether 
the term “connector assembly” would be understood by a person skilled in 
the art “to describe structure, as opposed to a term that is simply a nonce 
word or a verbal construct that is not recognized as the name of structure 
and is simply a substitute for the term ‘means for.’”1260  The Federal Circuit 
then noted that its precedent instructs that relevant dictionaries can be 
consulted “to determine if a disputed term has achieved recognition as a 
noun denoting structure, even if the noun is derived from the function 
performed.”1261  After examining the dictionary definitions of the words 
“connector” and “assembly,” the Federal Circuit concluded that: 
While the terms “connector” and “connector assembly” are certainly 
broad, and may in the end include any structure that performs the role of 
connecting . . .  [t]hose terms are routinely treated as structural by patent 
practitioners and courts, and we conclude that there is no reason to treat 
the term “connector assembly” any differently for purposes of section 
112[,] ¶ 6.  The consequence of defining the term “connector assembly” 
free of the constraints of section 112[,] ¶ 6 may be to render the claim 
more vulnerable to attack for invalidity, but that is a risk that a claim 
drafter assumes by choosing broad structural terms rather than choosing 
                                                          
 1256. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. 
 1257. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. 
 1258. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349. 
 1259. Id. at 1359-60, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1349.  The court canvassed its precedent in 
which it held that broad claim language lacking the word “means” did not invoke § 112, ¶ 6. 
See id. at 1360 (discussing Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 39 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1996), which held that the phrase “denote mechanism” 
was not a means-plus-function limitation; Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. 
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 696, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880 (Fed. Cir. 1998, which held 
that the phrase “digital detector” was not a means-plus-function limitation; Al-Site Corp. v. 
VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999), which held that 
the phrase “eyeglass hanger member” was not a means-plus-function limitation; CCS 
Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. Cir. 
2002), which held that the phrase “reciprocating member” was not a means-plus-function 
limitation; Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) (Fed. Cir. 2000), 
which held that the phrase “sealing connected joints” was not a means-plus-function 
limitation). 
 1260. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1350. 
 1261. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1350. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
1096 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:941 
to claim in means-plus-function format under section 112 [,] ¶ 6.1262 
The Federal Circuit further added that in light of its rules for determining 
whether a claim term without the word “means” invokes § 112, ¶ 6, “it is 
not surprising that we have seldom held that a limitation not using the term 
‘means’ must be considered to be in means-plus-function form.  In fact, we 
have identified only one published opinion since [1996] in which we have 
done so.”1263 
In Phillips v. AWH Corp.,1264 the Federal Circuit reversed a construction 
of the term “baffles” as a means-plus-function limitation.1265  The Federal 
Circuit noted that “use of the word ‘means’ creates a presumption that 
§ 112, ¶ 6 applies,” while absence of “the word ‘means’ creates a 
presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not apply.”1266  The Federal Circuit then 
explained that the disputed claim term “does not expressly use the word 
‘means’”1267 and “the word ‘baffle’ is a sufficient recitation of structure, 
which carries its ordinary meaning of ‘something for deflecting, checking, 
or otherwise regulating flow.’”1268  The Federal Circuit further elaborated 
that “[s]imply because the claims do not identify the matter upon which the 
baffle acts does not, by itself, rebut that presumption or render the term 
subject to means-plus-function treatment.  Our case law has focused on the 
structure of claim terms when determining whether § 112, ¶ 6 applies.”1269 
b.   Determining the recited function and corresponding structure 
NOMOS Corp. v. Brainlab USA, Inc.,1270 presented a means-plus-
function claim related to a system for identifying the precise position of a 
cancerous lesion in a patient’s body when the patient is positioned on a 
treatment table of a radiation therapy device.1271  The claim at issue recited 
as one of its limitations “a means for generating at least one ultrasound 
image of the lesion in the patient’s body.”1272  The question was whether 
this claim covered an accused infringer’s device which is also used for 
identifying the position of lesion in a patient’s body for purposes of 
administering radiation therapy, where the allegedly infringing device used 
a hand-held ultrasound probe, rather than a probe that was fixed to the 
                                                          
 1262. Id. at 1361-62, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1351. 
 1263. Id. at 1362, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1351. 
 1264. 363 F.3d 1207, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1265. Id. at 1211-12, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420. 
 1266. Id. at 1212, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420. 
 1267. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420. 
 1268. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 162 (1993)). 
 1269. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1420. 
 1270. 357 F.3d. 1364, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1271. Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1855. 
 1272. Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1855. 
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treatment table. 
The district court construed the means-plus-function limitation to require 
an ultrasound probe that was fixed by a bracket or fixation device that 
maintains the ultrasound probe perpendicular to the treatment table.  
Applying this construction, the accused device did not infringe.  On appeal 
the Federal Circuit agreed with this construction because the only 
embodiment described by the patient’s specification included a fixed 
device and described the probe as “disposed on” or “secured to” the 
treatment table.  Furthermore, the patent stated that “the means for 
generating the ultrasound image may be an ultrasound probe, including a 
means for mounting the ultrasound probe to a radiation therapy device.”1273  
The Federal Circuit also found it clear that “in order to generate ultrasound 
image[s] the ultrasound probe must be mounted to the treatment table by a 
fixation device” because the patent stated that the “‘[u]ltra sound probe . . . 
is mounted so that it can be moved upwardly and downwardly with respect 
to bracket 423, so that ultrasound probe 422 may be brought into contract 
with the patient’s body 302 in order to generate ultrasound image 
421.’”1274 
Plaintiff countered that claim 1 should not be construed to require a fixed 
probe because claim 3, dependant upon claim 1, expressly required a 
“means for mounting,” and therefore the concept of claim differentiation 
prevented the court from reading a mounting requirement into claim 1.  The 
Federal Circuit explained, however, that it was not reading limitations from 
a dependant claim into the independent claim; it found the fixed probe 
requirement by looking to the written description, not claim 3.  Also, it 
opined that the claim differentiation concept was a “guide, not a rigid rule,” 
and would not outweigh the provisions of § 112.1275  Having thus agreed 
with the district court interpretation of the claims, the Federal Circuit held 
that the accused device did not infringe because it fashioned a hand held 
probe.  It further concluded that because the accused device antedated the 
patent, there could be no resort to infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents of this means- plus-function claim. 
In TI Group Automotive Systems (North America), Inc. v. VDO North 
America, L.L.C.,1276 plaintiff appealed the district court’s granting of 
defendant’s post-verdict motion for a JMOL of non-infringement.1277  
Defendant cross-appealed the district court’s denial of its motion for a 
JMOL of invalidity.  The patent at issue was directed to a fuel pump 
                                                          
 1273. Id. at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1856. 
 1274. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1856. 
 1275. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1856. 
 1276. 375 F.3d 1126, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1277. Id. at 1132, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1333. 
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assembly technology.1278  Four claim terms were at issue in the appeal and 
cross-appeal.  First, plaintiff argued that the district court’s understanding 
of “fuel reservoir” as “the portion of the apparatus for pumping fuel in 
which fuel is collected and retained apart from fuel in the fuel tank” was 
too narrow.1279  The Federal Circuit held that the written description amply 
supported the district court’s definition, because each dictionary definition 
of “reservoir” implicates “some sort of containment of liquid.”1280  Thus, 
contrary to plaintiff’s proffered construction “in the context of this 
invention,” the fuel in the “fuel reservoir” was contained apart from the 
fuel in the “fuel tank.”1281 
The second claim term at issue was “pumping means.”  Plaintiff argued 
that the district court erred by construing this term as a means-plus-function 
limitation under § 112, ¶ 6.1282  The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that, 
although the term was presumed to be a means-plus-function limitation 
because it used the word “means,” the presumption was overcome because 
the claim limitation recited not only the means but also its structure, 
location, and operation.1283  The district court therefore erred by 
incorporating other limitations from the specification that were not 
necessary to perform the function recited in the limitation “to pump fuel 
into the reservoir.”1284 
With respect to the same claim element, plaintiff argued that the district 
court had again too narrowly construed “within” in “pumping means for 
pumping fuel into the reservoir, said means being located within the 
reservoir in the region of the opening” to require the pumping means to be 
located inside the reservoir.  On this point, plaintiff and defendant offered 
competing dictionary definitions, plaintiff arguing that “within” should be 
construed to mean “in the limits or compass of, not beyond,” and defendant 
arguing that “within” should be construed to mean “in the inner part or 
interior of.”1285  The Federal Circuit ultimately upheld the district court’s 
                                                          
 1278. Id. at 1130, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331. 
 1279. Id. at 1134, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1334. 
 1280. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1334-35. 
 1281. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335.  The independent claim at issue in the appeal recited:  
“2.  Apparatus for pumping fuel from a fuel tank to an engine comprising:  (a) a supply port 
for carrying fuel from the apparatus to the engine; (b) a fuel reservoir which includes an 
opening for connecting the interior of the reservoir to the interior of the fuel tank . . . .”  Id. 
at 1131, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1332 (emphasis added). 
 1282. Id. at 1135, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335. 
 1283. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335.  The court found that the portions of the claim limitation 
which recited “including a nozzle and a ventui tube in alignment with the nozzle,” “being 
located within the reservoir in the region of the opening,” and “the passage of fuel out of the 
nozzle an through the venture tube causing fuel to be entrained through the opening into the 
interior of the reservoir,” recited the structure, location, and operation of the “pumping 
means,” respectively. 
 1284. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335. 
 1285. Id. at 1136, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1335-36. 
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construction because plaintiff’s proffered construction was not so different 
from defendant’s, where “in ordinary and customary usage, what is not 
outside is on the inside.”1286 
The Federal Circuit also addressed defendant’s arguments supporting its 
construction, on the inner side.  Defendant argued that the patent’s 
drawings show the pumping means located inside the reservoir, that 
plaintiff’s construction ignored the “primary . . . and most relevant” 
definition of “within,” and that plaintiff’s statements during prosecution of 
a Japanese counterpart application confirmed that “within” was intended to 
mean “inside.”1287  The Federal Circuit found the first two arguments 
unpersuasive because it had previously held that drawings alone do not 
operate to limit the claims to the specific configuration depicted and 
because “a patentee is entitled to a definition that encompasses all 
consistent meanings.”1288  As for defendant’s third argument, the Federal 
Circuit “declined to comment, . . . and note[d] only that ‘the varying legal 
and procedural requirements for obtaining a patent protection in foreign 
countries might render consideration of certain types of representations 
inappropriate’ for consideration in a claim construction analysis of a United 
States counterpart.”1289 
As for the fifth term at issue, “opening for connecting the interior of the 
reservoir to the interior of the fuel tank,” the Federal Circuit construed it to 
require “that there be a hole, passage, or aperture for joining or linking the 
interior of the reservoir to the exterior of the reservoir.”1290  It found that 
the district court had erred in additionally requiring that the aperture be 
“disposed adjacent to both the interior of the reservoir and the interior of 
the fuel tank” because nothing in the ordinary meaning of the term nor in 
the written description required such limitations.1291 
Finally, the Federal Circuit found error in the district court’s construction 
of a limitation in a dependent claim that the opening for connecting, 
defined above, is “at the bottom of the reservoir” to mean that the opening 
must be in the “bottom surface of the reservoir.”1292  Rather, the Federal 
Circuit held, the ordinary and customary meaning of “bottom of the 
reservoir” is “the lower or lowest part of the reservoir,” and was not 
restricted to only the reservoir’s bottom surface.1293 
                                                          
 1286. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336. 
 1287. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336. 
 1288. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336. 
 1289. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1336 (citing Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A., 714 F.2d 
1110, 1116, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 185, 188 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 1290. Id. at 1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337. 
 1291. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337. 
 1292. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1338. 
 1293. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1338. 
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Defendant’s “pumping means” was located on the fuel tank side of the 
opening that divides the fuel tank from the reservoir; it was not “located 
within the reservoir” as required by the claims.  Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment granting of defendant’s post-
verdict motion for a JMOL of non-infringement.1294  Having found that the 
claims were too narrowly construed by the district court, it also vacated the 
district court’s opinion that the patent was valid and remanded the 
invalidity question for the court’s reconsideration under the properly 
construed claims.1295 
In Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford 
International, Inc.,1296 plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment of non-infringement.1297  The patent was directed to a 
remotely controlled device for handling sections of well casing to be 
lowered into a well after drilling.  The patented device included a “stabbing 
apparatus” mounted on a derrick which had “at least three major 
interconnectable subassemblies” that could be disassembled to facilitate 
transport, among other things, and an “extendable boom” which contained 
jaws on one end to engage the casing.1298  The boom was “hydraulically 
movable in an up-and-down pivoting motion or in a side-to-side motion, or 
both such motions simultaneously.”1299  In the preferred embodiment, a 
hydraulic piston and cylinder subassembly “which [was] connected to the 
boom through a plate structure” called a “lift plate” was used to raise and 
lower the boom holding the casing section.1300 
The asserted claims recited the following limitation, which the district 
court, the parties, and the Federal Circuit agreed was a means-plus-function 
limitation.1301  The means were for:   “selectively pivoting said boom about 
said horizontal axis to raise and lower the second end of said boom which 
carries said jaws, and to elevate said boom to a location where it extends in 
a generally vertical direction.”1302 
The district court held that the structure corresponding to this “means for 
selectively pivoting” term necessarily included the lift plate to which the 
boom was attached, rather than merely the piston and cylinder subassembly 
as plaintiff contended.1303  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
                                                          
 1294. Id. at 1139, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1338. 
 1295. Id. at 1139-40, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1339. 
 1296. 389 F.3d 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1297. Id. at 1376, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068. 
 1298. Id. at 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066.   
 1299. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 1300. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 1301. Id. at 1375, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 1302. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 1303. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
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construction.1304  Although the piston and cylinder subassembly 
occasionally was described without mention of the lift plate, the court 
found that “the only embodiment showing use of the piston and cylinder 
subassembly discloses a direct connection to the lift plate.”1305  
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit held that the applicant’s statement during 
prosecution that the “lifting cylinder ‘simply cannot be used’ when directly 
connected to the boom” in distinguishing the invention from the prior art 
“underscored the essentiality of the lift plate to the claimed function.”1306 
The Federal Circuit also established that the principle requiring that the 
“same terms appearing in different portions of the claims should be given 
the same meaning” extended to terms appearing in related claims and that 
this principle supported the more limited construction advanced by 
defendant and arrived at by the district court.1307  The Federal Circuit 
explained that other claims besides the asserted one contained the same 
means-plus-function limitation but also required a “yawing” function, 
meaning side-to-side movement.1308  Because (1) the lift plate was essential 
for performing a yawing function, (2) the identical means-plus-function 
term found in the asserted claim was found in claims requiring yawing, and 
(3) the specification gave no reason why the terms should be interpreted 
differently in the various claims, the district court found that the structure, 
which corresponded to the means-plus-function term in the asserted claim, 
required a lift plate.1309 
In reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-
infringement, the Federal Circuit agreed that the accused device, which 
achieved pivoting by an under-mounted hydraulic cylinder, satisfied the 
requirement that an identity of function exist in order to infringe a means-
plus-function claim.  The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that the 
accused device represented a “distinct structural approach” to performing 
that function.1310  Furthermore, because defendant’s accused device was in 
use before the filing of the patent, the Federal Circuit concluded that it did 
not need to engage in a separate analysis under the doctrine of 
equivalents.1311  It therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment of 
non-infringement. 1312 
In Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,1313 an issue on appeal was 
                                                          
 1304. Id. at 1379-80, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 1305. Id. at 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
 1306. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
 1307. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
 1308. Id. at 1374, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067. 
 1309. Id. at 1377-78, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069-70. 
 1310. Id. at 1378, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1311. Id. at 1379, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1312. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070. 
 1313. 379 F.3d 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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the determination of the proper structure corresponding to the claim phrase 
“a second means for generating a first control signal during a first state of 
circuit operation.”1314  The Federal Circuit explained that construing a 
means-plus-function limitation entails a two-step process.1315  First, a court 
must identify the recited function within the means-plus-function 
limitation.1316 Second, a court must examine the written description to 
determine the structure that corresponds to and performs the recited 
function.1317  The Federal Circuit further noted that “[p]roper application of 
§ 112 ¶ 6 generally reads the claim element to embrace distinct and 
alternative described structures for performing the claimed function.”1318  
Having identified the corresponding structure, the court explained that 
simply because a “disputed term is not limited to a single structure does not 
disqualify it as corresponding structure, as long as the class of structures is 
identifiable by a person of ordinary skill in the art.”1319 
Versa Corp. v. Ag-Bag International Ltd.1320 involved the proper 
construction of the term “means for creating air channels.”1321  The Federal 
Circuit began by noting that construction of a means-plus-function 
limitation “includes identifying the claimed function and determining the 
corresponding structure or acts disclosed in the specification.”1322  
Examining the claim language, the court reasoned that the dispute centered 
on “whether flutes must be included in the structures that perform this 
function.”1323  Though noting that “[i]n most places the specification 
describes that invention as including both flutes and perforated pipe,” the 
Federal Circuit observed that:  “the specification also points out that both 
structures are not required, stating:   ‘[I]t is believed that sufficient air will 
be present to achieve decomposition with either the channels . . . or the 
perforated pipe . . . although it is preferred that both the flutes . . . and the 
pipe . . . be utilized.’”1324  The Federal Circuit relied on precedent providing 
that “[w]hen multiple embodiments in the specification correspond to the 
claimed function, proper application of § 112, ¶ 6 generally reads the claim 
                                                          
 1314. Id. at 1321, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 1315. Id. at 1322, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071-72. 
 1316. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071. 
 1317. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1318. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072 (quoting Creo Prods., Inc. v. Presstek, Inc., 305 
F.3d 1337, 1346, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 1319. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1320. 392 F.3d 1325, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1321. Id. at 1327, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192. 
 1322. Id. at 1328, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193 (quoting IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas 
Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1430, 54 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1129, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
 1323. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1193. 
 1324. Id. at 1328-29, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193. 
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element to embrace each of those embodiments.”1325  Based on this 
precedent, the Federal Circuit concluded that “in light of this disclosure, 
flutes are not essential.”1326 
In dissent, Judge Newman explained that: 
This case does not present a new question, and it should not have a new 
answer.  The question is, can a patent claim clause written in means-
plus-function form be construed, as a matter of law, literally to cover a 
device that is not the invention described in the specification, that is not 
shown in any of the drawings, that was not examined for patentability, 
that was excluded by prosecution arguments, and that is not an asserted 
equivalent.  Statute and precedent require that the question be answered 
in the negative.1327 
The dissent further characterized the majority opinion as requiring that 
“the description of the invention, the prosecution history, and the prior art, 
must give way to a claim construction that covers an invention that the 
applicant foresaw but chose not to describe and prosecute.”1328 
c.  Preamble limitations 
Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc.1329 presented the 
issue of whether the term “blown-film” appearing in the claim preamble 
was a claim limitation.1330  Instructing that “[n]o litmus test defines when a 
preamble limits claim scope,”1331 the Federal Circuit identified two 
circumstances in which a term in the preamble operates as a claim 
limitation:  (1) when the preamble “recites essential structure or steps, or if 
it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim,”1332 and (2) 
when the preamble recites “additional structure or steps underscored as 
important by the specification.”1333  The Federal Circuit then determined 
that “blown-film” was a claim limitation because the “specification is 
replete with references to the invention as a ‘blown-film’ liner, including 
                                                          
 1325. Id. at 1329, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193 (quoting Micro Chem. Inc. v. Great 
Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258, 52 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1258, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
 1326. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193. 
 1327. Id. at 1331, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195. 
 1328. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195. 
 1329. 383 F.3d 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1330. Id. at 1309-10, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. 
 1331. Id. at 1309, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689 (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1788 (Fed. Cir. 
2002)). 
 1332. Id. at 1309-10, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689 (quoting Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. 
Hewlett-Packard, Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
 1333. Id. at 1310, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689 (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc., 289 
F.3d at 808, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788). 
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the title of the patent itself and the ‘Summary of the Invention.’”1334  The 
Federal Circuit further reasoned that the specification also repeatedly uses 
the term “blown-film” to describe the preferred embodiments and “the 
entire preamble ‘blown-film textured liner’ is restated in each of the 
patent’s seven claims.”1335  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that “the 
inventor considered that the ‘blown-film’ preamble language represented 
an important characteristic of the claimed invention.”1336 
In Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp.,1337 the district court held that plaintiff’s 
patent covering punch pliers for use in punching holes in overlapping 
sheets of metal was invalid for failing to satisfy the written description 
requirement.1338  The sole independent claim of the patent recited as its 
preamble “handheld punch pliers for simultaneously punching and 
connecting overlapping sheet metal” such as the corners of overlapping 
ceiling tile grids.1339  Furthermore, Figure Six of the patent illustrated the 
result of operation of the pliers in which “the portion of the metal not cut 
by the punching operation bends back down and flat with the metal surface 
so as to securely connect the two pieces of metal.”1340  The district court 
found that the written description did not support the claims because clear 
and convincing evidence showed that the pliers described by the 
specification punched holes through overlapping sheets of metal but did not 
connect the sheets, and Intirtool admitted that its pliers did not function in 
the way illustrated by Figure Six. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the judgment of invalidity, 
explaining that the district court erred by interpreting the preamble of the 
independent claim as a limitation.  The Federal Circuit held that the 
preamble added nothing to the remainder of the claim, which described the 
punch pliers in “complete and exacting structural detail.”1341  Furthermore, 
although the specification discussed “a connecting tab [that] remains 
securely connected to the parent sheet metal,” the court reasoned that the 
preamble did not recite “any additional structure or steps underscored as 
important by the specification.”1342  Moreover, any statements made during 
prosecution that the punch pliers “simultaneously punched and connected” 
metal sheets were merely referring to the benefits or features of the claimed 
invention, which were not patentably significant.  Finally, the Federal 
                                                          
 1334. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. 
 1335. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. 
 1336. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689. 
 1337. 369 F.3d 1289, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1338. Id. at 1293, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782. 
 1339. Id. at 1294, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. 
 1340. Id. at 1296, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785. 
 1341. Id. at 1295, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784. 
 1342. Id. at 1290, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
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Circuit concluded that the district court erroneously construed claim 
language reciting “bending the sheet metal plug formed by said cut 
substantially at an imaginary cord on the uncut sheet metal between the 
ends of said semicircular shaped cut” to require a “crimping effect” 
bending back the uncut portion of the holes as demonstrated in Figure 
Six.1343  It opined that the claim term was not restricted to the embodiment 
described by the figure, and therefore the court’s reliance on its erroneous 
construction rendered its finding of invalidity clearly erroneous.1344 
In Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of America,1345 the 
licensee of a patent directed to a method of detecting vitamin deficiencies 
was held liable for indirect infringement in recommending an infringing 
test to physicians.1346  The claimed method involved screening of body 
fluids for increased levels of homocysteine, an amino acid that is 
metabolized with the assistance of both vitamins B12 and folic acid and 
thus appears in elevated levels in a person or animal who suffers from a 
deficiency of either vitamin.1347  This method was called the “total 
homocysteine test” and identified a deficiency of either vitamin, but it did 
not indicate in which vitamin a patient was deficient.  Metabolite’s claims 
were also directed to a “total homocysteine-methylmalonic acid” test, 
which, through the use of methylmalonic acid, identified the particular 
vitamin that was deficient.1348 
Metabolite licensed the patented method to LabCorp, a laboratory testing 
company, who originally performed the total homocysteine assays.  In 
1998, LabCorp switched to a total homocysteine assay developed by 
Abbott Laboratories and discontinued paying royalties to Metabolite for its 
total homocysteine test.  Pursuant to a jury verdict, LabCorp was found to 
have willfully infringed Metabolite’s patent. 
LabCorp’s primary non-infringement argument on appeal rested on the 
construction of the claimed step of  “[c]orrelating an elevated level of total 
homocysteine in said body fluid with a deficiency of cobalamin or 
folate.”1349  LabCorp argued that this correlating step should be construed 
to require a showing of a separate hematologic or neuropsychiatric 
symptom to confirm the “correlation.”  The Federal Circuit disagreed, 
explaining that the claim only required correlation between an elevated 
level of total homocysteine and a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.  It 
found no further required correlation, nor anything about confirmation of 
                                                          
 1343. Id. at 1296, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785. 
 1344. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785. 
 1345. 370 F.3d 1354, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1346. Id. at 1371, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1094. 
 1347. Id. at 1358, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 1348. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
 1349. Id. at 1359, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084. 
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such correlation. 
The Federal Circuit found support for this interpretation in the patent’s 
preamble, “[a] method for detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate,” 
which it characterized as restating that the invention was a method of 
detecting vitamin deficiency, and it did not relate such deficiency to any 
specific “abnormality.”1350  The Federal Circuit found further support in the 
prosecution history, in which the examiner characterized the preamble as 
stating the intended use of the invention.  Finally, although the Federal 
Circuit discussed the relationship between elevated homocysteine levels 
and either clinical or hematological symptoms, it nevertheless found 
support in the patent’s specification, which acknowledged that the 
described method could show vitamin deficiencies that exist without any 
clinical symptoms. 
The Federal Circuit also rejected LabCorp’s argument that, since only 
twenty percent of assays have elevated levels of homocysteine, only that 
percentage could form the basis for a damages award.  LabCorp itself had 
urged the district court to define “correlating” to include either a mutual or 
reciprocal relationship, the court observed.  The Federal Circuit declined 
“the invitation to apply a different claim construction for computation of 
damages than for infringement liability.”1351 
7.  Miscellaneous claim construction issues 
The Federal Circuit reinforced its approach to “words of approximation” 
in Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.,1352 where it held that a claim 
reciting the term “substantial” and “substantially” did not require perfection 
with respect to the specific parameters that the terms modified.1353  Plaintiff 
brought an action against defendant alleging that its slurry tanks infringed 
plaintiff’s patent covering an apparatus for storing and uniformly mixing 
the liquid and solid components of waste that comprise slurries in 
preparation for the slurry’s treatment and/or use as a fertilizer or other 
agents.  The claims at issue were drawn to an apparatus for stirring slurries 
in slurry tanks and required as part of its limitations that certain flow 
generating means be positioned in a certain way for generating: 
substantial helical flow path of the liquid and solid components [with the 
components] traveling outwardly . . . from the center portion of the 
tank . . . then upwardly . . . then inwardly . . . then downwardly . . . and 
then outwardly . . . , the liquid and solid components continuing to travel 
in the helical path as the entire body of liquid and solid components 
                                                          
 1350. Id. at 1362, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. 
 1351. Id. at 1364, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088. 
 1352. 355 F.3d 1361, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1595 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1353. Id. at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600. 
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continues to rotate.1354 
The district court accepted defendant’s proposed construction of this 
“substantial helical flow path” limitation to require “a helical flow path” 
rather than a “largely or generally spiral-like flow path” as plaintiff would 
have it, because the district court understood the plain claim language to 
require “a flow path that emanates from the tank center and returns to the 
center after one rotation,” and because two of the patent’s figures 
illustrated a “perfectly helical flow.”1355  Applying this construction, the 
district court ruled that defendant did not infringe plaintiff’s patent and 
granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement. 
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, finding error in its construction.  According to the Federal 
Circuit, courts are to examine intrinsic evidence of record before resorting 
to extrinsic evidence, and they are to examine intrinsic evidence “in 
seriatim.”  It explained that a court is to start with the claim terms’ ordinary 
meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, and a court is to 
resort to the written description “when the claim language itself lacks 
sufficient clarity to determine the scope of the claims.”1356  In light of the 
its previous decisions construing “words of approximation” such as 
“substantial(ly)” to require something less than perfection, the Federal 
Circuit found the plain language of the claims at issue to be clear and not 
contradicted by anything in the written description—“substantial helical 
flow path.”  Such description required neither a perfectly helical flow nor a 
flow that returns to the center in exactly one rotation, a pattern 
demonstrated by a flow path that was none other than perfectly helical. 
In Vanderlande Industries Nederland v. International Trade 
Commission,1357 the Federal Circuit reviewed the International Trade 
Commission’s decision that certain imported machinery infringed the 
claims of a U.S. patent directed to “sortation systems,” i.e., mechanical 
systems for sorting items such as packages.1358  The meanings of two claim 
terms were disputed:  “glide surface surrounding said [slat] wall” and 
“glide surface having substantially the same configuration as said outer 
surface of said slat.”1359 
Plaintiff argued that the proper construction of the first term required the 
glide surface to contact the outer surface of the slat on all sides.  The 
Federal Circuit held that it did not.  Although it was evident that the glide 
surface in the preferred embodiment contacted the outer surface of the slat 
                                                          
 1354. Id. at 1364, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597. 
 1355. Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598. 
 1356. Id. at 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1600. 
 1357. 366 F.3d 1311, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1358. Id. at 1312, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1697. 
 1359. Id. at 1317, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1701. 
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at various points on all sides, there also existed points of no contact on each 
side in the same embodiment.  Furthermore, the Summary of Invention 
section of the patent allowed for one or more sides to not have contact with 
the slat because it stated that the invention includes embodiments with 
contact “between at least one edge of each slat and an engaging portion of 
the glide surface of the diverter shoe.”1360  The Summary section also 
described a contact point on the bottom of the slat without describing a 
similar point of contact on the top.  Even though the Summary of Invention 
section suggested that these embodiments lacking contact on all sides were 
not preferable, embodiments contact on all sides “f[e]ll within the 
disclosure of the invention, indicating that the patent requires a broader 
meaning” of the disputed term than the one offered by Vanderlande.1361 
The Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s argument that the patentee’s 
statements to the European Patent Office during prosecution of a European 
counterpart to the patent restricted the scope of the claims to cover glide 
surfaces that contacted all sides of the outer surface of the slat.  The 
applicants for the European counterpart stated that the claimed invention 
could be distinguished from a prior art device because the prior art device 
did not have a glide surface that would “surround” the slats.  Their 
argument was that because the structure in the prior art that corresponded 
to the claimed “glide surface” was located below the top wall of the slat, it 
would not “surround” the slats.  But the Federal Circuit agreed with the 
tribunal below that this distinction had “nothing to do with whether or 
where the ‘glide surface’ contacts the slot,” and therefore did not preclude a 
broader construction.1362 
Finally, plaintiff proffered a general-usage dictionary as proof that “glide 
surface” should be understood as having contact on all sides. It specifically 
relied on the dictionary’s definition of the noun “glide” and an illustrative 
example of the word which showed a circular metal button attached to the 
bottom of furniture legs in which the button completely contacted both the 
furniture leg and the floor.  Apart from its conclusion that plaintiff’s 
argument consisted of a “shaky syllogism,” the Federal Circuit dismissed it 
for several reasons.  First, plaintiff misapprehended the function of claim 
construction analysis of arriving at the construction the terms would be 
given by “a person skilled in the relevant art” by resorting to a general 
usage dictionary when the testimony of experts and the patent’s inventors 
showed that “glide surface” had no recognized meaning in the relevant art.  
“A general usage dictionary cannot overcome credible art-specific evidence 
                                                          
 1360. Id. at 1320, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703. 
 1361. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703. 
 1362. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1703. 
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of the meaning or lack of meaning of a claim term.”1363  Second, plaintiff 
relied on the definition of “glide,” “only one word in a two-word claim 
term.”1364  Finally, the dictionary definition proffered was “entirely 
eclipsed” by the patent’s written description which provided “detailed, art 
specific examples of glide surfaces . . . including embodiments in which the 
glide surface does not contact every side of the slat.”1365  Thus, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that a “glide surface” has “some contact, but not 
necessarily complete contact, with the outer surface of the slat, and that 
need not contact all sides of the slat.”1366  This construction differed slightly 
from that given to the term by the ITC because it required some contact; 
whereas the ITC’s construction would conceivably cover “no contact” 
technologies which the Federal Circuit believed were well beyond the 
scope of the disclosure. 
Turning to the second disputed claim term, “the glide surface having 
substantially the same configuration as said outer surface of said slat,” the 
Federal Circuit decided whether it was error for the ITC to not construe this 
term and whether the plaintiff’s proffered construction, “that the glide 
surface of the shoe must largely, but not necessarily wholly, resemble the 
configuration of the outer surface of the slat in every, or largely every, 
relevant respect,” was correct.1367 
Again, the Federal Circuit found defects in plaintiff’s position.  First, 
there was no requirement that the ITC formally construe this claim because 
it was not in dispute when the ALJ originally construed the claims.  
Moreover, the ALJ was “plainly attentive to the critical words 
‘substantially the same configuration’” in view of its statement that 
“substantially is considered to be a ‘broadening usage’ that must be given 
reasonable scope; such words must be viewed by the decision maker as 
they would be understood by persons experienced in the field of the 
invention.”1368  Third, plaintiff did not show how its proffered definition 
was significantly different from the ALJ’s explanation of the effect of the 
word substantially. 
In Scanner Technologies Corp. v. ICOS Vision System Corp., N.V.,1369 
                                                          
 1363. Id. at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704. 
 1364. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704. 
 1365. Id. at 1322, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1704.  The Court also dismissed 
Vanderlande’s argument that the content of a mediation statement drafted by the patent 
owner and licensee supported its contact-with-all-sides construction because it was 
ambiguous, and in any event, “was at most a theory advanced in a proceeding to mediate a 
separate litigation, upon which [the Court places] little—if any weight in claim 
construction.”  Furthermore, the content of the statement would be inadmissible in a patent 
suit in federal district court under Federal Rule of Evidence 408. 
 1366. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705. 
 1367. Id. at 1323, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705. 
 1368. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1705. 
 1369. 365 F.3d 1299, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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the court addressed the issue of whether the district court erred in 
construing the term “an illumination apparatus” as limited to an apparatus 
containing only a single illumination source.1370  The Federal Circuit 
recounted long-standing precedent that it “has repeatedly emphasized that 
an indefinite article ‘a’ or ‘an’ in patent parlance carries the meaning of 
‘one or more’ in open-ended claims containing the transitional phrase 
‘comprising.’”  Based on this precedent, the Federal Circuit held that the 
disputed term “is properly construed to encompass one or more 
illumination sources because the patentee has not evinced a clear intent to 
limit the article ‘an’ to a single illumination source in either the claims or 
the specification . . . .”1371 
Addressing defendant’s argument that both the disputed claim and the 
specification “call out other limitations with multiple components, e.g., 
‘first camera’ to a take a ‘first image’ and ‘second camera’ to take ‘a 
second image,’”1372 the court explained that: 
we do not agree that the failure to specifically refer to a “first 
illumination apparatus” and a “second illumination apparatus” evinces a 
clear intent on the part of the patentee that the term be limited to a single 
illumination source.  Indeed, the very use of the article “an” indicates, at 
least presumptively, that the patentees intended the claim language “an 
illumination apparatus” to mean one or more illumination sources, and 
thus to cover implicitly “a first illumination apparatus” and subsequent 
“illumination apparatuses” where they exist.  To limit the claim term “an 
illumination apparatus” to one illumination source, we require much 
stronger evidence of the patentees’ intent than strained extrapolation 
from the language employed by the patentees in other claim 
limitations.1373 
The Federal Circuit thus concluded that when a “comprising” claim 
“includes the article ‘a’ or ‘an,’ and the specification is at best inconclusive 
on the patentee’s intent to limit that article to a single element or step, [the 
court does not] find a ‘clear intent’ to so limit the claims.”1374 
In reaching its construction, the Federal Circuit distinguished its prior 
decisions in Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc.1375 and 
North American Vaccine, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,1376 in which the 
Federal Circuit held that use of the pronoun “a” limited the claim term to 
the singular form, as isolated cases involving unique sets of 
                                                          
 1370. Id. at 1304, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1371. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1372. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1373. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1374. Id. at 1305, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905. 
 1375. 99 F.3d 1098, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 1376. 7 F.3d 1571, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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circumstances.1377  The Federal Circuit explained that in Insituform where 
the disputed term was “a cup,” “‘neither the specification nor the drawings 
discloses the use of more than one cup,’ and in fact repeatedly described or 
depicted ‘the cup.’”1378  The Federal Circuit also distinguished North 
American Vaccine as inapposite because the claims in that case did not 
invoke the open phrase “comprising.”  Accordingly, the court concluded 
that:   “Indeed, it [is] the very use of the transition ‘comprising’ in 
conjunction with the article ‘a’ or ‘an’ that creates the presumption that the 
article is construed to mean one or more elements or steps, unless there is 
evidence of clear intent to limit the claims.”1379 
Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.1380 involved claims directed to kits used to 
prepare calcium minerals where the disputed language was the phrase 
“consisting of.”1381  Noting that this transitional phrase “is a term of patent 
convention meaning that the claimed invention contains only what is 
expressly set forth in the claims,”1382 the Federal Circuit reasoned that the 
phrase “does not limit aspects unrelated to the invention [and i]t is thus 
necessary to determine what is limited by the ‘consisting of’ phrase.”1383  
Having analyzed the disputed claim, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
“[w]hile the term ‘consisting of’ permits no other chemicals in the 
[claimed] kit [for preparing a calcium mineral], a spatula is not part of the 
invention that is described.”1384 
In dissent, Judge Schall reasoned that the majority opinion “errs in 
holding that [plaintiff’s] use of the phrase ‘consisting of’ limits only 
chemical, but not mechanical components.”1385  The dissent explained that 
“[o]ur case law makes it clear that ‘closed’ transition phrases such as 
consisting of are understood to exclude any elements, steps, or ingredients 
not specified in the claim.”1386  The dissent further noted that plaintiff 
“even recognized that a kit can include mechanical items, such as 
packaging, by stating in [the] claims . . . that ‘said dry ingredients and 
                                                          
 1377. Scanner Techs. Corp., 365 F.3d at 1304-06, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904-05. 
 1378. Id. at 1304, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 1379. Id. at 1305-06, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904-05. 
 1380. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1381. Id. at 1331, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 1382. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 1383. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 1384. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 1385. Id. at 1334, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 (Scholl, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
 1386. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1518 (Scholl, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(quoting AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1245, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1776 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). A significant thrust of the dissenting opinion was that plaintiff’s use of 
“consisting of” and its statements during prosecution provided notice to competitors that the 
claims only covered the elements expressly recited in the claims.  Id. at 1335-36, 70 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519-20 (Scholl, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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solution are present in separate containers.’”1387 
The topic of waiver in the context of claim construction has become 
much more prevalent in Federal Circuit jurisprudence, yet a cohesive 
framework for resolving the issue continues to prove elusive.1388  In 
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,1389 defendant argued 
that plaintiff failed to preserve its right to appeal a district court’s claim 
construction because it “did not make a formal objection when the jury was 
instructed on the claim construction.”1390  In response, plaintiff contended 
that “the claim construction was decided at the Markman hearing, and was 
not a proper subject of trial objection under [Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure] 51.”1391 Crediting the position advanced by plaintiff, the Federal 
Circuit explained that: 
When the claim construction is resolved pre-trial, and the patentee 
presented the same position in the Markman proceeding as is now 
pressed, a further objection to the district court’s pre-trial ruling may 
indeed have been not only futile but unnecessary.  In this case the court 
claim construction resulted from a hearing at which all parties’ positions 
were presented, and . . . extensively argued . . . . Objection under Rule 51 
was not required to preserve the right to appeal the Markman ruling.1392 
In Koito Manufacturing Co. v. Turn-Key-Tech., L.L.C.,1393 the Federal 
Circuit adopted a seemingly contrary position, holding that the patentee 
waived its right to challenge the district court’s claim construction by 
failing to object to the construction during trial even though the 
construction was rendered pre-trial in two Markman orders.1394  The 
Federal Circuit explained that the patentee: 
did not, however, preserve its claim construction argument at trial and 
also did not object to the jury’s instruction on this claim term.  Because it 
failed to preserve its rights, [patentee] is not permitted to contest the 
                                                          
 1387. Id. at 1335, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1519 Scholl, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
 1388. One of the first decisions in this area was Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 
F.3d 709, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998), in which the accused infringer 
changed its positions on claim construction on appeal and even argued that the claim 
constructions it advanced at trial were in error.  The court recognized the defendant’s about-
face as a clear strategy to “salvage its invalidity case,” and ruled that a party is prohibited 
from asserting a position on appeal that is inconsistent with a position it advocated at trial by 
the law of waiver and judicial estoppel.  The court, out of an “abundance of fairness,” 
however, declined to stop the defendant in the case at hand because it had not explicitly set 
forth this rule before.  Since then, there have been a series of cases in which the court has 
addressed waiver of a party’s right to argue claim construction on appeal, yet no cohesive 
rule has emerged. 
 1389. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1390. Id. at 1380, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339. 
 1391. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340. 
 1392. Id. at 1381, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340. 
 1393. 381 F.3d 1142, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1394. Id. at 1150, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
2005] PATENT SUMMARY 1113 
construction . . . . If [patentee] had wanted a different construction . . . it 
should have objected at trial.1395 
In Gaus v. Conair Corp.,1396 the Federal Circuit rejected plaintiff’s 
argument that the defendant waived its right to advance a claim 
construction on appeal that differed in scope from the proffered 
construction at the district court, explaining that:   “While the two 
formulations employ somewhat different language, they embody the same 
concept—that the probe network must contain two conductive elements 
that are separate or independent from the voltage—carrying portions of the 
hairdryer.  We find no change in position on [defendant’s] part, and thus no 
waiver.”1397  This holding appears to be a caveat to the court’s prior 
instruction that a party is not prevented from “clarifying” the original scope 
of its claim construction, suggesting that a proffered construction on appeal 
does not have to mimic en hac verba the construction urged at the district 
court. 
8.  Various tools of claim construction 
a.  Use of related prosecution histories 
In Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc.,1398 the Federal Circuit addressed 
propriety of using the prosecution history of second patent for construing 
claims of a first patent in circumstances when such claims were rejected on 
double patenting grounds over the second patent.1399  The Federal Circuit 
reasoned that such reliance is entirely appropriate because the prosecution 
history and content of the second patent “constitute[] part of the 
prosecution history of the . . . application [for the first patent].”1400  
Analogizing to an earlier decision providing that “prior art cited in a patent 
or cited in the prosecution history of the patent constitutes prior art,”1401 the 
Federal Circuit reasoned that statements made to overcome a double 
patenting rejection by distinguishing one from another application are part 
of the intrinsic evidence of the first patent.1402 
The Federal Circuit also addressed whether a district court correctly 
relied on added matter in a second application which was a continuation-in-
part of a first application when construing claims that issued from the first 
                                                          
 1395. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1196. 
 1396. 363 F.3d 1284, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1397. Id. at 1288, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383. 
 1398. 373 F.3d 1158, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1399. Id. at 1166-67, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62. 
 1400. Id. at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 1401. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62 (quoting Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 
F.3d 1364, 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 1402. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62. 
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application.1403  The Federal Circuit explained that such reliance is 
incorrect because the “the relevant passages from the [second 
application] . . . were added during the continuation-in-part . . . . These 
passages are therefore new matter added to the content of the [second 
application] subsequent to when it was distinguished from the [first 
application].”1404  Thus, “[w]hile the content of the [second application] at 
the time it was distinguished from the [first application] constitutes part of 
the prosecution history of the [first application], subsequently added 
material is not similarly incorporated.”1405 
The Federal Circuit elucidated its reasoning by explaining that 
[i]n the absence of an incorporation into the intrinsic evidence, this 
court’s precedent takes a narrow view on when a related patent or its 
prosecution history is available to construe the claims of a patent at issue 
and draws a distinct line between patents that have a familial relationship 
and those that do not.1406 
While noting that its earlier holding in Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech 
Systems, Inc.1407 permitted “reliance on statements made subsequent to the 
issuance of a patent when construing its claims where the statements were 
made in connection with continued prosecution of sibling applications,”1408 
the Federal Circuit determined that decision to be inapposite because: 
The [first application] and [second application] were filed separately and 
therefore lack the formal relationship necessary for free license to use the 
contents of the [second patent] and prosecution history when construing 
the claims of [the first patent] . . . . While the [second application] was 
distinguished from the scope of the [first] application’s claims, the 
relevant passages from the [second patent] relied on by the district court 
are new matter added by the . . . continuation-in-part application.  
Consequently, the passages are not part of the intrinsic evidence of the 
[second patent].  Absent a formal relationship or incorporation during 
prosecution, the new-matter content of the [second patent] is not 
available to construe the claims of the [first patent].1409 
b.  Use of prior art cited in prosecution histories 
In 2004, the Federal Circuit also placed an increased weight on prior art 
cited during prosecution in construing disputed claim terms.  The Federal 
                                                          
 1403. Id. at 1166-67, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 1404. Id. at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1405. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1406. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1407. 357 F.3d 1340, 1350, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also 
supra notes 1030-1053 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of the 
Microsoft Corp. case) . 
 1408. Goldenberg, 373 F.3d at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261-62. 
 1409. Id. at 1167-68, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1262. 
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Circuit had previously held that “[w]hen prior art that sheds light on the 
meaning of a term is cited by the patentee it can have particular value as a 
guide to proper construction of the term, because it may indicate not only 
the meaning of the claim terms to persons of ordinary skill in the art, but 
also that the patentee intended to adopt that meaning.”1410 
In Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the 
prosecution history and content of a patent which was cited as the basis for 
a double patenting rejection was properly considered in construing the 
disputed claims of a different patent because such subject matter “formed 
the basis of the examiner’s rejection of the [disputed claims] on double-
patenting grounds.”1411 
Similarly, in Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc.,1412 the Federal 
Circuit referenced cited prior art to determine that, at the time of the 
invention, persons of ordinary skill in the art would have understood the 
claimed phrase “upon detection of a suitably stable endpoint” to be broader 
than use of a predetermined timing method.1413  Analyzing two patents 
cited during prosecution, the Federal Circuit observed that the prior art 
“discloses both an endpoint-seeking methodology and a predetermined-
timing methodology,”1414 and therefore concluded that persons of ordinary 
skill in the art would have understood the phrase to encompass any method 
for calculating glucose concentration “without an error of clinical 
significance.” 
c.  Expert testimony 
In Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., the Federal Circuit addressed a district 
court’s decision to permit expert testimony during a summary judgment 
hearing at which claim construction issues were also argued.1415  Citing its 
past decisions, the Federal Circuit noted that “[a]lthough expert testimony 
and declarations are useful to confirm that the construed meaning is 
                                                          
 1410. Arthur A. Collins, Inc. v. N. Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042, 1045, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1143, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2000); accord Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1368, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[P]rior art cited in a patent or cited in the 
prosecution history of a patent constitutes intrinsic evidence.”). 
 1411. Goldenberg, 373 F.3d at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. The court’s analysis 
analogized to the decision in Kumar, 351 F.3d at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1224. 
 1412. 381 F.3d 1352, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1413. Id. at 1358, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1280-81. 
 1414. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1280-81. 
 1415. Goldenberg, 373 F.3d at 1166, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.  Judge Probst wrote a 
dissenting opinion, reasoning that nothing in the intrinsic evidence proscribed the 
“intracellular marker substance” from including portions of an antigen located inside a cell.  
Id. at 1170, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264 (Probst, J., dissenting).  In particular, the dissent 
opined that “the prosecution history can hardly be characterized as definitional of the term 
‘marker substance,’ and cannot be used, in my view, as a basis to conclude that ‘marker 
substance’ corresponds to an antigen, and not portions thereof.”  Id. at 1171, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1264-65 (Probst, J., dissenting). 
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consistent with the denotation ascribed by those in the field of the art, such 
extrinsic evidence cannot be used to vary the plain language of the patent 
document.”1416  The Federal Circuit then explained that the district court’s 
construction of the disputed terms “was consistent with that required by the 
intrinsic evidence, and the district court’s use of the expert testimony 
therefore falls within the permissible first clause of the above-quoted 
language.”1417  The Federal Circuit further clarified that “there is no 
prohibition on a district court’s ability to hear expert testimony.”1418 
B.  Literal Infringement 
In AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,1419 plaintiff for infringement 
of its patent claiming a glass window bearing a reflective coating to reduce 
transfer of heat through the glass.1420  The only existing patent claim 
required a “5-layered transparent coating” composed of alternating “layers” 
of zinc oxide and silver.  In a previous appeal by patentee,1421 the Federal 
Circuit had construed the term “layer” to mean “a thickness of a material of 
substantially uniform chemical composition, but excluding interlayers 
having a thickness not to substantially affect the optical properties of the 
coating.”1422  The Federal Circuit then remanded the case back to the 
district court for a determination of whether defendant’s accused low-
emissivity glass product infringed the claim under the Federal Circuit’s 
construction. Defendant’s accused product was produced by moving a 
piece of glass through sequential “coating zones” in which the thickness of 
certain materials such as zinc oxide and silver were deposited by 
“magnetron sputter deposition” on the glass.  To increase the thickness of 
certain coatings on the glass, the material was deposited twice or more on 
the glass in consecutive depositions.  As a result of this process, 
defendant’s accused product had a central zinc coating which had been 
formed by three separate “depositions.”  The district court held that this 
central zinc oxide coating was comprised of three separate “layers” as that 
term was defined by the Federal Circuit. Furthermore, certain of 
defendant’s products had titanium dioxide between its layers of zinc oxide 
and silver.  For these reasons, the district court held that the product did not 
display the five-layer structure claimed by the patent. 
                                                          
 1416. Id. at 1167, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261 (quoting Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek 
Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1332, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 1417. Id. at 1166, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1261. 
 1418. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1261.   
 1419. 375 F.3d 1367, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1420. Id. at 1369, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
 1421. See id. at 1370, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680 (noting that this litigation was 
originally filed in 1996 and had already been appealed to and remanded by the Federal 
Circuit twice before this decision was rendered). 
 1422. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1680. 
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court had improperly 
relied on the method of manufacture of the defendant’s product in 
determining whether that product infringed the “pure product claim.”1423  
Under its construction of the term “layer,” the Federal Circuit found that 
defendant’s successive depositions of zinc oxide might form one “layer” as 
required by the patent so long as the successive depositions did not have an 
“optical effect different than that of a single deposition of the same 
thickness.”1424  Thus, “multiple depositions [were] only relevant if they 
affect the structure and optical properties.”1425 
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment and reviewed the record to determine whether a genuine issue of 
material fact remained as to infringement. Based on a defendant’s internal 
document describing its products as containing five layers, and results of 
secondary ion mass spectroscopy studies of defendant’s products which 
showed no interface between successive depositions of zinc oxide, the 
Federal Circuit held that such a genuine issue of material fact did exist and 
remanded the case back to the district court.1426 
In International Rectifier, plaintiff argued that because the parties 
stipulated to a simulated shape of an accused device, the issue of 
infringement was a matter of law that hinged on claim construction.1427  
The Federal Circuit explained in General Mills Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, 
Inc.1428 that the “question of literal infringement collapses into claim 
construction and is amenable to summary judgment” was limited to cases 
in which the parties and the district court agreed how competing claims 
constructions would apply to the undisputed structure of the accused 
device.1429  The Federal Circuit held that such reasoning does not apply 
when “the structure of [accused] product has been stipulated to, not the 
factual determination of whether that product meets one or another claim 
construction.”1430  The Federal Circuit vacated summary judgment because 
“factual issues exist as to whether the [accused] devices” included the 
                                                          
 1423. Id. at 1373, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1424. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1425. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1426. The court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the alternative 
ground that at least some of Cardinal’s accused products contained a layer of titanium 
dioxide in between alternating layers of silver and zinc oxide.  Id. at 1374, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) at 1684-85.  It instructed the trial court to examine separately and distinctly each 
category of Cardinal’s accused products and to determine whether the titanium oxide would 
affect the optical properties of the coating.  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685. 
 1427. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1374-75, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1209, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1428. 103 F.3d 978, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 1429. Id. at 983, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. 
 1430. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 361 F.3d at 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218. 
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disputed claim limitations.1431 
In Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc.,1432 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the district court’s claim construction and remanded for 
new trial on infringement explaining that:   “It is well established that when 
an incorrect jury instruction—such as an incorrect claim construction—
removes from the jury a basis on which the jury could reasonably have 
reached a different verdict, the verdict should not stand.”1433 
In Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co.,1434 the Federal Circuit 
reversed a finding of infringement following a bench trial because the 
district court “did not provide any findings of fact or analysis to support its 
conclusion.”1435  The Federal Circuit noted that the district court’s opinion 
lacked any “expla[nation] how the limitations of the claim, as construed, 
compare to the allegedly infringing device.”1436  Explaining that while 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) “‘does not require detailed findings 
on every factual issue raised,’ the district court opinion ‘must include as 
many of the subsidiary facts as are necessary to disclose . . . the steps by 
which the trial court determined factual issues and reached its ultimate 
conclusions.”1437  The Federal Circuit therefore vacated the judgment 
below “[b]ecause the district court’s sparse opinion provides this court with 
only bald conclusions for review, we conclude that the district court’s 
judgment as to [issues of infringement] . . . is insufficient under Rule 
52(a).”1438 
In Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.,1439 the 
Federal Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment of non-infringement 
when the record contained “expert reports and other evidence [that] were 
both highly technical and confusing.”1440  Citing its prior case law 
regarding disposition of technical issues on summary judgment, the court 
instructed that “[i]t is not our task, nor is it the task of the district court, to 
attempt to interpret confusing or general testimony to determine whether a 
[claim] has been made out, particularly at the summary judgment 
                                                          
 1431. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218. 
 1432. 381 F.3d 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1433. Id. at 1383, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341. 
 1434. 365 F.3d 1054, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1624 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1435. Id. at 1060, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628. 
 1436. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628. 
 1437. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1628 (quoting Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex 
Corp., 5 F.3d 1477, 1478-79, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1343, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 1438. Id. at 1061, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1629.  Dissenting from the majority opinion’s 
holding on this issue, Judge Newman explained that the defendant “did not challenge the 
specificity of the district court’s infringement analysis, and did not appeal this aspect.”  Id. 
at 1063, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1630 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1439. 362 F.3d 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1440. Id. at 1378, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169. 
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stage.”1441 
In Centricut, L.L.C. v. Esab Group, Inc.,1442 the central issue was 
whether a patentee’s failure to proffer any expert testimony on 
infringement resulted in an absence of proof.1443  On appeal, the alleged 
infringer argued that the patentee failed to carry its burden of proof on the 
infringement because it did not show how the accused devices satisfied the 
claimed “work-function limitation.”1444  The Federal Circuit first explained 
that only expert testimony in the record was from the alleged infringer’s 
expert who testified that the patentee’s various evidence of infringement 
was not reliable and not an accurate representation of the accused 
product.1445  The Federal Circuit then noted that each of the patentee’s 
theories of infringement “suffer[ed] from the same deficiency:  none is 
supported by expert testimony.”1446  In so doing, the Federal Circuit 
explained that “[i]n many patent cases expert testimony will not be 
necessary because the technology will ‘easily understandable without the 
need for expert explanatory testimony,’” however, the Federal Circuit 
concluded that “there is no claim that this is such case.  Indeed, in this case 
the technology was complex.”1447  The Federal Circuit further elaborated 
that: 
We do not state a per se rule that expert testimony is required to prove 
infringement when the art is complex.  Suffice it to say that in a case 
involving complex technology, where the accused infringer offers expert 
testimony negating infringement, the patentee cannot satisfy its burden 
of proof by relying only on testimony from those who are admittedly not 
expert in the field.  That is what happened here, and the patentee thus 
failed to satisfy its burden of proof.  This case stands as an apt example 
of what may befall a patent law plaintiff who presents complex subject 
matter without inputs from experts qualified on the relevant points in 
issue when the accused infringer has negated infringement with its own 
expert.1448 
C.  Infringement Under the Doctrine of Equivalents 
1.  Festo 
In Honeywell International Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.,1449 
                                                          
 1441. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (quoting Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., 308 
F.3d 1304, 1316, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832, 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 1442. 390 F.3d 1361, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1443. Id. at 1363, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135. 
 1444. Id. at 1367, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 1445. Id. at 1367-68, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 1446. Id. at 1369, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 1447. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 1448. Id. at 1370, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141. 
 1449. 370 F.3d 1131, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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plaintiff for infringement of its patents directed to an aircraft auxiliary 
power unit (“APU”).1450  Each of the asserted patent claims required the 
APU to include “inlet guide vanes” and required the operation of a “surge 
bleed valve,” a valve that vents excess air in a main air duct within the 
APU’s air compressor, to be a function of the position of the inlet guide 
vanes.1451  Defendant’s accused device contained inlet guide vanes, but 
operation of its surge bleed valve was a function of temperature, rather than 
the position of the inlet guide vanes. However, the accused device had a 
feature in which operation of its surge bleed valve would be blocked during 
extreme conditions, and this blocking mechanism was a function of the 
position of the guide vanes. 
As part of its post-verdict motion for a JMOL of non-infringement and 
on appeal, defendant argued that its APU device could not be held to have 
infringed the patents under the doctrine of equivalents because the asserted 
claims were narrowed by amendment and that prosecution history estoppel 
barred all equivalents for the inlet guide vane limitation under Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.1452  During prosecution, the 
claims at issue were originally dependent on other claims that did not 
contain the inlet guide vane limitation.  The original independent claims 
were rejected as obvious over the prior art, and the claims asserted against 
defendant were amended to expressly incorporate the limitations of the 
rejected claims.1453  The district court held that because the claims were 
“merely rewritten into independent form, the elements at issue were not 
amended and patentee did not give up an embodiment of the invention with 
the inlet guide vane” limitation.1454  In contrast, the Federal Circuit held 
that an amendment that rewrites a dependent claim into independent form 
and surrenders the original independent claims constitutes a narrowing 
amendment that may give rise to an estoppel if it is made to secure the 
patent.1455  It rejected the patentee’s argument that “although it surrendered 
its broader independent claims, there is no presumption of surrender 
because the scope of the rewritten claims themselves has not been 
narrowed.”1456  The Supreme Court, it explained, had already considered 
this argument in Festo and had stated that “rewriting a dependent claim in 
independent form creates a presumptive surrender if the amendment is 
‘made to secure the patent.’”1457  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit had 
                                                          
 1450. Id. at 1133-34, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066. 
 1451. Id. at 1134-35, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066-67. 
 1452. Id. at 1138-39, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069. 
 1453. Id. at 1137, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068. 
 1454. Id. at 1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069 (internal quotations omitted). 
 1455. Id. at 1141, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071-72. 
 1456. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072. 
 1457. Id. at 1142, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
2005] PATENT SUMMARY 1121 
consistently applied this rule in its post-Festo decisions.  Having found that 
the patentee had presumptively surrendered all equivalents of the inlet 
guide vane limitation, the Federal Circuit remanded the decision of whether 
Honeywell had rebutted this presumption to the district court.1458 
In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,1459 the 
Federal Circuit found that under the correct construction, the “lipophilic 
phase” could include one or more “surfactants,” so long as the lipophilic 
component also contains at least one non-surfactant lipophilic excipient, 
which was capable of dissolving cyclosporine.1460  Defendant’s accused 
product contained a component called “Span 80” which was both a 
lipophilic excipient and a surfactant.1461  Because the accused product 
contained no non-surfactant components that would meet the requirements 
of a “lipophilic phase,” the court held that the product did not literally 
infringe the asserted claim. 1462 
Novartis argued that Defendant’s product infringed the claim under the 
doctrine of equivalents because, as its experts testified, Span 80 “ ‘does not 
exhibit the amphiphilic function of a surfactant’ nor does it ‘function as a 
surfactant . . . but, rather, . . . it functions as the lipophilic component.’”1463  
The Federal circuit, however, found that the specification expressly 
acknowledged that Span 80 was a surfactant, and therefore, Novartis was 
precluded from arguing that Span 80 was an equivalent to a non-surfactant 
required by the claim as construed.1464 
The Federal Circuit distinguished the case at hand from that of the 
Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products 
Co.,1465 and its own case Wright Medical Technology, Inc. v. Osteonics 
Corp.1466  In Graver Tank and Wright Medical, the Federal Circuit 
explained, “the fact that certain claimed limitations in the element at issue 
were missing in the accused product did not change the fact that the 
element, albeit different from that expressly claimed, was indeed present in 
the accused product.”1467  In contrast, the Federal Circuit found that the 
“lipophilic component” element could not be met under the doctrine of 
equivalents by Span 80, a surfactant, because inclusion of a chemical 
                                                          
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1707 (2002) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 1458. Id. at 1146, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 1459. 375 F.3d 1328, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1460. Id. at 1337, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1461. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1462. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1463. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1464. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657. 
 1465. 339 U.S. 605, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328 (1950). 
 1466. 122 F.3d 1440, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1837 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 1467. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 375 F.3d at 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659. 
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composition made entirely of surfactants would be inconsistent with the 
construction of “lipophilic component.”1468 
 In Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting Inc.,1469 plaintiff 
sued for infringement of its patent on a process for repairing underground 
sewer pipes.1470  The claimed method involved installing a liner into a pipe 
by applying “vacuum cups” to windows cut into the liner in order to draw a 
resin through the liner.1471  Originally, the asserted claim as filed contained 
no limit to the number of vacuum cups used in the method.1472  During 
prosecution of the patent, however, the applicants amended the claim to 
specify that the method used a single cup.1473  The defendants’ accused 
method at issue used multiple vacuum cups.1474 
Following a lengthy procedural history,1475 the Federal Circuit 
considered whether the plaintiffs were barred by prosecution history 
estoppel from asserting infringement under the doctrine of equivalents after 
Festo II and Festo III.1476  Plaintiff argued that the reason for its 
amendment of the claim to require a single vacuum cup had only a 
tangential relationship to the accused equivalent, and that therefore, the 
presumption of prosecution history estoppel was rebutted.1477  The Federal 
Circuit agreed.1478  It found that plaintiff made clear the applicants had 
made the amendment at issue in order to overcome a § 103 rejection to 
show that its process did not have the disadvantage of the prior art of 
                                                          
 1468. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1659. 
 1469. 385 F.3d 1360, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1470. Id. at 1362, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872. 
 1471. Id. at 1362-63, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1872-73. 
 1472. Id. at 1366, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 1473. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 1474. Id. at 1363, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 1475. See id. at 1363-67, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873-76 (involving an initial grant of 
judgment not withstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) by the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas, a subsequent retrial to the bench and finding of patent 
infringement and an initial appeal by defendants and cross-appeal by plaintiffs to the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).  The Court of Appeals affirmed the JNOV order but 
vacated and remanded the decision on other grounds.  The District Court again found for the 
plaintiffs, and defendants appealed.  The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded.  An initial petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court was denied.  After two remands, the District Court entered final liability judgment and 
another appeal ensued.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit then reversed in part, 
vacated in part, and remanded.  The District Court entered final judgment for plaintiffs and 
defendants again appealed.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit again reversed in 
part, vacated in part, and remanded.  Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was 
granted, and judgment was vacated and remanded to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.  The Federal Circuit initially reinstated the appeal, vacated, and remanded.  
However, following a petition for rehearing and response, the Federal Circuit decided the 
case on the merits. 
 1476. Id. at 1367, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876. 
 1477. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1876-77. 
 1478. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1876-77. 
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having a large compressor at the end of the liner.1479  The Federal Circuit 
held that there was “no indication anywhere in the prosecution history of 
any relationship between the narrowing amendment and a multiple cup 
process.”1480  Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs 
successfully rebutted the presumption that they were estopped from seeking 
to extend their claims to the accused process under the doctrine of 
equivalents.1481 
2.  Dedication-disclosure rule 
In Johnson & Johnston v. R.E. Service Co.,1482 the Federal Circuit 
formally pronounced the disclosure-dedication rule, holding that 
when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . . 
this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public.  
Application of the doctrine of equivalents to recapture subject matter 
deliberately left unclaimed would “conflict with the primacy of the 
claims in defining the scope of the patentee’s exclusive right.”1483 
In 2004, the Federal Circuit addressed the disclosure dedication rule for 
the first time since its decision in en banc decision in Johnson & Johnston. 
PSC Computers Products, Inc. v. Foxconn International, Inc.1484 
presented the Federal Circuit’s first opportunity to elaborate on the 
dedication-disclosure rule1485  PSC Computers involved a claim directed to 
a “resilient metal strap” for securing a heat sink clip to a microchip.1486  
The asserted patent also provided that “‘the elongated strap . . . is made of 
a resilient metal such as stainless steel although other resilient materials 
may be suitable for the strap,’” and that “‘other prior art devices use 
molded plastic and/or metal parts that must be cast or forged.’”1487  The 
parties both sold competing heat sink clips, with plaintiff’s clip made of 
metal and defendant’s clip made of plastic.1488  At the district court, 
plaintiff conceded no literal infringement, and the court then granted 
summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
reasoning that the dedication-disclosure rule precluded claims from 
                                                          
 1479. Id. at 1370, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1480. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1481. Id. at 1370-71, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1879. 
 1482. 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 1483. Id. at 1054, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (quoting Sage Prods. Inc. v. Devon 
Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1424, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). This 
articulation of the rule follows the court’s decision in Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 
1098, 1106-08, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1008-10 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 1484. 355 F.3d 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1485. Id. at 1355-56, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463. 
 1486. Id. at 1355, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 1487. Id. at 1356, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462. 
 1488. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462. 
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extending to plastic clips.1489 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit identified the two questions presented for 
review:  “(1) How specific must a disclosure in a written description be to 
dedicate matter to the public? and (2) Was the [patent’s] written description 
sufficiently specific to dedicate plastic parts to the public?”1490  Addressing 
the first question, the Federal Circuit first observed that similar to claim 
language that is interpreted from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in 
the art, “[i]t thus follows as a matter of logic that, in the absence of a 
compelling reason to do otherwise, the written description must also be 
interpreted according to the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the 
art.”1491  The Federal Circuit then answered the first question by explaining 
that “that if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand the unclaimed 
disclosed teaching upon reading the written description, the alternative 
matter disclosed has been dedicated to the public.”1492  The Federal Circuit 
further noted that “any generic reference in a written specification” does 
not necessarily result in dedication to the public, rather “[t]he disclosure 
must be of such specificity that one of ordinary skill in the art could 
identify the subject matter that had been disclosed and not claimed.”1493  In 
enunciating this rule for evaluating the dedication-disclosure rule, the 
Federal Circuit adopted a standard closely resembling the test for 
compliance with the written description requirement: 
We thus hold that if one of ordinary skill in the art can understand the 
unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the written description, the 
alternative matter disclosed has been dedicated to the public.  This 
“disclosure-dedication” rule does not mean that any generic reference in 
a written specification necessarily dedicates all members of that 
particular genus to the public.  The disclosure must be of such specificity 
that one of ordinary skill in the art could identify the subject matter that 
had been disclosed and not claimed.1494 
Addressing the second question, the Federal Circuit stated that “generic 
disclosure[s]” would not suffice to trigger the dedication-disclosure rule, 
and held that the patent’s reference that “‘other resilient materials may be 
suitable for the strap’” was not enough to effect a dedication of all resilient 
materials other than metal.1495  The Federal Circuit, however, explained that 
the specific disclosure that “‘[o]ther prior art devices use molded plastic 
and/or metal parts that must be case or forged’” worked a dedication of the 
                                                          
 1489. Id. at 1355, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461-62. 
 1490. Id. at 1358, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463. 
 1491. Id. at 1359, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465. 
 1492. Id. at 1360, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465. 
 1493. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465. 
 1494. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465. 
 1495. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (citation omitted). 
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alternative use of plastic parts to the public.1496  The Federal Circuit noted 
that one skilled in the art having read this disclosure 
could reasonably conclude from this language . . . that plastic clip parts 
could be substituted for metal clip parts.  [Plaintiff] was thus obliged to 
either claim plastic parts in addition to metal parts . . . or to not claim 
them and dedicate the use of plastic parts to the public.1497 
The court thus affirmed summary judgment, holding that the use of 
plastic clips was dedicated to the public.1498 
The Federal Circuit again addressed the scope and application of the 
disclosure-dedication rule in Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, 
Inc.1499  Toro involved a patent in which the specification disclosed both a 
replaceable ring cover and a unitary cover for a vacuum blower, but the 
claims were directed only to a permanently affixed cover (i.e., a unitary 
cover).1500  Plaintiff appealed the district court’s holding that the disclosure-
dedication rule precluded infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.1501 
The Federal Circuit initially noted that its precedent did not “explicitly 
articulate[] a standard for reviewing the application of the disclosure-
dedication rule.”1502  Explaining that the disclosure-dedication rule, like the 
prosecution history estoppel, limits the permissible scope under the 
doctrine of equivalents, the court reasoned that both rules should be 
analyzed under the same standard.1503  Given the prosecution history 
estoppel presents a question of law, the court held that “the disclosure-
dedication rule . . . presents a question of law, subject to de novo 
review.”1504 
To avoid application of the disclosure-dedication rule, plaintiff first 
argued that “failure to claim . . . a cover with a replaceable ring, was 
wholly unintentional and that the disclosure-dedication rule should not 
apply as a matter of law.”1505  The court rejected that argument, explaining 
that “intent is not part of the Johnson & Johnston disclosure-dedication 
                                                          
 1496. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (citation omitted). 
 1497. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465. 
 1498. Id. at 1361, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466. 
 1499. 383 F.3d 1326, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1500. Id. at 1331, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452. 
 1501. Id. at 1331-32, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453. 
 1502. Id. at 1330, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452. 
 1503. Id. at 1331, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452. 
 1504. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.  The opinion’s holding that application of the 
disclosure-dedication rule presents a question of law is internally inconsistent with the 
opinion’s subsequent reasoning that “[i]n the present case, the district court found no 
genuine issue of material fact in concluding that the disclosure of a replaceable ring would 
have been apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art.”  Id. at 1334, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1455.  If the disclosure-dedication rule is a question of law, it is unclear why affordance of a 
district court opinion would be based on the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
 1505. Id. at 1332, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453. 
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analysis.  The language of Johnson & Johnston is clear:   ‘The patentee’s 
subjective intent is irrelevant to determining whether unclaimed subject 
matter has been disclosed and therefore dedicated to the public.’”1506 
The plaintiff also argued that “the level of disclosure of a replaceable 
ring in the . . . patent [was] insufficient, as a matter of law, to trigger the 
disclosure-dedication rule.”1507  In doing so, plaintiff contended that the 
degree of disclosure necessary to trigger the rule must satisfy the written 
description standard under § 112, ¶ 1.1508  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
this argument, reasoning that “the disclosure-dedication rule does not 
impose a § 112 requirement on the disclosed but unclaimed subject matter.  
The standards articulated in § 112 are directed to the claimed invention, not 
to disclosures in the written description that may implicate the disclosure-
dedication rule.”1509  While acknowledging the court’s earlier decision in 
PSC Computer Products, Inc. v. Foxconn International1510 holding that 
subject matter is dedicated to the public “‘if one of ordinary skill in the art 
can understand the unclaimed disclosed teaching upon reading the written 
description,’”1511 the court explained that “disclosures implicating the 
disclosure-dedication rule need not directly relate to the description of the 
claimed invention or be contained in the ‘Detailed Description of the 
Invention’ section of the patent, but may appear merely in the portion of 
the patent describing the ‘Background of the Invention.’”1512 
Plaintiff further argued that the Federal Circuit’s decision in an earlier 
appeal held that the disputed patent did not describe any structure other 
than an attached ring, which precluded application of the disclosure-
dedication rule to removable rings.1513  The Federal Circuit rejected this 
argument too, explaining that its earlier decision “did not analyze the 
written description of the . . . patent for disclosed but unclaimed subject 
matter . . . . Rather, in that decision, this court construed a claim term and 
in that context concluded that the specification did not support [Plaintiff’s] 
proposed claim construction.”1514  The Federal Circuit further opined that 
“[m]aterial that is explicitly disclaimed in the specification—like the 
disclaimer of a removable ring in this case—is disclosed for purposes of 
                                                          
 1506. Id. at 1333, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453 (quoting Johnson & Johnston v. R.E. 
Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1053 n.1, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1230 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 1507. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453. 
 1508. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1509. Id. at 1334, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 1510. 355 F.3d 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1511. Toro Co., 383 F.3d at 1334, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454 (quoting PSC Computer 
Prods., Inc., 355 F.3d at 1360, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465). 
 1512. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455 (citations omitted). 
 1513. Id. at 1336, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
 1514. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
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the disclosure-dedication rule, but it cannot be encompassed within the 
scope of the claims.”1515 
3. Prosecution history estoppel 
In two parallel cases decided on the same day by the Federal Circuit, 
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Impax Laboratories, Inc.,1516 and SmithKline 
Beecham Corp. v. Excel Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1517 Glaxo Wellcome sued 
pharmaceutical companies for infringement of its patent when they filed 
Abbreviated New Drug Applications with the FDA proposing generic 
substitutes for the drugs covered by the patent.1518  The patented technology 
was a sustained release form of the anti-depression and anti-smoking drug, 
buproprion hydrochloride.  The claims were drawn to buproprion 
hydrochloride compounded with hydroxypropyl methylcellulose 
(“HPMC”), the latter ingredient being key for achieving sustained release.  
In their motions for summary judgment, the accused infringers argued that 
their generic compounds did not contain HPMC, but rather contained 
different agents that achieved sustained release, hydroxypropyl cellulose 
(“HPC”) and poly-vinyl alcohol (“PVC”).  Moreover, they contended that 
Glaxo could not attempt to extend its patent to reach their formulations 
under the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel because Glaxo limited its 
claims to require HPMC in response to a rejection by an examiner during 
prosecution.  In response, Glaxo explained that it had amended its claims to 
recite HPMC “to distinguish the sustained release agent in its invention 
from other disclosed excipients in the application.”1519 
Both district courts and the Federal Circuit agreed with the defendants.  
The following factors weighed in the Federal Circuit’s decision.  First, the 
patent examiner required Glaxo during prosecution to restrict its claims to 
include HPMC, because recitation of HPMC was “critical” to distinguish 
the claims from the prior art, namely the instant release formulations of 
buproprion hydrochloride that were known.1520  The examiner also required 
recitation of HPMC in order to satisfy the enablement requirement, because 
the application recited only HPMC as a sustained release agent, the 
application did not enable one with ordinary skill in the art to make other 
sustained release formulations.1521  Under Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,1522 restriction of the claims to formulations that 
                                                          
 1515. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
 1516. 356 F.3d 1348, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1517. 356 F.3d 1357, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1712 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1518. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1351, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707; SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 356 F.3d at 1359, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713. 
 1519. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1520. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (citation omitted). 
 1521. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1522. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
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required HPMC created a presumption that Glaxo gave up its claim to 
equivalents of HPMC.  Glaxo failed to rebut this presumption and thus 
could not support its infringement claims against the defendants, whose 
accused formulation did not include HMPC. 
The Federal Circuit also rejected Glaxo’s argument that it did not 
“narrow” its claims when it added HPMC, as required in order for the 
Festo presumption to arise, because at the same time it added HPMC 
limitation to its claims, it deleted another limitation, one requiring a 
specific shelf life of the compound.  The court rejected this argument 
because the HPMC limitation was not an entirely new limitation that 
replaced the shelf life limitation.1523  Rather, the preamble of the claims as 
originally filed already recited the phrase “sustained release tablet,” and the 
preamble limited the claims under Catalina Marketing International, Inc. v. 
Coolsavings.com, Inc.,1524 because it recited the “‘essential structure or 
steps, or if it is necessary to give life, meaning and vitality to the 
claim.’”1525 
Second, contrary to Glaxo’s contentions, the Federal Circuit found that 
the examiner had not required Glaxo to recite HPMC in its claims in order 
to distinguish the claims from other disclosed excipients.  Rather, the 
examiner found that the disclosed sustained release agent, HPMC, 
distinguished the invention that was the subject of Glaxo’s application from 
the prior art, and therefore found recitation of the sustained release agent to 
be critical to the patentability of the invention.1526 
Glaxo also failed to rebut the presumption that it threw away its right to 
claim other sustained release compounds. It attempted to dispel the Festo 
presumption by claiming that HPC was an unforeseeable equivalent.  
Under Festo, the presumption can be rebutted if the patentee shows that the 
alleged equivalent was unforeseeable at the time of the amendment of the 
claims that gave rise to the presumption.  Glaxo argued that if it were to 
have limited its claims to HPMC, PVC, and/or HPC formulations, the 
claims would have been rejected for including new matter, as HPC was not 
disclosed in the application.  Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo, 
Glaxo urged that the patentee’s ability to claim an alleged equivalent was a 
“hallmark of the unforeseeability excuse.”1527  The Federal Circuit rejected 
and criticized this interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision.  It opined 
that new matter prohibitions are not directly germane to the issue of 
                                                          
 1523. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 1524. 289 F.3d 801, 808, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1784-85 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1525. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708-09 (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 1526. Id. at 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. 
 1527. Id. at 1354, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (citing Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705). 
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infringement under the doctrine of equivalents and pointed out the fact that 
what it termed “the quintessential example of an enforceable equivalent, 
after-arising technology” would always be new matter.1528  Furthermore, 
Glaxo took the Supreme Court’s words out of context:   the Federal Circuit 
found no sympathy in Festo for patentees who fail to claim readily known 
equivalents at the time of application.  Instead, the question was whether 
Glaxo could have foreseen sustained release agents for buproprion 
hydrochloride other than HPMC at the time of filing or amendment.1529  In 
the case of HPC, included by Impax in its formulation, there existed ample 
evidence that HPC was used as a release agent at the time the claims were 
amended.  In contrast, there was not enough evidence of record to decide in 
the SmithKline case whether PVA was a foreseeable and claimable 
sustained release compound for buproprion hydrochloride.1530  Thus, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision in Glaxo,1531 and 
remanded the decision in SmithKline.1532 
Gaus v. Conair Corp.1533 presented an appeal from a jury verdict of 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents involving an accused device 
that used a single component to perform the function of two claim 
elements.1534  Plaintiff argued that the jury verdict was correct in light of 
the court’s precedent that equivalency can be established even when 
“‘separate claim limitations are combined into a single component of the 
accused device.’”1535  The Federal Circuit, however, noted that its 
precedent makes clear that “‘[a] particular structure can be deemed outside 
the reach of the doctrine of equivalents because that structure is clearly 
excluded from the claims whether the exclusion is express or implied.’”1536  
                                                          
 1528. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 1529. Id. at 1355, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 1530. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 356 F.3d at 1365, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718. 
 1531. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 356 F.3d at 1357, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712. 
 1532. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 356 F.3d at 1365, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.  An 
additional argument raised by Glaxo in Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., but not in SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., centered on claim one of the asserted patent which recited HPMC as a 
limitation as originally filed.  Glaxo argued that because HPMC was not added as limitation 
to Claim one in response to an office action, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel 
would not apply to the enforcement of Claim one; therefore, Glaxo could reach equivalents 
to HPMC through that claim.  The Federal Circuit was not persuaded.  It explained that the 
Festo bar to invocation of the doctrine of equivalents applies to all claims containing the 
same limitation to ensure consistent interpretation of the same claim terms in the same 
patent, and there was no reason to diverge from the line in this case.  It reasoned that Claim 
one recitation was not added in response to an examiner’s rejection because it already 
existed at the time of filing.  There was nothing to say that the examiner considered 
recitation of HPMC to be less critical to claim one’s patentability than other claims. 
 1533. 363 F.3d 1284, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1534. Id. at 1291, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385. 
 1535. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385 (quoting Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 
16 F.3d 394, 399, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1767, 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
 1536. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385 (quoting SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v Advanced 
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1345, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 
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Noting that the patent “criticized prior art in which the protective device 
relied on the fluid coming in contact with the voltage-carrying portions of 
the system,”1537 the Federal Circuit concluded that the patentee “disavowed 
coverage of devices in which the two components are separate . . . the 
patentee cannot reclaim that surrendered coverage by invoking the doctrine 
of equivalents.”1538 
In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,1539 the plaintiff 
appealed a grant of the JMOL of no infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents, arguing that the district court incorrectly required “evidence as 
to the level of ordinary skill in the art as part of [the] proof of infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents.”1540  The Federal Circuit affirmed the 
judgment below, noting that the “‘vantage point of one of ordinary skill in 
the relevant art provides the perspective for assessing the substantiality of 
the differences’ between the claimed invention and the accused device.”1541  
The Federal Circuit further elaborated that “the requirement that 
equivalence be evaluated from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in 
the art applies whether equivalence is misused by the ‘function-way-result’ 
test or by the ‘insubstantial difference’ test.”1542 
D. Indirect Infringement 
In Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting Inc.,1543 the Federal 
Circuit acknowledged that the standard for determining whether a party has 
the requisite intent in order to qualify as an inducer of infringement under § 
271 was ambiguous.1544  Specifically, it stated that “there is a lack of clarity 
concerning whether the required intent must be merely to induce the 
specific acts or additionally to cause an infringement.”1545  It cited Manville 
Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.1546 for the proposition that “‘[t]he 
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer’s actions 
induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions 
would induce actual infringements’”1547 and Hewlett-Packard Co. v. 
                                                          
2001)). 
 1537. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385. 
 1538. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386. 
 1539. 382 F.3d 1354, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1540. Id. at 1357, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347. 
 1541. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347 (quoting Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 1542. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347 (quoting Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 62 F.3d at 
1518-19, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1645-46). 
 1543. 385 F.3d 1360, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1544. Id. at 1377-78, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884. 
 1545. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884. 
 1546. 917 F.2d 544, 553, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 1547. Insituform Techs., Inc., 385 F.3d at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884. 
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Bausch & Lomb, Inc.1548 for the proposition that “‘[p]roof of actual intent 
to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary 
prerequisite to finding active inducement.’”1549  The Federal Circuit 
refrained from settling the law on this issue, however, because it found that 
the lower court’s holding that defendants were liable for inducing 
infringement should be upheld under either standard. 
Defendants Firstliner and CAT were in the business of rehabilitating and 
restructuring pipes.  Firstliner oversaw the marketing of its “trenchless” 
procedure for pipe rehabilitation to potential licensees, and sold pipe liners 
and related materials to CAT and its licensees.1550  The district court held 
defendants CAT and Firstliner liable for induced infringement of 
Insituform’s patented process of fixing underground pipes by installing a 
liner into the pipe.  The district court based its decision on the fact that 
CAT and Firstliner’s licensee, in responding to a questionnaire, indicated 
that it used the infringing process and that Firstliner representatives 
provided directives to teach the licensee how to implement the process.1551  
Reviewing the decision of the district court under the clearly erroneous 
standard, the Federal Circuit held that there was evidence in the record to 
support the district court’s finding of induced infringement, and it was “not 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.” 1552 
Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.1553 presented a matter of first 
impression for the Federal Circuit.1554  Plaintiff appealed the district court’s 
granting of summary judgment in favor of Analog with respect to 
Pelligrini’s claims of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).1555  
Plaintiff held a patent directed to “brushless motor drive circuits,” and 
defendant, headquartered in the United States, designed circuit chips that 
either alone or in combination with other components, ostensibly fell 
within the scope of the patent claims.  All of defendant’s circuit chips, 
however, were manufactured outside of the United States, and most of 
                                                          
 1548. 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 1549. Insituform Techs., Inc., 385 F.3d at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884. 
 1550. Id. at 1363, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873. 
 1551. Id. at 1378, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. 
 1552. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885. 
 1553. 375 F.3d 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1630 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1554. Id. at 1115-16, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632. 
 1555. Id. at 1116, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632.  35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) reads: 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United 
States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where 
such components are uncombined in whole or in part, such a manner as to actively 
induce the combination of such components outside the United States in a manner 
that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United Shall 
be liable as an infringer. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000). 
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them were sold and shipped to customers outside of the United States.  
Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s chips which were manufactured and sold 
abroad were “supplie[d] or cause[d] to be supplied in or from the United 
States” in violation of § 271 because they were designed in the United 
States and produced and sold according to instructions emanating from the 
United States.1556 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court.  It found 
that § 271 (f)(1) “is clear on its face,” applying “only where components of 
a patented invention are physically present in the United States.”1557  It 
found further support for its decision in its previous cases stating that the 
“tort” of patent infringement occurs where the offending act is committed, 
and not where the injury lies.  Thus, it held that the “‘suppl[ying] or 
caus[ing] to be supplied’ in § 271(f)(1) clearly refers to physical supply of 
components, not simply to the supply of instructions or corporate 
oversight.”1558 
Plaintiff argued that the court’s location requirement would result in a 
“‘seemingly contradictory construction of §271(f)(1)’”1559 in that the 
combination of components outside the United States cannot occur if the 
components are inside the United States.1560  Plaintiff additionally argued 
that boilerplate language in defendant’s commercial invoices, admittedly 
included to demonstrate compliance with U.S. export laws, proved that 
defendant in fact did supply components from the United States, or at least 
prevented Analog from denying that fact to escape liability under U.S. 
patent laws. 
The Federal Circuit rejected both of these arguments.  First, it held that 
its construction of § 271(f)(1) would result in no inconsistency because it 
was obvious that § 271(f) contemplates an intervening sale or exportation 
between the time the components exist in their uncombined state within the 
United States and the time the components are combined outside of the 
United States.  Second, the Federal Circuit determined that compliance 
with the export laws was not an issue before the court, and the fact that 
defendant notes on its invoices that its commodities were exported from the 
United States simply “does not stand up against the uncontested fact that no 
[accused] chips were exported from the United States.”1561 
In Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp.1562 the Federal Circuit 
addressed circumstances under which a party could be held liable for 
                                                          
 1556. Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1115, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1631. 
 1557. Id. at 1117, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 1558. Id. at 1118, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 1559. Id. at 1117, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633 (citation omitted). 
 1560. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 1561. Id. at 1118, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634. 
 1562. 363 F.3d 1263, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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indirect infringement.1563  The Federal Circuit explained that “[i]n order to 
prove vicarious liability for indirect infringement, a plaintiff who 
demonstrates direct infringement must also establish that the defendant 
possessed the requisite knowledge or intent to be held liable.”1564  The 
Federal Circuit further noted “[a] defendant’s liability for indirect 
infringement must relate to the identified instances of direct infringement.  
Plaintiffs who identify individual acts of direct infringement must restrict 
their theories of vicarious liability—and tie their claims for damages or 
injunctive relief—to the identified act.”1565 
In Linear Technology Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp.,1566 plaintiff 
appealed a grant of summary judgment holding that defendant was not 
liable for contributory infringement of claims directed to controlling a 
switching voltage regulator.1567  While noting that “the evidentiary showing 
in this case may be sparse and not altogether clear,” the court vacated the 
grant of summary judgment reasoning that a genuine issue of fact existed 
as to whether defendant was liable for contributory infringement.1568  In 
particular, the Federal Circuit noted that the record contains evidence that 
defendant’s products used by third parties “may have circuitry that prevents 
reversal of inductor current,” and evidence that defendant’s customers may 
“directly infringe by using [defendant’s] parts to prevent current 
reversal.”1569 
In Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corp. of America,1570 the 
Federal Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict that defendant indirectly infringed 
                                                          
 1563. Id. at 1272, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 1564. Id. at 1273-74, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376 (citing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. 
Bausch & Lomb, 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
Dynacore and its citation to Hewlett-Packard continues a schism in the court’s 
jurisprudence on whether induced infringement requires “proof of actual intent to cause the 
acts which constitute the infringement,” Hewlett-Packard Co., 909 F.2d at 1469, 15 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529, or a “showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced 
infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce 
infringement,” Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553, 16 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  See also Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo 
Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1377, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(acknowledging without resolving the “lack of clarity” in this issue). 
 1565. Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1274, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. The court affirmed 
summary judgment of non-infringement, explaining that 
 [i]t is well settled that an expert’s unsupported conclusion on the ultimate issue of 
infringement is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and that a party 
may not avoid that rule simply by framing the expert’s conclusion as an assertion 
that a particular critical claim limitation is found in the accused device. 
Id. at 1278, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379. 
 1566. 379 F.3d 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1567. Id. at 1326, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 1568. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 1569. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075. 
 1570. 370 F.3d 1354, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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plaintiff’s patented method of detecting vitamin deficiencies.1571  The 
claimed method comprised the steps of (1) assaying a body fluid for an 
elevated level of total homocysteine and (2) correlating an elevated level of 
total homocysteine with a deficiency of certain vitamins.  In its primary 
non-infringement argument, defendant asserted that the doctors to which it 
provided the accused assay were not shown to have performed the second 
correlating step.  The Federal Circuit disagreed.  It found “substantial 
evidence” supporting the jury’s verdict where it was shown that physicians 
receiving total assays performed the step and an inventor testified to the 
effect that “it would be malpractice” for a doctor to receive the assay and 
then not determine the deficiency.1572  The Federal Circuit held that the 
record did not need to contain direct evidence that every physician 
performed the “correlating” step in order to support the verdict.  Rather, it 
opined that circumstantial evidence is “‘not only sufficient, but may also be 
more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.’”1573 
The Federal Circuit also found that a reasonable jury could find that 
defendant had the requisite intent to induce infringement under § 271(b) 
where defendant’s articles stated that elevated total homocysteine 
correlated to particular vitamin deficiencies, and further recommended 
treatment of such deficiency with vitamin supplements.1574 
E. Willful Infringement 
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrezeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp. (“Knorr-Bremse”)1575 addressed the 
long-debated issue of whether an adverse inference is properly drawn by a 
factfinder in determining willful infringement when a defendant either does 
not rely on an opinion of counsel or fails to obtain such an opinion.1576  The 
factual posture of the case involved an appeal from a finding of willful 
infringement, in which one defendant argued that “an adverse inference 
should not have been drawn from [the] withholding . . . of an opinion of 
counsel concerning the patent issues, and from the failure of [another 
defendant] to obtain its own opinion of counsel.”1577  The majority opinion 
addressed four specific questions for which it requested additional briefing 
from the parties and invited submission of amicus curiae briefs.1578 
                                                          
 1571. Id. at 1357, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083. 
 1572. Id. at 1364, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088. 
 1573. Id. at 1365, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088 (quoting Moleculon Research Corp. v. 
CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 805, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 1574. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088. 
 1575. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1576. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560. 
 1577. Id. at 1340, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562. 
 1578. Id. at 1341, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562. 
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Before reaching the specific questions, however, the Federal Circuit 
observed that the “concept of ‘willful infringement’ is not simply a conduit 
for enhancement of damages; it is a statement that patent infringement, like 
other civil wrongs, is disfavored, and intentional disregard of legal rights 
warrants deterrence.”1579  Noting that “[f]undamental to determination of 
willful infringement is the duty to act in accordance with law,”1580 the 
Federal Circuit explained a finding of willful infringement is predicated 
“on consideration of the totality of the circumstances . . . and may include 
contributions of several factors.”1581 
The Federal Circuit also traced the evolution of the adverse inference in 
the context of determining willful infringement.1582 In particular, the court 
addressed its decision in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen 
Co.,1583 which involved a defendant who was advised by its attorney to 
“‘continue to refuse even to discuss the payment of a royalty’” because 
“‘[c]ourts, in recent years, have—in patent infringement cases—found the 
patents claimed to be infringed upon invalid in approximately 80% of the 
cases.’”1584  The court explained that based on the record evincing “flagrant 
disregard of presumptively valid patents,”1585 the Underwater Devices court 
held that “‘where, as here, a potential infringer has actual notice of 
another’s patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to 
determine whether or not he is infringing,’ including ‘the duty to seek and 
obtain competent legal advice.’”1586 
The Federal Circuit then noted that the issue of privilege first arose in 
Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc.,1587 in which the defendant had “not 
even asserted that it sought advice of counsel when notified of the allowed 
claims,”1588 and the court held that the defendant’s “silence on the subject, 
in alleged reliance on the attorney-client privilege, would warrant the 
conclusion that it either obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was 
advised that its . . . accused products would be an infringement of valid 
U.S. patents.”1589  The court explained that the propriety of using an 
                                                          
 1579. Id. at 1342, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
 1580. Id. at 1343, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
 1581. Id. at 1342-43, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564 (citing Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems 
Indus. Prods., 897 F.2d 508, 510, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1972, 1973 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 1582. Id. at 1343, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
 1583. 717 F.2d 1380, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 1584. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrezeuge GMBH, 383 F.3d at 1343, 72 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564 (quoting Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1385, 219 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) at 572). 
 1585. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrezeuge GMBH, 383 F.3d at 1343, 72 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
 1586. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564 (quoting Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389-
90, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 576). 
 1587. 793 F.2d 1565, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 160 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 1588. Id. at 1580, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 173. 
 1589. Id., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 173. 
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adverse inference was reinforced in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & 
Supply Co.,1590 in which the court held that “a court must be free to infer 
that either no opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, it was 
contrary to the infringer’s desire to initiate or continue its use of the 
patentee’s invention.”1591  Having canvassed the history of the adverse 
inference, the court concluded that while those decisions did not “focus . . . 
on attorney-client relationships, but on disrespect for law . . . . [T]he 
implementation of this precedent has resulted in inappropriate burdens on 
the attorney-client relationship.”1592 
Turning to the questions before it, the Federal Circuit first addressed the 
issue of:   “When the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product 
privilege is invoked by defendant in an infringement suit, is it appropriate 
for the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful 
infringement?”1593  The court simply stated that “[t]he answer is ‘no,’” 
explaining that “[a]lthough the duty to respect the law is undiminished, no 
adverse inference shall arise from invocation of the attorney-client and/or 
work product privilege.”1594  Citing to the Supreme Court’s instruction that 
the attorney-client privilege is “the oldest of the privileges for confidential 
communications known to common law,”1595 and that its purpose 
“encourag[es] full and frank communication between attorneys and their 
clients and thereby promot[es] broader public interests in the observance of 
law and administration of justice,”1596 the Federal Circuit explained: 
Although this court has never suggested that opinions of counsel 
concerning patents are not privileged, the inference that withheld 
opinions are adverse to the client’s actions can distort the attorney-client 
relationship, in derogation of the foundations of that relationship.  We 
conclude that a special rule affecting attorney-client relationships in 
patent cases is not warranted . . . . There should be no risk of liability in 
disclosures to and from counsel in patent matters; such risk can intrude 
upon full communication and ultimately the public interest in 
encouraging open and confident relationships between client and 
attorney.1597 
                                                          
 1590. 853 F.2d 1568, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 1591. Id. at 1572-73, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611. 
 1592. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrezeuge GMBH, 383 F.3d at 1343, 72 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564. 
 1593. Id. at 1344, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565. 
 1594. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565. 
 1595. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 389 (1981)). 
 1596. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389). 
 1597. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565 (citations omitted).  In so doing, the court noted 
that “[t]here is precedent for the drawing of adverse inferences in circumstances other than 
those involving attorney-client relationships,” such as a party’s refusal to produce 
documents or its destruction of documents.  Id. at 1345, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565. 
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The Federal Circuit thus concluded that while a “defendant may of 
course choose to waive the privilege and produce the advice of counsel . . . 
[such action] shall no longer entail an adverse inference as to the nature of 
the advice.”1598 
The second question before the court was “[w]hen the defendant had not 
obtained legal advice, is it appropriate to draw an adverse inference with 
respect to willful infringement?”1599  The Federal Circuit again answered 
the question “no,” explaining that the issue “is not of privilege, but whether 
there is a legal duty upon a potential infringer to consult with counsel, such 
that failure to do so will provide an inference or evidentiary presumption 
that such opinion would have been negative.”1600 
The Federal Circuit reasoned that together with its “holding that it is 
inappropriate to draw an adverse inference that undisclosed legal advice for 
which attorney-client privilege is claimed was unfavorable, we also hold 
that it is inappropriate to draw a similar adverse inference from failure to 
consult counsel.”1601  The court further reasoned that “[a]lthough there 
continues to be ‘an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of 
the known patent rights of others’ . . . the failure to obtain an exculpatory 
opinion of counsel shall no longer provide an adverse inference or 
evidentiary presumption that such an opinion would have been 
unfavorable.”1602 
The third question addressed by the Federal Circuit was “[i]f the court 
concludes that the law should be changed, and the adverse inference 
withdrawn as applied to this case, what are the consequences for this 
case?”1603  Answering the question, the court explained that “[b]ecause 
elimination of the adverse inference as drawn by the district court is a 
material change in the totality of the circumstances, a fresh weighing of the 
evidence is required to determine whether the defendants committed willful 
infringement.”1604  The court did so despite the district court’s analysis of 
                                                          
 1598. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1599. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1600. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1601. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1602. Id. at 1345-46, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566 (quoting L.A. Gear Inc., v. Thom 
McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1127, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1924 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  
The court’s answers to questions one and two give rise to another question:  under what 
circumstances can a plaintiff introduce into evidence that a defendant obtained an opinion 
on which it did not rely or that defendant did not obtain any opinion at all?  Put differently, 
it is difficult to imagine any reason why a plaintiff would refer to an opinion that a 
defendant did not rely upon for any reason other than to have the factfinder draw a negative 
inference.  The court’s opinion noted that certain amicus curiae raised the issue, but it 
declined to address the issue because it was “not raised by this case, was not before the 
district court, and has not been briefed on this appeal.”  Id. at 1347, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1567. 
 1603. Id. at 1346, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1604. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567. 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
1138 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:941 
other factors supporting a finding of willfulness.1605 
The last question before the Federal Circuit was whether “the existence 
of a substantial defense to infringement [should] be sufficient to defeat 
liability for willful infringement even if no legal advice has been 
secured?”1606  The Federal Circuit also answered this question in the 
negative, observing that its “[p]recedent includes this factor with other 
factors to be considered among the totality of circumstances, stressing the 
‘theme of whether a prudent person would have sound reason to believe 
that the patent was not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable, and 
would be so held if litigated.’”1607  The Federal Circuit explained that 
“accord[ing] each factor the weight warranted by its strength in the 
particular case . . . [is] preferable to abstracting any factor for per se 
treatment, for this greater flexibility enables the trier of fact to fit the 
decision to all the circumstances.”1608 
Writing separately, Judge Dyk concurred-in-part and dissented-in-part, 
explaining that he joined the “majority opinion insofar as it eliminates an 
adverse inference” but dissented to the extent that the majority’s opinion 
may be read to reaffirm the Underwater Devices holding.1609  In dissent, 
Judge Dyk observed that “[t]here is a substantial question as to whether the 
due care requirement is consistent with the Supreme Court cases holding 
that punitive damages can only be awarded in situations where the conduct 
is reprehensible.”1610  Judge Dyk further noted that the court’s own 
precedent “often recognized that enhanced damages . . . are a form of 
punitive damages . . . [that] are awarded to punish reprehensible behavior, 
referred to in this context as willful infringement.”1611  Accordingly, Judge 
Dyk reasoned that 
a potential infringer’s mere failure to engage in due care is not itself 
reprehensible conduct.  To hold that it is effectively shifts the burden of 
proof on the issue of willfulness from the patentee to the infringer, which 
must show that its infringement is not willful by showing that it 
exercised due care.1612 
In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,1613 the plaintiff appealed the district 
court’s grant of a JMOL that there was no willful infringement, arguing 
                                                          
 1605. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567. 
 1606. Id. at 1347, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567. 
 1607. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567 (quoting SRI, Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs. 
Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 1608. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567. 
 1609. Id. at 1348, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1610. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568 (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) and BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)). 
 1611. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568. 
 1612. Id. at 1349, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569. 
 1613. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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that willfulness could be found by a jury because the evidence showed that 
defendant had knowledge of the asserted patent and that defendant 
“provided no evidence that it had relied on an opinion of counsel that its 
activities were not infringing.”1614  Foreshadowing its en banc decision in 
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp.,1615 the 
Federal Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ argument and explained that: 
[A]bsent an initial presentation of evidence on the [willfulness] issue by 
[plaintiff], this burden of coming forward in defense did not arise.  There 
is no evidentiary presumption that every infringement is willful.  Willful 
infringement is not established by the simple fact of infringement, even 
though [defendant] stipulated that it had knowledge of [defendant’s] 
patents.1616 
In Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting Inc.,1617 the district 
court had held that certain defendants’ infringement was willful “due to a 
complete absence of competent advice regarding possible infringement of 
the ‘012 patent and a flagrant display of deliberate misconduct by [the 
defendants] throughout this proceeding.”1618  The Federal Circuit vacated 
this decision in light of its decision in Knorr-Bremse.1619  The court in 
Knorr-Bremse held that “the failure to obtain an exculpatory opinion of 
counsel shall no longer provide an adverse inference or evidentiary 
presumption that such an opinion would have been unfavorable.”1620  
Because the district court in Insituform relied upon such an inference in 
deciding that the defendants’ infringement was willful, and elimination of 
this inference would materially change the totality of the circumstances the 
district court was required to consider in making its willfulness 
determination, the court could not uphold the district court’s decision and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.1621 
In Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc.,1622 the Federal Circuit held that the 
mere filing of an abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) cannot 
constitute an act of willful infringement compensable by attorney’s fees.1623  
Apotex had filed an ANDA seeking FDA approval of a generic version of 
                                                          
 1614. Id. at 1332, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. 
 1615. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 1616. Norian Corp., 363 F.3d at 1332, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. 
 1617. 385 F.3d 1360, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1618. Id. at 1377, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884 (emphasis omitted). 
 1619. See id. at 1377, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884 (citing Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (2004) holding that failing to attain an 
attorney’s exculpatory opinion “shall no longer provide an adverse inference or presumption 
that such an opinion would have been unfavorable.”). 
 1620. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH, 383 F.3d at 1346, 72 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566. 
 1621. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567. 
 1622. 376 F.3d 1339, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1623. Id. at 1342, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802. 
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Ceftin®, an orally administered antibiotic.  Glaxo brought a declaratory 
action against Apotex alleging that its ANDA infringed two of Glaxo’s 
patents covering Ceftin® under § 271(e)(2)(A).1624  The district court found 
that Apotex’s ANDA infringed Glaxo’s patents and that Apotex’s 
infringement was willful because it did not exercise due care, relying 
heavily on the fact that Apotex did not receive an opinion from patent 
counsel.  The Federal Circuit reversed.  It reasoned that infringement under 
§ 271(e)(2)(A) was a “highly artificial” act of infringement which results in 
only a very limited set of consequences set forth in § 271(e)(4).1625  It noted 
that under the statutorily limited list of available remedies, a court could 
only award money damages if commercial activity had actually occurred in 
the United States or if the product had been imported.  It described 35 
U.S.C. § 2851626 as an “exception” to these limits in that it permits 
attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in exceptional 
cases.1627 
Although a “myriad of factual circumstances” may give rise to the § 285 
exception, the Federal Circuit found that such circumstances were not 
present in this case.1628  Apotex had not engaged in any litigation 
misconduct nor included any certification in its ANDA under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)1629 that commercial marketing of the subject drug would not 
infringe any valid, unexpired patent.1630  It contrasted these facts to those in 
Yamanuchi Pharmaceutical Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal,1631 in which the 
Federal Circuit determined that a “baseless and ‘wholly unjustified’” 
certification combined with litigation misconduct, warranted a finding of 
willfulness.1632  Under these circumstances, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the district court had abused its discretion in finding willful 
infringement.1633 
                                                          
 1624. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)(2000) (“It shall be an act of infringement to 
submit[:](A) an application under Section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act . . . for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, . . . [i]f the 
purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the 
commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug . . . claimed in a patent or the use of which is 
claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.”). 
 1625. Glaxo Group Ltd., 376 F.3d at 1349, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1626. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000). 
 1627. Glaxo Group Ltd., 376 F.3d at 1350, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1628. Id. at 1350-51, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808-09. 
 1629. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2000). 
 1630. Glaxo Group Ltd., 376 F.3d at 1344, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809.  The omission 
was due to the fact that Glaxo had not listed its patents in the Orange Book because at the 
time its patent applications were filed, antibiotics were excepted from such listing under a 
now-repealed section of the FDCA.  Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803-04. 
 1631. 231 F.3d 1339, 1346, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 1632. Glaxo Group Ltd., 376 F.3d at 1350, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1633. Id. at 1351, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809. 
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IV.  INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND OTHER DEFENSES 
A.  Inequitable Conduct 
In Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp.,1634 the district court held that the 
patentee had engaged in inequitable conduct during prosecution of its 
patent covering punch pliers by “repeatedly stat[ing], and indeed 
stress[ing], that the described tool simultaneously punched holes and 
connected ceiling grids, knowing that this assertion was false.”1635  
Specifically, the district court found “clear and convincing evidence” that 
the claimed punch pliers punched holes in overlapping sheets of metal but 
did not connect the sheets.1636  The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that 
the repeated statements were “not clearly incorrect,” because, as the district 
court had found, a loose connection was established through use of the 
pliers.  Furthermore, the statements regarding “punching and connecting” 
referred merely to the features described in the preamble of the patent’s 
sole independent claim.1637  For these reasons, the Federal Circuit found 
that patentee’s conduct during prosecution neither rose to the required level 
of materiality to support a finding of inequitable conduct nor were its 
statements false.1638  Therefore, it held that the district court clearly erred in 
its findings that plaintiff’s statements were material misrepresentations and 
abused its discretion in ruling that Intirtool had engaged in inequitable 
conduct.1639 
Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V.1640 presented an appeal from a 
grant of summary judgment that defendant procured the disputed patent 
through inequitable conduct.1641  In particular, the district court held that in 
order to overcome a rejection for lack of enablement, the defendant 
submitted a false declaration with intent to deceive the PTO by omitting 
negative test results concerning the claimed method for producing a protein 
toxic to insects.1642 
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by noting that to “hold a patent 
unenforceable for inequitable conduct, a court must find, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the applicant omitted or misrepresented material 
facts with the intention of misleading or deceiving the patent examiner.”1643  
On the issue of falsity of the declaration, plaintiff argued that the district 
                                                          
 1634. 369 F.3d 1289, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1635. Id. at 1296, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785. 
 1636. Id. at 1294, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783. 
 1637. Id. at 1296-97, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785. 
 1638. Id. at 1297, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785. 
 1639. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785. 
 1640. 363 F.3d 1235, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1641. Id. at 1237, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1642. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 1643. Id. at 1239, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
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court correctly held that defendant’s assertion in its declaration that it knew 
of no negative test results was clearly false.1644  Defendant by contrast, 
argued that the “omitted test results were not ‘negative’ with respect to the 
question that the patent examiner was seeking to answer,” but rather 
“showed that those tests led to no reliable conclusion.”1645  Noting that at 
summary judgment “‘the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and 
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor,’”1646 the Federal 
Circuit determined that the district court erroneously resolved the disputed 
issue of falsity in favor of defendant because such a decision: 
[R]equired the court to reject the explanation provided in [defendant’s] 
affidavit.  If the [district] court were to credit [defendant’s] affidavit, it 
could find that the test results withheld from the PTO were not negative 
and [the defendant’s] statement to the PTO that he know of no contrary 
results was true.1647 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that a material issue of fact existed 
concerning the truth of the defendant’s declaration.1648 
Relying on the court’s earlier decision in Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, 
Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc.,1649 plaintiff argued that defendant’s 
litigation affidavit was “insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
as to falsity.”1650 The Federal Circuit, however, determined that Pargaon 
was markedly different from the case before it, explaining that in Paragon 
“there was no question that the submission to the PTO was false and that 
the false representations were material; the only issue was whether the false 
and material representations were submitted with an intent to deceive.”1651  
The Federal Circuit then reasoned that, by contrast, the record before it 
contained disputes of material fact concerning both “the issue of intent” 
and “whether [defendant’s] declaration was false or misleading at all.”1652 
Specifically, the Federal Circuit observed that because defendant’s affidavit 
“described in detail each of the allegedly negative test results and explained 
why those test results, in [defendant’s] view, were not inconsistent with the 
declaration . . . submitted to the PTO,” the record contained a disputed 
issue of fact for the factfinder to resolve.1653 
The Federal Circuit further explained that even if no genuine issue 
                                                          
 1644. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 1645. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260-61. 
 1646. Id. at 1240, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). 
 1647. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 1648. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 1649. 984 F.2d 1182, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 1650. Monsanto Co., 363 F.3d at 1240, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 1651. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 1652. Id. at 1241, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
 1653. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261. 
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existed concerning the falsity of defendant’s declaration, a triable issue 
remained regarding defendant’s intent to deceive the PTO.1654  The court 
opined: 
[A]lthough the intent element of fraud or inequitable conduct may be 
proven by a showing of acts the natural consequence of which were 
presumably intended by the actor, this requires the fact finder to evaluate 
all the facts and circumstances in each case.  Such an evaluation is rarely 
enabled in summary proceedings.1655 
Noting that defendant’s statement that it “did not intend to deceive the 
PTO was based on [its] detailed explanation of [its] interpretation of the 
disputed results,”1656 the court thus concluded that defendant had “at least 
state[d] facts supporting a plausible justification or excuse for the 
misrepresentation.”1657 
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the district court’s determination 
that “the circumstances surrounding the declaration provided convincing 
evidence that [defendant’s] declaration was submitted with the intention of 
misleading the PTO,”1658 particularly in light of “the threat that without the 
declaration the examiner would limit the claims”1659 and defendant’s status 
“as a small enterprise with limited resources . . . pursuing a survival 
strategy.”1660  Though agreeing that “circumstances surrounding the 
submission of the declaration are certainly relevant to the inquiry into 
intent,”1661 the court concluded that:   “[T]he small size of the applicants’ 
company and the applicants’ presumed incentive to obtain broad patent 
protection for their inventions did not give rise to such a compelling 
inference of deceptive intent as to justify the entry of summary judgment 
on the issue.”1662 
In Alza Corp. v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.,1663 defendant appealed the 
district court’s finding of no inequitable conduct.1664  Defendant argued that 
an inventor committed inequitable conduct by submitting a declaration to 
the PTO containing statements that were misleading and inconsistent with 
actual test results.1665  The district court found that the statement at issue on 
                                                          
 1654. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1655. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (quoting Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 
at 1190, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567). 
 1656. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1657. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (quoting Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc., 984 F.2d 
at 1191, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569). 
 1658. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1659. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1660. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1661. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1662. Id. at 1241-42, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262. 
 1663. 391 F.3d 1365, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1664. Id. at 1373, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 1665. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
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appeal “was literally true” but “had the potential to mislead the 
examiner.”1666  However, the district court reasoned that “in light of all the 
circumstances,” it could not find that the inventor “acted with the requisite 
intent when he failed to point out that the data he submitted to the patent 
examiner included values that would suggest that one could also achieve an 
adequate flux in a transdermal system that used a sufficiently large fentanyl 
citrate.”1667  Reviewing the record evidence, the court held that the district 
court did not commit clear error or abuse its discretion.1668 
B.  Antitrust 
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling,1669 plaintiff appealed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment denying its claim that defendant committed 
patent misuse by tying patented products of first generation soybean seeds 
to unpatented second generation soybean seeds.1670  The Federal Circuit 
explained that “in evaluating a patent misuse defense, ‘[t]he key inquiry is 
whether, by imposing conditions that derive their force from the patent, the 
patentee has impermissibly broadened the scope of the patent grant with 
anticompetitive effect.’”1671  The Federal Circuit then explained that a tying 
agreement may serve as a form of patent misuse if a licensor “conditions 
the license on a patent licensee’s purchase of an unpatented material for use 
in the invention.”1672 
In vacating the grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit reasoned 
that defendant “does not raise a typical tying allegation and the mere 
recitation of the word ‘tying’ is not sufficient to state a patent misuse 
defense.”1673  Noting that the “licensed and patented product (the first 
generation seeds) and the good made by the licensed product (the second 
generation seeds) are nearly identical copies,”1674 the court declined “to 
hold that [defendant’s] raw exercise of its right to exclude from the 
patented invention by itself is a ‘tying’ arrangement that exceeds the scope 
of the patent grant.”1675 
                                                          
 1666. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 1667. Id. at 1373-74, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 1668. Id. at 1374, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.  In dissent, Judge Dyk reasoned that 
“[t]here would seem to be no basis for finding the statement ‘literally true.’” Id. at 1376, 73 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
 1669. 363 F.3d 1336, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1670. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1671. Id. at 1341, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 
157 F.3d 1340, 1372, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 1672. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1673. Id. at 1342, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1674. Id. at 1343, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 1675. Id. at 1342, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
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C.  Pre-Emption 
Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.1676 presented 
an issue of whether federal patent law preempted state-law tort claims in 
circumstances in which defendant could not establish that plaintiff’s claims 
of infringement were objectively baseless.1677  Noting that, as a general 
matter, state-law claims “can survive federal preemption only to the extent 
that those claims are based on a showing of ‘bad faith’ action in asserting 
infringement,”1678 the court explained that “federal patent laws thus bar 
state-law liability for communications concerning alleged infringement so 
long as those communications are not made in ‘bad faith.’”1679  After 
canvassing the Supreme Court’s and Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence 
concerning the bad faith standard,1680 the court determined that: 
[T]he objectively baseless standard . . . applies to state-law claims based 
on communications alleging that a patent holder has engaged in wrongful 
conduct by asserting claims of patent infringement . . . . A plaintiff 
claiming that a patent holder has engaged in wrongful conduct by 
asserting claims of patent infringement must establish that the claims of 
infringement were objectively baseless.1681 
Turning to the record below, the court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment that defendant’s state-law tort claims were preempted by the 
patent laws, noting that defendant “made no effort to establish that the 
claims asserted by [plaintiff] with respect to [two asserted] patents were 
objectively baseless, either because those patents were obviously invalid or 
plainly not infringed.”1682  With regard to a third asserted patent, the court 
concluded that plaintiff’s infringement claim “was not objectively baseless, 
as is amply demonstrated by our reversal of that grant of summary 
judgment [of noninfringement].”1683 
                                                          
 1676. 362 F.3d 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1677. Id. at 1374-75, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67. 
 1678. Id. at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (citing Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 
182 F.3d 1340, 1355, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
 1679. Id. at 1374-75, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67. 
 1680. The court specifically addressed the Supreme Court’s decision in Professional Real 
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., in which the Court held that a 
“lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits.”  508 U.S. 49, 60, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 
1648 (1993).  The court likewise noted its holding in Golan v. Pingel Enterprises, Inc., that 
“[t]o show bad faith in [the patentee’s] actions, [plaintiff] must offer clear and convincing 
evidence that [patentee] had no reasonable basis to believe that the [accused device] 
infringed [the] patents.”  310 F.3d 1360, 1371, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1918 (Fed. Cir. 
2002).  The court also noted its decision in Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 
providing that federal law preempts state law claims that punish “publicizing a patent in the 
marketplace unless the plaintiff can show that the patentholder acted in bad faith.”  153 F.3d 
1318, 1336, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 1681. Globetrotter Software, Inc., 362 F.3d at 1377, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169. 
 1682. Id. at 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 1683. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167; see also id. at 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
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D.  License 
In Jacobs v. Nintendo of America, Inc.,1684 plaintiff sued for infringement 
of its patent covering a “tilt sensitive” video game control box.1685   
Plaintiff had previously sued defendant’s supplier of certain 
“accelerometer” components of the claimed control box, Analog Devices, 
Inc., for inducement and contributory infringement of the same patent.  
That litigation ended when plaintiff and Analog entered into a settlement 
agreement providing Analog a license “to make, use, sell, import and 
export components . . . for use in tilt-sensitive control boxes,” and by which 
plaintiff covenanted not to sue Analog for “any cause of action having as 
an element the infringement of the ‘958 patent by Analog or any other 
party, whether occurring in the past, present or in the future.”1686  
Defendant asserted that it was protected from suit by plaintiff’s agreement 
with Analog.  The Federal Circuit agreed, reasoning that basic contract law 
principles prevent a party who assigns a right in exchange for consideration 
from acting to undermine the commercial value of that right.1687  Thus, 
plaintiff could not prevent Analog’s customers from making infringing 
control boxes after granting Analog the right to sell components of those 
control boxes. 
Plaintiff argued that defendant could only raise the license as a defense if 
the court determined that Analog’s accelerometer components had no 
noninfringing uses.  Plaintiff’s argument referred to previous Federal 
Circuit decisions discussing the Court’s view that a patentee’s (or 
licensee’s) sale of an article that has no noninfringing uses may carry with 
it an implied license to use the article in an infringing manner.1688  
However, the Federal Circuit found these cases to be irrelevant, because 
there was no need to make a determination as to whether plaintiff had given 
Analog the right to sell components to be used in infringing devices.  The 
settlement agreement conclusively allowed Analog to sell its 
accelerometers to be used in infringing control boxes because plaintiff 
could not prevent anyone from making non-infringing devices.  Thus, the 
agreement would only make sense if it was understood to permit the sale of 
components to be made in infringing devices.1689 
                                                          
1168 (finding that where claim is not objectively baseless, the court cannot examine 
litigant’s subjective motives and therefore cannot establish bad faith). 
 1684. 370 F.3d 1097, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The authors’ law firm 
represented defendant in this case. 
 1685. Id. at 1098, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
 1686. Id. at 1098-99, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055-56. 
 1687. Id. at 1101, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057. 
 1688. Id. at 1100, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057 (citing Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners 
Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686, 231 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 474, 476 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 1689. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1057. 
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Plaintiff next offered three separate interpretations of the license 
agreement that would permit suit against defendant.  First, plaintiff 
contended the agreement granted Analog a “bare license” that consisted 
merely of the right not so be sued for making, using, or selling the 
accelerometers.  But the Federal Circuit found that if it were to adopt 
plaintiff’s construction of the license provision of the settlement agreement, 
then the additional “covenant not to sue” provision would be completely 
redundant.  Furthermore, the license provided Analog the right to sell 
accelerators “for use in tilt-sensitive control boxes.”1690  This language 
went far beyond the grant of a bare license.  Second, plaintiff argued that 
the license should be interpreted to grant Analog the right to make and sell 
infringing control boxes on its own (rather than the accelerometer 
components).  The Federal Circuit found it unlikely, however, that Analog 
would have bargained for the right to build infringing control boxes on its 
own because it was not in the business of making game controllers.  As its 
last attempt, plaintiff broadly argued that the license afforded Analog the 
right to sell accelerometers to anyone without fear of suit, but simply did 
not shield its customers from suit.  The Federal Circuit again rejected this 
argument asking why Analog would have “contracted for the right to 
manufacture and sell a product knowing that its customers would be unable 
to use the product for the bargained-for purpose.”1691  Thus, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that plaintiff was precluded 
from suing defendant for its manufacture and sale of tilt-sensitive control 
boxes that incorporated Analog’s accelerometers.1692 
E.  Settlement 
Unova, Inc. v. Acer Inc.1693 involved an appeal from a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment holding that a settlement agreement between 
plaintiff and a third party worked to release defendant from patent 
infringement liability where the defendant had acquired the third party 
subsequent to the settlement agreement.1694  As an initial matter, the 
Federal Circuit noted that “[s]ettlement agreements are governed by the 
generally applicable law of contracts”1695 and that “[a] contract must be so 
interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it 
existed at the time of contracting.”1696  Reviewing the applicable California 
                                                          
 1690. Id. at 1101, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058. 
 1691. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058. 
 1692. Id. at 1102, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1058. 
 1693. 363 F.3d 1278, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1464 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1694. Id. at 1279-80, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465-66. 
 1695. Id. at 1281, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466. 
 1696. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (Deering 
2004)). 
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contract law, the Federal Circuit determined that “courts have held that a 
third party’s rights under a release agreement are predicated upon the 
contracting parties’ intent to benefit him and that the third party bears the 
burden of showing that the contracting parties intended to release him.”1697 
Having reviewed the settlement agreement, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the plaintiff and third party “did not intend to release 
[defendant] from liability for infringement arising from events that 
occurred before it became [third party’s] parent” company.1698  In 
particular, the Federal Circuit observed that “release provision itself is most 
sensibly read as not releasing [defendant] from liability for infringement 
prior to its acquisition of [the third party]” because the provision stated that 
the plaintiff “‘hereby releases [the third party], its parents, and its 
subsidiaries’ from all claims that related to ‘an allegation of infringement 
of any Smart Battery Patents.’”1699  The Federal Circuit explained that it 
construed the provision to mean that as of the signing date the defendant 
released the third party, its parents, and subsidiaries from liability for prior 
infringement.1700  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that because 
the defendant was not the third party’s parent “on that date,” it “is not 
entitled to the benefit of the release.”1701 
Addressing the defendant’s argument that such an interpretation would 
render the term “parent” to be a nullity because the third party did not have 
any parent companies on the date the settlement agreement was signed, the 
Federal Circuit explained that it would “not interpret the release provision 
contrary to the plain meaning of its language or contrary to common sense.  
The release agreement is written in the present tense . . . and refers to acts 
of past infringement; thus it most naturally does not refer to [third party’s] 
future parents.”1702  The Federal Circuit further noted that when the parties 
to the settlement agreement intended to refer to future entities, they did so 
expressly and “the fact that they did not similarly modify the term ‘parents’ 
suggests that they did not seek to release [the third party’s] future 
parents.”1703 
F. Miscellaneous Defenses 
In National Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway, Ltd.,1704 the 
Federal Circuit confronted an issue that only two federal courts had ever 
                                                          
 1697. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466. 
 1698. Id. at 1282, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467. 
 1699. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467. 
 1700. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467. 
 1701. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467. 
 1702. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467. 
 1703. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1467. 
 1704. 357 F.3d 1319, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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before addressed:   what is the scope of the “temporary presence” 
exemption to liability for infringement in 35 U.S.C. § 272?1705  National 
Steel sued Canadian Pacific Railway (“CPR”) for infringement of its patent 
directed to a type of railway car and moved for a preliminary injunction.1706  
The district court granted National Steel’s motion, finding that CPR had 
conceded that the asserted claims read on its railway cars and that its 
defenses to infringement lacked substantial merit.1707  As one of these 
defenses, CPR contended that its actions were exempt from liability under 
§ 272’s “temporary presence” exception to infringement liability.1708  
Under this statute, never before interpreted by the Federal Circuit, the use 
of any invention in “certain foreign-owned” vehicles entering the United 
States “temporarily or accidentally” is not an act of infringement under 
certain conditions.1709 
To prove that its use of the accused railcars was exempted under this 
statute, CPR brought forth evidence that it was a Canadian company and 
that its rail cars operated on rail lines that, for the most part, it owned in 
Canada and the United States to deliver lumber from Canada to the United 
States.1710  The district court held that these facts were insufficient to raise a 
substantial question of whether CPR was liable for infringement.1711  The 
Federal Circuit disagreed.  First, it disagreed with the district court’s 
reasoning that the rail car invention was not used in a foreign-owned 
vehicle because the trains that pulled the cars were owned and operated by 
U.S. companies in the United States.1712  The Federal Circuit looked to 
Congress’s definition of “vehicle” in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 4,1713 
which it said controlled its interpretation of the term, and found that the 
district court had construed that term in § 272 too narrowly.1714  Rather, a 
vehicle for purposes of § 272 “includes every description of carriage or 
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of 
transportation on land,” carriage being defined in Webster’s Dictionary as 
                                                          
 1705. Id. at 1329, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.  35 U.S.C. § 272 states: 
The use of any invention in any vessel, aircraft or vehicle of any country which 
afford similar privileges to vessels, aircraft of vehicles of the United States, 
entering the United States temporarily or accidentally, shall not constitute 
infringement of any patent, if the invention is used exclusively for the needs of the 
vessel, aircraft or vehicle and is not offered for sale or sold in or used for the 
manufacture of anything to be sold in or exported from the United States. 
35 U.S.C. § 272 (2000). 
 1706. Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd., 357 F.3d at 1322, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642. 
 1707. Id. at 1324, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 1708. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645. 
 1709. Id. at 1326, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646. 
 1710. Id. at 1323-24, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644-45. 
 1711. Id. at 1328-29, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647-48. 
 1712. Id. at 1328, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 1713. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 1714. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
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“means of conveyance,” “a wheeled vehicle for people, or a wheeled 
support carrying a burden such as a gun carriage.”1715  Therefore, the court 
concluded, the railcars were vehicles for purposes of the exemption.1716 
The Federal Circuit next turned to the issue of whether CPR’s railcars 
were only entering the United States “temporarily” for purposes of 
satisfying § 272’s requirements.1717  Resorting to the legislative history 
behind the statute which indicated that it was promulgated to facilitate 
international commerce that would otherwise be overburdened by 
conflicting patent laws regulating transportation vessels, it held that 
entering “temporarily” should be defined to mean “entering for a period of 
time of finite duration with the sole purpose of engaging in international 
commerce.”1718  Contrary to the urgings of National Steel Car, the Federal 
Circuit found the following factors irrelevant to this inquiry:   the 
magnitude of the benefit derived by the accused infringer as a result of the 
use of the vehicle in the United States and the burden imposed on the 
patent holder as a result of the exemption.1719  Also dismissed was National 
Steel Car’s argument that CPR should not be able to claim the benefit of 
the exemption because there existed testimony that their cars occasionally 
are “grabbed” by the U.S. railway without permission and used for 
domestic commerce.1720  This evidence did not show that the cars entered 
with the “purpose to engage in commerce other than international 
commerce.”1721 
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed the question of what the 
requirement that the invention be “used exclusively for the needs of 
the . . . vehicle” meant.1722  The court disagreed with the district court’s 
narrow interpretation that the invention at issue should exclude inventions 
“pertaining to the construction of the vehicle.”1723  It found no distinction in 
the statute between “propulsive needs” and “structural needs,” therefore the 
district court was wrong in its reasoning that because the invention at issue 
defined the structure of the rail car, rather than an aspect of the 
locomotive’s propulsion system, the use of the invention did not fall within 
the scope of § 272.1724  Rather, looking again to the legislative history, the 
court found that the Supreme Court case which the statute had codified, as 
well as the Paris Convention Treaty after which the statute was modeled, 
                                                          
 1715. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648 (internal quotations omitted). 
 1716. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648. 
 1717. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649. 
 1718. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
 1719. Id. at 1329, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
 1720. Id. at 1332, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 1721. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 1722. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 1723. Id. at 1332-33, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650-51. 
 1724. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650-51. 
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both expressly extended the scope of noninfringing uses to inventions used 
in the construction of vehicles.1725  Therefore, the train cars at issue 
satisfied this requirement.1726 
Finally, the court found error in the district court’s finding that CPR was 
precluded from benefiting from the statutory exemption because, allegedly, 
both CPR and the supplier of the accused cars that it used had sold the cars 
in the United States.1727  As for the alleged sales by the supplier, the statute 
only exempts sales in the United States by those that temporarily enter the 
United States, and not third parties.1728  Therefore, the supplier’s sales did 
not bar CPR from using this defense.1729  Second, as for the alleged sales by 
CPR to United States companies, the district court itself recognized that 
there had been no decision regarding the ownership of the cars—the only 
finding was that CPR “may” engage in such conduct.1730  This was 
insufficient to deprive CPR of its § 2721731 defense.1732 
In Vanderlande Industries Nederland v. International Trade 
Commission,1733 the Federal Circuit reviewed the ITC’s ruling that 
Vanderlande Industries Nederland and Vanderlande Industries, Inc. 
(“Vanderlande”) had “engaged in unfair methods of competition and unfair 
acts” in violation of § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing and 
selling a “sortation system” that infringed a U.S. patent.1734  Vanderlande 
contested the ITC’s ruling on the basis that the patent owner and exclusive 
licensee (“Complainants”) were equitably estopped from asserting the 
patent against Vanderlande.1735  Specifically, Vanderlande argued that the 
Complainants misled Vanderlande by (1) their delay in filing suit despite 
their knowledge that Vanderlande had contracted to build the accused 
sorting systems in Europe and the United States, and by (2) their 
participation in the construction of a United Parcel Service sorting facility 
in which Vanderlande was installing the accused system.1736 
Despite these allegations, the Federal Circuit held that Vanderlande did 
not fulfill the first element of equitable estoppel requiring that “the 
patentee, who usually must have knowledge of the true facts, 
communicates something in a misleading way, either by words, conduct or 
                                                          
 1725. Id. at 1333, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 1726. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 1727. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 1728. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 1729. Id. at 1334, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 1730. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 1731. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1732. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653. 
 1733. 366 F.3d 1311, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1734. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1698. 
 1735. Id. at 1324, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 1736. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
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silence.”1737  The Complainants had twice warned Vanderlande by letter 
that it may infringe their patent if it built its sorting system in the United 
States, and such “warnings of potential infringement . . . are precisely the 
opposite of the sort of conduct needed to give rise to equitable 
estoppel.”1738  Furthermore, the Complainants had only waited nine months 
after confirming that Vanderlande was using an infringing system at the 
United States Parcel facility before filed a complaint with the ITC.1739 
In Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp.,1740 Intirtool owned a patent on punch 
pliers and supplied these pliers to Texar, who resold them to retailers.1741  
In 1993, Texar informed Intirtool that, although it was “perfectly satisfied” 
with Intirtool, it could get very similar pliers from a competing supplier for 
a lower cost.  Texar therefore requested that Intirtool match the lower price.  
When Intirtool refused, Texar at a later, unspecified date, turned to the 
competitor for its supply.  Intirtool did not pursue enforcement of its patent 
against Texar until 2000.  The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas found that Intirtool should have known from its 1993 conversation 
with Texar that Texar was “going to continue to sell the punch pliers but 
would acquire them from another vendor,” and held that, as a result of 
Intirtool’s delay in filing suit until 2000, Intirtool’s pre-filing damages were 
barred.  The Federal Circuit reversed.1742  Although it found that a 
presumption of laches arises “where a patentee delays bringing suit for 
more than six years after the date the patentee knew or should have known 
of the alleged infringer’s activity,”1743 it found that Texar’s notice to 
Intirtool that it contemplated the possibility of reselling competing tools at 
a future date was not sufficient to give Intirtool actual or constructive 
knowledge of an act of infringement.1744  Rather, at the time of that 
conversation, Texar was still Intirtool’s “perfectly satisfied” customer.  
Therefore, the laches clock did not start ticking as a result of the 1993 
conversation between Intirtool and Texar, and because there was no 
evidence that Intirtool should have known that Texar had ever acted on its 
plan, the laches clock did not start ticking at all.  Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit held that the district court’s determination that Intirtool should have 
known that it had an infringement claim more than six years prior to the 
date it filed suit against Texar was an abuse of discretion.1745 
                                                          
 1737. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 1738. Id. at 1325, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 1739. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707. 
 1740. 369 F.3d 1289, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1741. Id. at 1292-93, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782-83. 
 1742. Id. at 1298, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786. 
 1743. Id. at 1297, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786 (internal quotations omitted). 
 1744. Id. at 1297-1298, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1785-86. 
 1745. Id. at 1298, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786. 
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V.  REMEDIES  
A.  Permanent Injunction 
International Rectifier Corp. v. Samsung Electronics Co.1746 involved an 
appeal from contempt proceedings following entry of a permanent 
injunction.1747  At the district court, the parties stipulated to a consent 
judgment and an injunction that resolved all infringement issues concerning 
defendant’s product but reserved the issue of infringement regarding 
products made by defendant for a third party according to the third party’s 
specifications.1748  Tracking the language of § 271(a),1749 the permanent 
injunction prohibited defendant “‘from making, using, offering for sale or 
selling in or importing into the United States the components, devices or 
products infringing any claim of [the asserted patent].’”1750  Two years after 
entry of the permanent injunction, plaintiff initiated contempt proceedings 
against defendant and the third party for violating the injunction through 
sales of third party-designed and defendant-manufactured devices in the 
United States.1751  Thus, the primary issue on appeal was whether 
defendant’s and third party’s conduct violated the district court’s order.1752 
The Federal Circuit started its analysis by noting that “[a] court may 
grant an injunction in a patent infringement case ‘in accordance with the 
principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by the 
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.’”1753  The Federal 
Circuit explained that “it is well known that United Sates patent laws ‘do 
not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United 
States,’”1754 and that “‘it is not an infringement to make or use a patented 
product outside of the United States.’”1755  The Federal Circuit then 
reasoned that because no dispute existed that defendant’s actions did not 
occur within the United States, its actions do not violate either the language 
of the permanent injunction or the applicable patent law precedent.1756 
                                                          
 1746. 361 F.3d 1355, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1747. Id. at 1357, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125. 
 1748. Id. at 1358, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126. 
 1749. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers ot sell, or sells any patented invention, within the 
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the 
patent therefore, infringes the patent.”). 
 1750. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 361 F.3d at 1360, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127. 
 1751. Id. at 1358, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126. 
 1752. Id. at 1359, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127. 
 1753. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1127 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000)). 
 1754. Id. at 1360, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 
183, 195, (1856)). 
 1755. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (quoting Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 
215 F.3d 1246, 1251, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 1756. Id. at 1361, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128. 
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Then addressing plaintiff’s theory that the defendant’s and third party’s 
agreement to subvert a permanent injunction was tantamount to 
infringement of the patent, the Federal Circuit held that such an argument 
“has no basis in law.”1757  The court further reasoned that even if the third 
party imported an infringing device, such conduct would not violate the 
permanent injunction because there was no basis for attributing the third 
party’s conduct to the defendant.1758  Rather, the Federal Circuit explained 
that “[t]he only occasion when a person not a party may be punished is 
when he has helped to bring about . . . an act of a party.  This means that 
the non-party must either abet the defendant, or must be legally identified 
with him.”1759  Based on the record, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
only arrangement between defendant and third party was a fabrication 
agreement for the manufacture and shipment of devices outside the United 
States, and there was no evidence that defendant exercised any control over 
the third party nor was defendant related to the third party.1760 
In International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,1761 the issue was whether 
a permanent injunction order “prohibiting infringement by ‘any device 
covered by one or more of Claims 1 through 5’”1762 of the disputed patent 
was overly broad given the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65(d).1763  The Federal Circuit noted that, as a general matter, 
“broad injunctions that merely instruct that enjoined party not to violate a 
statute” are contrary to the policy of Rule 65(d) because “[s]uch injunctions 
increase the likelihood of unwarranted contempt proceedings for acts 
unlike or unrelated to those originally judged unlawful.”1764  The Federal 
Circuit explained that in the patent infringement context, it “has rejected as 
                                                          
 1757. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128. 
 1758. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (citing Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., 248 
F.3d 1376, 1379, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791, 1793 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  In Tegal, the Federal 
Circuit explained that “courts have held parties in contempt based on the conduct of others, 
but in that circumstance they have required proof that the party subject to contempt 
sanctions had control over those who engaged in the conduct proscribed by the injunction.”  
248 F.3d at 1379, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793. 
 1759. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 361 F.3d at 1362, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (quoting 
Additive Controls & Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 96 F.3d 1390, 1394, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1106, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 1760. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128. 
 1761. 383 F.3d 1312, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1571 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1762. Id. at 1316, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574. 
 1763. Id. at 1315, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573. Rule 65(d) provides: 
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the 
reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable 
detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the acts or acts 
sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their 
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in 
active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by 
personal service or otherwise. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d). 
 1764. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 383 F.3d at 1316, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574. 
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overly broad a permanent injunction that simply prohibits future 
infringement of a patent.”1765 Discussing its decision in Additive Controls 
& Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc.,1766 the court explained that 
it vacated a permanent injunction order because: 
[I]t lacked specific terms and a reasonably detailed description of the 
acts sought to be restrained.  Furthermore, the order failed to state which 
acts constituted infringement or to expressly limit its prohibition to the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the specific device found to infringe, or 
devices no more than colorably different from the infringing device.1767 
Analogizing the circumstances in Additive Controls to the permanent 
injunction order on appeal, the court explained that “[o]n its face the 
injunction applies to many more devices than those actually adjudicated.  
Indeed, by its terms the injunction applies to ‘any device’ made or sold by 
[defendant] that is within the scope of the patent claims.”1768  The Federal 
Circuit further reasoned that the 
actual scope of the injunction cannot be that expansive . . . because this 
court has held that “contempt proceedings . . . are available only with 
respect to devices previously admitted or adjudged to infringe, and to 
other devices which are no more than colorably different therefrom and 
which clearly are infringements of the patent.”1769 
The court thus concluded that “the only acts the injunction may prohibit 
are infringement of the patent by the adjudicated devices and infringement 
by devices not more than colorably different from the adjudicated devices” 
and “to comply with Rule 65(d), the injunction should explicitly proscribe 
those specific acts.”1770 
B. Damages 
1.  Lost profits 
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,1771 the plaintiff appealed the 
district court decision denying its claim for lost profits, arguing that there 
was a functional relationship between a patented device and an unpatented 
material requiring application of the entire market value rule.1772  Vacating 
the district court’s order, the Federal Circuit explained that: 
                                                          
 1765. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574. 
 1766. 986 F.2d 476, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 1767. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 383 F.3d at 1316, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574 (internal 
citations omitted) (citing Additive Controls, 986 F.2d at 479-80, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 
1801 
 1768. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574. 
 1769. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574 (quoting KSM Fastening Sys., Inc. v. H.A. Jones 
Co., 776 F.2d 1522, 1526, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 676, 679 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 1770. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574. 
 1771. 382 F.3d 1367, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1772. Id. at 1371, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
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The entire market value rule was a principle of patent damages that 
defined a patentee’s ability to recover lost profits on unpatented 
components typically sold with a patented item . . . . “[T]he rule has been 
extended to allow inclusion of physically separate unpatented 
components normally sold with a patented components” with the caveat 
that both were “considered to be components of a single assembly or 
parts of a complete machine, or they together constitute a functional 
unit.”1773 
Based on the record evidence, the court determined that the patented 
device and unpatented material “are in fact analogous to parts of a single 
assembly or a complete machine, as the [unpatented material] functions 
together with the [patented product] to produce the visual appearance that 
is central to [plaintiff’s patent].”1774  The court further reasoned that 
“[d]espite some limited interchangeability . . . the two items do ‘function 
together to achieve one result.’”1775 
In Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc.1776 plaintiff sought 
to recover lost profits based on its sister company’s sales.1777  While noting 
that “the recovery of lost profits by a patentee is not limited to the situation 
in which the patentee is selling the patented device”, the Federal Circuit 
rejected plaintiff’s attempt to extend the reach of lost profits and made 
clear that “the patentee needs to have been selling some item, the profits of 
which have been lost due to infringing sales, in order to claim damages 
consisting of lost profits.”1778  The Federal Circuit explained that plaintiff 
and its sister corporation “may not enjoy the advantages of their separate 
corporate structure and, at the same time avoid the consequential 
limitations of that structure—in this case, the inability of the patent holder 
to claim lost profits of its non-exclusive licensee.”1779  Accordingly, the 
Federal Circuit held that although plaintiff “may have the right to sue under 
its patents, both as an owner and as a back-licensee, it can recover only its 
own lost profits, not [its sister company’s].”1780 
2.  Reasonable royalty 
In Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,1781 defendant challenged an 
assessed royalty rate as “unreasonable as a matter of law” because it would 
                                                          
 1773. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 
1538, 1543, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1073(Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 1774. Id. at 1372, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 1775. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (quoting Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1551, 35 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073). 
 1776. 383 F.3d 1303, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1777. Id. at 1310, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690. 
 1778. Id. at 1311, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690. 
 1779. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690. 
 1780. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1690. 
 1781. 355 F.3d 1327, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
PATENT.OFFTOPRINTER 10/7/2005  12:31 PM 
2005] PATENT SUMMARY 1157 
have required defendant to sell the product below cost and defendant could 
not have raised its prices to account for the royalty because it was “already 
selling the products at a loss.”1782  The Federal Circuit rejected defendant’s 
challenge, explaining that “[t]here is no rule that a royalty be no higher 
than the infringer’s net profit margin.”1783  The Federal Circuit further 
noted that defendant’s evidence “establishes no more than what it might 
have preferred to pay, which is not the test for damages.”1784 
In Monsanto Co. v. Ralph,1785 the Federal Circuit again declined to 
overturn the jury’s award of a reasonable royalty on the ground that 
defendant would not have “negotiate[d} a royalty in excess of [its] 
anticipated profit.”1786  The Federal Circuit explained that “although an 
infringer’s anticipated profit from use of the patented invention is ‘[a]mong 
the factors to be considered in determining’ a reasonable royalty . . . the 
law does not require that an infringer be permitted to make a profit.”1787 
In Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,1788 the Federal Circuit again affirmed 
that upon finding of infringement, a plaintiff is entitled to at least a 
reasonable royalty pursuant to § 284,1789 if such damages are sought.1790  At 
trial, the plaintiff’s expert testified that a reasonable royalty would have 
been fifteen percent, while defendant’s expert testified that such a royalty 
would have been three percent.1791  The district court then entered judgment 
on the jury’s finding that no amount of damages had been proven.1792  In 
reversing this judgment, the Federal Circuit explained that § 284 requires 
that “damages to a successful claimant in a patent infringement suit shall 
not be less than a reasonable royalty.”1793 
3.  Enhanced damages 
In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.,1794 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
                                                          
 1782. Id. at 1338, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489-90. 
 1783. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490 (quoting State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., 
Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1026, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
 1784. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490. 
 1785. 382 F.3d 1374, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1786. Id. at 1384, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522. 
 1787. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Georgia-Pac. 
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 238 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970)). 
 1788. 363 F.3d 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1789. Section 284 provides, in pertinent part, that a court shall award a successful 
claimant “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention.”  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). 
 1790. Norian Corp., 363 F.3d at 1333, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517.  Of course, a 
plaintiff can choose not to plead damages resulting from infringement, and seek only an 
injunction. 
 1791. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. 
 1792. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. 
 1793. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. 
 1794. 382 F.3d 1367, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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the denial of enhanced damages and attorney’s fees explaining that its 
precedent makes “clear that ‘a finding of willful infringement merely 
authorizes, but does not mandate an award of increased damages.’”1795  The 
Federal Circuit also noted that the district court “properly considered the 
various factors relating to attorney fees, including ‘the degree of culpability 
of the infringer, the closeness of the question, [and] litigation behavior.”1796 
4.  Attorney’s fees and costs 
In Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc.,1797 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees to the defendant based on 
plaintiff’s alleged litigation misconduct, explaining that it “decline[s] to 
second-guess the district court’s judgment” because “[t]he district judge is 
in a far better position to assess that matter than we are, and nothing 
presented to us on appeal indicates that the district court’s assessment is so 
clearly flawed as to justify our overturning the district court’s holding on 
that issue.”1798  The Federal Circuit also declined to accept defendant’s 
argument that it was entitled to attorney’s fees based on an inequitable 
conduct theory that was raised solely in the context of a request for 
attorney’s fees.1799  The Federal Circuit explained that based on defendant’s 
“belated raising of the inequitable conduct issue and the exacting standard 
applicable to attorney fee requests, we hold that the district court did not err 
in denying [defendant’s] fee application.”1800 
Inland Steel Co. v. LTV Steel Co.1801 involved an appeal from a denial of 
defendant’s request for attorney fees and costs based on the court’s 
determination that the defendant was not a prevailing party in 
circumstances in which the asserted patent was found invalid during re-
examination before the PTO.1802  The question before the Federal Circuit 
was “whether [defendant] is a ‘prevailing party’ and thus potentially 
eligible for the award of attorney fees and costs.”1803  The Federal Circuit 
first observed that it applies its own law “to define the meaning of 
prevailing party in the context of patent litigation.”1804  The Federal Circuit 
then stated that “to be a prevailing party, one must ‘receive at least some 
                                                          
 1795. Id. at 1373, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388-89 (quoting Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen 
Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 
 1796. Id., 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (quoting Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic 
Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 1797. 382 F.3d 1354, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1798. Id. at 1366, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1354-55. 
 1799. Id. at 1366-67, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355. 
 1800. Id. at 1367, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1355. 
 1801. 364 F.3d 1318, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1472 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1802. Id. at 1319, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1473. 
 1803. Id. at 1319-20, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1474. 
 1804. Id. at 1320, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1474 (quoting Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie 
Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1181, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1707, 1710 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
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relief on the merits,’ which ‘alters . . . the legal relationship of the 
parties.’”1805  The Federal Circuit held that in light of district court entry of 
judgment of non-infringement and dismissal of invalidity counterclaims as 
moot, defendant “is a prevailing party on a claim adjudicated by the district 
court, even though it initially prevailed on the issue of invalidity in a 
different forum.”1806  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit remanded back to 
the district court to determine whether attorney’s fees and costs should be 
awarded given defendant’s status as the prevailing party.1807 
In Power Mosfet Technologies, L.L.C. v. Siemens AG,1808 the Federal 
Circuit held that a party who had all claims asserted against it dismissed 
with prejudice was a prevailing party for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(d)(1).1809  The court explained that it applies its own law to 
determine whether a party is prevailing, and explained that, under its law, a 
“dismissal of a claim with prejudice . . . is a judgment on the merits.” 1810 
Stephens v. Tech International1811 involved an appeal from a district 
court’s grant of attorney’s fees to defendant under § 285.1812  The district 
court based its award on findings that plaintiff’s infringement suit was 
frivolous and in bad faith and its notification of a separate patent 
application constituted litigation misconduct.1813  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit began its analysis by noting that exceptional cases under § 285 
typically involve “inequitable conduct before the PTO, litigation 
misconduct, vexatious and otherwise bad faith litigation, frivolous suit or 
willful infringement.”1814  The Federal Circuit then explained that “[a] 
frivolous infringement suit is one which the patentee knew or, on 
reasonable investigation, should have known was baseless.”1815 
Reviewing the record, the Federal Circuit held that the district court 
erred in concluding that plaintiff’s suit was frivolous.1816  In particular, the 
Federal Circuit reasoned that plaintiff’s theories of claim construction and 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents were consistent with the 
intrinsic evidence, expert testimony, and precedent.1817  The court also held 
                                                          
 1805. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1474 (quoting Former Employees of Motorola Ceramic Prods. 
v. United States, 336 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-05 (2001)). 
 1806. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1474-75. 
 1807. Id. at 1321, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1475. 
 1808. 378 F.3d 1396, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1809. Id. at 1415-16, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 1810. Id. at 1416, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 1811. 393 F.3d 1269, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1812. Id. at 1273, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. 
 1813. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. 
 1814. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. 
 1815. Id. at 1273-74, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372 (quoting Haynes Int’l, Inc. v. Jessup 
Steel Co., 8 F.3d 1573, 1579, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1652, 1657 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 1816. Id. at 1274, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373. 
 1817. Id. at 1274-75, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1373-74. 
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that notifying defendant of pending application was not litigation 
misconduct, but was well within plaintiff’s rights under 35 U.S.C. § 
154.1818 
5. Pre-filing investigation under Rule 11 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens 
Co.1819 relaxed the standard for a pre-filing investigation from the court’s 
prior decision in View Engineering Inc. v. Robotic Vision Systems, Inc.1820  
Q-Pharma involved an appeal from a district court’s denial of Rule 111821 
sanctions and attorney’s fees after plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its claim 
of infringement and agreed not to sue defendant in the future for 
infringement of the asserted patent.1822  On appeal, defendant argued that 
the district court abused its discretion by failing to award sanctions given 
that plaintiff’s pre-suit claim construction was frivolous, plaintiff’s reliance 
on defendant’s advertisements were not reasonable, and that plaintiff did 
not take reasonable steps to test the accused product to determine whether 
it was infringing.1823 
Holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, the Federal 
Circuit explained that “[i]n the context of patent infringement actions, we 
have interpreted Rule 11 to require, at a minimum, that an attorney 
interpret the asserted patent claims and compare the accused device with 
those claims before filing a claim alleging infringement.”1824  Attempting to 
demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by failing to levy 
sanctions, defendant first argued that plaintiff never possessed a formal pre-
filing claim chart.1825  Rejecting this argument, the Federal Circuit 
explained that “a claim chart is not a requirement of a pre-filing 
infringement analysis, as the owner, inventor, and/or drafter of a patent 
ought to have a clear idea of what the patent covers without the formality 
of a claim chart.”1826 
The defendant also argued that sanctions were appropriate because 
plaintiff’s pre-filing claim construction analysis was frivolous.1827  The 
Federal Circuit again rejected defendant’s argument, reasoning that claim 
construction is “not always an exact science, and it is not unusual for the 
parties to offer competing definitions of even the simplest claim 
                                                          
 1818. Id. at 1276, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 1819. 360 F.3d 1295, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 1820. 208 F.3d 981, 986, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1179, 1183 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 1821. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 1822. Q-Pharma, Inc., 360 F.3d at 1297-98, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002-03. 
 1823. Id. at 1300, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 1824. Id. at 1300-01, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1825. Id. at 1301, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1826. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1827. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
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language.”1828  The court thus concluded that defendant’s pre-filing 
construction was not frivolous because it “followed the standard canons of 
claim construction and was reasonably supported by the intrinsic 
record.”1829 
Defendant next contended that plaintiff’s pre-filing infringement analysis 
was inadequate because it was premised only on plaintiff’s advertising 
statements and did not include actual testing of the physical product.1830  
The Federal Circuit explained that while plaintiff could have conducted a 
more thorough investigation, the reliance on advertising statements and 
product ingredients provided a sufficient basis for filing suit.1831 
Defendant also contended that the suit was frivolous because plaintiff 
should have known that the asserted claims were invalid in light of letters 
from potential licensees questioning their validity.1832  The Federal Circuit 
rejected this contention, observing that plaintiff 
reasonably believed its patent to be valid in light of the statutory 
presumption of validity . . . as well as licenses that several companies 
took under the patent.  The . . . letters from accused infringers 
questioning the validity of the [asserted] patent do not negate 
[defendant’s] legal and factual bases for believing the patent to be 
valid.1833 
The Federal Circuit then distinguished its prior decision in View 
Engineering from the circumstances on appeal.  While explaining that View 
Engineering “makes clear that reliance on advertising as a basis for filing 
an infringement suit is not sufficient under Rule 11,”1834 the court limited 
that decision to its facts by noting that “sanctions were warranted because 
the patentee had not performed any claim construction analysis or an 
infringement analysis prior to filing its counterclaim for infringement.”1835  
By contrast, the court explained that defendant relied on both its claim 
construction analysis and plaintiff’s advertisement information.1836  The 
court further explained that 
our case law makes clear that the key factor in determining whether a 
patentee performed a reasonable pre-filing inquiry is the presence of an 
infringement analysis . . . [a]nd an infringement analysis can simply 
consist of a good faith, informed comparison of the claims of a patent 
                                                          
 1828. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1829. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1830. Id. at 1301-02, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005. 
 1831. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005-06. 
 1832. Id. at 1303, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 1833. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 1834. Id. at 1302, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 1835. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 1836. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
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against the accused subject matter.1837 
Defendant also argued that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying attorney’s fees.1838  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s denial based on the same reasoning as it affirmed the court’s denial 
of sanctions.1839  The Federal Circuit further reasoned that attorney’s fees 
were properly denied because “we fail to see how a changed legal theory 
that leads to the voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit can amount to bad faith 
litigation.”1840 
                                                          
 1837. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006. 
 1838. Id. at 1303, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 1839. Id. at 1304, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
 1840. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007. 
